THE ONTOLOGY OF AUTHENTICITY IN JOHN FOWLES'S NOVELS

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To Fulya and Yusuf

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ABSTRACT

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This study is concerned with the ontological analysis of the authenticity of existence in the works of John Fowles. The concept of authenticity in the ontological-existential sense has its most suggestive reverberations in the selected three novels of Fowles—The Magus, The French Lieutenant's Woman, and A Maggot. These novels portray individual characters, all male, being stranded upon the edges of their existential awakening, with the equal chances of attaining or failing to attain a substantial degree of autonomy at the cost of losing their various possessions. In contrast to the common scholarly tendency to apply the existentialist philosophy of Sartre in making statements about the degrees of authenticity of the characters in Fowles's fiction, this study instead proposes that the authenticity should be investigated as an ontological issue—an issue of being, just as Heidegger did when he wrote his seminal work Being and Time. Thus, this study aims to explain ontologically how and why Nicholas in The Magus remains in a state of uncertainty about his future chances of choosing his own self over a multiplicity of selves fictionally created in the godgames of Conchis; how and why Charles in The French Lieutenant's Woman moves much closer than Nicholas to the possibility of substituting his Victorian self with the upcoming twentieth-century existentialist self; and finally, how and why Ayscough in A Maggot fails to see the authenticity of Lee's self and the genuineness of her own interpretation of the circumstances about the mysterious discovery of a dead body and the untraceable loss of somebody else.

Key Words: John Fowles, Martin Heidegger, authenticity, existentialism, ontology

ÖZET

JOHN FOWLES'UN ROMANLARINDA KENDİNE ÖZGÜLÜĞÜN ONTOLOJİSİ

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Bu çalışma, John Fowles'un eserlerinde varoluşun kendine özgülüğüne dair ontolojik açıdan yapılan incelemeyi konu edinmektedir. Ontolojik anlamıyla kendine özgülük kavramı Fowles'un seçilen şu üç romanında en belirgin yansımalarını barındırmaktadır—Büyücü, Fransız Teğmenin Kadını, ve Yaratık. Bu romanlar tümü erkek olan bireysel karakterleri varoluşsal uyanışlarının kıyısında adeta sahile vurmuş bir halde resmetmektedir. Bu karakterlere sahip oldukları çeşitli şeyleri kaybetme pahasına önemli bir oranda otonomi kazanmayı başarabilme ya da başaramama hususlarında eşit şanslar tanınmıştır. Fowles'un kurgu eserlerinde karakterlerin kendine özgü olma dereceleri ile ilgili yargılarda bulunurken Sartre'ın varoluşçu felsefesini kullanan ve genel-geçerlik kazanan akademik eğilimin aksine, bu çalışma, en önemli eserlerinin başında gelen Varlık ve Zaman'ı yazarken Heidegger'in de yaptığı gibi, kendine özgülüğün ontolojik bir mesele olarak incelenmesi gerektiğini önermektedir. Bundan dolayı, bu çalışma ontolojik açıdan şunları incelemeyi hedeflemektedir: nasıl ve neden Büyücü'de Nicholas, Conchis'in oyunlarında kurgusal olarak yaratılmış olan benliklerden ziyade kendi benliğini seçme noktasında gelecekte yapacağı seçimle ilgili bir belirsizlik durumunda kalmaktadır; yine benzer bir şekilde, nasıl ve neden Nicholas'la kıyaslandığında, Fransız Teğmenin Kadını'nda, Viktoryen benliğini içinde bulunduğu zamana göre henüz gelmekte olan yirminci yüzyılın varoluşçu benliğiyle değiştirme hususunda yapacağı seçime Charles daha yakın durmaktadır; ve son olarak yine aynı şekilde, nasıl ve neden Yaratık'ta Ayscough, Lee'nin kendine özgülüğünü ve dahası, ölü bir cesedin gizemli bir şekilde bulunmasının ve bir başkasının da izi sürülemeyecek şekilde ortadan kaybolmasının ardındaki olayları yorumlayışında kendini belli eden özgünlüğünü görememektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: John Fowles, Martin Heidegger, kendine özgülük, varoluşçuluk, ontoloji

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INTRODUCTION

Written over a period of almost a quarter of a century in the second half of the twentieth century, the fiction of John Fowles as a whole seems to have its locus hidden in his placement of the focus on the gaining of "whole sight" as the prerequisite to avoid "desolation" in every sense of the word (Fowles, 2004a: 7). The absence of access to light and its consequent misery appear to form the backbone of his works of fiction in which a variety of characters are repeatedly depicted as figures coming from nowhere and thrown in a state of persistent ambiguity. More significantly, this has long been the benchmark for a vast array of critical readings of his fiction. This study similarly aims to insert itself in this group of critical readings, albeit with a newer focus placed upon the examination of a selection of Fowles's fiction in the light of German philosopher Martin Heidegger's views concerning the ontological clues of authenticity. The overall objective of this study is to consult Heidegger about the assessment of the prospects of major characters gaining the whole sight—or, to use an alternative expression, their prospects of achieving the authenticity of existence—in the selected novels of Fowles.

An essayist, a translator, a poet, and a short-story writer, the true fame of John Fowles (1926 – 2005) lies in the scholarly acknowledgement of him as one of the leading contemporary British novelists. He was born in Leigh-on-Sea, Essex. Following his military service as a lieutenant in the Royal Marines from 1945 to 1947, he began to study French at Oxford University. After earning his Bachelor's degree, he taught English first in France, then in Greece and finally in England. While he was in Greece,

he met his first wife, Elizabeth, who died of cancer in 1990. Upon their return to England, they lived for a short term in London. He lived in Lyme Regis, Dorset, for the rest of his life after he had moved there from London in 1966.

His career as a full-time novelist began with the publication of The Collector in 1963, and it extended as far as to the mid-1980s. Within a timespan of almost a quarter of the century, Fowles wrote six novels and one collection of stories. The publication of The Collector in 1963 was followed by the publication of the first edition of The Magus in 1965. When The French Lieutenant's Woman was published in 1969, Fowles won the Silver Pen Award and subsequently the W. H. Smith and Son Literary award in 1970. His collection of stories, The Ebony Tower, was published in 1974. Three years later, in 1977, both Daniel Martin came out and The Magus was re-published in its revised edition. In the next few years, Fowles wrote and published two more novels: Mantissa and A Maggot. Although his career as a novelist was continued with the publication of Mantissa in 1982, he had had to end it with the publication of his final novel, A Maggot, in 1985, because of a stroke he suffered in 1988. The publications of the three of his novels—The Collector, The Magus, and The French Lieutenant's Woman—were followed by their adaptations for cinema. The screen adaptation of The Collector was released in 1965, The Magus in 1968, and The French Lieutenant's Woman in 1981.

After the stroke, he could publish only works of non-fiction. The stroke left him without sufficient imaginative power to continue writing more fiction. His later attempts to keep writing fiction were all left either unfinished or unfulfilled. He could come up with only one more work of non-fiction just a decade later in 1988. The Aristos marks Fowles's first work of non-fiction which was published first in 1964 and subsequently in 1968 in a revised edition. It was followed by The Tree which came out in 1979. The appearance of The Wormholes – Essays and Occasional Writings in 1998 was continued with the subsequent publications of his journals in two volumes. While the first volume of The Journals was published only two years before he died in 2005, the second volume was published posthumously in 2006.

The Collector tells the story of an abduction in which Miranda, an art student, falls victim to the obsession of Frederick, an uneducated collector of butterflies, who neurotically believes that he can randomly pick a girl and force her to love him. His obsession, however, leads to the death of the girl in the end. In The Collector, Fowles presents the series of events leading to the death of the girl from both angles, leaving the reader free to choose which version to trust. While the intricate mixture of reality and illusion in The Magus, a game-oriented novel which consists of a series of ordeals, brings the narrative to an unsettled conclusion, the narrative is similarly brought to a multiple ending in The French Lieutenant's Woman as well, in which the portrayal of the Victorian romance between two lovers combines with an elegant form of postmodern narration. The French Lieutenant's Woman enables Fowles to compare most effectively "past and present in order to understand one by the other" (Brantlinger, Adam, & Rothblatt, 1972: 348). Initially planned to bear 'Variations' as its title, The Ebony Tower contains a collection of stories, one of which is Fowles's own translation of a medieval French story, titled "Eliduc". Fowles wrote Daniel Martin as a semiautobiographical novel while he was in his forties. The novel is about a man in his forties who wishes to write his autobiographical story. Daniel Martin is commonly considered as the only novel which Fowles concluded with a relatively happier ending, shifting much more manifestly than ever his focus away from existentialism to humanism. In Daniel Martin, Fowles uses a serpentine narrative technique, not only shifting the points of view but also going back and forward continuously in the narrative time. An Oxford graduate, Daniel is an English man living in the United States and pursuing a film career in Hollywood. The novel casts him as someone stuck in between—unable to constitute himself as either an English man or an American. Mantissa hosts a fictional representation of what takes place in the mind of Miles Green who finds himself taken mysteriously to a hospital, without the slightest idea of how he got there, who he is, and who his wife and children are. In Mantissa, Dr. Delfie, the fictional creation of the mind of Miles Green, is seen to assume subjectivity in her arguments with and reactions against her creator in a long discussion of theirs about writing and literature, among many other things. Fowles goes back to the early 18th century in A Maggot, a novel that begins with a mental image of five travellers riding through the countryside for a secretive purpose. The narrative is broken off with the news of the discovery of a hanging corpse with violets stuffed in its mouth—the corpse of Dick Thurlow—and the disappearance of his master, Mr Bartholomew. The ensuing

launch of a series of exhaustive ‘examinations and depositions’ of several characters falls short of reaching a satisfying conclusion, since they all leave the investigator, Henry Ayscough, helpless in the labyrinth of interpretation.

Taken as a whole, Fowles’ fiction is generally considered to be among the finest examples of postmodern British literature, and has in time won him fame as a novelist whose fiction resembles “a huge protean amusement park” where “illusion becomes reality rather than vice versa” (Palmer, 1974: 1-2). Considered technically, his fiction qualifies as postmodern because it evinces the postmodern mixture of self-reflexivity, intertextuality, and historiography. The historiographic aspect of Fowles’s novels such as The French Lieutenant’s Woman, Daniel Martin and A Maggot tends to manifest itself as “the interpenetrating or telescoping of past and present” (Cooper, 1991: 105). The way in which Fowles handles the past in his novels generally is regarded as the reflection of a “desire to colonize the past as a playground of authorial narcissism” (139). What is more, many of his novels attest to his metafictional manipulation of the working mechanism of fiction through his occasional narratorial entries into his own narrative—something intended both to provide his own commentaries on the action, the characters and the plot on the one hand, and to compare his own world to the worlds of his fiction on the other. Palmer (1974) comments upon the metafictional dimension of Fowles’s fiction in terms in which he describes Fowles as “a novelist writing into a mirror so that each of his works reflects back upon his own mind and vision” (3). It is particularly The French Lieutenant’s Woman, Daniel Martin, Mantissa and A Maggot where the self-reflexive tendency of the postmodern fiction “to exhibit its textuality, to signal and display its fictional nature” becomes all the more apparent (104). Thematically speaking, however, the description of Fowles as a novelist of ideas finds its possibly best confirmation in the intellectual familiarity that he had developed as a student at Oxford in the 1940s and the 1950s with both the French existentialism and the French literature. Therefore, Fowles’s fiction as a whole emerges as “an embodiment of freedom, of individuality, and of existentialism” (Salami, 1992: 13). As Fowles himself pointed out in one of his interviews, the abovementioned familiarity afterwards led him to take on the profession of writing fiction with a major view towards examining the chances of his characters attaining existential freedom and authenticity in various fictional environments which are remote either in time from the moment of writing, as in his quasi-historical novels The French Lieutenant’s Woman

and A Maggot, or distant in place from the location of writing, as in his autobiographical novels The Magus and Daniel Martin:

> I'm interested in the side of existentialism which deals with freedom: the business of whether we do have freedom, whether we do have free will, to what extent you can change your life, choose yourself, and all the rest of it. Most of my characters have been involved in this Sartrian concept of authenticity and inauthenticity. (Campbell and Fowles, 1976: 466)

The evolution of Nicholas in The Magus as the possessor of "selfish passions" into Rebecca Lee in A Maggot as the embodiment of "other-directed compassion" emerges as the thread which appears to most effectively bind all his fiction together in a manner in which Fowles "tells and retells the story of what it means to be human and live authentically in a postmodern world" (Vipond, 1999: xiii). His fiction can be taken as the written expression of his "obsession" with the relentless exploration of not only newer ways of writing but also with the extent of freedom in human life, the role of hazard, or chance, as a causative force in human existence, the possibility of grasping the opportunity to grow to an existential maturity, the existential quest for self-knowledge and self-discovery, and the confusion of the line between fiction and reality (Fowles, 1970: 41).

Of all his fiction, the three novels in particular—The Magus, The French Lieutenant's Woman, and A Maggot—appear to exemplify his abovementioned obsession with maximum accuracy. To begin with, the original impetus for these three novels has always been an image. In fact, Fowles described himself in his interview with Baker (1989) as a writer grossly attracted by the "image-constituted kernels of a story" (15). The kernel of the story has become an image of a villa in The Magus, an image of a woman in The French Lieutenant's Woman, and an image of travellers on horseback in A Maggot. Moreover, these novels can be regarded as an amalgamation of various structural forms functioning all at the same time. As Hutcheon (1978) suggests, The French Lieutenant's Woman emerges as the novel which beautifully embodies "the combined use of allegory, parody, self-mirroring structures, and overt commentary" (81). In a similar manner, she continues to suggest that The Magus effectively appropriates the use of various forms, including "the *Bildungsroman*, the gothic tale, the

masque, psychodrama and fantasy" (84). Moreover, one of the main concerns of Fowles's fiction is to depict certain characters in a state of failure to solve puzzles—whether built naturally as in A Maggot or built artificially as in The Magus or embodied in the personification of a character, namely Sarah Woodruff, as in The French Lieutenant's Woman—whereas they relentlessly delude themselves that they will eventually grow abler to make it through. One other point commonly shared by these three novels is related to the absence of a home and a family of the main characters. The characters directly influenced by this kind of separation from home and family include Nicholas Urfe in The Magus, Sarah Woodruff in The French Lieutenant's Woman, and Rebecca Hocknell and Mr Bartholomew in A Maggot. The impact of the absence of homes and families on the main characters is further strengthened by Fowles's choice of specific settings which may be foreign as in The Magus, or a remote small village as in A Maggot, or a countryside on the coastal town of Lyme Regis as in The French Lieutenant's Woman. It is especially The Magus which hosts a fictional world where the reality is deliberately subordinated to the fiction. As the story unfolds, Nicholas Urfe grows aware of the need to understand the working mechanism of the fictional world which he cannot evade in any way. In each case, the main characters are introduced into the narratives as uprooted figures, finding themselves in places far away from their homes, either spatially or temporally. As Palmer (1974) suggests, the introduction of the central characters as uprooted figures into the narratives often takes place "suddenly" and "irrationally" (79). Besides, Fowles's fiction is commonly acknowledged as the fiction of growth and maturity in the existential terms. In fact, the possibility of the existential growth of the characters forms the thematic core of Fowles's fiction. In Palmer's (1974) words, the thematic scheme of Fowles's fiction "dramatizes the struggles of individuals to define themselves and to make moral decisions about the conduct of their lives in worlds which discourage self-expression and deny existential freedom" (78). Palmer also suggests that the existential growth implies "the loneliness of selfhood" which the central characters of Fowles's fiction experience in one way or another (79). Moreover, it should be noted that the existential growth often emerges as a response to a female call. In her analysis of the fiction of John Fowles, Onega (1996) refers to it as "the single archetypal topos of the hero's quest for maturation," frequently propagated by a female temptation (40). In each of the three novels, women come to the fore as "the stimulus of mystery" (Sweeney, 1983: 107). These three novels attest to a female impulse which pushes or tempts a male figure to a state of maturity, followed by

an initial state of bewilderment which arises from being exposed to a series of mysterious events or from being introduced to an enigmatic figure. The major male characters in these novels, namely Nicholas Urfe in The Magus, Charles Smithson in The French Lieutenant's Woman and Henry Ayscough in A Maggot, are somehow brought face to face with an enigmatic figure or with a mysterious event which they erroneously believe that they can solve. The authorial decision to construct the narrative around a mystery or an enigmatic figure in each novel appears to stem from his belief that "unknowing, or hazard, is as vital to man as water" (Fowles, 1993: 27). These common characteristics of Fowles's selected three novels can accurately manifest that they are fundamentally interwoven with existential themes.

The proposition that "the postmodern imagination … is an existential imagination" can perhaps find its best verification in John Fowles's fiction (Spanos, 1972: 148). Fowles (1993) attaches particular significance to existentialism, because existentialism—as Fowles has tended to understand it—is an issue of individuation in the exact sense of the word. For him, the real locus of existentialism lies in "the revolt of the individual against all those systems of thought, theories of psychology, and social and political pressures that attempt to rob him of his individuality". The relation of existentialism to his selected three novels may perhaps be better illustrated in his description of the function of existentialism as an attempt "to re-establish in the individual a sense of his own uniqueness," as in the personalities of Rebecca Hocknell Lee in A Maggot and Sarah Woodruff in The French Lieutenant's Woman; "a knowledge of the value of anxiety as an antidote to intellectual complacency (petrification)," as in the personalities of both Charles Smithson in The French Lieutenant's Woman and Henry Ayscough in A Maggot; and "a realization of the need he has to learn to choose and control his own life," as in the personalities of Nicholas Urfe in The Magus and Charles Smithson in The French Lieutenant's Woman (122).

Much of the scholarly criticism has addressed and still continues to address the abovementioned themes in the fiction of Fowles from the perspective of French existentialism solely, particularly through the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. In a similar manner, this study also aims to contribute to the available criticism of Fowles and his fiction by analysing his selected three novels from the general perspective of

existentialism. The specific matter of subject is one and the same in each analysis of the three novels: the existential modes of authenticity vs. inauthenticity. 'Which characters in each of these three novels can be regarded as authentic in existentialist terms and which cannot?' and 'what makes certain characters emerge as existentially authentic and others inauthentic?' are the few questions, among many others, which will be focused upon in each analysis. The need for this study, however, has arisen from (a) the realization that authenticity and inauthenticity form the two of the major concepts of existentialism which Martin Heidegger discussed in his Being and Time (1927) years before Sartre did it in his Being and Nothingness (1943); (b) the absence of any scholarly work which discusses these two concepts in the fiction of Fowles from the Heideggerian perspective; (c) the suggestion shared by the scholars like Warnock (1970), Palmer (1976) and Spanos (1976) that it is the existentialism of Heidegger, rather than that of Sartre, which best connects itself to the postmodernist writing through its later adaptation by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida for his development of the theory of deconstruction in the late 1960s—something which can be pinpointed in the fact that Heidegger's ontological treatise in Being and Time starts with the avowed aim of destructing the traditional western metaphysics in the first place.

It is without a doubt that Fowles's fiction accurately attests to his postmodernity. Heidegger has also been classified as a philosopher with a postmodern orientation. According to people like Palmer (1976), the postmodernity of Heidegger can be demonstrated in his introduction of "a new interpretive self-awareness" when an analytical interaction with a literary text is underway (413). In tandem with the argued novelty of the postmodern interpretive self-awareness of the Heideggerian ontology, the genuineness of this study lies in its interpretive approach: the present study suggests that the question of existential authenticity vs. inauthenticity in Fowles's fiction can be handled from a distinct viewpoint, which is based upon the ontological interpretation of human existence in its authentic and inauthentic modes which Martin Heidegger has investigated and presented at length in his Being and Time.

Aside from the Introduction and the Conclusion, the present study has been structured into four body chapters. The chapter on the theoretical framework of this study, Chapter One, covers in its first part an overview of the historical development of

existentialism as a philosophical movement, and the contributions of major existentialist philosophers to it; in its second part, it moves on to express the basic assumptions of Martin Heidegger in his Being and Time about the ontology of human existence in its authentic and inauthentic possibilities. Each of the next three chapters has been devoted to one of the three novels of Fowles listed in the chronological order of publication. The chapter on The Magus, Chapter Two, discusses the relation of the novel to the existential possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity in its first part, while the second part investigates The Magus from the ontological perspectives of Being-in-the-world, thrownness, falling, and understanding. The existential evolution of Charles into someone with an authentic sense of the self is brought under the spotlight in the chapter on The French Lieutenant's Woman, Chapter Three, in relation to the ontological concept of anxiety. The discussion in the chapter on A Maggot, Chapter Four, is closely linked to the ontological concepts of interpretation and understanding, and is centred around the inability of Henry Ayscough to develop a genuine sense of direction to go out of the maze which he finds himself drifted to by the puzzlement of depositions. The Conclusion covers the final evaluative thoughts about the congruence between the planned outcome of the study and the actual one it has.

These introductory notes on Fowles, his fiction, and his philosophical attachment to existentialism are continued in more detail in the next chapter with further notes on existentialism as a philosophical movement in general, and on its combination with the phenomenology and ontology of Heidegger in particular.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXISTENTIALISM AND HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to supply a theoretical framework within which the whole remainder of this study will be contextualized. Since this study has been oriented towards the exploration of Fowles's fiction as well as towards the search for ontological clues about the existential circumstances in which the authenticities of the characters are shaped, it appears necessary that existentialism should be introduced as a philosophical movement in the first place, followed by the introduction of Heidegger's ontological outlook on the conditions of existential authenticity in the second place.

1.1. Existentialism and Major Existentialist Philosophers

Existentialism provides the general framework within which the present study questions the two modes of authenticity and inauthenticity and seeks for answers to them. To begin with its definition, it can be broadly defined as the philosophy of existence—a philosophical movement which emerged in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century (Tillich, 1944: 44). It is especially the years of turmoil in the first half of the twentieth century that raised it to the level of a highly philosophical movement which became the voice of millions across Europe in general for their

demand to get free. It is, however, particularly France where existentialism reached its zenith with the publication of Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness in 1943. Among the best-known representatives of existentialism can be cited Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. As Tillich points out, the discussion of the relationship between essence and existence forms the starting point of the existential philosophy (44). Aside from the relationship between essence and existence, it also covers the discussions of the following notions: possibility and actuality, estrangement, time and temporality, death, finitude, subjectivity and objectivity, truth and reality, loneliness, etc. From Kierkegaard onwards all the way down to Sartre, existentialists commonly proposed that human existence is essentially distinct from the existence of objects or animals. The distinction lies in the human capacity for choosing—or, to put it more specifically, in the human freedom to choose. In fact, the existentialist emphasis on the human freedom came as a response both to "the 'rational' system of thought and life developed by Western industrial society and its philosophic representatives" and to the resultant destruction of "individual freedom, personal decision and organic community" in the end (Tillich, 66).

In her Existentialism, Mary Warnock (1970) charts the development of existentialism from its birth to its present state. She traces the historical rise of existentialism as far back as Kant, whose ethical theory foregrounds man as "the possessor of a will" (3). Warnock's overall analysis of the major existentialist philosophers reveals that all of them have jointly erased the Cartesian distinction between the mind / the inner and the body / the world (138). Furthermore, she adds that the existentialist methodology relies upon "a perfectly deliberate and intentional use of the concrete as a way of approaching the abstract, the particular as a way of approaching the general" (133). According to her, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the two leading figures of existentialism, came up with their own interpretations of the human existence and its prerogative—the freedom of choice. While Kierkegaard formulated the religious version of existentialism in accordance with Christianity, Nietzsche became far more secular in his handling of existentialism. However, both philosophers agreed with Kant that the source of value of human existence lies in the acts of will (6).

With the emergence of existentialism, terms such as individuality and subjectivity have gained enormous significance. Existentialism essentially proposes that life is largely a consequence of individual responsibility of deciding how to live. It holds that the concepts of right and wrong can change from one person to another. Therefore, the development of existentialism begins with the rise of the philosophical tendency to choose the individual over the community. In Warnock's analysis, this tendency is termed as subjectivity, or the reliance upon individual attempts to develop a response to the domination of an external code of morality, or objectivity. Warnock's analysis includes the definition of objectivity as "the tendency to accept rules governing both behaviour and thought" (8). Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are united in their attack against objectivity as "the enemy of understanding" (13). Warnock notes that for Kierkegaard, the capability of existence required the capability of "devising" one's own way of life (134). Furthermore, both philosophers jointly argue that objectivity is an illusion. This explains the reason why the significance of the freedom of choice lies in the tendencies of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to bring subjectivity to the foreground, send objectivity to the background, and stress the need for inwardness in enabling man to discover the truth for himself.

The most remarkable characteristics of Kierkegaard and his existentialism can be narrowed down to his "passionate, anti-scientific, personal approach to the world" (75). Compared with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche emerges as the first philosophical voice of the call for absolute refusal to accept "the whole doctrine of the universalizability of the moral law" (19). According to Warnock, the significance of Nietzsche consists in his being the first philosopher to express far more firmly than ever been witnessed the disbelief that a purely objective description of phenomena can ever be possible. What gets passed off as the objective truth is in fact a collection of falsified beliefs. The implication of this is that existentialism calls for refusal to believe that moral laws have been designed purely for the benefits of humanity. On the contrary, the Nietzschean thought assumes that man is naturally oriented towards designing his environment in such a way that his institutionalization of moral laws and ethical values allows him to "dominate and manipulate the world" as he wishes (14). At this point, Warnock's commentary on Nietzsche runs as follows:

> The essential truth, as he [Nietzsche] saw it, was that men choose their own values; just as in describing the world they choose those categories of descriptions which seem most useful, which enable them to manipulate the world best, so, still more manifestly, they exercise their will to power in praising and admiring those features of the world which help them to dominate and master their environment. (16)

Warnock further suggests that Existentialism can be considered as "a compound of emotional and intellectual factors" (23). According to her classification, while the thoughts of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche provide the necessary sources to identify the emotional side of existentialism, the intellectual side of it comes from Edmund Husserl and his work on phenomenology which laid the methodological foundation of existentialism. In a sense, it was Husserl who introduced the scientific dimension to existentialism. Moreover, Husserl also strictly defied the Cartesian separation of the mind from the body (69). The basic methodological components of phenomenology include the *epoché*, or the phenomenological reduction, the purpose of which is "to eliminate presuppositions, and to turn experience into 'pure phenomena'" (28). The fundamental purpose of phenomenology is to develop an objective method for studying and describing what is commonly referred to as subjective phenomena: consciousness and experience. In other words, Husserl and his phenomenology were oriented towards explaining the relation between the subject 'I' and "his perceptual and emotional world" (68).

The influence of Husserl and his phenomenology on existentialism can hardly be grasped without an insight into the thoughts of his pupil, Martin Heidegger, and his adaptation of phenomenology. Although Heidegger is commonly regarded as a leading philosopher of the modern existentialist movement, he has never referred to himself as such. What rather connects Heidegger to those existentialist philosophers who preceded him and to those who followed him is essentially his phenomenological interpretation of the Being of beings through his ontological study of the human existence. Therefore, the phenomenology as Heidegger framed it can also be called Existentialist phenomenology.

As Warnock suggests, a profound disagreement which broke out between Heidegger and Husserl in terms of their approach to the purpose of phenomenology led to the emergence of the following differentiation between Husserl's phenomenological

focus on consciousness and Heidegger's use of phenomenology as a means of access to the ontological constitution of the Being of beings (48). The focal point of the existentialism of Heidegger has been described as ontological—or, as an investigation into the meaning of Being of beings. In contrast to Heidegger, Husserl bracketed "all questions concerning existence to achieve greater certainty" in a scientific sense (Schroeder, 2006: 216). To use Werner Brock's (1949) words, Heidegger adopted the phenomenology of Husserl "to analyse the structure of Dasein [the human existence], as it actually is, in its relations to the things in the 'world', non-human and human" (33). To further clarify the point at hand, Heidegger relies upon what he himself calls "hermeneutic phenomenology" as the philosophical method to carry out the investigation in question.

Warnock also suggests that Heidegger should be thought of "as the first philosophical Existentialist, that is, as the first to direct phenomenology into an Existentialist channel" (67). The reason for this is that Heidegger took Husserl's phenomenology and extended it to cover an analysis of the significance of freedom for the possibility of an authentic mode of existence. According to her, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's equation of existence with the future and the possible rather than with the present and the actual, has helped to get the human existence redefined "as a free subject, capable of *doing* things and *initiating changes* in the world" (68).

It would be wrong to treat Heidegger as a philosopher who has been an existentialist per se and has used phenomenology throughout his career. He was an existentialist, as Warnock points out, "albeit one-time and partial" (53). The line of his career shows that in the second half of his career, which started sometime in the early 1940s, his interest gradually has shifted away from phenomenology as the proper philosophical method of study of Being to the investigation into the language of poetry which he believed would eventually provide the necessary link to the understanding of Being. It is therefore important to keep in mind that for the purpose of this present study only the first part of Heidegger's entire philosophical career will be of concern to us.

The choice of subjectivity over objectivity, understood in Kierkegaardian terms as a fundamental existentialist approach towards the interpretation of phenomena on an

individual level, can be extended to Heidegger's concept of *jemeiningkeit*. Warnock prefers to provide the English equivalent of individuality for *jemeiningkeit*. It basically means that with all the future possibilities it offers to me, my existence is wholly my own. In this respect, the fundamental contribution of Heidegger to existentialism can be found in his overall proposition that to exist is basically an issue of possibility on an individual level. Furthermore, he mainly suggests that existence, taken as a matter of possibility, can be either authentic or inauthentic. As will be discussed in more detail in the next pages, these two terms are of crucial importance to his existentialist philosophy. Warnock sums up her understanding of the Heideggerian notion of inauthenticity as a failure "to distinguish ourselves from the mass" (55). She furthermore provides her own definition of authenticity as "a realization of one's position in the world, one's isolation, and one's inevitable orientation towards one's own death" (60). In fact, Heidegger's overall argument for the distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of existence relies heavily upon his discussion of death which has the potentiality to lead to the emergence of intense feelings of dread and anxiety when it is conceived as a point in life in which the possibility of existing will no longer be available. Death is discussed in Heidegger as an instance of nothingness, which is of crucial importance to the possibility of attaining existential authenticity. Warnock introduces to her reader the Heideggerian concept of nothingness in its two senses: nothingness as "a kind of gap or separation" between the human consciousness and the world, and nothingness as the "futility" of the world and its contents (93).

It is without a doubt that Warnock's characterization of Being and Time as one of the major existentialist works which was "aimed at exploring man's place in the world" succinctly sums it up (69). Nevertheless, it would not be misleading to argue more specifically that Heidegger wrote his Being and Time to define the authentic mode of existence and its differentiation from the inauthentic one. Yet, it is obvious that his theory is complicated enough, and because the present study relies heavily upon the exposition of additional concepts of his existential phenomenology, which are in one way or another related with authenticity and inauthenticity, the details will be provided in the following pages, after a brief introduction to the French existentialists—first Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his phenomenology, and then Sartre and his existentialism.

Warnock introduces Merleau-Ponty as the French philosopher who is best known for his work Phenomenology of Perception (72). Warnock defines the focal point of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical writing as consisting in a series of efforts to understand "the relation between consciousness and the world" at all levels conceivable (73). The existentialist emphasis on the subjectivity of perception leads Merleau-Ponty to borrow *Lebenswelt*[1] from Husserl and *Dasein* from Heidegger and to use them together to develop his theory on "my being in the world" in his Phenomenology of Perception (90). The annihilation of the assumption that there exists "an absolute distinction between the perceiving subject and the object perceived" is, according to Warnock, central to Phenomenology of Perception (78). In this respect, Merleau-Ponty presupposes that the understanding of man's place in the world in existential terms requires the understanding of perception as a phenomenological fact.

Despite the visible effects of Husserl and his phenomenology on Merleau-Ponty and his thoughts, the influence of the Husserlian phenomenology on the French existentialist intellectuals begins with Sartre. The significance of Sartre as an existentialist lies in his pioneering work in introducing Husserl and his phenomenology to French philosophers (71). In this respect, the Sartrean existentialism can be termed as more Husserlian, and less Heideggerian.

Sartre put his formulation of existentialism in his seminal work Being and Nothingness. The existentialist philosophy of Sartre embarks upon the distinction between the two modes of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The non-conscious objects, such as stones or shoes, exist in the mode of being-in-itself. Their existence as stones and shoes in the mode of being-in-itself is constant. The mode of being-for-itself is, however, an issue of freedom in the human context. Human beings cannot be thought of as being human beings in the way trees are thought of as being trees. Human beings are distinguished from other beings in terms of their freedom to choose what they wish to become. The mode of being-for-itself becomes a matter of human freedom "when it negates the in-itself and rushes into the future, as when a human subject strives towards

[1] Usually translated from German as lifeworld, *lebenswelt* is used as a technical term in the phenomenology of Husserl to describe "the world of human activity" in which "everyday sociability" is treated as the base of human existence (Macey, 2001: 230). It serves as the starting point of any phenomenological study of other realms of life and human consciousness (Macey, 298).

authenticity by assuming a situation and the possibility of freedom that it affords" (Macey, 2001: 201). The existentialism of Sartre agrees with that of Heidegger that existence is closely related with the discovery of the ways for actualizing the possible, with the concept of nothingness and its resultant feeling of dread—or, anxiety, and with freedom. However, what best distinguishes Sartre from Heidegger is that Sartre defines existence as preceding essence, whereas existence is conceived as equal to the essence itself in Heidegger. According to Warnock, just as nothingness has been an essential component of the Heideggerian existentialism, it has also been crucially significant for understanding Sartre's version of existentialism, which defines man as a Being-for-itself while objects are defined as Beings-in-themselves. Warnock further suggests that in the existentialism of Sartre, nothingness should be considered as an empty space between the consciousness of a human being and the world of unconscious beings which "he aims to fill by his own actions, his thoughts and his perceptions" (94). Warnock's analysis of Sartre and his existentialism ends with her statement that in his later years, Sartre shifted his focus away from Existentialism to Marxism. As she points it out, Sartre viewed Marxism as the dominant philosophy of the twentieth century, while he regarded existentialism as simply "an ideology conceived within its framework" (127).

The Heideggerian concept of inauthenticity finds its counterpart in the notion of Bad Faith in the existentialism of Sartre. In the chapter on Bad Faith in Being and Nothingness, Sartre (1978) puts the utmost emphasis on the constitution of human reality in Bad Faith "as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is" (63). He uses the same argumentation when he points to "the ontological characteristic of the world of bad faith with which the subject surrounds himself" (68). Bad faith is, in this respect, something that denotes self-deception. Bad Faith also bears a close resemblance to falsehood, argues Sartre. However, he draws a fine distinction between the two. He emphasizes that falsehood implies a state in which the truth is hidden from the others, whereas "in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth" (49). Warnock describes the Sartrean theory on Bad Faith as a consequence of the pretence that man has got limited freedom in choosing what to think of and to do in his continual endeavour to avoid the burden of "anguish" which results from his abrupt realization that nothingness is indeed central to the human existence (98). Under the entry of existentialism in The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory, Macey (2001) defines Bad Faith as the self-deceptive choice to refuse to choose at all. Macey's comments on the

Sartrean existentialism further include Sartre's dismissal of the view that Bad Faith can be considered as something excusable (116). While Sartre refuses to offer a way out of Bad Faith, Heidegger suggests in his Being and Time that there are possible ways to achieve authenticity.

To sum up, as Warnock suggests, existentialism, despite its present decline in its appeal to the contemporary man, has essentially been a philosophical attempt to "place man in his context in the world" (125). The contextualisation of man, both spatially and temporally, has been, in other words, the fundamental component of the existentialist movement in the twentieth century. Existentialism has also been the voice of those who jointly felt the need to explore not only the relation between man and his freedom but also his autonomy (132). However, the fact remains that the impact of existentialism as a philosophical movement on us has now been less strongly felt than it used to be in the past. The existentialist movement of the 1950s has been superseded by the movements of structuralism and post-structuralism of the 1970s and 1980s. Strongly disagreeing with the view that Sartre and his existentialism can explain the transition from the 1950s to the 1980s, Warnock instead suggests that the transition in question can rather be explained only through the existentialism of Heidegger, because his focus upon destruction is commonly believed to have inspired Jacques Derrida to theorize his deconstructionism (143).

1.2. Martin Heidegger and His Existential Ontology

Heidegger's existentialism is built upon his own phenomenological investigation of the ontology of human existence. His existentialism is methodologically both phenomenological and ontological. Phenomenology has been briefly introduced above as the science of conscious experience. As for ontology, it can be concisely defined as the philosophical study of being in a systematic manner. The Greek philosopher Aristotle is commonly known as the first philosopher to have studied entities that have being as the subject of a scientific inquiry. In fact, ontology was not the term that Aristotle himself used in his Metaphysics to denote the science of being. Originally, it was First Philosophy that he used as the term to define the science "whose remit is being *qua* being and the things pertaining to that which is *per se*" (1998: 79).

It appears essential to become familiarized with the notion of substance and its significance for the Aristotelian ontology before moving on to the discussion of Heidegger and his ontology. Substance forms the backbone of Aristotle's study of being and the entities that have being which issues from his introduction of classifications earlier in his Categories, where he has catalogued entities according to ten criteria. The list runs as follows: Substance, or the what of something—i.e., man or horse; Quantity, or how large or small something is—i.e., three inches in width; Quality—what sort of thing something is—i.e., black or white; Relation—to what something is related or in what way something is related to something else—i.e., greater or smaller; Place—the where of something—i.e., at school or in the garden; Time—the when of something—i.e., yesterday or tomorrow; Posture or Position—the physical attitude in which something is located—i.e., sitting or standing; State or Condition—the circumstances of something—i.e., armed or unarmed; Action—the function of something—i.e., cuts or burns; and Affection—how something is affected by the action—i.e., is cut or is burnt (1962: 19).

According to Aristotle, substance makes up the principal cause of the being of all other categories. Without it, the others would not even have been conceivable. For this reason, Aristotle considers it of utmost significance for the philosopher to "*gain possession of the principles and causes of substances*" before all else (81). In this respect, one of the major contributions of Metaphysics has been both to define the substance of a thing as its essence and to demonstrate it philosophically. As will be seen in more detail later in this chapter, Aristotle's failure to draw an ontological distinction between the being of human beings and the being of other entities will become the major point of criticism in Heidegger's seminal, yet incomplete work, Being and Time.

In Being and Time, Heidegger (2008) expresses the objective of his treatise as consisting in an ontological attempt "to work out the question of the meaning of *Being*" (1). This question is commonly considered to have been first posed by the Greek philosophers Anaximander and Parmenides, and later by Aristotle. Since then, however, Heidegger argues, it has never ever been raised again as part of a serious philosophical inquiry, possibly because an understanding of it has been erroneously considered as readily available to all of us. It is especially to the Aristotelian way of handling beings

according to their categorical properties that Heidegger's main objection is directed. In view of this, Heidegger appears to be comparing the Pre-Socratic philosophers to those who came after. With this in mind, in his Being and Time, Heidegger aims at granting this long-forgotten question its due place back in the history of the western philosophy. Heidegger therefore intends his treatise to be an attempt to restate the question of Being after initiating "the process of destroying the ontological tradition" of the Western world (49).[2]

Early in his treatise, he draws attention to the distinction between his use of 'being' (*Seiend*) as a term to designate an entity, or a thing, and his use of 'Being' (*Sein*) as a term to describe the way entities are, or they exist. He particularly emphasizes that the Being of entities should not be confused with the entities themselves: "The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity" (26). In other words, the distinction between the two terms, namely ontological and ontical, is stressed right at the beginning of his treatise: while ontological is used as an adjective to describe anything connected with the Being of entities, ontical is rather used in connection with the beings/entities themselves. He further comments upon the difference between the two by arguing that the prospects of understanding something which is ontically closest to us are, in fact, ontologically farthest from us (69).

He also warns against taking entities as the starting point of the ontological endeavour to understand Being, since he rules out the possibility that Being can ever "be 'explained' in terms of entities" (241). This is also the point about which Heidegger has raised his criticism against the Greek philosophers who, he believes, took the ontological study of human existence as something equal to the categorical study of non-human entities. Heidegger instead proposes that the entity which can alone pose the question about the meaning of Being, and which can alone understand Being itself, namely the human being, should be the starting point of any existential-ontological analysis. He makes it clear early on that rather than non-human entities "we are ourselves the entities to be analysed" (67). Hence, he introduces Dasein as a technical

[2] Spanos compares the Heideggerian project of destroying the traditional metaphysics of the Western world to the function of postmodern literature: "Postmodern literature … makes the 'medium' itself the 'message' in the sense that its function is to perform a Heideggerian 'de-struction' of the traditional metaphysical frame of reference, that is, to accomplish the phenomenological reduction of the spatial perspective by formal violence" (1976: 475).

term in order to distinguish the human existence from the existence of non-human entities.

Heidegger postulates that there are two types of non-human entities. The first type of them covers those which are available out there by nature: whose existence does not depend on human beings, such as trees, rivers, water, etc. He uses the term 'present-at-hand'—or, '*vorhanden'* in German—to denote them. The second type refers to the general category of equipment, or utensils, which owe their existence to human beings, or which are made by men to serve a particular purpose, such as desks, pencils, cars, etc. They are termed 'ready-to-hand'—or, '*zuhanden'* in German.

Heidegger draws attention to the essential distinction that he has drawn earlier in his treatise between the following three terms: being as an entity, the Being in general, and the Being of Dasein. According to Heidegger, Dasein is distinguished from other entities in terms of its relationship to its own Being. What characterizes the Being of Dasein is that Dasein is concerned with its Being, and also it has an understanding of its Being. Dasein is concerned with its Being because "Being is an *issue* for it"; and similarly, Dasein can understand Being, because it "*is* ontological" (32). To put it in another way, Heidegger equates Being in general with the Being of Dasein in particular. As Brock suggests in his introductory notes on Being and Time, Dasein is distinguished from other entities, both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, as the only being whose existence is exclusively its own (29). As has been pointed out above, Heidegger's term for this is mineness (*jemeiningkeit*): "Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am" (78). The implication of this is that the whole responsibility of my existence is wholly my own. Additionally, Heidegger attributes the concept of existence/existing solely to Dasein: "*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence*" (67). Brock believes that this allows him to designate the defining characteristics of Dasein as existentiale/existentialia, while he uses the Aristotelian concept of categories, or existentia to refer to the characteristics of other entities, both present-at-hand and ready-to-hand (32). For example, Being-in is an existentiale which exclusively belongs to Dasein as one of its defining characteristics; however, in terms of the things which are either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, Being-in is converted into an existentia, or the category of being inside something else (Heidegger, 82).

Heidegger further suggests that temporality holds the key to his ontological inquiry into the meaning of Being in general as well as to the meaning of the Being of Dasein in particular. He considers time as the phenomenon in which "*the central problematic of all ontology is rooted*" (40). He then expresses his intention to approach Dasein from the perspective of temporality: "The question of the meaning of Being must be carried through by explicating Dasein beforehand in its temporality" (42). Heidegger's major criticism of the ordinary exposition of time is that time has been traditionally interpreted as a sequence of nows—i.e., as being based in the present. As will be discussed in more detail below, he rather proposes that temporality is primarily based in the future.

Before moving on to further details, it should be noted at this point that Heidegger structures his treatise around two parts, although the second part never appears. Similarly, he separates the first part into three divisions, although the third division never comes out. He discusses temporality in Division Two of Part One. Although Division One is titled "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein," it is rather a chapter on the study of Dasein's spatiality. What Heidegger does in Division Two is just a reworking of some of the same concepts that he has introduced in Division One. For instance, he approaches the notion of everydayness from a spatial perspective while he discusses Dasein's existential state of being in the world in Division One; and he does the same thing in Division Two from a temporal perspective as well. Therefore, Division One can and should be considered as a study of "Dasein's *existential spatiality*," while Division Two is devoted to the study of its temporal dimension (83). Heidegger analyses neither time nor space as separate entities; the objective of his analysis is to explain the meaning of occupying a place both in the world and in time in a way which is unique to human beings.

1.2.1. Division One: Dasein's Spatiality as Being-in-the-world

Division One is largely devoted to the discussion of Dasein's basic state of existence in the world. Heidegger calls it Being-in-the-world. The human existence owes its definition to the fact that the world provides necessary space for the actualization of its possibility to *be*. Being-in-the-world is a basic ontological

phenomenon which cannot be broken into further pieces; on the contrary, it must be thought of as a whole: "Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly *whole*" (225).

Heidegger's conception of Dasein's spatiality is closely linked with his ontological investigation of the relationship of Dasein with the entities, existing as either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand in the world. One of the fundamental ontological constituents of Being-in-the-world therefore consists in the fact that human beings are surrounded by various kinds of entities which they use for various purposes. However, Heidegger calls attention to the ontological distinction of the Being-in-the-world of Dasein from the Being-in-the-world of other entities:

> Dasein is essentially not a Being-present-at-hand; and its "Spatiality" cannot signify anything like occurrence at a position in 'world-space', nor can it signify Being-ready-to-hand at some place. Both of these are kinds of Being which belong to entities encountered within-the-world. Dasein, however, is 'in' the world in the sense that it deals with entities encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity. (138)

The spatiality which existentially belongs to man cannot be thought of separately from Being-in-the-world. Heidegger analyses the spatial ontology of Dasein in terms of its closeness to whatever exists around it. Dasein understands its spatial ontology through whatever is near it.

As Being-in-the-world, Dasein is also surrounded by others. The implication of this is that sharing emerges as an essential constituent of human existence, because each individual human being is bound to share the one and the same world with others. In this respect, Heidegger chooses Being-with as a term to designate the existential characteristic of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world. He maintains that even being alone is a mode of being with others, albeit in its deficient mode. The possibility of an escape from the social dimension of human existence is not available. To illustrate this point further, Heidegger differentiates between concern and solicitude: whereas the term "concern" is used to define the relationship of Dasein with tools and equipment, the relationship of Dasein with other Daseins is defined with the term "solicitude" (157). Heidegger believes that in the mode of being with others, solicitude operates

ubiquitously as well as unexceptionally, though deficiently: “Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not ‘mattering’ to one another—these are possible ways of solicitude” (158).

In his examination of the ways in which the Being of Dasein manifests itself, Heidegger places the utmost emphasis upon the concept of what he calls state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*). Brock clarifies it as “the [specific] way in which a Dasein is ‘placed’ in life and in the world” (47). The states-of-mind of Dasein are most easily visible in the moods. To put it in simpler terms, the easiest way to know about others is to examine their moods. Similarly, it is our moods which will disclose us in the most direct way. In this respect, Heidegger believes that moods have the ontological priority over “all cognition and volition” (175). He afterwards analyses one special mood, namely fear, to contrast it with anxiety later in his treatise and to prepare the reader for the examination of the crucial notion of care. In his analysis of the phenomenon of fear, Heidegger briefly suggests that being human is synonymous with being fearful by postulating that fear and fearing are essential to the characterization of the Being of Dasein: “Dasein as Being-in-the-world is ‘fearful’” (182).

One other way in which the Being of Dasein becomes manifest is called understanding (*Verstehen*). Heidegger treats it as a fundamental constituent of the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. In Heidegger’s ontological analysis, understanding mainly implies awareness of a future possibility for the sake of which Dasein exists. In other words, Dasein always understands itself as a possibility—something which makes it a future-oriented phenomenon. In this sense, understanding emerges as something tantamount to projecting: “The understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call ‘*projection*’” (184). In understanding, Dasein gains the capability of assessing the chances of whether it can make a future possibility come true or not. The assessment may turn out to be incorrect from time to time, and consequently it may lead Dasein to miss some of its potentialities; or a correct calculation may award Dasein with the ability to see that they are coming true. Moreover, as an existentiale, understanding may be authentic or inauthentic, depending on the self—the public or the individual—out of which it arises.

In addition to his ontological definition of human existence as the capability of seeing the future as a totality of possibilities, Heidegger continues to suggest that the ontological characteristics of Dasein's Being include interpretation (*Auslegung*) as well. Heidegger states that interpretation is "grounded existentially in understanding" (188). In other words, it should be construed as the outcome of understanding. Heidegger postulates that interpretation is fundamentally centred on the 'as' structure: understanding a particular phenomenon is afterwards followed up by interpretation of the same phenomenon 'as' something. The Being of Dasein manifests itself most noticeably in its interpretations of something 'as' something: "The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the the base of interpretation. In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it *as* a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge…" (189).

Heidegger's analysis of the ontological manifestation of human existence through states-of-mind and through understanding includes one other constitutive element: discourse, or speech (*Rede*). Heidegger regards discourse as "*the existential-ontological foundation of language*" (203). Discourse, Heidegger maintains, allows Dasein to express its Being as Being-in-the-world in a comprehensible way: "Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world" (204).

As has been hinted at previously, at the heart of Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's Being lies the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. The whole treatise can even be boiled down to a philosophical attempt to explain that interpretations of existence, on both levels of space and time, can be authentic or inauthentic. The question regarding authenticity can also be formulated as follows: To what extent does someone's interpretation of existence belong to him, or her?[3]

According to Heidegger, while authenticity signifies the mode of existence which belongs to the self of one's own, inauthenticity refers to the mode of everyday existence which belongs to the self when it is appropriated by the "they" (*Das Man*), or

[3] The German term for authenticity is *eigentlich*. One alternative translation of it is available as "my-ownly*"* in Spanos (1976, 462). One other alternative translation of it is also available as "owned" in Käufer (2013, 342).

the they-self as he calls it.[4] In Section 27 of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses at length the concept of the "they" in relation to Dasein's Being. He defines the "they" as something "which is nothing definite, and which all are" at the same time (164). He treats the 'they' as one of the existential traits of Dasein's Being—i.e., as an existentiale. Furthermore, Dasein's inauthenticity is closely related to its everydayness as well as to its falling—a point which Heidegger discusses in relation to Dasein which "in its very everydayness, *has lost itself*, and, in falling, 'lives' *away from itself*" (223). According to Heidegger, the "they" has "publicness as the kind of Being which belongs to" it and can regulate the mode of inauthentic existence of Dasein in its everydayness (178). Moreover, it "supplies the answer to the question of the '*who'* of everyday Dasein" (166). Heidegger also argues that the authentic Being-one's-Self should not be considered as something entirely "detached" from the concept of the they; on the contrary, he cautions the reader to regard it as "an existentiell modification of the 'they'" (168). In his discussion of the split between the public self and the individual one, Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein tends to choose the one which is most readily available and closest to it—that is, the public self. To use Heidegger's phraseology, for the most part and proximally, in its average Being, Dasein chooses what is most closely available to it. Ontologically, Dasein emerges as the owner of that kind of Being which "understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today" (435).

After describing the ontological constitution of Dasein's Being-in-the-world as consisting in moods, understanding, and discursive speech, Heidegger sets himself the next task of showing Dasein "as it is *proximally and for the most part*—in its average *everydayness*" (37-38). The purpose is to provide a phenomenological demonstration of the Being of Dasein in ways in which it is most closely available to Dasein itself: in its publicly modulated, average, everyday kind of Being. Heidegger points out to three characteristics of this kind of Being: Idle talk (*Gerede*), Curiosity (*Neugier*), and Ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*). As a way of communication, idle talk forms part of the Being of everyday Dasein. Heidegger introduces the concept of idle talk as a modified version of discursive speech. He cautions the reader against taking idle talk as something "disparaging" (211). He rather defines idle talk as "the possibility of

[4] An alternative translation of the German term *Das Man* is available as "one like many" in Brock's notes on Being and Time (45).

understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own" (213). In idle talk, the relationship of Dasein to the world, to the others, and to itself is understood "in a mode of groundless floating" (221). Human beings are fundamentally motivated by their ability to see in their exploration of the environment in which they exist. Curiosity emerges as a modification of this ability. The ontological meaning of curiosity is, according to Heidegger, just to see, regardless of whether the object of sight has been understood genuinely or not. In curiosity, the Being of Dasein is simultaneously "everywhere and nowhere." Ambiguity can thus be described as a state of confusion in which one cannot decide whether one has genuinely understood something or not, because it has been publicly spoken about, or interpreted: "Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not" (217).

The three existential components of the Being of everyday Dasein converge on what Heidegger terms as the combination of falling and thrownness. The basic trait of falling is that it belongs to everydayness. Dasein usually finds it tempting to maintain its existence in the everyday mode of Being. Dasein's ontological constitution as Being-in-the-world thus gains significance as an attractive phenomenon. The relation of Dasein to the world is, Heidegger further suggests, a relation of attraction and fascination: "Proximally and for the most part Dasein is fascinated with its world" (149). Dasein's fascination with its world leads it to experience a fall into the world in the form of "an absorption in Being-with-one-another" (220). Dasein lets itself be absorbed into as well as by what the ontological term 'the they' signifies. Heidegger defines this kind of absorption in the "they" as falling, which "is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein" (220). Falling is further characterized as a "downward plunge […] into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness" (223).

Falling implies an ontological state in which not only a total absorption in the world of daily activities takes places, but also the individual self loses itself and merges into the public self. Heidegger interprets falling as a condition in which Dasein constantly feels tempted to remain, because in falling, Dasein develops a kind of "tranquilizing" attachment to "the supposition of the 'they' that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 'life'" (222). Yet, despite all this, falling precludes Dasein

from discovering authentic ways of gaining access to its innermost potentiality of Being as well. This results in the estrangement of Dasein from itself. To sum up, falling emerges as an ontological phenomenon of daily human existence which we are tempted to lead, because we find consolation in believing that it offers us the comfort of having all the facilities at our own disposal, although this may not be, and probably is not, the case.

Everydayness results in a false interpretation of Dasein as an entity with an ontological condition which is characterized, to use the Heideggerian terminology, as concern: "Everydayness takes Dasein as something ready-to-hand to be concerned with" (336). However, it is 'care' which essentially belongs to the ontological constitution of Dasein: while Dasein is concerned with entities such as equipment, it cares about itself. In other words, everydayness and inauthenticity collaborate in leading to the false attribution of concern to Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein is ontologically defined as care. Heidegger employs 'care' as a term to designate particularly the structure of Dasein's Being-in-the-world: "Dasein's Being reveals itself as *care*" (227).

Care as an existential concept separates the ontology of Dasein from the one which belongs to other entities, because it is only Dasein that takes its Being as an issue. To put it in other words, Dasein cares about its Being in every possible respect. This is the reason why human beings put clothes on, have food, get a job, sleep, and copulate on the one hand, and advance in sciences, write poetry, play chess, and read novels on the other hand. It is also care that explains why we do not simply bump into things or one another when we walk down a street amid a huge crowd or drive on a busy road. The ultimate goal of care is always to maintain the ontological status of an existing human being as affirmative in every respect.

Heidegger believes that the tendency of Dasein to keep itself in a state of falling can be regarded as a sign of "*fleeing*" not only from its own self into the public self but also from authenticity into inauthenticity (229). "In falling," Heidegger posits, "Dasein turns away from itself" (230). Not only is Dasein mostly motivated to remain in the state of falling in which it avoids a confrontation with itself, but also is it usually tempted to favour the public mode of existence. However, Heidegger suggests that there

exists a way in which Dasein may indeed be brought face to face with itself, and be introduced to its own possibility of authentic existentiality. It is anxiety or dread (*Angst*) which can do it.

Heidegger offers anxiety as an alternative to fear. In this respect, both are ontologically treated as types of states-of-mind. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two. While the object of fear is ontical and it covers entities within the world—either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, the object of anxiety is ontological and it covers Being-in-the-world itself: "*That in the face of which one has anxiety* [*das Wovor der Angst*] *is Being-in-the-world as such*" (230). Heidegger regards anxiety as an essential prerequisite for the authenticity of its Being as Being-in-the-world. What anxiety essentially does is to enable Dasein to realize that it has got the freedom of making a choice between authenticity and inauthenticity. Anxiety also helps Dasein to develop its own method of interpretation of the world in which it maintains its Being. Additionally, anxiety "individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world" (232). To sum up, anxiety provides the force with which Dasein is brought back from the state of falling and from "its absorption in the 'world'" (233).

Heidegger relates his discussion of anxiety and its influence on the way in which authenticity is discovered as the ownmost possibility of the individual self to his discussion of care as the ontological definition of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world. The concept of anxiety helps to reveal the ontological definition of care as being comprised of three fundamental components: "existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen" (235). These three terms will be of great importance in the analysis of Division II, where the ontological definition of Dasein as care is discussed in its temporal dimension.

Before Heidegger extends his discussion of the Being of Dasein to cover its temporality, he provides the ontological definition of care as follows: "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)" (237). Later in Being and Time, Heidegger points out the connection between these three fundamental components and the definition of care itself: He connects

existentiality to the ahead-of-itself, facticity to the Being-already-in, and falling to the Being-alongside (293).

In sum, Heidegger explains the spatial ontology of human beings by emphasizing the world as the sole place where they can be. However, the world is not the only defining characteristic of the ontology of human beings. Because care signifies a structural totality of the Being of Dasein, it includes both concern and solicitude; both authenticity and inauthenticity; and both spatiality and temporality. As Taminiaux (2006) also suggests, the combination of spatiality and temporality as a fundamental aspect of human existence is also demonstrable in the construction of the word Dasein. While the 'sein' part of Dasein basically means 'being', the 'Da-' prefix has the double meaning of both 'there' and 'then' (43). All this considered, the notion of time also emerges as an item to be taken into consideration for an ontological analysis of human beings. Hence, the next section covers a brief introduction into the temporality of Dasein.

1.2.2. Division Two: Dasein's Temporality

It should perhaps be noted beforehand that Heidegger left Division Two unfinished, and never went back to and resumed it in a systematic way in his lifetime. Although he afterwards wrote a number of essays regarding the ontological status of human existence, he never finished Being and Time.

What he does in this division is, to put it roughly, to redefine the ontological constitution of care in terms of temporality. In other words, he connects Dasein's spatiality to its temporality through his own definition of care. Before he provides this connection, Heidegger draws a distinction between time and temporality and warns against the possibility of understanding temporality along the lines of understanding time. Rejecting to consider temporality as "an *entity*," he tends to treat time as a being, while he conceives temporality as something which has its own Being (377).

He begins his discussion of Dasein's temporality with an evaluation of death as "a phenomenon of life" (290). He emphasizes that death should be "understood

existentially" (284). The implication of this is twofold: a) as Heidegger points out in his Poetry, Language, Thought, dying, just like existence, belongs solely to Dasein itself: "Only man dies. The animal perishes" (2001: 176). A similar remark is also available in Being and Time, where Heidegger maintains that the death of anything alive, except for the death of a human being, must be ontologically construed as an instance of "perishing"; b) in a similar manner to existence, death is always an individual issue: "Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all" (284). Just as the definition of Dasein's spatiality has been formulated as Being-in-the-world, Dasein's temporality rests upon the formulation of it as Being-towards-death, which is "essentially anxiety" (310). It entails anxiety, because, understood existentially, death is defined as "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" (294).

Heidegger expresses the meaning of his abovementioned definition of death in simpler terms as "the utter nullity of Dasein" (354). Death only marks the point at which Dasein's Being-in-the-world ends. However, the journey of man towards his final destination at death begins as soon as he is born. The future-oriented mode of existence which characterizes the Being of Dasein is the result of what Heidegger ontologically terms as Being-ahead-of-itself. Dasein always projects itself into the future possibilities, argues Heidegger, because it never reaches a state of perfection while it continues to exist: "It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is *constantly something still to be settled*" (279). At this point, Heidegger introduces "not-yet" as the technical expression to denote this constant lack of totality. This might perhaps explain the reason why we, as human beings, never feel that we have done enough in life. Does Dasein ever reach a state of being whole? The answer to this question is, according to Heidegger, affirmative; yet, it reaches its wholeness only in death—a moment when it "loses the Being of its 'there'" (281).

In a similar manner to his categorization of Dasein's spatiality as being either authentic or inauthentic, Heidegger distinguishes between the two modes of existence according to Dasein's interpretation of, or stance on death. Heidegger's argument regarding the inauthenticity of Dasein is that Dasein, in its everydayness which is wholly controlled by the public way of understanding things in general, remains

indifferent to its journey towards its end in death. His argument is based upon Dasein's everyday falling tendency to cover up "its ownmost Being-towards-death" and flee "*in the face* of it" (295). Dasein's "everyday falling evasion *in the face* of death" is regulated by a public interpretation of death as something simply to be feared of, but certainly not to be anxious about (303). The ontological significance of death as a constitutive element of the human existence is covered up in the way in which death is handled and interpreted publicly. The key to the authentic understanding and interpretation of death lies, according to Heidegger, in the notion of anticipation (*vorlaufen*) [5], because it "individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being" (310). Existential authenticity requires that death as a phenomenon of life should not be ignored or forgotten. In this regard, anticipation means that death is never treated as a trifle of life. Rather, it signifies a mode of existence in which death is kept alive in the mind up until the moment it becomes actual.

Heidegger continues his discussion of death with his introduction of three phenomena as the constitutive components of the authentic Being of Dasein: conscience, guilt and resolution. These three phenomena are all interconnected. Those who reject to understand and interpret death as it is commonly understood and interpreted begin to ask themselves whether their life will have been wasted or not by the time the moment of death comes. Stricken by the ensuing feeling of guilt, they seek ways to hear the response of their conscience. Hearing it, they become resolved in their self-oriented journey to authenticity. Heidegger expresses the interconnection of these three phenomena on an ontological level by suggesting that conscience should be understood as "*the call of care*" (322). The call of conscience—something which he describes as "a mode of *discourse*" functions as an appeal to Dasein to rescue itself from the state of having been lost in the public existence (314). Put rather differently, conscience can find a way of speaking to Dasein about the wrongness of its publicly dominated mode of Being, and can thus push Dasein to feel guilty about it. The call of conscience thus indicates that "Dasein is essentially guilty" (353). Being-guilty acts as the force which prompts Dasein to recognize the need to hear the call of conscience properly. Thus, the existential journey of a person towards his or her authenticity begins

[5] An alternative translation of the German word 'vorlaufen' is available as 'running forward in thought' in Brock's analysis of Being and Time.

with the call of his or her conscience to find himself or herself in the first place. In this sense, the call of conscience arises as something which helps Dasein to take upon itself its own authenticity.

Conscience releases its call "*solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent*" (318). What this means is that the Dasein to whom the appeal is made should be able to hear, or else, to discover the possible ways of hearing the call. This is also called hearing the call authentically. Heidegger explains the significance of being able to hear the appeal correctly by referring to it as something which is "tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, to projecting oneself upon one's *ownmost* authentic potentiality for becoming guilty" (333). The call of conscience is, in sum, the call for action. As soon as the call is heard properly, the hearer is prompted to act resolutely towards fulfilling his or her innermost potentiality to be authentically existent. Therefore, the term which Heidegger uses to express the significance of resolution for the authentic mode of Being is "the constancy of the Self" (369). Much of the emphasis is placed upon the need to remain resolved in the projection of the self upon its innermost possibility of authenticity, since authenticity requires a constant resolution to keep the individual Self as safe and secure as possible from the tantalization of the self of the public.

According to Heidegger, the division of time into the moments of past, present and future is representative of the inauthentic and ordinary interpretation of time: "The conceptions of 'future', 'past' and 'Present' have first arisen in terms of the inauthentic way of understanding time" (374). Heidegger instead argues that temporality should be taken as a phenomenon in its entirety. His conception of temporality does not create boundaries between the three moments of time as past, present and future; on the contrary, he considers them as a whole. These moments of time are called 'ecstases' in his own formulation of temporality. Hence, he suggests that the division of time into the moments of past, future and present should be replaced with what he calls "the unity of the ecstases" of temporality. These ecstases are respectively called the future, the character of having been and the Present (377).

The wholeness of Heideggerian temporality issues from his understanding of care. As has been mentioned above, the objective of Heidegger's treatise can be recaptured as an attempt to take his own definition of care in Division One where he discusses spatial ontology and then to reshape it, as it were, according to his own understanding and interpretation of temporality in Division Two. We have seen in the preceding pages that Heidegger's definition of care runs as follows: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). The following provides us with a demonstration of how the ecstases of time as the future, having been and the Present (or, making present) are bound together with this definition of care:

> The "ahead-of-itself" is grounded in the future. In the "Being-already-in…", the character of "having been" is made known. "Being-alongside…" becomes possible in making present. (375)

In opposition to the ordinary understanding of temporality which focuses on the primacy of the present moment, or now, Heidegger's understanding of the authentic temporality starts with the future, continues with having been, and arrives at the present: "*The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future*" (378).

As Heidegger points out, Dasein is distinguished from other entities in terms of its relation to the notion of time. Dasein can measure time by means of natural phenomena such as sunrise and sunset as well as by means of clocks. Heidegger argues that the measurement of time is what makes it publicly available to all of us. It is especially through the use of clocks for the measurement of time that time is counted as an endless collection of nows: "When *time* is *measured*, it is *made public* in such a way that it is encountered on each occasion and at any time for everyone as 'now and now and now'. This time which is 'universally' accessible in clocks is something that we come across as a *present-at-hand multiplicity of* '*nows*'" (470). Furthermore, Heidegger refuses to designate Dasein as an entity which 'ends' at the moment of death or becomes something 'past' after a certain point in time. The Being of Dasein rejects any temporal affiliation with whatever has the character of presence-at-hand or ready-to-hand. For this reason, the Being of Dasein cannot be designated as past when it ceases

to exist. Rather, it gets transformed into "having-been-there" (432).[6] Ending and being past belong to the Being of entities either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand:

> Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having the kind of Being of something still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factical Dasein exists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death. (426)

From the Greeks onwards, time has commonly been regarded as consisting in an infinite sequence of nows. This type of understanding is, Heidegger argues, a defining characteristic of inauthenticity: "For the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of 'nows' which are constantly 'present-at-hand', simultaneously passing away and coming along. Time is understood as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of "nows", as the 'course of time'" (474). In contradistinction to this common understanding of time, however, Heidegger describes the essence of authentic temporality as being "finite" (399). This implies that Dasein is a finite entity. Dasein's existential finitude which starts at its birth and ends at its death is described as a specific movement of stretching. Between these two points in time, namely the birth and the death, Dasein existentially "is stretched along and stretches itself along" (427). This movement of stretching is existentially called the historicality / historizing of Dasein. Additionally, Heidegger's formulation of the authentic temporality is circular: the future of Dasein is described as the coming-back of Dasein back to its own self in the mode of having been. "*As an entity, as futural,"* Dasein *"is equiprimordially in the process of* ***having-been***" (437). The three moments of time are constantly in the process of making up "the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been" (374). The Heideggerian temporality refuses to think of one ecstasis as coming earlier than the other. The three ecstases work in such a way as to allow temporality to temporalize itself (i.e., to make itself understandable) "as a future which makes present in the process of having been" (401).

Though having been left incomplete, Being and Time does nevertheless provide a full definition of care—something which forms the backbone of the whole treatise.

[6] Dasein is literally translated as Being-There. Because the past form of '*sein'* is '*gewesen'*, when no longer existent, Dasein becomes *da-gewesen*, which can be translated as having-been-there.

Through this definition of care, Heidegger has established valuable connections between some major concepts which he has introduced in Being and Time. These connections include the association of existentiality with understanding, both of which are temporally grounded in the future, which corresponds to the 'ahead-of-itself' part of the definition of care; the association of facticity to states-of-mind, or moods, both of which are linked together to the temporal character of having been, which corresponds to the 'Being-already-in' part of the definition of care; and the association of Being-fallen with Being-alongside, both of which are argued to be grounded in the Present.

To sum up, as Brock points out in his reflections on the significance of Being and Time, it should be regarded as a philosophical work which Heidegger intended to be an analysis of Existentiality in the form of "an 'ontological' characteristic of human Dasein," rather than Existence as an "ontic" structure (125). The notes that Macey wrote on Heidegger in his dictionary of critical theory exposes the kernel of what has been written in this chapter up to this point about Being and Time as succinctly as follows:

> The central category of Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time … is Dasein, literally meaning 'being there'. This is a specifically human attribute, and it is contrasted with the being-at-hand (*Vordhandensein*) of things, which are 'at hand' or 'to hand' in that they are there to be used by Dasein. Dasein is the mode of human beings' being (*Seiende*) in the world, and is often described as 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*) in that Dasein is literally cast or thrown into a world of contingency or facticity and must therefore strive towards authenticity rather than fall back (*verfallen*) into the apparent familiarity of the world or the idle chatter that distracts it from the understanding of its situation. … Dasein's mode of being is spatial in that it is thrown into a three-dimensional world, but it is also temporal. Dasein does not exist within time; its being is, rather, time itself. … Dasein is characterized by the fact that it has been in the past and will be in the future. Its temporal horizon is imposed by its finitude or the prospect of ceasing to be: Dasein is being-towards-death. The care (*Sorge*) and anxiety (*Angst*) induced by the prospect of being-towards-death can be overcome only by 'resoluteness' and striving towards authenticity. (2001: 177-178)

As has been previously pointed out in Introduction, in contrast to the existentialism of Sartre, Heidegger's ontological study of human existence in its entirety has been chosen as the theoretical guide to the present study of Fowles's selected novels. The two basic differences between the Sartrean existentialism and the Heideggerian ontology can be used as evidence to support the choice in question. One of them can be located in their contradictory approaches to the same essential question

regarding the relationship between existence and essence. In contrast to the Sartrean view of the essence of human existence as consisting in a void which through existing—or, to use Nicol's (2009) words, through "making committed, responsible choices"—humans gain both the responsibility and the freedom, all at the same time, to fill in in whatever way they wish, the Heideggerian perception of existentialism refuses to regard the essence of human existence as a void to be filled in (107). Furthermore, whereas Sartre suggests that existence comes before essence—i.e., the existential facticity of man is the most critical signifier of the definition of his contextualized presence in the world and it comes before all else, Heidegger rules out a relationship of precedence of this sort between the two, and rather argues that the existence of man is synonymous with the encapsulation of his ontological essence as care and Being-in-the-world.

These major concepts introduced and discussed above have the pivotal role to play in establishing the connection between the Heideggerian ontology of human existence and the analyses of the selected three novels of Fowles. The Heideggerian concept of Being-in-the-world and its derivatives—thrownness and understanding will be the building blocks of an existential exploration of Nicholas Urfe's dilemma between authenticity and inauthenticity in The Magus. The ontological notion of anxiety will facilitate an existential discovery of how the journey to a state of authenticity in The French Lieutenant's Woman begins with the rise of Charles to a solitary figure, freed from all his fears. Interpretation emerges as the key ontological concept which will guide the proposition that despite his initial confidence in his professional powers to do otherwise, Henry Ayscough's eventual failure to solve the mystery in A Maggot is a result of his inauthenticity—i.e., his tendency to make sense of the findings of his investigation in the most common way ever possible.

The Magus tells the story of Nicholas Urfe, an Oxford graduate, who finds himself in a mysterious situation on a Greek island, Phraxos, where he has been appointed to teach English at a private school. Nicholas has difficulty in pinpointing the reality on the island because it has been theatrically created: he faces a reality which is modelled on a fictional paradigm. In this respect, The Magus presents a fictional environment where Nicholas's adventurous journey to the reality is repeatedly barred

from a successful ending. The fictional reality begins to surround Nicholas as he meets Maurice Conchis, who owns a villa called Bourani on the island. As he visits Bourani more frequently, he also meets others, including twin sisters, called June and Julie, and some others, like Hermes and Maria, whom Conchis have employed. It becomes clear later in the novel that Conchis manifests the characteristics of a playwright who assigns particular roles to particular characters in a play: everyone on the island has already been hired by Conchis to play a role under a false identity and with an invented history. In earlier parts of the novel Nicholas hears from Conchis a series of invented stories about his own past, whereas Conchis later replaces them with newer invented stories. Despite being slow, Nicholas gradually realizes that Bourani serves as an isolated site where Conchis has created a personal world of fiction with a group of people whose histories are fabricated and whose identities are false.

Much of the action on the island in The Magus takes place at night. Fowles creates a specific atmosphere in which the presence of light is brought to a minimum, and which impairs Nicholas's ability to see phenomena for what they are. Fowles might be pointing out by the profusion of darkness throughout his novel to the phenomenon of sight as the ontological precondition for seeing. Sight is only possible when there is light. The absence of daylight, however, prevents Nicholas from securing his spatiotemporal totality. It is no wonder that Nicholas appears to grasp only the fragments of the truth about the mysterious events going on and about the people he has met during his stay on the island. The intellectual efforts of Nicholas to find out about the situation in which he earlier found himself at Bourani begin to yield their results after he leaves the island. He is only able to grasp the truth in its totality after he leaves Greece and returns to London, where darkness remains absent for most of the time.

The island in The Magus, Phraxos, has its own spatial characteristics. Life on an island cannot be expected to be the same as that which is lived on a main land, or at sea, or on a mountain. Phraxos represents a small world where Nicholas gains an ontological status which is distinct from, say, the one which he used to have as an Oxford student. Heidegger's theory that human existence is characterized by a certain kind of Being which he defines as Being-in-the-world will be used to describe Nicholas as someone whose existence in Phraxos can be compared to Being-in-the-fiction. Likewise, Phraxos

which functions as the representation of a small world should be kept in mind if Nicholas's existence on it is to be conceived as meaningful and purposeful. Just as Heidegger argues that man is thrown into the world, Fowles also throws Nicholas into a network of relations which exist on Phraxos. Besides, Nicholas cannot help feeling that Bourani holds a mystery from which he cannot evade. He returns to Bourani again and again, both in space and time, even after Conchis and others leave it. His obsession with Bourani can be ontologically explained by Heidegger's remark about Dasein's fascination with its world.

The French Lieutenant's Woman can simply be summed up as a story of unrequited love: although Charles is mysteriously attracted to Sarah, and falls in love with her, she refuses to return his intense feelings of love. Besides being a story of unrequited love, The French Lieutenant's Woman can also be regarded as a novel in which one of the characters, namely Charles, grows mature in thought. Despite her refusal to respond to Charles's love for her, she emerges as a character whose individual struggle for autonomy and independence from anything which otherwise would have bound her to the dictum of her time teaches him a lot. She is seen to be fiercely at war against the influence of her society upon ways in which she seeks possible ways to assert her claim upon her own existence. In this respect, Sarah sets an example to Charles.

Charles grows in maturity from a state of dependence to independence. A closer analysis of the narrative would reveal that the increasing maturity of Charles is a consequence of his success in learning not to fear the public domination of individual existence. He owes his success to his observation of Sarah as someone without fear. In other words, Charles finds in Sarah the inspiration to ignore his fears that his refusal to be a typical Victorian in every possible sense of the word will cost him a lot. Sarah appears to Charles as the emblematic representation of individual autonomy in a period in which the British society has powerfully hovered over the individuals. Charles's decision to follow in the footsteps of Sarah leaves him at an existential state in which he begins to have intense feelings of anxiety. In a sense, Sarah introduces to Charles the pain of detaching himself from the common self of the society.

Fowles ends The French Lieutenant's Woman in two possible ways. In the first one, the narrative is brought a conclusion in which Sarah reveals to Charles her resolution not to marry anyone in an assertive manner. Yet, they do not part. In the second one, Charles meets Sarah, speaks his final words in anger to her, and leaves the room furiously without the slightest hesitation whatsoever. Fowles comments that the significance of the ending, especially the second one, is attributable to a quote from Mathew Arnold's Notebooks (1868) which has been used as an epigraph to the final chapter. The quote reads "True piety is *acting what one knows*". Fowles (2004b) suggests that if uttered by a modern existentialist, the same quote would rather read either "True humanity …" or "True authenticity …," although the intended significance would remain the same (469). This final remark of Fowles's demonstrates that The French Lieutenant's Woman is a novel worthy of an existential analysis. As has been pointed out above, anxiety is one of the fundamental components of authentic existence. With this in mind, the analysis of The French Lieutenant's Woman will incorporate a more detailed account of anxiety and a deeper understanding of its significance for the possibility of authenticity.

A Maggot opens with a prologue where Fowles (1996a) gives a definition of the word 'maggot' itself. He afterwards provides a brief background for the story of his novel. Fowles writes in his prologue that the story begins with a group of "faceless" travellers riding "in a deserted landscape" to an unknown destination (5). This indicates that the travellers do not have a totality of spatial ontology, because neither the author nor the reader knows about where they are coming from and where they are going. In other words, as it is the case with his two other novels, A Maggot also begins with a mystery. Identities of the characters are also not immediately revealed; they remain in the metaphorical shadow of darkness for a while as they are only referred to by such designating words as the older man, the younger man, the girl, and the man in scarlet coat. It is only later in the story that the older man is revealed to be Mr Bartholomew, and the girl Louise, for example. Additionally, A Maggot shares with The Magus the theme of acting. As Maurice Conchis is portrayed as a godlike character who assigns particular roles to particular people under his employment, Mr Bartholomew emerges as a similar character who hires people to act and conceal their true identities.

The story in A Maggot is left incomplete, and it is followed by a long series of interviews conducted by Henry Ayscough with several characters about the mysterious death of Dick, a deaf and mute servant to Mr Bartholomew, and the disappearance of others along with him. Henry Ayscough is lawyer hired by the father of Mr Bartholomew to investigate the mysterious event. Mr Bartholomew's father never appears in the novel; Fowles gives him a presence which is only hinted at in Henry Ayscough's reports. Fowles lets the reader know about this mystery first through a chapter of the historical chronicles and then through a news item in The Western Gazette. The rest of the novel is afterwards composed of the interviews which lead Henry Ayscough, and the reader, to no substantial conclusion in the end. The position of Henry Ayscough is similar to the position of the reader; both have to rely solely on what others have to say about the reason of Dick's death as well as of his companion being missing, despite the fact that each narrative may easily contradict one another. Both Henry Ayscough and the reader have to rely on personal narratives, however modified they may be, to get a more coherent and conclusive version of narrative about Mr Bartholomew and Dick. Just as Henry Ayscough does, the reader alike has to fill in the blanks with bits of contradictory information available to him or her to form a firm opinion as to what actually might have happened.

As has been discussed in the preceding section, interpretation is included as a derivative of understanding in the list of constitutive elements of human existence—regardless of the distinction between its authentic and inauthentic modes. The implication of this is that interpretation can be either personally owned or publicly regulated. The more authentically interpretation can be carried out, the more correct conclusions it can yield. Therefore, interpretation gains significance as a representative act of finding one's way through a jumble, as it allows one to see things as they really are. In this regard, A Maggot draws attention to itself as a novel in which interpretation of various and often contradictory phenomena forces upon the reader a much more cognitive effort than is usually necessary. The analysis of A Maggot from the perspective of Heideggerian phenomenological existentialism suggests that Henry Ayscough's delusional belief in the value judgements of his time and his society brings him to an impasse in his interpretation of the varying accounts of the mysterious death of Dick and the mysterious disappearance of Mr Bartholomew. His failure to make his

interpretation entirely a product of his own—or, to authenticate it, results in his failure to understand as well as to interpret things as they really are.

"The existentialist writer", Palmer (1974) argues, "is most concerned with man's relationship to the world and the way the world controls or influences life" (83). The contextualization of man in the world through existentialism provides the main impetus for a similar contextualization of the central characters of Fowles's novels in their corresponding fictional paradigms. With all this in mind, the pages ahead should be taken in their entirety as a showcase for the appropriacy of the methodology chosen for and employed throughout the whole remainder of the present study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MAGUS: THE AUTHENTICITY OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

This chapter aims at introducing The Magus in its first half, and supplying an ontological interpretation of it on the grounds of existential authenticity in the second half. The available criticism of The Magus suggests that Nicholas fails to achieve a full state of existential authenticity for various reasons such as his propensity to take fiction for reality. The discussion below, however, suggests that his inauthenticity of existence should be accounted for by an analysis of the situation into which he has been fictionally thrown in the ontological terms of Being-in-the-world, falling, thrownness and mineness.

2.1. An Overview of The Magus

The Magus marks Fowles's first attempt at fiction in the mid-1950s. Almost thirty years after the first edition of The Magus came out in 1965, Fowles wrote that the idea for The Magus germinated in his mind shortly after he went to Greece in the winter of 1952 to teach English at a boarding school on the island of Spetsai. His arrival on Spetsai formed "the very genesis, of the as yet unwritten – unimagined indeed – book" (1996b: 60). His experiences in Greece have not only left him with a valuable source for The Magus but also led him to acknowledge the country as one of his homelands (60).

In one of his interviews, Fowles described The Magus as a novel which he began to write while he was “very much under the influence of Kafka” (Campbell and Fowles, 1976: 457). In another interview, he defined the fundamental condition of human existence as a sort of godgame in which “we’re always in contact with a kind of super-Conchis” (Tarbox, 1999: 160). For this reason, the fact that Fowles initially considered “The Godgame” and “The Maze” as the two alternative titles to The Magus is most probably related to freedom as a crucial component of his personal outlook on the human existence consisting of “insoluble mysteries” (1970: 37). Comparing the existential condition of human beings to an entrapment within a labyrinth, Fowles described the reason for writing The Magus as an attempt to prove that “life really is a huge game between us and God, or whatever you choose to take as God” (Reynolds and Noakes, 2003: 13). He further declared that the existential purpose of human life consisted in “the gaining of a sense of freedom” (14). In this regard, through the mouth of Conchis, Fowles allowed the reader to know of his opinion about the equation between freedom and existence: “One exists no more, one is no longer free” (2004c: 437).[7]

Fowles wrote in his “Notes on an Unfinished Novel” that The Magus, like The Collector and The French Lieutenant’s Woman, was a product of imagination which originated from a single image. The single image that pushed Fowles to write The Magus is that of a villa on a Greek island (1990: 149). Set on that island in 1953, The Magus brings Nicholas Urfe face to face with a self-imposed obligation to interpret various mysterious phenomena as they occur around him at a villa on the Greek island of Phraxos[8]. Early in The Magus Nicholas actually refers to his future journey to Greece as a need he has felt for "a new land, a new race, a new language," and most importantly for "a new mystery" (19). As if to satisfy his need, Fowles takes Nicholas on a journey to the Greek island of Phraxos where he has been appointed to teach English at a boarding school, and he lets him fall amid a series of mysterious events which speedily follow one after another, and puts him in an “entrapment in an eccentric sorcerer’s scheme” (Kakutani, 1982: 2).

[7] All further references in this chapter without a specified author and a specified year are to The Magus.
[8] Phraxos is the fictional name Fowles has used for the Greek island of Spetsai. Palmer (1974) tends to regard the island of Phraxos as “a symbol of Nicholas’s interior space” (87).

"The Magus used up all my life for twenty years," Fowles told Reynolds (Reynolds and Noakes, 2003: 11). The implication of this is that The Magus differs from Fowles's other novels in terms of the length of time it took him to get done with writing it. Although Fowles began writing it long before his first novel The Collector was published in 1963, it took him longer than a decade to publish the revised version of The Magus in 1977. Even writing almost twenty years after the revised edition came out, Fowles still expressed his dissatisfaction with it (1996b: 65). The reason why it took him so long is partly because he kept revising The Magus over and over again, and partly because he "wanted to say all sorts of things about life, and it got too complicated" (Campbell and Fowles, 458). To explain the reason for such a long delay metaphorically, it can be said that The Magus for him became an island to which he drifted, whereas The Collector grew to be a product of careful planning and deliberation (Boston, 1969: 2). It can therefore be described as a novel which is, to put it the way Eliot Fremont-Smith did, "magnificent in ambition, supple and gorgeous in execution" (1966: 1).

In passing, it should be noted that Fowles's choice of a Greek island as the setting for the bulk of his novel is also significant because it is related to his view of islands as "a strange, locked world apart" (Reynolds and Noakes, 20). In this respect, Fowles's novels and his fictional characters can be argued to reflect Fowles's own life and his personality. For instance, when Nicholas talks about his Oxford years early in The Magus and lets the reader know about the formation of a small club called Les Hommes Révoltés where he joined discussions about "being and nothingness," he actually acts as the mouthpiece for Fowles (17). Nicholas's isolation can be similarly attributed to Fowles's own "taste for isolation and loneliness" (Boston, 1). The existential meaning of an individual having been situated on an island in a fictional world cannot be expected to differ widely from the feeling of existential loneliness which accompanies the human existence. Being stranded on an island intensifies the largely existentialist feelings of separateness, loneliness and frustration. Palmer (1974) also points out that isolation is given the spatial form of existence on an island as part of the major existential thematic concern of Fowles's fiction (81).

Fowles lets what McSweeney calls “the existential theme of hazard” play the central part in the organization of events which encompasses Nicholas (1983: 124). In a similar vein, Hill explores the notion of hazard, or chance, in connection with the notion of play in Fowles’s fiction. According to his argument, Fowles’s introduction of hazard and play as the two intertwined notions into his fiction which tend to challenge the godlike authority figures is intended to foreground hazard as “man’s ally, defining the sense of mystery which is vital to him” (1980: 216). The significance of hazard becomes clearer in the response Nicholas receives to his question as to why he has been picked on in the first place. The response to his question teaches him the rule that “the basic principle of life is hazard” (627).

In addition to hazard as an existentialist concept underpinning The Magus, the novel is also “a fanciful and mystical excursion into the realm of myth and illusion” (Gussow, 1977: 1). In a similar manner, Hussey prefers to describe it as "the timeless 'domaine' of incipient myth" (1983: 20). After Nicholas steps into the fictionalized world of Conchis who defines himself as "psychic," and after he joins Conchis’s entourage, the mystery instantly takes him over, leaving him stranded at Bourani[9] until Conchis allows him to retreat at intervals back to his daily life at school (100). The psychic characteristic of Conchis might explain the reason why scholars like Lenz tend to describe The Magus as “a radically disorienting, exciting, and disturbing psychodrama” (2008: 75).

In The Magus which hosts myth and mystery as its fundamental building blocks, Fowles tends to make use of ‘mystery’ in a double manner: one is profane and the other is sacred. His use of mystery “in the sacred sense” makes it emerge as “the deeply symbolic aspect of experience, often conceptualized through myth;” and his use of mystery “in the profane sense” causes it to be treated as “a ‘mystery’ story” (Rubenstein and Fowles, 1975: 329). As Nicholas remarks somewhere in The Magus, he is in a myth which he can’t understand; however, he feels that he has to understand it; and he admits the paradoxical conclusion that “understanding it meant it must continue” (381). In this respect, the godgame in The Magus draws attention to itself as a case of perpetual disenchantment. The real enemy against which Nicholas has to arm himself is the

[9] The meaning of Bourani is specified as “skull” in Palmer (1974: 88).

psychological impact of being relentlessly unable to break the spell of disenchantments induced by the godgame of Conchis rather than Conchis himself. On the one hand, his attraction to Bourani grows stronger as he is allowed to go deeper and deeper into the mystery; on the other hand, his patience to fully grasp what is happening around himself grows thinner and thinner:

> Fowles seems to have thought it essential to his existential beliefs in hazard and the absence of certainty in human existence to have Urfe undergo an endless succession of deceptions and frustrations in his attempts to understand what is happening to him. (McSweeney, 126)

As McSweeney also points out, "one's perception of reality" constitutes "one's phenomenological world" as well (110). In this regard, Nicholas cannot be argued to be successful in constructing his phenomenological world in his own way until he returns to London. Fowles does not tend to allow Nicholas to feel safe in his own phenomenological world because his perception of reality on Phraxos suffers a continuous distortion as he is constantly "teased, fooled, lied to, and in one way or another seduced by Conchis and his minions" (Pritchard, 1978: 1). Even only a few days before his departure from Athens to London toward the end of the second part of the novel, his words still express frustration with being "the man in the dark, the excluded, the eternal butt" (564). Additionally, Nicholas's feelings of insecurity on Phraxos increase significantly as he becomes the embodiment of "impotent, insignificant man attempting to cope with immense, threatening, and often mysterious forces that he can neither understand nor control" (Novak, 1985: 72). In other words, the theatricality of life at Bourani and thereafter hinders Nicholas from securing a system of his own for the phenomenological decryption of the godgame at Bourani.

Nicholas's interpretative endeavours to find meaning establish his phenomenological horizon which in turn sets the benchmark for the reader as well. Eddins similarly comes up with the argument in his article that "in terms of The Magus, it is as though the reader-persona were not only duped and enlightened along with Nicholas, but made privy to Conchis's inmost scruples and concerns as the initiation proceeds" (1976: 218). Therefore, a similar feeling of existential uneasiness surrounds the reader as well while he or she joins Nicholas in his unsuccessful efforts to secure a definite meaning of what is actually going on. To expresses this point alternatively in

other words, it can be suggested that Conchis's position as the magician and Fowles's position as the author amount to the same thing in terms of their readership:

> Nicholas' scepticism at what is happening to him, his constant attempts to de-mystify the unusual incidents by explaining them, and his relation to Conchis (the magus/magician) parallel the reader's attitude toward the events described, his attempt to make sense of them, and his relation to Fowles (the magus/author). (Rubenstein and Fowles, 1975: 330)

The reason that Nicholas fails to see things accurately is partly related to his fascination with the "deceptions and illusions" by Conchis (McSweeney, 111). His almost blind fascination leads him to become "an unwilling conspirator" in his own fate on Phraxos (Fremont-Smith, 2). It is also important to note that as the author of The Magus, Fowles takes Nicholas to the fictional world created by Conchis; however, he avoids helping him with his search for definitive answers to the questions that keep his mind occupied. As Hussey argues, Fowles does the same thing to the reader as well: "Fowles reveals to the reader his need for aesthetic solutions to moral problems and refuses to fill it" (25). The way in which Conchis plays tricks upon Nicholas and causes him to feel confused is quite similar to the way in which Fowles treats his readers. Both are apt to create occasions for "playing a godgame with the minds of [their] readers" (Lorenz, 1996: 70).

In addition to being psychic, Maurice Conchis emerges as the magus as well. Fowles lets the meaning of the magus become known to the reader during a conversation late in the novel between June and Nicholas: "There's a card in the Tarot pack called the magus. The magician… conjuror" (477). A variety of scholarly definitions have been provided to describe Conchis the Magus in other ways as well. These include him being called "the omnipotent divinity" in Novak's description where his "mysterious ways and supernatural powers control and enthral Nicholas" (73). McSweeney describes Conchis as "a self-appointed reality instructor" who has a group of people acting for him under different pseudonyms (122). Likewise, Holmes labels him as "the master plotter" who "deliberately incorporates as much hazard as is consistent with staging for Urfe and then dissipating the series of illusions involving Julie, June and the other actors in his company" (1988: 293).

Besides all these designations, Cooper tends to view him as “the mysterious orchestrator of ontological games” (1991: 65). What Cooper seems to imply here is that Conchis arranges his games in a world of entire artificiality. The ontological status of his world staged at Bourani is in the starkest contrast to that of the world outside. Conchis is not alone in his wish to keep Nicholas for as long as possible within the borders of his artificial world; he has the help of a perpetrator: Fowles. Fowles’s position as a novelist helps Conchis enjoy a high degree of freedom in playing his own role as the magus and establishing a mysteriously delusional set-up for Nicholas. When asked in one of the interviews to comment upon the importance of secrets and mystery in his fiction, Fowles replied as follows:

> I’m a great believer in the only half-known. In fact, in everything that is basically unknown, mysterious, magical. I must admit that I have been very interested in proper magic. The way that – this is because I am a novelist – people manage to fool other people into believing that they are seeing reality, which is exactly what we novelists have to do. We have to trick them and deceive them, against a reality – their reality – that we don’t know. We have to make our make-believe reality the true one, if only just for the moment of the novel. (Reynolds and Noakes, 2003: 22)

Nicholas is, however, quick to spot the artificiality of Conchis's fictional world. That is why Nicholas’s general attitude towards Bourani consists in seeing it as a masque constructed with various personas. Soon after Nicholas meets Conchis and hears his story of how he has come to Bourani, he makes it clear that he has sensed "an air of stage-management" in the way Conchis talked: "He did not tell me of his coming to Bourani as a man tells something that chances to occur to him; but far more as a dramatist tells an anecdote where the play requires" (109). Although Nicholas grows suspicious of the authenticity of the reality constructed by Conchis and his crew, his growing sensual attraction to Julie intensifies his misbelief that she might eventually help him solve the puzzle. His fascination with Julie “as a figure of romance enveloped in a supernal glow of mystery, culture, wealth, and unattainability” causes him to look down upon his Australian girlfriend, Alison, whom he had met earlier in the novel, as someone without much attraction (124). His mistaken trust in Julie leads him to an erroneous conclusion because he cannot realize how bewilderingly skilled she can be in acting out a role and, therefore, mistakes her sexual intercourse with him for an honest act of hers.

As a general characteristic of Fowles's fiction which identifies the universe as "female in some deep way," Nicholas relies on either Alison or Julie as representative figures of female wisdom for solving the puzzle (Campbell and Fowles, 465). Fowles himself expresses his view of "man as a kind of artifice, and woman as a kind of reality" (1990: 158). Therefore, Nicholas existentially oscillates between the two girls. Although he considers Alison as a girl far beneath his social class and far beyond his English blood, he cannot help feeling deeply attached to her in some way or another. On the other hand, Nicholas views Julie as someone with a shared class and national identity, and thinks that she must be the person whom he can rely upon. To explain Nicholas's hesitation in making an existentially authentic choice between Alison and Julie, Acheson borrows from Conchis the wave-water metaphor and points out that Nicholas is attracted to both girls, because, while Julie can be compared to the water, which according to Acheson represents the female sex in general, Alison can be compared to the wave, which represents a particular member of the female sex:

> … Urfe is attracted to both the particular and the general, though less to the 'wave' – the individual – than to the 'water', the female sex. The question Conchis poses is a 'mirror' in the sense that it reflects Urfe's belief, at the beginning of the novel, that women are sex objects, and this, of course, is a revealing aspect of his existential inauthenticity. If he is to become more authentic, Urfe must make sense of the world in his own way. (1998: 25)

Hussey also discusses the water-wave metaphor as part of her argument for the existence of a connection between art and reality, and suggests that water should be thought of as representing "substance," while wave should be considered as "a figure of speech, a way of seeing water, a word that projects form onto a protean reality" (24). A passage on pages 401 and 402 in The Magus where Nicholas reflects upon the news of Alison's suicide can allow water and wave to be compared respectively to content and form, meaning and appearance, and ethics and aesthetics:

> By this sinister elision, this slipping from true remorse, the belief that the suffering we have precipitated ought to ennoble *us*, or at least make us less ignoble from then on, to disguised self-forgiveness, the belief that suffering in some way ennobles *life*, so that the precipitation of pain comes, by such a cockeyed algebra, to equal the ennoblement, or at any rate the enrichment, of life, by this characteristically twentieth-century retreat from content into form, from meaning into appearance, from ethics into aesthetics, from *aqua* into *unda*, I dulled the pain of that accusing death; and hardened myself, to say nothing of it at Bourani.

Nicholas's abovementioned indecision over whom to rely on can be extended to Fowles's choice to leave Nicholas and Alison at a frozen present at the end of The Magus as well. The indeterminacy which permeates not only Nicholas's calculation of the prospects of a future with or without Alison but also Fowles's decision not to guarantee the reader a shared future between Nicholas and Alison reflects, according to Cooper, the "Keatsian brink between anticipation and certainty, between the promise of revelation and the refusal to tell" (1991: 78). Cooper supports her suggestion in a footnote on the same page that the last paragraph of The Magus is rich enough in terms of both autumnal imagery and atmosphere to become associated with the ode "To Autumn," "The Ode on a Grecian Urn" and the nightingale of Keats.

Early in The Magus, Nicholas describes himself as someone who "had been, and always would be, intensely false; in existentialist terms, inauthentic" (62). However, by the end of the novel, Nicholas appears to have made some progress in his quest for the existential authenticity: "Slowly I was learning to smile, and in the special sense that Conchis intended" (646). Nicholas's journey from inauthenticity to authenticity is a hard-won yet incomplete one. Fowles did not mean him to gain full existential authenticity at the end of the novel, although The Magus ends with a chapter "certainly about achieving authenticity" (Campbell and Fowles, 466). Nicholas can only eventually develop a sort of insight into his own existential condition as a human being who had been left all alone on the path towards self-discovery. To use the words of Hill who wrote about the notion of play in Fowles's fiction, "the experiences on Phraxos enable Nicholas to become a 'magus' himself (that is, controller of his own destiny)" (214). The notion of self-discovery is significant to notice here because in one of his interviews Fowles referred to it as the existential thesis of his books (Campbell and Fowles, 465). To use Acheson's argument, Nicholas's internal journey brings him to the border of existential authenticity only after he begins to pursue Alison in London, because Alison stands in marked contrast with Nicholas in terms of her proximity to the fulfilment of her potential for existential authenticity. Nicholas's realization that he has been erroneous in his judgement about the authenticity of Conchis and members of his theatrical cast comes quite late in the novel, ending with a kind of spiritual transformation, and eventually making him "speciesless" (McSweeney, 123).

Some scholars, including Novak, have argued that Nicholas fails to respond in a constructive manner to the godgame of Conchis. According to Cooper, one of the reasons for this is that the denial of penetration into "the text of Bourani" renders Nicholas powerless to grasp "its meaning in a discursive or intellectually intelligible form" (64). The degree of change in the personality of Nicholas who goes through a set of staged experiments on Phraxos is, according to Novak, next to nothing. The characterisation of Nicholas prior to his enchantment by the godgame at Bourani as someone "isolated, selfish, indecisive" remains the same even after the godgame ends (76). Novak further goes on to argue that Nicholas embodies the modern man in that he fails to construe life as a combination of "challenges," "complexities" and "opportunities" (78). What does not change about him is, however, his existential loneliness. The Magus begins with Nicholas and ends with him, all alone, as the leading exemplar of *homo solitarius*.

2.2. The Magus and The Question of Ontological In/Authenticity

Authenticity, as Fowles understands it, is largely an existential issue of freedom and choice; however, according to Martin Heidegger it can also be an ontological question of interpretation and appropriation. It is true that Fowles's novels have been mostly analysed under the light of Sartrean existentialism which holds that "no essence or transcendent design underpins existence" (Holmes, 291). One such analysis is available in Eddins's discussion of the relationship between authenticity and authorship in existential terms. His argument is mainly focused on the achievement of the status that both Nicholas in The Magus and Sarah in The French Lieutenant's Woman enjoy and on how they consequently come to possess the existential authorship of their own lives. The purpose of the following section is, however, to provide a Heideggerian perspective on the question of authenticity in relation to questions such as where the major characters of The Magus are ontologically situated, how they tend to interpret and respond to external phenomena, and what is the ontological reasoning behind their decisions and acts. The discussion will be built around three specific terms of the Heideggerian ontology: Being-in-the-world, thrownness and understanding.

As it has been pointed out earlier in the previous chapter, one of the defining characteristics of Dasein according to Heidegger is its Being-in-the-world. Put simply, Being-in-the-world signifies a kind of existence, or a way of being, which has a number of properties. These properties include thrownnes/falling and understanding. In his discussion of Being-in-the-world and its properties, Heidegger always develops a two-sided approach: authentic vs. inauthentic. The authenticity of existence is described as the consequence of how Dasein interacts with its world of existence. The interaction in question necessarily requires such phenomenological endeavours as understanding and interpretation of the ontological environment which surrounds Dasein. The degree of existential authenticity is proportional to the degree of phenomenological authenticity in the way in which Dasein tries to understand and interpret its environment.

In this respect, the following section contains discussions about the existential inauthenticity of Nicholas as a character with a double ontological status both in the fictional world of Bourani and in the fictional world of The Magus, which will be labelled Being-in-the-fiction; and as a character who finds himself in the middle of a deep mystery, which will be termed Thrownness; and as a character who sets out to do a detective work in the last section of the novel to reflect back upon the situation at Bourani, which will be labelled Understanding.

2.2.1. Being-in-the-World and Being-in-the-Fiction

As Nicholas's experiences on Phraxos in the longest part of The Magus demonstrate, he takes on a fictional existence while he is at and around Bourani. The change in his spatiality on Phraxos which takes the form of a movement into or out of Bourani corresponds to the change in his ontology in the form of an entry in or an exit out of the fiction. Entries into Bourani also mean entries into the world of fiction; conversely, exits out of Bourani correspond to exits out of the world of fiction. How then should the change in Nicholas's ontological status at Bourani be read? One possible offer of reading comes from Heidegger, whose fundamental ontology regards Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein. To use Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the basic state of Nicholas while he is at Bourani can be similarly described as Being-in-the-fiction.

A number of scholars have jointly pointed at the parallel between the fictional existence of Nicholas in The Magus and his fictional existence at Bourani. Cooper discusses it in her analysis of the fictions of John Fowles from the perspectives of power, creativity and femininity. She points out that Bourani is a textual world, authored by Conchis, where Nicholas becomes a reader (59). Hussey also views The Magus as "a paradigm of the relationship between art and life" (19). In a similar manner, The Magus is considered as the representation of "a cross between intellectual puzzle and a dazzling work of fiction" (Rubenstein and Fowles, 1975: 328). Nicholas thus emerges as a character whose fictional existence both in Fowles's The Magus and at Conchis's Bourani deserves a more detailed discussion about the significance of his entrapment in the fictional dimension of his existence. The fact that Nicholas as one of the characters in The Magus is brought by another character in The Magus to the status of a reader of various texts at Bourani calls for an interpretive endeavour to ask the following question: Where exactly does Fowles locate the character?

One possible answer comes from Docherty: "Fowles 'foregrounds' character" (1982: 129). Docherty develops an argument similar to the one which Eddins had developed earlier in 1976. Although Docherty and Eddins sound similar in their arguments, Docherty's argument differs from Eddins's in that he chooses to use a kind of terminology which includes words such as ontology and being. His argument is therefore mainly ontological and it is concerned with "a struggle" on the part of those characters who seek ways to equip themselves "with extension" beyond their narratively determined ontological statuses; a struggle to reach a level where they "existentially create themselves in the writing of their own textual *histoire*" (119). According to Docherty, Fowles does it by allowing his characters to have their own histories and to develop their own subjectivities—something which enables them to rise to the same ontological level as the readers:

> We see in Fowles' manipulation of narrative viewpoint a determination to raise the ontological status of characters from that of object to that of subject with potential for imposing his own *texte*. That is, instead of the reader being the "pure subject" with a "crystalline" text under his *regard*, Fowles creates the illusion that his characters, by virtue of their potential existence within a number of textual stories, can as it were "walk out" of the text which we are engaged in reading and thereby can choose to exist as subjectively as we do. (121)

Docherty is right to indicate that characters can freely walk out of their textual boundaries in Fowles's novels. He relies upon a distinction in meaning between the two French words, '*text'* and '*texte'* when he makes his point about the existential movements of the characters out of their ontological boundaries in Fowles's fiction. In a footnote early in his article, he differentiates one from the other in the following terms: "Briefly, the "text" is the words on the page before us; a "*texte*" is a fictive construction of reality—i.e., here it is the world as seen or creatively distorted by the characters who exist within the text" (119). The stress which he places upon the differentiation between the two should be taken as a reminder that The Magus ranks high on the list of postmodernist fiction which treats fiction as a reconstructed form of reality.

Docherty also makes a point about the multiplicity of '*textes*' in Fowles's fiction. The multiplicity of '*textes*' can be defined as the insertion of a smaller textual paradigm into a larger one, while these two paradigms together may be inserted into another larger one, and so on and so forth. For example, Nicholas is subjected to the ontological terms of existence not only in the larger text of The Magus which Fowles has created, but also in the smaller text which Conchis authors and manipulates. He, therefore, holds a double ontological status at the same time. He exists as a being in the two fictional worlds simultaneously: both in the one created by Fowles and in the other one created by Conchis. But it is actually Fowles who allows Conchis the freedom to host Nicholas in his fictional world, and more importantly, to play with Nicholas's relation to the fictional world in The Magus by, for example, forging letters from Alison to Nicholas and the vice versa as well as inventing news reports about Alison. Furthermore, Alison emerges as a figure "cast as Reality" in the fictional world of The Magus (647). Conchis stands out as a fictional figure in the same world with the capacity of a god-like novelist to build his own fictional world inside it; and Nicholas stands right in between the two. As Hussey points out, the fact that the names 'Alison' and 'Conchis' have letters which also exist in the name 'Nicholas' may similarly point out to Nicholas's state as a figure "caught between life and the labyrinth." This state of impasse leads him to make a serious error of judgement and consequently he "takes life for fiction and art for reality" (21).

The reader has, on the one hand, the '*texte*' of Nicholas by Fowles, and on the other hand, the '*texte*' of Nicholas by Conchis. This implies that Nicholas is as much in the fictional world of The Magus as he is in the fictional world of the magus, Conchis. And Nicholas uses the term "*domaine*" to refer to the fictional world of the magus, Conchis, set up at Bourani (134). Additionally, as it has been pointed out in the previous pages that Conchis assertively tells Nicholas that "all here [at Bourani] is artifice" (406). Actually, this is confirmed during a conversation late in the novel between Mrs Lily de Seitas, who is the mother of the twin sisters, and Nicholas. She tells him that the godgame is based on "the premise that in reality all is fiction" (627). Early in the novel, the more Nicholas hears from Conchis about how he volunteered to join the war against Germany in World War I and how he came to Bourani, the closer he comes to Conchis's domain, and the easier he falls prey to his fantasies. This might explain the reason why Cooper prefers to describe the *domaine* as "the magical enclosure" (55). Conchis's narration of his personal life story, the authenticity of which remains a mystery both to Nicholas and to the reader at the same time, acts like a spellbinding fictional device throughout the narrative. However, as the events begin to unfold in Chapter 52 and bring Nicholas face to face with the hard facts about Bourani and with the truth that the story Conchis told Nicholas early in the novel about himself is "pure invention", he slowly begins to feel that there should exist a border between Bourani and the rest of the island (411). He senses that it is an ontological border between the reality as Fowles has presented to him and the fiction as Conchis has constructed it. For this reason, he describes his walk out of Bourani back to his school on a weekend as "a re-entry into reality" (157).

Bourani is fictional because primarily it exists in a script. It hosts a meta-theatrical construction without an audience that owes its existence to the script that Conchis has written for his new kind of drama

> in which the conventional separation between actors and audience was abolished. In which the conventional scenic geography, the notions of proscenium, stage, auditorium, were completely discarded. In which continuity of performance, either in time or place, was ignored. And in which the action, the narrative was fluid, with only a point of departure and a fixed point of conclusion. Between these points the participants invent their own drama. (404)

This feature of Bourani allows Nicholas to conclude that Lily, who later turns out to be Julie, and her twin sister June, and the others, have all been assigned particular roles under pseudonyms to play according to the script. The constantly changing identities of the people at Bourani leave Nicholas even more confused because Conchis's new drama requires that one does not know what one can believe and what one cannot. In this regard, The Magus stands out as a novel in which the meaning free-floats. In fact, Bourani appears to offer neither him nor the twin sisters any traceable tinges of reality outside the script. Nicholas, therefore, feels convinced enough that anything that he does, or appears to do, in violation of the rules Conchis has set in his domain is bound to bring a change to "tomorrow's 'script'" (322). Likewise, the girls express helplessness about what course of action they should take after Nicholas hears from Conchis about their schizophrenic behaviour and they consequently decide to be themselves, because Conchis does not tell them "the next chapter" of the script (326). In addition, he hears from Julie that Conchis is "very skilled at rearranging reality" (219). He is led to deduce from all this that Conchis must be a novelist within the novel, "creating with people, not words" (242).

However, it is not until halfway through the novel (Chapter 46) that Nicholas hears for the first time from Julie that Conchis actually "wanted to mount a situation in which we two [the twin sisters June and Julie] were to play parts rather like the ones in the original Three Hearts story" and he would have Nicholas play the Greek poet without him realizing it (337). It is especially in Chapter 55 where Nicholas hears Conchis make a direct reference to their fictional functionalities at Bourani while he and his crew leave Bourani: "You do not know your meaning yet. Or mine" (447). With this remark, Nicholas realizes that anyone at Bourani, including himself, has a particular meaning, whether it is literal or metaphorical, that he has to discover in the first place if he wants to solve the whole mystery. All this allows Nicholas to realize without a doubt that he has a fictional presence at Bourani. At this point, Nicholas sees that he is actually in the fiction when he is at Bourani, which has been for him the locus of "the reality of the unreality" (279). Additionally, to reinforce the fictionality of his situation at Bourani, Nicholas uses the language of fiction for explaining his feelings of shock at being taken a prisoner after he has sex with Julie: "I still couldn't accept that this was not some nightmare, like some freak misbinding in a book, a Lawrence novel become, at the turn of a page, one by Kafka" (489).

Only towards the end of the novel, Nicholas can develop the ability to spot the source of reality somewhere near him: he finds out that he has been erroneous about Alison. In Chapter 63 in which he returns to the school a few days after the trial ends where he is granted the freedom not only to judge Conchis and his entourage but also to choose to punish or not to punish Lily, he reflects upon the meaning of Alison's presence in his life. He now concludes that only she has been "a constant reality" for him: "I knew she [Alison] was a mirror that did not lie; whose interest in me was real, whose love was real" (539). It is also true that Nicholas belatedly realizes that his existence at Bourani has been part of a fictional design. The fact that both realizations come belatedly in the novel appears to confirm the suggestion that it is rather ironical to have a strong desire for the real in the land of unreal—that is to say, at Bourani. Despite his eagerness to embrace the real, Nicholas has not been strong enough in his opposition against various forms of seduction by the female representatives of the unreal such as June and Julie (Rubenstein and Fowles, 1975: 331). Moreover, it has been pointed out earlier in this study that besides his realization of the importance of Alison for him, Nicholas achieves only a partial success in self-recognition. Nicholas's immature self-recognition is partly related to the labyrinthine structure of the novel "in which each line of pursuit leads to a dead end or false corner" (Rubenstein and Fowles, 330). Nicholas confirms this explanation with his own answer to his own question of what he has become after all his experiences on the island. He admits that he has become "nothing but the net sum of countless wrong turnings" (539). According to Holmes, the reason that Nicholas can only achieve a partial success in self-recognition is related to the idea that "narrative plots are inevitably defective as modes of self-discovery and self-realization" (294). In this regard, The Magus stands out as the novel in which Fowles allows Conchis to play around with the meaning by structuring the chasing of it like a search for something lost in a labyrinth.

In addition to its fictiveness, Bourani represents for Nicholas "a polysemantic world" as well (280). As Nicholas remarks, "the one sure feature of 'things'" at Bourani is that their appearance to him stands in stark opposition to their actual beings (312). Especially Chapter 60 contains Nicholas's reflections upon his past experience with regard to Conchis and his crew being the source of "a constant dramatic irony" at Bourani after he is taken a prisoner and is allowed to wake up only five days later to find that he is somewhere completely unknown to him (493). The resultant ambiguity

hinders Nicholas from achieving a final meaning of what he sees around or hears of. His comparison of Conchis to modern poets in terms of their poetical ability to "kill ten meanings with one symbol" should account for his recurrent feeling that he has to interpret and re-interpret what he has seen or heard of before (186).

2.2.2. Thrownness and Falling

The first part of The Magus essentially covers a self-introduction of Nicholas to the reader up until the point in the narrative of his travel from London to the Greek island of Phraxos. Nicholas's mind is constantly occupied with getting a plausible answer to his question as to why he, but not somebody else, has made his way to Bourani, met Conchis and members of his entourage there, and become the subject of their experiment. On the surface level the reason for his travel appears to be that his application for a teaching position on the island has been granted official approval; however, his reflections in the subsequent parts of the novel upon his experiences at Bourani enable him to realize at a deeper level that the existential notion of hazard has indeed played the essential part in leading him to Bourani. In other words, Nicholas finds himself "deep in the strangest maze" after his arrival at Bourani (313).

As has been discussed above, Fowles relies upon the use of hazard as a fundamental excuse for the organization of the plot in The Magus. Actually, during his conversation with Nicholas early in the novel, Conchis hints at the answer when he asks Nicholas if he feels chosen. When Nicholas answers that he does not feel chosen in any way, he prompts Nicholas to reconsider his answer and introduces the notion of hazard to him as well as to the reader for the first time: "Hazard makes you elect. You cannot elect yourself" (87). Besides Conchis, Mrs Lily de Seitas also represents the Sartrean existentialist wisdom. During her conversation with Nicholas late in the novel, she lets Nicholas hear of her expression of consent to accept "the responsibility that our good luck in the lottery of existence puts upon us" (604). Also, Mrs Lily de Seitas also talks to Nicholas about the notion of hazard, or chance, and rephrases Conchis's words with a scientific reference: "If one gets deep enough in atomic physics one ends with a situation of pure chance" (628).

Mrs Lily de Seita's reference to 'luck' and 'lottery' hints at the availability of a similarity between the Satrean existentialism and the Heideggerian ontology in terms of their theoretical approaches to the notion of thrownness. The counterpart of hazard in Heidegger's fundamental ontology is thrownness. Where Fowles uses hazard in reference to Nicholas finding himself at Bourani, Heidegger would possibly opt for the use of falling and thrownness as the technical terms to express the same thing about him. Thrownness explains the way in which man comes to occupy a position within the world. We, human beings, exist as beings in the world, because we have been ontologically thrown into it. According to Heidegger, like thrownness, falling is a fundamental part of Dasein's Being-in-the-world as well. It signifies a phenomenon which "reveals an *essential* ontological structure of Dasein itself" (2008: 224). Heidegger uses falling to express the basic state of existence in which "proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its 'world'" (264). In other words, the current state of existence of human beings in the world has begun with them being thrown into it, and continues with them being lost and absorbed in it. Heidegger's definition of falling as "an absorption into Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity" can also apply to Nicholas while he is at Bourani (220). At Bourani, Nicholas's sense of isolation from people disappears because Conchis enables him to have the sense of Being-with-one-another by arranging for him to meet June and Julie in ways that only increase his curiosity. While he discusses the notion of falling, Heidegger refers to inauthenticity as the result of falling which implies a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world "which is completely fascinated by the 'world'" (220). In this regard, thrownness and falling account for Nicholas's failure to reach the ultimate authenticity because of his above-mentioned fascination with Bourani.

2.2.3. Understanding

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, besides thrownness and falling, understanding also emerges as one of the fundamental ontological concepts in the Heideggerian philosophy. The natural inclination to try to make sense of the existential situation that affects almost the whole of the humanity perhaps finds its best expression in Heidegger's words that "*understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being*" (32). As life goes on, questions about it also keep coming in. Human

beings do not simply accept that they exist and go on living; they are rather endowed with a unique capability to try and find answers to those questions that they ask about the ontological grounds of existence in general, such as the following: how and why on earth are we here in the world; why do we die; what is going to happen after death; and so on and so forth. Such questions are all part of a general tendency to create a contextual world of meaning of our own by figuring out possible connections between various phenomena. Nicholas in The Magus does the same thing as well. After he finds himself in the middle of an intriguing web of signs on Phraxos, he sets to the work of making out what is what.

Nicholas's later queries in the novel lead him to the female figure of wisdom, Mrs Lily de Seitas, who brings him face to face with the fact that telling "lie upon lie" has been the standard way for expressing the truth in the fictional world of Conchis (626). His queries begin early in the third part of the novel where he refers to himself as "Adam after the fall" (576). His comparison of himself to the fallen Adam is followed by his decision in Chapter 70 to pursue "the trail of Conchis and Lily in England; and through them, of Alison" (577). For this reason, before he sets off to his detective work, Nicholas first comes up with explanations for each item on his glossary of names (such as 'Maria'), objects (such as 'the paintings at Bourani'), gestures (such as 'raising both arms above the head'), expressions (such as 'you may be elect'), and terms (such as 'hypnotism'). Although Nicholas does a lot to find the centre of the maze in the meaning-oriented labyrinthine world of fiction constructed by Conchis, questions that Nicholas addresses to Mrs Lily de Seitas in the following chapters of the last part of the novel, and the answers he receives from her lead him to the conclusion that "the maze has no centre". At this point, Nicholas admits that he has been defeated. He now regards himself as an anti-hero, left "at a crossroads, in a dilemma, with all to lose and only more of the same to win" (645).

2.2.4. Mineness

What implications does this realization have for Nicholas after he returns to England in the third part of the novel and sets to the search with vigilance for answers to his questions? Does his realization that Bourani with all its ingredients is purely fiction

help him to achieve authenticity in the way Heidegger means it to be? To bring this discussion to a close at this point, it appears to be necessary to point out to the ontological markers of authenticity in the Heideggerian philosophy. The concept of authenticity emerges mainly as a matter of appropriating the ontological act of interpretation. The implication is that authenticity is an issue of defining the extent to which one's interpretation of phenomena such as time and place, Being and existence, and the like, is one's own. In addition to interpretation, one other term most closely related with authenticity in the Heideggerian philosophy is mineness. By mineness, Heidegger implies that "Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine" (150). In other words, mineness expresses a kind of individual responsibility for anything one chooses to do or not to do. In this respect, mineness raises the question about the source of meaning as the marker of authenticity. Heidegger's argument for the differentiation between authenticity and inauthenticity rests upon the distinction between the Self (the individual himself/herself) and the They-Self (the public in general) as the two alternative sources of the meaning. Heidegger's definition of the "*they*" suggests that it is both the supplier of "the answer to the question of the '*who*' of everyday Dasein," and it specifies "the referential context of significance" (166-7). This may explain the reason why despite his attempts to find the truth about Conchis and his fictional world in his own way, Nicholas cannot situate himself at the centre of his own world of meaning: it is because he finds himself falling over and over again "under the spell of Conchis the magician" (376).

The significance of the authenticity of existence for Nicholas is proportional to the degree to which he desires to overcome his inability to mark the ontological difference between his existence on the island and his existence in London, which is intensified by his unwillingness to overcome his blindness to Alison and her representation of the call for an exit out of Bourani. The textual evidence to suggest that Nicholas has sought ways to secure the authenticity of his existence is scarce. Analysed in this way, the abovementioned argument that Nicholas's attainment of existential authenticity is not complete maintains its validity, because the source of meaning for Nicholas has not been entirely his own self. He rather has chosen to depend upon Conchis, June, Julie and Mrs Lily de Seitas, among others, for the constitution of the meaning in an ambiguous way. The ambiguity has been a result of the peculiar feature

of Conchis's world where "every truth […] was a sort of lie; and every lie a sort of truth" (294).

Fowles leaves Nicholas and Alison at a frozen present at the end of The Magus. The possibility of whether or not Nicholas will later grow to a fully existential authentic state remains ambiguous. The ambiguity of the ending in The Magus transfers itself into the multiplicity of the ending in his next novel, The French Lieutenant's Woman, where Fowles takes up a similar issue, yet he works it out in a different context. In order to grant Charles the freedom to choose his own self in a move towards the acquisition of existential authenticity which Fowles has formerly denied Nicholas, the ambiguous ending of The Magus is replaced with the multiple endings of The French Lieutenant's Woman.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FRENCH LIEUTENANT'S WOMAN: THE AUTHENTICITY OF ANXIETY

The purpose of the present chapter is to introduce The French Lieutenant's Woman in the first place, and then move on to a discussion of the existential implications of the relation between Sarah and Charles from the Heideggerian perspective on anxiety. In contrast to Nicholas who has failed in The Magus to solve the godgame of Conchis at Phraxus, Charles is given the narrative chance in The French Lieutenant's Woman to try his guess more than once when faced with the self-willed task of dismantling of the ambiguity of Sarah's narrative. The analysis below of Charles's Victorian existence and the choices that he later makes about the future of his relation with Sarah is oriented towards the demonstration of ontological conditions in which his authenticity of existence is mirrored in varying degrees in the alternative endings to the novel.

3.1. An Overview of The French Lieutenant's Woman

John Fowles began to write The French Lieutenant's Woman in 1967 and published it in 1969. He set the novel in a period almost one hundred years back—1867. The one-hundred-year gap between the actual writing of the novel and the period of

time in which it was set is not merely a gap without its consequences; on the contrary, it is a significant indicator of how the writing of fiction has changed over a hundred-year period. In his introductory notes on The French Lieutenant's Woman, David Lodge emphasizes that "not just the artificiality of historical fiction, but the artificiality of *all* fiction" is revealed in the exposition of "the gap between the date of the story and the date of its composition" (1993: 133). Accordingly, the reader of The French Lieutenant's Woman is frequently reminded by the narrator that although this is a typically Victorian novel in terms of its plot construction, it has been structured according to the literary theories flourishing in the second half of the twentieth century.

A short yet adequate description of the structure of The French Lieutenant's Woman can be found in Binns's description of this novel as a historical romance in his article where he described it as "a novel which proceeds with a quirky, Chaplinesque narrative rhythm, luxuriating in ironically redundant social-historical data and self-conscious authorial wit" (1973: 331). Likewise, a short yet adequate summary of the plot of The French Lieutenant's Woman can be borrowed from its own author who described it in one of his interviews as a novel about "a woman [Sarah Woodruff] being rejected and then in some way rejecting a man [Charles Smithson]" (Singh, 1999: 90). Approaching from a different angle, Rankin labels The French Lieutenant's Woman as "a novel about the evolution of an existentialist." As such, the novel can be regarded as fundamentally being concerned with Charles whom Sarah leads to the path of evolution from "a rather ordinary Victorian gentleman" into "an existential hero" (1973: 197).

The French Lieutenant's Woman is distinguished from Fowles's other novels in terms of its success: on account of its international reception, The French Lieutenant's Woman became the novel which gained its author "the kind of critical attention owing to him" (Binns, 317). The French Lieutenant's Woman also excelled as the novel which Fowles once described as "an exercise in technique," and "a complex bit of literary gymnastics," whereas he categorized The Collector and The Magus as "a kind of fable" (Halpern, 1999: 16). In his interview with David North, Fowles expressed his own opinion of The French Lieutenant's Woman in terms which described it as the novel that he "shall never beat." At the time of speaking, he even made it clear that he thought it unlikely that he would "ever write a book as good as" it was (1999: 58). In a similar

vein, when asked to name his best novel in another interview, Fowles modified the question a little bit and awarded The French Lieutenant's Woman the title of a novel which was "technically the best written" (Barnum, 1999: 108).

Technically speaking, The French Lieutenant's Woman is a novel set in the Victorian age but written from the 20th-century perspective. Lodge regards the narrative purpose of composing The French Lieutenant's Woman as an attempt to "bring a twentieth-century perspective to bear upon nineteenth-century behaviour, perhaps revealing things about the Victorians that they did not know themselves, or preferred to suppress, or simply took for granted" (132). In a sense, Fowles recreates in The French Lieutenant's Woman "the narrative moment, the solid characterisation, the descriptive care, of the nineteenth-century realistic novel" at a temporal distance (Bergonzi, 1979: 225). In addition, as a twentieth-century novelist, Fowles interrupts his narrative quite often to comment upon his characters situated in the Victorian setting.[10] In fact, Fowles locates his novel in a specifically historical setting which owes its significance to two key figures of the 19th century: one is Charles Darwin and his The Origin of the Species (1859), and the other is Karl Marx and his Das Kapital (1867). In one of the early pauses in the narrative, the narrator lets the reader know that those days Marx was "quietly working" in the British Museum Library on Das Kapital (Fowles, 2004b: 13)[11]. These two fundamental figures and their works had a huge impact on the way the Victorian era evolved into the 20th century. Around the time in which The French Lieutenant's Woman is set, to use Scruggs's words, "Darwin has withdrawn the last

[10] The Victorian setting denotes the period in the English political history between 1830 and 1901 during which Queen Victoria remained in throne. The Victorian age corresponds to the emergence of England as the first country in the world to industrialize, to the rise of London as the new commercial centre of attraction in Europe, and to the expansion of British colonialism to further overseas countries. Here and there, Fowles's narrator makes some remarks on the Victorian age in The French Lieutenant's Woman. The novel appears to achieve its characterization of the Victorian age as the age of repression—the repression of sexuality, the repression of individuality and the repression of personal freedom (Rankin, 1973: 198). The narrator's remarks further include a reference to the two major Victorian values which everyone was supposed to observe in every sphere of their lives: "duty" and "propriety" (371). Brantlinger et al. similarly cites "Duty and Work and Chastity" as the essential components of "Victorianism" (1972: 340). It was a duty to conform to socially accepted values. Yet, this is also an age of growing dissatisfaction with the national prosperity and accumulation of wealth, among other things; it is by and large a period marked for "its tumultuous life," "its iron certainties and rigid conventions," "its repressed emotion and facetious humour," "its cautious science and incautious religion," and "its corrupt politics and immutable castes" (366). Besides, women were largely regarded as naturally apt to lead their lives in a domestic environment. The ideal femininity found its best expression in being "demure," "obedient," and "shy" (18).

[11] All further references in this chapter without a specified author and a specified year are to The French Lieutenant's Woman.

rusty link in the decrepit Chain of Being, and Marx will soon inform his contemporaries that the apparently solid social structures of the Victorians are built on sand" (1985: 98).

The story of The French Lieutenant's Woman is typically Victorian. What is commonly thought of as fascinating about The French Lieutenant's Woman is that "the sudden authorial intrusion, the dropping of the novelist's persona as narrator, is itself thoroughly Victorian" as well (Allen, 1970: 67). In his introductory notes on The French Lieutenant's Woman, Nicol points out that it can therefore be viewed as "an extraordinarily effective pastiche of the nineteenth-century realist novel" (107). Binns believes that this should be considered as a clear indication of "self-parody" which Fowles inserts "into the fabric of his narrative to deny his omniscience and to poke fun at his own ethical commitment" (321). In one of his interviews, Fowles himself explains the reason why he has done so by pointing out that although his knowledge of the Victorian age "in the historian's sense" is limited to only a few historical facts, he counts himself sufficiently knowledgeable about its "by-ways," and its "psychological side." Additionally, Fowles refers to the need to "come to terms with" his own hatred of the Victorian way of life, including being brought up by his own Victorian parents (Singh, 90).

3.2. The French Lieutenant's Woman and Its Predecessors

In pointing out to common characteristics of Fowles's first three novels—The Collector, The Magus and The French Lieutenant's Woman, Binns observes that each of them "begins with a precise location of time and place" (319). In the case of The French Lieutenant's Woman, the location is Lyme Regis, England; and the date is March, 1867—one hundred years before the actual writing of the novel began took place. It is, however, clear from Fowles's "Notes on an Unfinished Novel" that he had been cautious about the possibility that his novel might be erroneously considered as a historical novel (147). The narrative structure of The French Lieutenant's Woman indicates that Fowles relies upon four significant methodological manipulations of historical data in writing a novel about a period one hundred years back: re-presenting, re-working, re-writing and re-formulating the Victorian age (Cooper, 1991: 135). For

this reason, as Acheson also points out, it would not be wrong to label The French Lieutenant's Woman as a historical novel "only in part" (1998: 34).

According to Binns, The French Lieutenant's Woman can be compared to The Magus in terms of relations which exist between certain characters in both novels. For instance, the way in which the relation between Nicholas Urfe and Maurice Conchis begins to form itself at the very beginning and extends as far as the length of the narrative takes in The Magus has its parallel in The French Lieutenant's Woman as well. Just like Urfe, Charles also cannot dismiss "the idea that his destiny is at the mercy of an elaborate godgame" (330). Binns also looks at Urfe and Charles from an existentialist point of view and concludes that they both "illustrate the existential possibilities in selfish and socially-secure individuals, dramatizing a personal evolution from the bad faith within themselves and discovering through suffering a meaningful code of ethics" (333). Moreover, just as Urfe feels powerless to break off the spell cast by Conchis, and just as he feels tempted to embrace Conchis as the sole source of wisdom despite his reluctance to do so, Charles's repeatedly failed attempts to find his way out of his obsession with "the enigma of Sarah" similarly brings him only nearer and nearer back to Sarah, and she advances closer and closer to the foreground as the sole source of help with which Charles can hope to "come to terms with the contradictions in his own nature" and "find his authentic identity" (325).

The similarity between Sarah and Conchis rests largely upon the argument that both are able to handle deceptions craftily (McSweeney, 111). McDaniel similarly argues that while Sarah can be compared to Conchis, Charles can be compared to Nicholas. The godgames of Conchis and the stratagems of Sarah elevate both of them to the level of the "enigmatic figures" who are able to "see through" masks of inauthenticity (1985: 36). In view of this, as Fowles's narrator points out, it is with "an instinctual profundity of insight" that Sarah is able to see through:

> She could sense the pretentions of a hollow argument, a false scholarship, a biased logic when she came across them; but she also saw through people in subtler ways. Without being able to say how, any more than a computer can explain its processes, she saw them as they were and not as they tried to seem. (53)

When compared to Nicholas, however, it becomes evident that Charles is a man of different times, since he lived almost one hundred years before Nicholas; that is why they belong to two distinct time zones. Charles remains a Victorian from start to finish, and he never truly breaks off with his Victorian ideals; on the other hand, Nicholas's sense of attachment to a particular period is very loose; therefore, he can perhaps be described as a man without roots. However, as McDaniel suggests, the thing which is common to both men is that they are subject to the element of games / godgames which exists in both The Magus and The French Lieutenant's Woman (35). Just as Nicholas falls prey to the godgames of Conchis, Charles also falls prey to the stratagems of Sarah. While Nicholas and Charles have their own games, Conchis and Sarah have their own godgames which McDaniel argues

> encourage a moral and emotional athleticism that can sustain the individual in all of his human occupations, especially in his practice of what modern existentialists have called responsible freedom. The godgame functions as a training ground for the inexperienced protagonist, who learns and practices skills that will be useful when the godgame is over. (33)

Furthermore, as McDaniel defines Nicholas and Charles as the two characters who are busy with "the shallow, exploitive activities" of their own, she also describes the godgames of Conchis and Sarah as being "beneficial" (32). Sarah's power to enable Charles to realize with a sense of anxiety that he is free to choose despite his fallacious belief in the existence of a set of social values which according to him precede personal preferences comes from her success in playing her godgame at "a level of constructive purpose, morality, and productiveness" (36). Perhaps, most importantly, Sarah's godgame is intended to make Charles realize that "instead of rules to follow, there are choices to make" (38).

Moreover, Binns comments on an additional common point which The French Lieutenant's Woman shares with its predecessors: in each novel, Fowles portrays the English society as "a mythic battleground" in which individuals are all alone and caught "in a conflict for moral and imaginative survival against […] social conformity" (320). In The French Lieutenant's Woman, these individuals are introduced to the reader as Charles Smithson and Sarah Woodruff. Whereas the relationship between Sarah and

Charles begins as a relationship of "curiosity," "pity," and "love" in the first place, it ends with Charles's ruin on the one hand and Sarah's disappearance on the other. At the same time, it leads Charles to suffer a growing sense of alienation "from the comfortable ease of his intelligently cultured existence" due to "his awakening passion" for Sarah (Tatham, 1971: 406). By and large, it is passion which plays the major role in leading to a consequence of this kind to emerge. It motivates Sarah to come up as "a figure out of a Hardy ballad," meaning that "she is a romantic figure, the victim—in more than one sense—of passion" (Allen, 66). The contrast between the two can be continued with a further description of Charles as "an anachronism"—as someone who is "unable to adapt to a changing world," and of Sarah as a woman well-equipped with "qualities of independence and self-assertion which assure her survival in an emerging new world" (Creighton, 1982: 223).

Lastly, as his other novels developed from an image, The French Lieutenant's Woman has also its seed in a recurring visual image of a woman in black, standing at the seaside of Lyme Regis and looking out at the horizon.

Just as The Collector and The Magus are interwoven with existentialist notions such as freedom, individual responsibility and authenticity, The French Lieutenant's Woman is also a novel largely dominated by existentialism and its derivative themes. In his "Notes on an Unfinished Novel," Fowles explains the reason behind his decision to write The French Lieutenant's Woman and blend it with existentialist notions as arising from his belief that "the Victorian age, especially from 1850 on, was highly existentialist in many of its personal dilemmas" (152). It is especially The French Lieutenant's Woman in which freedom in its twentieth-century existentialist sense becomes the main issue for Fowles: the freedom which he allows his fictional characters to enjoy as each of them builds a component of his narrative, and the freedom which he allows his readers to enjoy as they join the process of the construction of his narrative. The French Lieutenant's Woman also addresses the crucial issue about the possibility of its major characters "attaining personal freedom" through self-discovery (Barnum, 116). As Creighton notes, the authorial remarks in Chapter 13 of The French Lieutenant's Woman place Fowles in a position in which "he cannot impose his authority upon the characters but must instead respect their autonomy" (220). In addition to the fact that

the notion of freedom has its existential undertones, it is also closely related to the central characteristic of The French Lieutenant's Woman that its narrative structure is mainly governed by self-reflexive fictionality. As Hutcheon suggests, the novel is structured around an endeavour by the storyteller to explain his way of handling the storytelling in its contemporary sense (1978: 81).

It should be noted in passing that although Fowles was still preoccupied with existential notions such as freewill and freedom when The French Lieutenant's Woman was first published in 1969, he admitted several times in his later interviews that his defence of the existentialist ideals became much weaker over the later years. For instance, when asked in an interview conducted ten years after the publication of The French Lieutenant's Woman to comment upon Charles, who was described there as "a Darwinian in a tussle with social determinism—that is, who seeks a freedom of action which, in a fundamental sense, he doesn't wholly believe in," Fowles's words appear to be in favour of his belief in the freedom of choice, though less firmly established than it was ten years earlier:

> I simply don't know the answer to the old enigma of free will. In many ways I get more and more dubious of its existence as I grow older, and (for instance) now regard many past and supposedly "free" decisions of my own as clearly conditioned; and especially in terms of choices taken during writing as regards character destinies and courses of events. (Bigsby, 1999: 72-73)

It is likewise evident from his words that he spoke in another interview one year later that his belief in free will was continuing to lose much of its gravity: "I sense that ninety percent of human life is conditioned. But, you see, that tiny fragment where there's doubt is vital. All my novels are about how you achieve that possible—possibly non-existent—freedom" (Singh: 85). Further evidence for his growing support for the belief that "we are very largely determined" is also available in his 1985 interview with Relf where he made it clear that he tended "more and more to take a natural scientist's view of life" (1999: 121).

The French Lieutenant's Woman diverges from its predecessors mainly in terms of the way it ends. Unlike The Collector and The Magus, The French Lieutenant's Woman has multiple endings. The novel is brought to three different endings in

Chapters 44, 60 and 61—the first of which being the most conventional while the last one the least. The purpose of doing this is, to use Creighton's words, to allow the reader to be "reintroduced into the fictional experience" and to turn the spotlight back on "the creative function of the reader." Furthermore, she describes The French Lieutenant's Woman as a novel in which "the reader is drawn back into the fictional transaction, invited to share in the construction of imaginative possibilities" (219). On the other hand, Nicol believes that the multiplicity of the endings of The French Lieutenant's Woman should be taken as a prime indicator of its adherence to "the forking paths principle" of the postmodern narrative (110). It can also be regarded as a readerly novel because of the alternative endings it offers: Fowles "goes through the motions of authorial neutrality" as he offers three different versions of the ending to his novel (Binns, 331). McDaniel expresses a rather different opinion in her remark about The French Lieutenant's Woman and The Magus—either being brought to a multiplicity of endings or being left unfinished—that both novels are guided by games and godgames which "lead each protagonist to an end that is not an end" (40). All these aspects referred to above can well add up to the classification of The French Lieutenant's Woman as a post-modern novel in

> its break with the formal autonomy and rhetorical silence of modernist novels, in its invitation to the reader to participate in co-creation of the text, in its jarring conflation of Victorian and modern perspectives, in its metafictional commentary, in its blurred distinctions between the real and the fictional. (Creighton, 223)

The post-modernist manner in which Fowles chose to write The French Lieutenant's Woman combines with the way in which the interaction between the two major characters—namely, Sarah Woodruff and Charles Smithson—becomes one of the leading concerns of the novel. The initial enthusiasm with which Charles becomes an ardent reader of Sarah's story of how she has come to be known as the French lieutenant's woman later leads him to disown his Victorian possessions without the slightest hesitation. His desire to discover Sarah eventually brings him to the point at which he admits that he has to take his existential journey towards the discovery of his real self alone. The next section covers a discussion about the relation between Sarah and Charles and its implications upon the existential growth of Charles to a man whom Fowles leaves all alone at the threshold of authenticity.

3.3. The Implications of the Relation between Sarah and Charles

The relation between Sarah and Charles has been widely discussed by the scholars of Fowles's fiction. The commonly suggested opinion is that it is essentially existential. Fowles treats both Charles and Sarah as the two existentialists living in the Victorian age, because Sarah enables Charles to realize that he can become and remain authentic in the existentialist sense if he can fearlessly defend and preserve his existential freedom. However, there are other suggestions as well. These include discussions which propose that the relation between the two is a relation between the narrator and the reader. This proposition can be found in Rankin's comparison of Sarah to the narrator, and Charles to the reader. Rankin suggests that the narrator's frequent digressions from his story are aimed at making comments upon his own fiction so that the reader might better understand the working mechanism of his narrative; similarly, Sarah's digressions to the seaside cause Charles "to confront the inadequacy of his Victorian ideals" as well as "to evolve into an existentialist" (199). Rankin continues to suggest that Charles's faith in the Darwinian concepts of survival and evolution should be regarded as attributable to Fowles's decision to re-work a conventional Victorian story and make it evolve into a twentieth-century existentialist novel, woven with a contemporary sense of freedom:

> Since the conventions of the novel have "evolved" in order to imitate more closely the "real world" of twentieth century existentialism, this particular novel must blend with its literary environment in order to survive. At this point in the history of the novel, a thoroughly Victorian novel, written in the Victorian conventions, would be a mere fossil. (196)

Some others tend to regard The French Lieutenant's Woman as a tragedy, and they suggest that the relation between Charles and Sarah can be read from a psychoanalytical perspective which is basically founded upon the fact that neither Charles nor Sarah has existing family ties when the narrative commences. As is the case with Nicholas in The Magus, Charles is introduced to the reader as a thirty-two-year old young man. Neither of his parents is alive: his mother died when he was one year old, and his father passed away twenty years later. In a similar way, Sarah is presented to the reader as a character in her mid-twenties; yet, she has also virtually non-existent family relations. In the background of Sarah lies a father figure whose love of money has led to

the confinement of him to Dorchester Ayslum and subsequently to his death there a year later when she had yet begun to earn her own living.

In 1972, Gilbert J. Rose wrote an article about The French Lieutenant's Woman in which he discussed the significance of the relationship between a novel and its author from a psychoanalytical viewpoint. His discussion is by and large based upon the loss of unity, or oneness with the mother which Charles suffers at the age of one when his mother dies in childbirth—a fact which Rose believes can explain Charles's (as well as the author's) obsession with Sarah. Rose suggests that Charles's obsession with Sarah can be attributed to his unconscious attempts to restore his lost connection with his mother in his relationship with Sarah. This also explains why in the second ending Charles walks out of the home despite the fact that he sees that he is the father of a daughter:

> It can only be because Sarah and daughter are really ghosts-revivified images of the corpse of mother and sister. Charles has recreated them as he had done before in the form of Sarah the prostitute and her daughter, from whom he also fled. (168)

Rose also comments upon Fowles's decision to write The French Lieutenant's Woman out of his obsession with "the woman in black" (166). He believes that in writing a novel, the author hopes to restore his lost oneness with the mother "out of which his own newness was born" (173). The novel thus establishes the link between the past of the novelist and his present.

In his 1985 article, Douglas B. Johnstone similarly argued for the need to develop a psychoanalytical approach to The French Lieutenant's Woman if it is to be "fully appreciated" (72). Johnstone's description of The French Lieutenant's Woman as a tragedy rests upon his character and behaviour analysis of both Charles and Sarah from the psychoanalytical perspective: "The French Lieutenant's Woman is a tragic portrait of a decent man and woman caught in the locked gears of their unconscious responses to each other" (82). Johnstone furthermore tends to place special emphasis on the prerequisite for understanding Charles's behaviour in the first place in order to understand Sarah's as well (69). He also suggests that the element of mystery which exists in both The Magus and A Maggot has its analogue in The French Lieutenant's

Woman as well: for example, like Nicholas Urfe in The Magus and Henry Ayscough in A Maggot who are drawn closer to the enigma despite each step they take to unearth it, Charles Smithson also finds himself more and more entangled by the mystery of Sarah while he wishes to figure her out.

The abovementioned tendency to treat The French Lieutenant's Woman as a tragedy has been revised to cooperate with the existentialist approach as well. In his study of John Fowles as a modern novelist, Acheson discusses The French Lieutenant's Woman as a work of tragedy which can be analysed from an existentialist point of view. He develops different arguments about the authenticity and tragic statuses of both Sarah and Charles in accordance with his reading of the three different endings that Fowles has offered to his novel. His association of tragic flaw with existential inauthenticity rests upon his argument that while each ending accords Sarah and Charles a different status which can existentially be classified as either authentic or inauthentic, their motivation for combining their choices with their action can also be explained as typical of a tragic protagonist or antagonist. Briefly, his main postulation can be summed up as follows: existential inauthenticity should be regarded as a consequence of the tragic flaw in explaining the relationship between the action and the character (37).

The abovementioned suggestions to read The French Lieutenant's Woman as a text of tragedy seem to neglect the need to look at a significant component of existentialist philosophy, which is anxiety. Anxiety marks the point at which the relationship between Sarah and Charles takes on a particular significance, and hence it will become a central part of the discussion below. It is through anxiety that the changes from Charles the Victorian to Charles the 20th-century Existentialist, from Charles the pursuer of Sarah as the object of his sexual desire to Charles the pursuer of existential authenticity through his encounter with Sarah, and from someone who was simply one among the many early in the novel to someone else who has ridden himself of the imprisoning ties of the society can be explained.

3.4. The Ontological Implications of Anxiety

As has been previously pointed out, the scholars of Fowles's fiction commonly suggest that the consequence of the interaction between Sarah and Charles, which basically consists in getting closer to authenticity, should be read and interpreted in existentialist terms. This study, however, proposes that it can and indeed should be read in the ontological terms set out by Heidegger. Therefore, anxiety has been particularly chosen for this purpose as the term with which it will be convenient to comment upon the evolution of Charles from a Victorian into an existentialist, or from someone in flight from his own self into someone in need of his own self.

While in the Heideggerian ontology anxiety denotes the possibility of accessing to a truly authentic mode of being, fear is contrasted with it to designate the inauthentic mode of being. Although both are described as states of mind which make up the essential constituents of human existence, the reader of Being and Time is cautioned to remember that fear is the "inauthentic" mode of anxiety (Heidegger, 2008: 234). Moreover, fear is ontologically distinguished from anxiety in terms of its source. The cause of fear can only be spotted in entities within the world whose ontological status is distinct from that of Dasein. The entities which are ready-to-hand or present-at-hand can only be the source of fear. However, anxiety is related to the ontological constitution of Dasein which is expressed as Being-in-the-world. In a similar manner, while fear promotes forgetting, anxiety encourages remembering that existence is essentially a matter of choosing on an individual level. Therefore, the importance of anxiety lies in its power to enable human beings to realize that they are free to choose between authenticity and inauthenticity:

> Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free for* (*propensio in*…) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always it. (232)

Additionally, a close relationship exists between anxiety and uncanniness in the way Heidegger brings the two together: "In anxiety one feels '*uncanny*'" (233). With regard to the uncanniness, the function of anxiety appears to remind Dasein that its

mode of Being-in is ontologically different from that of other entities such as cars and cats. Whereas the Being-in of beings which are either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand denotes the mode of being inside, it signifies for Dasein the modes of being alongside or being familiar with. When Dasein is lost in its absorption in the world, it takes on the mode of Being-in of the present-at-hand or ready-to-hand entities. With anxiety, however, Dasein's mode of Being-in is restored to its original. To use Heidegger's own words, it is only through anxiety that "Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of the '*not-at-home*'" (233). In their explicatory notes on the concept of anxiety and uncanniness, Wrathall and Murphey jointly suggest that anxiety should be construed as an ontological component of Dasein's Being which alone acts for Dasein as the constant reminder of its uncanniness—or, its state of being not at home. Anxiety thus paves the way for the recognition that "I need to have a world and I long to be at home in or belong to that world" (2013: 19). In other words, anxiety constantly reminds Dasein that its ontological constitution is laid bare in its Being-in-the-world in the way which is unique to it.

According to Heidegger, human existence, or Dasein, in its simplest and barest form, is essentially grounded in its tendency to get lost both in the public contentment, or the "they" as Heidegger tends to name it, and in the daily activities which occupy much of one's time. It appears that human existence is for the most part programmed to become part of a larger organization, to seek shelter in it, to forget that responsibility for individual existence can and should be chosen over attachments to groups, and to believe that there exists no difference between a group identity and an individual one. This tendency of Dasein is described as a mode of being in which it keeps "falling into the 'they' and the 'world' of its concern" (230). As Dasein falls, it also flees from itself. Since it is only Dasein which emerges as the true owner of the potentiality to be itself in the authentic sense of the word, the fleeing of Dasein from itself implies its evasion of authenticity as well. Moreover, in its ontological state of falling, Dasein also flees from the burden of anxiety. To get back to itself, however, Dasein needs to be reminded that existence is essentially an issue of individual responsibility. At this point, Heidegger offers anxiety as the sole mechanism of individualization: "Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities" (232).

The upshot of all this can be summed up as follows: in its inauthentic mode of existence, Dasein understands and interprets all of the ontological phenomena in an everyday manner which is publicly governed. The individual Dasein ceases to exist at all. This mode of understanding and interpretation in which Dasein tends to maintain its existence is ontologically designated as falling. One of the most noticeable characteristics of falling is that it allows Dasein to turn away from itself. In turning away from itself, Dasein also flees "*into* the 'at-home' of publicness" (234). That is to say, Dasein feels satisfied with the public interpretation of its ontological constitution expressed as Being-in-the-world. It is at this point that anxiety manifests its significance for the recovery of the authenticity of Dasein and its Being. Anxiety awakens Dasein to the deception of the ease with which Dasein tends to stick to the publicly guided understanding and interpretation of all the ontological phenomena related to its Being.

The implication of the ontological significance of anxiety in The French Lieutenant's Woman can be located in the observation that Sarah acts as the source of anxiety in her mysteriously ambiguous interaction with Charles. Not only does Sarah take Charles on a journey and leave him alone and guideless at a critical fork, but also does she leave him face to face with the unknown when their journey ends abruptly. Nevertheless, while he was initially fearful that he was taking a severely wrong step in joining her, he gradually learns to overcome his fears as he travels to a destination, although he has had virtually no ideas about it before. To be more precise, she leaves him anxious in the ontological sense of the word about the possibility of making the right choice between authenticity and inauthenticity. And all this becomes possible as a result of the interaction between Sarah and Charles, which had begun earlier with Charles's discovery of Sarah.

3.4.1. Charles's discovery of Sarah

Fowles casts Sarah as a dark figure at the very beginning of his novel, and he makes it a source of growing attraction to Charles. Charles's initial encounter with the portrayal of Sarah as an enigmatic figure, therefore, comes quite early in the novel. Charles sees Sarah from a longish distance for the first time when he takes a walk with his betrothed, Ernestina, in Lyme Bay. While the reader is given the initial impression

of her as “a dark shape,” Charles’s initial impression of her is shaped by what he hears from Ernestina about her: that she is most commonly referred to as both “poor Tragedy” and “The French Lieutenant’s … Woman;” that “she is a little … mad;” that she often comes to Lyme Bay because “she waits for him [the French lieutenant] to return;” and that “she is a servant of some kind” (9). When he goes nearer to her, however, his expectation that he is going to be met with “the favoured feminine look” of his age is proven false at once by the emergence of a facial expression which is described as uniquely “unforgettable” and “tragic.” Sarah’s face strikes Charles as distinctly un-Victorian largely because it defies “artifice,” “hypocrisy,” “hysteria,” “mask,” and “sign[s] of madness” (10).

Just as the reader does, Charles also receives much of the information about Sarah from other characters in the novel, without being sure enough to know that they are reliable or they are not. For instance, the vicar describes Sarah as being “slightly crazed,” because “she suffers from grave attacks of melancholia” (35). Similarly, Dr Grogan, a typical Victorian medic, deems Sarah’s case out of range of medical treatment when he defines her behaviour as an indication of being desirous to be “a sacrificial victim” as well as of being “possessed” and “dark” (157). Moreover, in contrast to the common Victorian perception of religiosity, which is perhaps best embodied in the personality of Mrs Poulteney, the public perception of her is that “she is a sinner” (37).

Charles’s first one-to-one encounter with Sarah occurs in one of his wanderings on Ware Commons in which he believes that he has “stumbled on a corpse” below the edge of the plateau. What he sees is actually “a woman asleep” (70). While this is a non-verbal encounter, the next one allows them to speak to each other. When he sees her once again in the woods, she begs him not to tell anybody that he has seen her “in this place” (87). Their third encounter takes place at Mrs Poulteney’s house, where an exchange of glances between Charles and Sarah reveals, according to the narrator, that “two strangers had recognized they shared a common enemy” (106). It is during their first meeting in privacy that Sarah tells Charles for the first time her own story of how she met with the French lieutenant, Varguennes, after he was rescued from a ship wreck and brought to Mrs Talbot’s for medical treatment, of how she rejected Varguennes’s

insistent proposal to take her to France with him after his recovery, of how she failed to resist the temptation to go out and see Varguennes in secret after his return back to Weymouth for a brief period of time, of how she decided to let him have sex with her despite her realization of an adverse change in Varguennes's character to insincerity. It is at this moment that he perceives at first hand the kind of determination which he probably has not seen or heard of before—the determination to "marry shame" as the sole source of existential survival. Sarah explains to Charles the reason why she "did this shameful thing" in a manner in which it sounds like she is delivering an existential manifesto:

'I did it so that I should never be the same again. I did it so that people should point at me, should say, there walks the French Lieutenant's Whore – oh yes, let the word be said. So that they should know I have suffered, and suffer, as others suffer in every town and village in this land. I could not marry that man. So I married shame. I do not mean that I knew what I did, that it was in cold blood that I let Varguennes have his will of me. It seemed to me then as if I threw myself off a precipice or plunged a knife into my heart. It was a kind of suicide. An act of despair, Mr Smithson. I know it was wicked … blasphemous, but I knew no other way to break out of what I was. If I had left that room, and returned to Mrs Talbot's, and resumed my former existence, I know that by now I should be truly dead … and by my own hand. What has kept me alive is my shame, my knowing that I am truly not like other women. […] I think I have a freedom they cannot understand. No insult, no blame, can touch me. Because I have set myself beyond the pale. I am nothing, I am hardly human any more. I am the French Lieutenant's Whore.' (175)

Here, Sarah is in fact declaring to Charles her upcoming existential battle against the suppression of the Victorians—something perhaps best embodied once again in the personification of Mrs Poulteney.

Fowles appears to have inserted Sarah into the novel as the major character whose embodiment of the critical perspective on the Victorian attitude towards several issues, including religion, gender roles, marriage and the fulfilment of family obligations, and the like, far surpasses her time. Yet, what perhaps most clearly distinguishes Sarah from the others, including Charles, is that her actions show no sign of fearing that she may have to face the bitterest ending ever imaginable at that time unless she agrees to the Victorian standards of morality as well of religion: a state of total isolation from every department of the society. In fact, Sarah is someone who can courageously refuse with indignation to be called a sinner for entertaining her wish to

remain aloof in her frequent deviations away from the centre to the periphery which are basically intended to allow her to enjoy solitude. Sarah's main objection consists in her refusal to consent to the common belief propagated largely by Mrs Poulteney that sinning can alone justify suffering and pain (142). Despite this huge difference in their perceptions, and despite the fact that Sarah's existential escapades largely result from the public rejection of its approval as well as of its permission to share the same space, she refuses to be provoked easily into feelings of fear. Sarah's frequent visits to Ware Commons—despite its pejorative connotations—can provide an example: the significance which Mrs Poulteney attaches to Ware Commons is profoundly different from that which Sarah attaches to it: while Sarah regards it as "nothing but a large wood" where she could spend some time alone because "no one frequents it," Mrs Poulteney's remarks reflect the firmly established Victorian belief that walking on Ware Commons is alone an indisputably sufficient cause for public scandal (92). Additionally, despite her presence as a governess at Mrs Poulteney's, which covertly meant that she has to remain highly alert to Mrs Poulteney's voyeuristic control over her, and despite the certainty that it will be met with strong disapproval from Mrs Poulteney, Sarah goes out alone and continues to do so; she refuses to sit together with the visitors from time to time; and she "still shows signs of attachment to her seducer"—that is to say, the French lieutenant (60).

As has been mentioned above, after his initial encounters with Sarah, Charles emerges as the single person to start to develop a tendency not to join others in regarding her as a fallen woman. The typical Victorian perception of her dictates that she should be viewed as a fallen woman simply because of "her impulse towards freedom and her instinctual knowledge of sexuality" (Brantlinger et al., 1972: 340). However, unlike others who tend to ignore the intellectual potential that Sarah holds, he is strongly advised by Dr Drogan to regard Sarah as someone who has been inflicted with "a typhus of the intellectual faculties" (225). Yet, Charles senses that Sarah indeed has the kind of intellectual capacity which sets her apart from her contemporaries: "He had realized she was more intelligent and independent than she seemed" (120). What is more, it is only Charles who offers a helping hand to Sarah and advises her to leave Lyme altogether to enjoy a happier life (123).

At this point, the question may arise as to why it is only Charles but not the others who tends to dismiss the public perception of Sarah as the French Lieutenant's Whore. One part of the answer for this question appears to consist in Charles being a self-imposed wanderer in search of an ontologically different and far more personal narrative, which he believes that only Sarah is likely to have:

> It was a fixed article of Charles's creed that he was not like the great majority of his peers and contemporaries. That was why he had travelled so much; he found English society too hidebound, English solemnity too solemn, English thought too moralistic, English religion too bigoted. (129)

The other part seems to be embedded in a state of confusion in which Charles admits to Dr Grogan that he feels like "a man possessed against his will":

> There is something in her. A knowledge, an apprehension of nobler things than are compatible with either evil or madness. Beneath the dross … I cannot explain. (227)

However, the narrator continues to suggest that Charles, whose individual existence gradually grows contrary to the Victorian existence at all its levels, can hardly be expected not to regard Ernestina as "artificial," "characterless" and "monotonous" (129). With her social standing which does not allow her to stop and think for a moment that things could just as well be conceived as and actually be different than they are, Ernestina remains a distant hope for Charles. It is highly significant to take notice of the narratorial remark which concerns the reason for Charles's attraction to Sarah, stated as follows:

> [Charles was attracted to] some emotion, some possibility she [Sarah] symbolized. She made him aware of a deprivation. His future had always seemed to him of vast potential; and now suddenly it was a fixed voyage to a known place. She reminded him of that. (130)

In sum, it is Charles's pursuit of "the meaning of life" which takes him to Sarah (298). In other words, Charles finds in Sarah what he searches for but fails to find elsewhere: an embodiment of the will as well as of the resolution, both mixed up with a high degree of anxiety, to tread alone the path to the realization of an utterly individual potential in existential terms—or, to sum it up with one single word, to authenticity.

3.4.2. Sarah's Ontological Ambiguity

This section is concerned with the presentation of the ambiguity which surrounds Sarah and her narrative. Sarah deliberately constructs her story of how she has become publicly known as the French lieutenant's woman in an ambiguous manner. Charles easily falls prey to the ambiguity of her infamy as the fallen woman and the story behind it. However, he slowly begins to realize that there is something strange about her story. The strangeness lies in the way in which Sarah creates an ontologically ambiguous story. The following is a discussion of how Charles is influenced by the ontological ambiguity of Sarah's story.

Hutcheon stresses the significance of parody as a central constituent of the novel at issue and voices her belief that existentialism, combined with "the ironic, parodic function of the modern narrator," offers a unique perspective from which it becomes possible to "see Sarah as Sarah and not as the French Lieutenant's Whore" (85). In other words, she argues that it takes the reader as well as Charles a considerable amount of time to develop an existential insight of this kind with which they can fully realize that "Sarah's identity as the fallen woman is a *fiction*" (87). Therefore, she suggests that the reading of The French Lieutenant's Woman should incorporate an understanding as well as an appreciation of existentialism as the philosophical framework in which the writing of a conventional Victorian story from a twentieth-century perspective becomes intelligible.

In accordance with Hutcheon, Cooper also suggests in her extensive analysis of The French Lieutenant's Woman that the metafictional dynamics of the novel makes possible the reading of Sarah as a mysteriously fictional character who is allowed individual freedom to join her creator in the process of creating a text (114). While she is written by the narrator into his own text, she is also allowed to write her own narrative within it. As Tarbox also points out, the narrator and Sarah work in collaboration while they are "simultaneously writing and undercutting" what they have set to write (1996: 94). Yet, the text which Sarah constructs refuses to allow its reader—Charles in particular—to grasp its meaning fully, just as Nicholas had not been allowed full access to the domain created by Conchis in The Magus. Cooper believes that the

major reason why Charles cannot get a full grasp of the meaning of Sarah's text is that it is "an ontologically ambiguous text." Both Conchis and Sarah are able to create narratives which can be regarded structurally identical to the larger narratives available in The Magus and The French Lieutenant's Woman, because both novels tend to advocate ambiguity as a result of their "narrative indeterminacy and rejection of closure" (110).

As Cooper continues to suggest, however, it is true that Sarah resorts to occasional manipulations of Charles for the purpose of writing her own text (129). In other words, as Lenz also argues, Sarah is allowed narratorial as well as existential freedom to manipulate a fictional character of the larger narrative by

> implicating Charles in her situation, luring him out of Lyme to her hotel in Exeter, deceiving him into an intimate meeting with her in her fire lit bedroom, seducing him into an act of brief but world-shattering intercourse, and finally abandoning him, Sarah uses Charles to transcend her role as the French Lieutenant's Whore. (2008: 122)

Tarbox also agrees with Cooper and Lenz that Sarah manipulates Charles. Tarbox's observation is centred on Sarah's manipulation of "Charles into a position where he must begin to deconstruct his affiliation with official manhood" (96).

Yet, it is not easy to morally judge Sarah for what she has done, because, as Fowles makes it clear in one of his interviews, he has intentionally left her in a greyer area where it is highly difficult to come up with a fairly definitive interpretation of "her character and her motives" altogether, and to reach a conclusion as to whether she should be held accountable "for using Charles to find her own freedom" or not (Barnum, 110). McSweeney similarly points out to a potential difficulty of the same kind which is likely to accompany attempts to interpret Sarah, and instead calls for action "to establish a state of phenomenological congruence with her – that is, to enter into an acceptance of unknowing and mystery" (141).

The mystery issues from the fact that Sarah is fundamentally different from the other characters in The French Lieutenant's Woman. Fowles's portrayal of her as an exception—or, as an outcast—to the society as it used to exist in 1867 finds its best

expression in scenes where she is depicted as a lonely woman standing on the quay of Lyme Regis, "the symbolic 'wild zone' of the Undercliff," staring out at the sea for hours (Nicol, 107). In most instances, Fowles takes her somewhere across the border between the sea and the land and presents to the reader the image of a woman facing the sea with her back turned to Lyme Regis. Similarly, the public definition of her as the French lieutenant's woman, or whore, is one of the reasons behind her frequent digressions to the seaside/outside. Therefore, unlike others, Sarah emerges as "the most *un*stereotypical character in the novel" (Scruggs, 102). McSweeney similarly describes Sarah as the sole character who is distinguished from the others by her "energizing mystery" which the others do not have (139). Moreover, Sarah leads a "totally isolated" existence which cannot be helped (Tatham, 407). She is not representative of a typical Victorian personality and femininity, either. She is rather someone with a mindset which is essentially and substantially different from her contemporaries. Most importantly, as a modern author, Fowles allows Sarah the freedom to have her own fiction in which she creates and ensures her own fictional existence. All this suggests that it is not easy to define her by the standards of the 1860s alone.

As Lenz suggests, she is a woman aware of "the limitations of epistemological and ontological systems available to her" and who, therefore, feels the need to seek "more intuitive and authentic ways of knowing and being" (102). The impenetrability of Sarah as a character and her narrative as an ambiguous text is in fact intended to push Charles closer and closer towards existential authenticity (128). In this respect, she holds a transformative power which most of her contemporaries do not have. Hence, hers can be classified as an individual search for a way out of the Victorian world, as a conscious and deliberate endeavour to set herself free from all the constraints of the Victorian society that exist, and as a crucial attempt to establish herself as Sarah rather than a French lieutenant's woman on a different level, both ontologically and epistemologically—an attempt which will become an initiator of a great philosophical debate for the twentieth-century existentialists.

On the other hand, for the most part, Charles "is held in the pleasantly anaesthetizing expectations of his class and personal rectitude" (Tatham, 408).

Charles's paleontological[12] interest in fossils is largely attributed to his unconscious fear that his Victorian existence is coming to its end; and he remains largely inauthentic about his wish to break off his existential relationship with the Victorian era. Despite his early propensity for the Victorian way of living, however, Charles grows unable to ignore the call of the upcoming twentieth-century existentialist philosophy to face the existential angst at first hand. Just as Nicholas is attracted to the mystery surrounding Bourani in The Magus, Charles is also attracted to the mystery surrounding Sarah. Charles appears to sense her ontologically ambiguous text in the first place; moreover, he emerges as the sole character in the novel with a keener interest in learning more about her story; and he gradually grows impatient to hear more from her about herself; and furthermore, he feels that he has to have necessary tools of interpretation to understand her.

As Acheson suggests, it seems that, in sum, Sarah is far more likely to achieve the existential authenticity than Charles appears to be. The possibility of Charles achieving the existential authenticity emerges, therefore, largely as a matter of his ability to discover that he is free to choose, accompanied by a peculiar feeling of anxiety though, just as Fowles describes the anxiety of freedom as an impact of "the realization that one is free and the realization that being free is a situation of terror" (343). Sarah comes to his help at this point: as long as the final ending of the novel is concerned, Acheson argues, she emerges as the female Conchis of The French Lieutenant's Woman and directs Charles to "the threshold of authentic self-discovery" by enabling him to realize that "he is terrifyingly free in a world bereft of God and devoid of moral guidelines" to choose to become what he wishes to be (341-42).

3.4.3. Charles's Existential Evolution

The French Lieutenant's Woman gives its reader a portrayal of personal evolution in the existentialist terms. It is a portrayal of Charles turning from a hero into an anti-hero "who must pick his way through unforeseen disappointments" (Brantlinger et al., 1972: 353). Charles fearfully takes steps in the path of losing his Victorian self on

[12] Palaeontology organizes the scientific gathering and study of fossil remnants of dead animals and plants.

the one hand, while he gets nearer to the destination of "a firmer understanding of the condition of man" on the other (354). As the narrative progresses towards its multiple ending, Charles shows fewer signs of fearing that his choice of Sarah over Ernestina is going to cost him a lot. His feelings of fear become replaced by feelings of anxiety. Nevertheless, these feelings of anxiety are paradoxically as well as densely wrapped up with a sense of disenchantment with his Victorian beliefs and ideals, and much more importantly, with his personal trust in Sarah. His sexual intercourse with Sarah in Exeter ends with his realization that contrary to her previous story of her relationship with Varguennes in which she said that she had given herself to Varguennes, she has actually given her virginity to Charles. Sarah's deception deeply shakes his belief in her as well as in whatever she represents for him. Therefore, he goes to a church in the hope of restoring his Victorian beliefs and ideals. However, when he exits the church, he goes out with feelings of disillusionment with whatever represents the Victorian age:

> He seemed as he stood there to see all his age, its tumultuous life, its iron certainties and rigid conventions, its repressed emotion and facetious humour, its cautious science and incautious religion, its corrupt politics and immutable castes, as the great hidden enemy of all his deepest yearnings. That was what had deceived him; and it was totally without love or freedom … but also without thought, without intention, without malice, because the deception was in its very nature; and it was not human, but a machine. (366)

He is driven by his exploration of the void in his Victorian existence to an overwhelming sense of anxiety that unless he does something substantial to fill the void with a truer sense of purpose, he will end up being the Charles he has always been. In this sense, his discovery leads him to do anything, at any cost, to adopt a more authentic mode of existence and be the Charles he has not been yet.

In fact, Charles remains unshaken in his resolution to rediscover Sarah, although he knows that he is losing all his Victorian possessions one by one as he vigilantly keeps searching for her. This can as well be taken as proof that he is no longer governed in his actions by feelings of fear. When Charles goes to Lyme from Exeter; he writes a letter to Sarah in which he expresses his resolution to break off his engagement to Ernestina. His disclosure to Ernestina of his intention to end his engagement to her causes him to sustain his first loss. Not only does he lose Ernestina, but also does he lose the prospects of a financially rich future. He afterwards decides to go back to

Exeter to see Sarah once again. However, he finds that she has already gone to London. This is the second loss he suffers. When his search for Sarah in London produces no results, he decides to travel widely across the continental Europe first and then take a ship to the United States of America, where several months later he receives a note of information that Sarah has been found at last. He has no sooner gotten the news than he leaves America. It is at this point that the narrative is brought to double alternative conclusions.

The first alternative to the conventional ending is happier because Charles reunites with Sarah, though it may be thought of as a bitter reunion which takes place as follows. Fowles takes Charles to a house in London owned by Mr Dante Gabriel Rossetti, the brother of Christina Rossetti. He learns that Sarah works as an assistant to Mr Rossetti, a renowned pre-Raphaelite painter. Shortly after their encounter, their conversation about how she has come to be an assistant as well as a model to Mr Rossetti jumps to Charles's accusation that Sarah has lied to him when she previously told him that she loved him. The conversation later drifts into her explanation to Charles of the reasons why she insistently has refused to marry: one of the reasons is that she does not want to share her life with someone else, and the other one is that she is perfectly happy with her present life (453). However, Charles does not believe that she is telling the truth; on the contrary, he accuses her of having been a hater of the male sex from the very start, intent with a masochistic purpose: "You have not only planted the dagger in my breast, you have delighted in twisting it" (456). The reunion of Charles with Sarah takes place in tears after she reveals to him the fact that he is a father of a baby girl, named Lalage (461). One is at this point prompted to ask what would have happened if Charles had never sought Sarah, or if he never found her? When he similarly asks why the reunion was allowed to take place only after he continuously searched for Sarah, finally found her after months of awaiting the news of a possible discovery, and was shockingly introduced to Lalage, the only response he receives from Sarah is this: "It had to be so." It is, therefore, important to note that this ending is brought to its conclusion when Charles admits the impossibility of unearthing the mystery around Sarah: "Shall I ever understand your parables?" (462). The second alternative to the conventional ending is rather furious. The narrative is resumed from the moment when Charles accuses Sarah of being a liar. A brief exchange of angry words between Charles and Sarah is followed by Charles leaving the house in a rage,

without knowing that Sarah has given birth to his daughter. At the end, Charles chooses to be “a lifelong celibate” (Brantlinger et al., 1972: 342).

As has been hinted at in previous chapters, in rounding his narrative off with his final comments, Fowles re-affirms his existentialist position as a firm believer in chance, or as he prefers to term it, hazard: we are shaped by our chance-given abilities. Yet, he quotes Marx as defining life as “*the actions of men* (and of women) *in pursuit of their ends*” (469). In other words, he emphasizes the need for change by means of the will to act. By replacing piety with authenticity in the second epigraph from Arnold Mathew to his final chapter, Fowles stresses the importance of authenticity as the fundamental principle which he believes should guide all these actions.

Charles’s movement towards freedom in its modern sense away from duty in its Victorian sense gains momentum as the three endings are sequentially presented to the reader. Actually, the three alternative endings may as well be read as markers of the stages of the radical evolution in Charles’s perception of the society as well as of his own self. As Rankin suggests, when Fowles concludes his narrative in Chapter 44, he gives the reader a typical portrayal of the Victorian gentleman; when he brings his narrative to its conclusion in Chapter 60, however, he shows the reader the romantic side of Charles; and finally, in Chapter 61, Fowles presents Charles in his “existential rebirth” (205). In the last ending, Charles becomes aware of the need to start afresh, yet, alone and with a fundamentally distinct sense of freedom from whatever which is strictly Victorian:

> Charles Smithson’s rite of passage largely fits the paradigm of Victorian spiritual crisis in which, usually triggered by loss of faith, the individual is thrust from the passive security of traditional beliefs and moral and social sanctions into an abyss of self-consciousness and a sense of chaotic flux of human existence, from which he eventually emerges with a new, more thisworldly and selfish faith. (McSweeney, 136)

He can only begin to sense the fictionality of Sarah’s identity as a whore when she fearlessly rejects him. It is at the very end of the novel that Sarah rejects Charles in order to make him conceive that unlike her, he has long been deprived of the freedom to have his own fiction. As Acheson also points out, Charles can only bring himself to the point of existential authenticity in the third and final ending of The French Lieutenant’s

Woman where he can fully relinquish his fears as well as his "adherence to contemporary convention – to notions of duty, honour and self-respect" (42).

To conclude the discussion in this chapter about The French Lieutenant's Woman, it can be argued that just as Sarah needs Charles for the realization of her authorial desire "to advance the chapters in her own unfolding life-narrative," Charles also needs Sarah in return "to make Sarah and her narrative conform to his [readerly] desires" (Siegle, 1983: 134). In this regard, The French Lieutenant's Woman portrays the evolution of Charles from someone who believes that the provincial life has "no mystery" and "no romance" into a romancer enthralled by the impenetrable mystery of Sarah; from "the scientist, the despiser of novels" into an ardent seeker of meaning in Sarah's narrative; and from someone engulfed by fear that he may lose his privileges should he act contrary to his Victorian ideals into someone else who has replaced fear with anxiety as he has lost all his privileges as a Victorian during his search for a chance to get back to Sarah (11). In short, The French Lieutenant's Woman can be read as a novel in which Sarah invites Charles to the realization that although the quest for the authentic mode of existence allows no space for fear, it necessarily entails the existential angst, or anxiety.

Fowles's reconstruction of a Victorian romance in the postmodern style in The French Lieutenant's Woman is widely regarded as the prime example of his mastery of fiction. However, his mastery in this sense is not confined to The French Lieutenant's Woman alone. The follow-up comes with the publication of A Maggot in 1986, in which Fowles goes as far back in time as 300 hundred years, and creates a fictional work out of a news report of the discovery of a hanging body and of someone missing. The story of a romance and the subsequent zigzags in the path of the narration in The French Lieutenant's Woman later become the story of a mystery and the ensuing investigation in A Maggot. More importantly, the authenticity of the choices which Charles makes in The French Lieutenant's Woman regarding his future with or without Sarah becomes the authenticity of interpretation with which Ayscough reads or misreads the testimonies in A Maggot.

CHAPTER FOUR

A MAGGOT: THE AUTHENTICITY OF INTERPRETATION

The aim of the discussion in this chapter is to provide an existentialist reading of how interpretation, a constituent of the ontological definition of human existence as care, can be a marker of the authenticity of existence in A Maggot. The focus will be placed upon Rebecca Hocknell Lee and Henry Aycough as the two characters whose interpretations of the same event are argued to lead them to entirely different conclusions. One becomes the mother of a daughter who would later be the founder of a new religious movement, namely Quakerism, whereas the other remains where he had always been.

4.1. An Overview of A Maggot

A Maggot is John Fowles's last novel which he published in 1986. In a similar manner to The French Lieutenant's Woman, A Maggot also embodies what may be loosely called a combination of three different roles of John Fowles as an author in one fictional work: we have an author adopting the roles of a critic, a historian and a fabulator all at once while he is looking at the first half of the 18th century from the perspective of someone living in the second half of the 20th century (Cooper, 215). The question of why A Maggot was set in the first half of the 18th century finds its best

answer in an interview where Fowles said that he had developed a great interest in the 18th century, especially in its first half, since he came to regard it as a special period of the British history when some "important socio-cultural movements" and "enormous changes" were either taking place or were about to occur (Fowles and Foulke, 1985: 377). Similarly, speaking to James R. Baker of the temporal setting of A Maggot in 1736, Fowles referred to it as the year when three major historical events, namely the French Revolution, the American War of Independence, and the Romantic movement, had yet to wait for their turns to come (1986: 666). His authorial remark on his choice of the last day of April 1736 as the date at which the story was set draws attention to its equal distance in time from the English Revolution in 1689 and to the French in 1789. In this regard, A Maggot emerges as a fine example of having a fictional setting sometime before or after the birth of some important historical events or figures in the history of England.

In his interview with Barnum, Fowles said that he often developed the story, the plot and the narrative of his novels around a particular image that he may sometimes have kept cherishing over a decade, because he often regarded himself "a very slow producer" who "put[s] books away and forget[s] all about them for long periods, sometimes for years on end" (109). Just as it was the case with both The French Lieutenant's Woman and The Magus, A Maggot was likewise borne out of an image. He spoke of A Maggot, yet unfinished at the time of the interview, and said that it sprung from an image that he had had for over a decade of "a group of [five] people riding across a skyline" (118). In his prologue to A Maggot, Fowles wrote that well before he began to write it, he had developed an obsession with a recurring image:

> For some years before its writing a small group of travellers, faceless, without apparent motive, went in my mind towards an event. Evidently in some past, since they rode horses, and in a deserted landscape; but beyond this very primitive image, nothing. I do not know where it came from, or why it kept obstinately rising from my unconscious. The riders never progressed to any destination. They simply rode along a skyline, like a sequence of looped film in a movie projector; or like a single line of verse, the last remnant of a lost myth. (1996a: 5)[13]

[13] All further references in this chapter without the specified author and without the specified year are to A Maggot.

A Maggot opens with the scene of these five people travelling on horseback to Bideford for a mysterious purpose. The time is "the last afternoon of April" in 1736 and the place is "a remote upland in the far south-west of England" (7). They find a lodging to spend the last night of April in Barnstable. Although they are scheduled to continue with their journey on the morning of May 1st, the journey unexpectedly halts. The reason is that one of them, namely Mr Bartholomew, mysteriously has disappeared and he will never be heard of or seen again for the rest of the novel, and the other, namely Dick Thurlow, his deaf-mute servant, has been found hanging dead with violets stuffed into his mouth. With the unexpected disappearance of Mr Bartholomew and the discovery of the death of his servant, Fowles abruptly breaks off the story and leaves the room to Henry Ayscough, a lawyer hired by the father of Mr Bartholomew, an unnamed duke, to investigate the mysterious incident, and to question the other three travellers and to find out the truth about his son's whereabouts.

It is interesting to note that except for Dick, the other three are all hired and disguised by Mr Bartholomew under various false names and relations. Francis Lacy, an actor whom Mr Bartholomew assigns the role of an elderly merchant called Mr Brown, passes himself off as the uncle of Mr Bartholomew. Similarly, David Jones, from Wales, another actor whom Mr Bartholomew introduces to the public as his bodyguard, adopts the false name of Sergeant Timothy Farthing. Lastly, Rebecca Lee, also known as Fanny or the Quaker Maid, who is a whore, is instructed by Mr Bartholomew to introduce herself as Louise to the public. Rebecca is later in the novel to be revealed as repentant for her former state as a whore, and as pregnant with the real historical figure, namely Ann Lee, who will later turn out to be the future founder of the Shaker movement in America.

A Maggot can perhaps be summed up as succinctly as follows: a diligent detective search for the true causes of a mysterious death of a deaf and mute servant and the disappearance of his lord ends up nowhere but in a doomed failure. In this regard, A Maggot can be considered as a novel of mystery, followed by a vain investigation carried out in the form of a long exchange of questions and answers between a solicitor and a group of people. However, each of those questioned tells the questioner his or her own version of the same story—something which makes A Maggot a novel told by

multiple narrators. All Fowles does in A Maggot is to present the reader with the transcripts of the sworn testimonies of various people, leaving the reader all alone to make his/her choice of what to believe and what not to believe. To this effect, the authorial intrusion into the construction of the individual narratives is also kept at its lowest. As Fowles told Katherine Tarbox, the sense of mystery is even more intensified as the author disdains to help the narrator to allow the reader to fill in the gaps in A Maggot (1999: 163). Neither the narrator nor the reader is revealed the full extent of the events, because, as it has been pointed out as part of a discussion of the scope of omniscience which has been made available to the narrator of A Maggot, the reader is positioned at the same level of omniscience as the narrator:

> Fowles does not grant his narrator psychological and spatial omniscience but restricts his proximity to the characters. For example, the narrator is as much in the dark as the reader concerning the enigmatic motives and character of Bartholomew […] (Holmes and Fowles, 1991: 234)

A similar remark can be found in Lenz's analysis of A Maggot where he argues that "the narrator of A Maggot has no special knowledge of the events the novel investigates" (203).

Additionally, A Maggot can be argued to represent the type of novel which qualifies as an example of detective fiction with lots of blanks to be filled in by the reader while he or she tries hard in his or her search for a safe conclusion at the end of the narrative, if something of the kind is ever possible, because, as Acheson puts it, A Maggot has the three major characteristics of being vague, uncertain and mysterious (80). In this regard, A Maggot stands out as a novel in which the load of the work falls upon the shoulders of the reader because it has much more left out of the narrative rather than put in it. In fact, in 1988, only two years after A Maggot was published, Fowles used the analogy between the ways in which nature and fiction were similarly designed with "full of gaps," and he borrowed from Roland Barthes the French term '*jouissance'* while he told Katherine Tarbox that he regarded reading a novel as much creative an act as writing it could be (1999: 155). In his earlier interviews, especially in those with Barnum in 1984 and with Carlin Romano in 1986, Fowles similarly stressed the importance of selecting what to leave out rather than what to put in while writing a novel. It was especially in his interview with Barnum that he stressed that being able to

make sound decisions as to what to exclude and what to include forms “a major part of the skill of a writer” (103). Similarly, he defined the “area of mystery” as “a very important element in the novel” (Relf, 124). The point of leaving out appears to force the reader to fill in as many blanks in a fictional piece of writing as possible. It is especially in A Maggot that the narrative is designed to give the reader an idea about “the difficulties involved in being certain about something that happened even a short time ago” (Acheson, 77). To use the words of Walter Miller Jr., the reader is teased all the more about tolerating a far greater degree of “indeterminacy” than ever “as to plot and character” in A Maggot (1985: 1).

It can perhaps be argued that A Maggot is the novel among the other novels of Fowles which has the most to leave out of the narrative, and which Fowles feared would therefore “enrage people” (Relf, 124). Fowles even admitted to Romano that he had taken a risky step in writing A Maggot because he avoided explaining everything in it (1999: 136). In terms of its plot construction, Fowles takes the reader to a certain point in the narrative where he leaves him/her all alone with the transcription of a long exchange of questions and answers between the questioned eyewitnesses and the questioner lawyer, Henry Ayscough, hired by the father of Mr Bartholomew to conduct an inquiry just “like an academic historian would” into his Lordship’s whereabouts which remains unknown both to the reader and to him throughout the novel (Acheson, 81).

In her brilliant discussion of the connection between the self, the world and the art in Fowles’s fiction, Onega refers to A Maggot as “his most powerful historiographic metafiction” (46). However, Fowles himself had written in the epilogue to his novel and later told James R. Baker during an interview that “he’d done absolutely no research” about the characters. Therefore, Fowles refrained from being regarded as an academic historian pursuing certitude (663). Yet, the subject-matter of A Maggot has been historically enveloped “in a haze of uncertainty” (Holmes and Fowles, 1991: 241). For this reason, it should be noted that although A Maggot appears to be an historical novel at first sight, Fowles makes it clear in his epilogue to A Maggot that it “is a maggot” and it should not be regarded as “an attempt, either in fact or in language, to reproduce known history” (455).

Given their chances of discovering the truth which lies somewhere beneath the multiple layers of accounts of one and the same mysterious event in which Mr Bartholomew disappears and Dick is found dead with violets stuffed into his mouth, the reader of A Maggot and Henry Ayscough seem to have an equal share of success, because epistemologically both stand at an equal distance from the narration, and both have only their own senses to rely on when they need to find out possible contradictions which might contrarily affect the reliability of various testimonies. The reader also feels driven to join Henry Ayscough in his confession to his Lord that he has not been successful in discovering the truth about Mr Bartholomew and Dick in "his attempt to reconstruct the past" (Holmes and Fowles, 1991: 231). As Acheson also notes, hearing all those testimonies enables Ayscough to go only a step or two further than he was at the outset of his inquiry (88). Onega makes a similar point when she argues that hearing four different interpretations of one and the same mysterious incident brings Henry Ayscough, along with "the realism-biased reader," only to an inevitable deadlock in his estimation of them (46). Henry Ayscough's excuse for his own failure to establish an irrefutable opinion is, however, in fact a tricky one, since he postulates that his inability to establish the truth is a result of God's decision to preclude humankind from knowing all:

> Man would of his nature know all; but it is God who decrees what shall or shall not be known; and here must we resign ourselves to accept His great wisdom and mercy in such matters, which is that He deems it often best and kindest to us mortals that we shall not know all. (450)

This should in fact be taken as evidence that Ayscough is using the religious argument to justify his failure in a manner which is typical of existential inauthenticity. His unwillingness to take upon himself the responsibility for his failure exemplifies the usual attitude which used to be available in his time. With the advent of existentialism at the turn of the twentieth century, however, the focus began to be placed upon the need to admit the responsibility on an individual level for the consequences of decisions and actions. As a result, the resort to the religion to explain the failure has lost its function as existentialism has gained growing popularity. Existentialism has therefore become the voice of those who look askance at most of the religious arguments when they are used to cover up failures or dishonesty.

4.2. Three Figures: Mr Bartholomew, H. Ayscough and Rebecca H. Lee

A Maggot presents its readers with three main strands of outlook on life, separately embodied by Mr Bartholomew, Henry Ayscough and Rebecca Hocknell Lee. These major characters can be compared to some of those in both The Magus and The French Lieutenant's Woman. In A Maggot, Mr Bartholomew appears to do a slightly different version of what Conchis has previously done in The Magus: both employ actors and actresses to create 'texts' of their own construction, or a false impression of the reality (Cooper, 218). Furthermore, like Conchis and Sarah, Mr Bartholomew embodies the characteristic of an enigmatic figure. The parallelism between Mr Bartholomew and Conchis and Sarah can be extended to cover the relation between Nicholas Urfe and Henry Ayscough which makes them emerge as truth-seekers without a prospect of much success. Like Urfe, Ayscough does the job of seeking ways to establish a secure understanding of the truth. However, both either misread or fail altogether to read the texts created by their magi for their own godgames. A structurally similar, yet content-wise different relation exists between Alison and Rebecca, the two female characters situated in both novels, who are distinguished from others by virtue of their adherence to their own interpretation of the texts. Like Alison, Rebecca represents the female wisdom.

4.2.1. Mr Bartholomew as the Enigmatic Figure

To begin with Mr Bartholomew, he essentially emerges as the most enigmatic figure of all in A Maggot. In this respect, he bears a resemblance not only to Conchis in The Magus but also to Sarah in The French Lieutenant's Woman (Tatham, 406). He also enacts what may be loosely called the role of a free and prodigal, yet also alienated pursuer of the meaning of life, following closely in the footsteps of his predecessor in The Magus—Nicholas Urfe. Neither of them is known to maintain virtually any close family ties—something which can be spotted in Mr Bartholomew's description of himself as "a disobedient son" (26). In view of this, in his review of A Maggot published in The New York Times in 1985, Walter Miller Jr. described Mr Bartholomew as someone with "a disembodied spirit" who "plays a Satan in rebellion against the father: an impotent Satan, a Satan as the author of lies, driven to a tryst with

a mysterious mother figure in a cave" (2). Likewise, Onega refers to Mr Bartholomew as an aristocrat who has grown increasingly interested in "ancestral, secret alchemical and esoteric practices" after graduating from Cambridge (46). She also regards Mr Bartholomew as a character with a "shifting and fragmentary" identity who eventually becomes "the author of his own life story" (48). According to Onega, the fragmented fictional characters of Fowles's novels, namely Daniel Martin and Mr Bartholomew

> eventually achieve their self-reunification and manage to bridge the gap with the external world when they become their own authors/magicians, that is, when they conquer their fear of hazard and of the impossibility of human knowledge, [and] learn the value of true love… (50)

Due to the fact that Mr Bartholomew and the details of his disappearance are largely kept in darkness throughout A Maggot, the narrative of A Maggot centres around a detective work to find answers to the following basic questions: who is Mr Bartholomew, what kind of a person is he, and what has happened to him? Additionally, the narrative is constructed in such a way that information about the missing and dead characters, namely Mr Bartholomew and Dick, can only be obtained from other characters, rather than from the narrator himself. In this respect, the reader of A Maggot can get an answer to each of these questions only by going through the lines of the written accounts of Henry Ayscough's investigations. In other words, the reader is only able to have as much information about both what might actually have happened to both Mr Bartholomew and Dick as Henry Ayscough can obtain from the depositions.

One of the first depositions belongs to Francis Lacy, who plays the role of a London merchant and uncle of Mr Bartholomew. Both the reader and Henry Ayscough can learn from him that Mr Bartholomew comes from the north of England; is interested in the natural sciences (127); considers himself as "a victim of unjust and unkind fate" (129); reveals the reason for his journey to be related to both his father's prevention of him from marrying a girl whom he loved the most and the fact that at the same time she has been pressed by her uncle to marry his son (131); believes that the ancients knew "their life's meridian," or the secret of life in general, much better than us, because we as the moderns are still unable to pinpoint it accurately; he would sacrifice anything for the possession of it (148); argues that human beings lead their existence "like the personages in a tale or novel," assuming that their existence is perfectly real, without in

fact being aware that they are merely constructions “made of imperfect words and ideas” (150); blames his contemporaries for being “corrupted” by an ill-designed learning of the history (150); and postulates that human beings are only free to choose in “small things,” but “in greater matters” they have to observe the right of an author to make the correct choice (151).

In accordance with Lacy’s report that Mr Bartholomew was unhappy with his fate, Henry Ayscough similarly describes Mr Bartholomew as someone who “was given all, except contentment with his seeming most fortunate lot” (185). Likewise, a similar confirmation of Mr Bartholomew’s interest in metaphysical issues is evident in a letter which Mr Bartholomew’s professor at Cambridge writes in response to Henry Ayscough’s enquiry and in which Mr Bartholomew is portrayed as having been extremely interested in “beliefs or theories of this physical world” which would rather be classified as fantastical than “probable or experimental” (194). Information about Mr Bartholomew’s relation with women comes from Rebecca. According to her, Mr Bartholomew is a sexually incompetent man who “had never lain with a woman” before; however, “he suffered greatly for the knowledge of it” (307). Rebecca confirms Lacy in her deposition that the journey Mr Bartholomew undertook was in fact designed as “a false elopement” (311).

Besides Mr Bartholomew, two other characters are also central to the construction of the narrative of A Maggot: Henry Ayscough and Rebecca Hocknell.

4.2.2. Henry Ayscough as the Detective Figure

Henry Ayscough is a highly self-confident lawyer, believing firmly that his investigation is bound to unearth the mystery surrounding Mr Bartholomew and Dick Thurlow. That he is capable of excavating the truth behind the mysterious disappearance of Mr Bartholomew and the inexplicable death of his servant leads him to do the job of an investigator who works diligently to gather pieces of information from as many depositions as possible in order to reach a coherent and safe conclusion about the case he is working on. Whereas his investigation can supply a source of information about others, the narrator is the sole source of information about Henry Ayscough

himself. The narrator views him as a product of his times and his society. For this reason, the narrator asks and answers the following questions: what was the English society like at that time and what were the fundamental characteristics of it? In his authorial intrusion into the narrative, Fowles makes the following remarks about the English society as it existed in the early 18th century: a) it "was comparatively fluid" and had a dynamic structure which allowed social mobility for those members of the society who were already positioned above a certain line; however, "its fate was fixed from day of birth" and mobility was out of question for those below this particular line; b) the "worship" of property and money was the top item on the list of the things "dearest to the heart of English society;" c) it abhorred the idea of change for fear that it could lead to "anarchy and disaster" (233–234).

Of all the characters, Henry Ayscough emerges as the only one with a firm belief in the abovementioned set of values which Fowles thought best characterized his society; and he was exceptionally good at embodying the fundamental characteristics of the English society in the early 18th century. For instance, he is one of those "assiduous" and "shrewd" lawyers who are perfectly capable of "seeing on which side the butter lay" (236). He is also one of the 18th-century English barristers who are described by Fowles to be "far more concerned with stuffing their green bags full of money then in getting cases settled." For this end, Ayscough's definition of 'normal workload' encompasses

> the purchase of property, the granting of leases and copyholds, foreclosing on defaulters, judging new petitions for fields and farms; supervising repairing and insuring, dealing with heriot and farleu, thraves and cripplegaps, plowbote and wainbote, hedge-scouring and whin-drawing (and a hundred other obscure *casus belli* between landlord and tenant); besides the manipulation of boroughs to ensure the outcome of their parliamentary elections as his master willed. (235)

In one of his authorial intrusions into the narrative, Fowles refers to the Fleet, also known as the debtors' prison in London, while he informs the reader about the profession of Henry Ayscough's father, who "had been vicar of Croft, a small village near Darlington in North Yorkshire." He afterwards links the Fleet to the then squire of Yorkshire, Sir William Chaytor, who had had "to spend the last twenty years of his life" imprisoned in it due to his inability to overcome his financial problems (235). Writing

figuratively, Fowles later comments that Ayscough was likewise a figure imprisoned in the Fleet due to his inability to overcome his prejudices arising from his profession:

> All ancient and established professions must be founded on tacit prejudices as strong as their written statutes and codes; and by those Ayscough is imprisoned as much as any debtor in the Fleet by law. (236)

Fowles's comment is followed by his observation of the existence of a similarity between Ayscough and the modern people—a similarity which suggests that both are "equal victims in the debtors' prison of History, and equally unable to leave it" (237).

The characterisations of Mr Bartholomew as the enigmatic figure and Henry Ayscough as the detective figure brings out the need for the search for a third figure who could be representative of the key to the enigma. Her outstandingly individual manner in which she has related herself not only to the enigmatic figure of Mr Bartholomew but also to the events prior to the disappearance of Mr Bartholomew grants Rebecca Hocknell Lee the exceptional status of the holder of the key in question.

4.2.3. Rebecca Hocknell as the Evolving Figure

Rebecca Hocknell Lee can perhaps be best designated as a figure of evolutionary female wisdom. She is the only character in A Maggot who turns out to be someone else than she used to be at the beginning of the narrative. She also embodies a figure of self-awareness; she knows that while she was working as a prostitute she "was on the path to hell and with no excuse save [her] own obstinacy in sin." She also views herself as someone "who sin[s] in hatred of the sin itself" (309). The decision to change her life, followed by her service to Mr Bartholomew, leads her to undergo a spiritual and religious "transformation from whore to madonna" (Cooper, 215). In other words, she exchanges the past of a whore for the future of a devout dissenter. To make an exchange of this kind possible, Rebecca welcomes Mr Bartholomew's proposal to take her with him away to the west, because she sees Mr Bartholomew as the only key to unlock the gates of her prison. Although she "is several months gone with child", she marries John Lee, a Quaker, and lives along with her parents in Manchester (289). Her relationship with her father, Amos Hocknell, is quite powerful; in fact, she closely

follows in the footsteps of her father, also a Quaker, who is described as someone with the reputation of "a good carpenter and joiner, though adamant in his heresy" (277).

Rebecca Hocknell Lee stands in stark contrast to Henry Ayscough in terms of her attitude towards the validity of visions, since she vehemently argues for her faith in having seen them all. Although she is frequently attacked by Ayscough for her obstinacy in telling her own story as she believes it has taken place, she remains strictly upfront about the coherence of her testimony, strongly disdaining Ayscough's proposal to change any of it. Her resistance to tell a one-dimensional story, perfectly believable by the standards of Ayscough's profession, elevates her to the position of an "authentic" narrator with a firm belief in "her standpoint with all its attendant insights and limitations" (Lenz, 220).

Henry Ayscough fails to appreciate the motivations behind Mr Bartholomew's travel and Rebecca's increasingly consolidated piety. The relation between Rebecca and Henry Ayscough has been an "angry" one, according to Miller Jr., because, as he regards it, Lee "represents radical, prophetic, Adventist, puritanical and feminist Protestantism" and she resists Ayscough who "personifies the Georgian establishment" (2). On the other hand, Ayscough is portrayed "as a representative early-eighteenth-century man of reason and neo-classical tradition," in contrast to Rebecca who is distinguished by her "romantic individualism and reliance on feeling" (Holmes and Fowles, 1991: 230). Onega joins Holmes and Fowles in her description of Ayscough as the figure representing the Enlightenment in its three major qualities: empiricism, rationality and conservatism (46). Lenz also describes Ayscough as someone "convinced that genuine knowledge proceeds only from logical method" (207). For this reason, the purpose of placing A Maggot in 1736 appears to have been to allow Rebecca Hocknell Lee "to confront the Enlightenment" as it was embodied in the personality of Ayscough (Onega, 46).

Henry Ayscough fails in his attempts to establish epistemologically a coherent and convincing opinion about what really might have happened to his Lordship and Dick, despite his care for doing the job of applying a filter to the information that he has collected from several depositions. In spite of his hard-work and his initial self-

confidence, which can be plainly seen in his first letter to the father of Mr Bartholomew where he expresses his conviction that Mr Bartholomew "both lives and breathes, and shall be found," his failure to generate a code of interpretation of his own with which he hopes to achieve a flawless comprehension of the case in question eventually leads him to admit that he has been unsuccessful (106). In one of his letters to the father of Mr Bartholomew, Henry Ayscough admits that he "can come to no sure conclusion" because what has been confronting him is "a great enigma" (284). Similarly, in his final letter to the same person, Henry Ayscough feels driven to confess that he "may hope, yet may not in reason believe, his Lordship [Mr Bartholomew] still lives" (444).

Obviously, the reason for his failure can be accounted for in many ways. It partly stems from the fact that Henry Ayscough's investigation involves hearing different versions of the same story from different people, a fact which forces him to face the challenge of making his mind about the true(st) one. To exemplify it, he hears the story of what has taken place in the cave in two versions—first from John and subsequently from Rebecca; however, it later becomes clear to him that what he has heard from John is only a modified version of the story which actually belongs to Rebecca:

Q. Did not the Devil himself have advantage of you in that Devonshire cavern? Why answer you not? Jones says he did, and that you told him so.
A. I told him what he might believe.
Q. And not what truly passes there?
A. No.
Q. You lied to him?
A. Yes. In that.
Q. Why?
A. Because I wished to lead him from meddling further. Because I would be what I am now become, an obedient daughter and a true Christian. And most, the last. (304)

Similarly, Henry Ayscough first hears about the Amesbury incident from Lacy, although Lacy himself has previously heard about it from Jones. That is, Henry Ayscough is the last person to hear the Lacy-modified version of the Jones version of the Amesbury incident. Likewise, in the first place Henry Ayscough hears the Jones-modified version of the Rebecca version of the Devonshire incident. In all cases, Rebecca emerges as the only eyewitness to tell Henry Ayscough in the first person what exactly has happened both in Amesbury and in Devonshire. Therefore, Henry Ayscough

should—or, has to—believe in her story and be careful not to make it an issue of debate if he is to reach a reliable conclusion. However, he often tends to dismiss her story because of its superstitious content.

Other arguments might be based on readings of the novel from psychological, historical or sociological perspectives, among others, each offering a different explanation for the failure in question. The argument here is, however, based upon a reading of the novel from the philosophical perspective expounded by Heidegger, and which postulates that Henry Ayscough's failure to solve the mystery results from the ontological inauthenticity of his interpretation.

4.3. The Inauthenticity of Ayscough's Interpretation

Henry Ayscough's wish to solve the mystery behind the disappearance of Mr Bartholomew and the death of Dick and the ensuing investigation which involves him hearing several people testify about the incident can all be accounted for by the Heideggerian notion of care which constitutes the ontological definition of human existence, or Dasein. The term 'care' occupies the most central position within the Heideggerian philosophy of ontology. Heidegger uses it to define the human existence as something fundamentally grounded in and linked up with the phenomenon of being in the world. That is to say, the focal point of his argument that "Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein" is that there are ontological implications of the fact that human beings are essentially entities existent *in* the world but not somewhere else (Heidegger, 84). Therefore, the ontological phenomena of both the world itself and the existence in the form of occupying a position both in space and in time simultaneously in the world make up the most essential part of the definition of human existence as care.

Care as the ontological definition of human existence in the world—or to use Heidegger's phraseology—Being-in-the-world, necessitates understanding and interpretation of phenomena in the first place, since they together "make up the existential state" of Dasein (193). The urge to satisfy the desire to bring something left in darkness to light, to make something unknown knowable, and to discover something

alien, among other things, is in each case the automatically generated human response to the ontological call of care. As Inwood also suggests, it is of vital importance to indicate at this point that care should be taken as a general term which includes a) concern when the focus is placed upon human existence maintained along with other things in general to perform daily activities—a mode of existence which Heidegger designates with the term Being-alongside-the-entities; b) solicitude when the focus is placed upon human existence maintained along with other human beings in a shared environment —a mode of existence which Heidegger designates with the term Being-with-others (1999: 35). To make concern clearer, for instance, Heidegger explains it as

> having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining… (83)

Heidegger also postulates that ways in which care—the Being of Dasein, or human existence in general—manifests itself can be either authentic, originating from one's own self, or inauthentic, stemming from the public, or to use Heidegger's phrase, the "they". The whole of Being and Time can perhaps be boiled down primarily to a study of the human existence in its most common form the most noticeable characteristic of which is an evasion of the responsibility primarily to maintain a continuous contact with the self, and secondarily to a philosophical proposal to develop an alternative mode of existence which is instead wholly based upon the self. As one of the constituents of human existence, understanding as an ontological concept can also be authentic or inauthentic, depending upon the source—the self or the public—out of which it arises. At this point, the significance of interpretation needs to be stressed with regard to its function as the fundamental separator between authenticity and inauthenticity: human existence gains its authenticity or loses it in accordance with the degree to which the interpretation of phenomena such as life, death, time and existence, among other things, is personally processed. As Inwood argues in his discussion of interpretation as one of the essential constituents of Heidegger's ontological study of human existence, interpretation also functions as an ontological tool for enabling Dasein to relate itself to its environment, to see equipment "*as* such-and-such and for [a specific use with] something" (106).

In Heidegger's opinion, authenticity can be possible "if Dasein discovers the world in its own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being" (167). Discovering the world in one's own way is actually tantamount to being able to develop one's own interpretation of the ontological significance of occupying a place in the world. In fact, in Being and Time, Heidegger appears to have shown us, the readers, the epitome of an authentic interpretation of being, time and the related concepts. Yet, Heidegger emphasizes that human existence is mostly maintained in its inauthentic, average and everyday mode, because "proximally Dasein is 'they', and for the most part it remains so" (167). The same idea can also be found in the following statement: "Proximally and for the most part Dasein is absorbed in the 'they' and is mastered by it" (210).

As has been stated above, in every respect, Ayscough emerges as a man of this type—lost in his time and in his society. His worldview has been entirely shaped by the public opinion. As if this were not enough, he shows no signs of feeling that he must distinguish himself from others in one way or another. His failure to notice that he has not been himself but just one of the common men of his time can be explained by the Heideggerian notion of falling which characterizes human existence as so much absorbed in its worldly concerns "that it forgets itself as an autonomous entity and interprets itself of current preoccupations" (Inwood, 23). Likewise, the public interpretation of things in general also explains the reason why Ayscough remains blind to his inauthenticity, the most salient features of which are, among other things, "groundlessness" and "nullity" (Heidegger, 223). Publicly guided, Ayscough's investigation eventually leads him nowhere but to a total failure of understanding, simply because, as Heidegger suggests, "by publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone" (165). His failure to develop a sufficiently revealing insight into the situation can be considered as an outcome of the fact that while inauthenticity resulting from public interpretations of phenomena tends to cover up the truth, authenticity does just the opposite; it reveals the truth.

Speaking ontologically, Ayscough can be viewed as a man who leads the kind of existence which is the closest and the most readily available to him. In contrast to

Ayscough, however, Rebecca emerges as the opposite character who makes it an issue of entirely personal approach to the situation in question: she has her own story and sticks to it. Although Ayscough repeatedly dismisses Rebecca's testimony on the grounds of being "more of gross fantasy than credible fact," and believes that she has most probably been either poisoned, or has been under the influence of drugs, or has been put under spell while she was in Amesbury and Devonshire, she has unhesitatingly and invariably let her faith in herself guide her from the very beginning through the processes of telling her own story, taking her own decisions and making her own choices, all in her own way (448). Because Rebecca's account of what she has seen while she was in Amesbury and Devonshire largely consists of visions and apparitions, Ayscough remains steadfast in his determination to regard it as an "absurd and blasphemous tale" (413). To begin with, Rebecca's report of having seen inexplicably and suddenly "a light more large than any human making," and "a young man and an old [one]" staring at them while they knelt at the stones in Amesbury provokes Henry Ayscough into getting angry as well as into an immediate refusal to believe her:

Q. [Ayscough:] I will not believe this. I warn thee, I am not to be imposed upon.
A. [Rebecca:] I speak truth.
Q. No. Thou hast cunningly prepared this, to confound me. Thou and thy prophesying man, I'll warrant he put thee to this tale.
A. No, he did not. I have never yet told him.
Q. Yea or nay to that, still thou liest.
A. No. I tell thee saw them, they stood little further than this room is long. Tho' I saw them not well, for my eyes were made blind by the light, as I say. (325)

The exchange of self-asserted determination on the part of Rebecca to believe in what is rationally most unlikely, and the inexhaustible refusal on the part of Ayscough to share her readiness as well as her willingness to believe in the unbelievable continues with full force as she goes on to come up with further reports. These include having seen the sudden apparition of "a lady in silver" by whom they were guided while they were walking up to the mouth of the cavern in Devonshire (354); having seen the vision of "a great swollen maggot" out of which three women—supposedly a mother, her daughter and her granddaughter—emerged and stood on the floor of the cavern before the two of them physically merged into the other one (359); having looked out the window of the maggot "upon a great city" which, according to Rebecca's description of it, was "exceeding beautiful" and was called 'June Eternal' where the reign of "peace

and prosperity" allowed "no poor, no beggars, no cripples, no sick, not one who starved" to exist (371-372, 375); having seen "Lord Jesus Christ," and "Holy Mother Wisdom" whom she described as "the bearing of God's will" (379); having remained all alone in darkness with the sudden turnover of the scene from a heaven-like peaceful place to a hellish battlefield "where men fought like tigers" amid sounds of "clashing iron, of oaths and cries, of pistol and musket and fearsome cannon" (380); and having seen further scenes "of torture, of murther and treachery, of the slaughter of innocents, […] and the cruelty of man more savage than the wildest beasts" which included the burning of a fourteen-year-old girl (381).

Rebecca's wish to get her story heard forcefully in the hope that it will be met with as little objection as possible from people such as Ayscough remains unfulfilled until the very end while Ayscough keeps in each case mounting a highly skeptical attitude towards her narrative:

Q. What is this?
A. It was so, I tell thee.
Q. And I tell thee not, 'tis too much.
A. I swear by Jesus, it happened so, or so seemed.
Q. This fine chamber of precious stones flew out of the cavern in an instant and above a great city? I am not your green gosling, mistress, by the heavens am I not.
A. 'Tis in my telling I deceive thee. In naught else. I tell thee what I saw, tho' how I saw it I know not.
Q. This is more fit for chapbook than any ear of reason. I believe thee a canning whore still, with all thy talk of hammers and saws, dust and chips.
A. I tell truth. I beg thee, thee must believe. (371)

What actually distinguishes Rebecca from other characters, especially from Henry Ayscough, is her resolution to resist the public temptation to become someone she has not chosen to be; on the contrary, she resolutely remains to be as she is in every respect ever possible; she would never give up owning her own self. The word 'resolution' is particularly used here for its resonance in the Heideggerian ontology which postulates that resolution is indeed at the heart of the ontological definition of existential authenticity. According to Heidegger, resolution is highly important for "letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'" (345). It is only by way of resolution that Rebecca can maintain a constant avoidance of the temptation to be guided by the public in forming her opinions, beliefs and interpretation of

phenomena—or, in establishing her own world of significance. Part of the clearest evidence of this lies in her belief that Mr Bartholomew continues to live in one form or another. Although she is firmly convinced that Henry Ayscough will not share any of her beliefs, she keeps her faith alive that Mr Bartholomew still lives, yet not in this physical world, "but lives in in June Eternal, and is one with Jesus Christ" (421). When Rebecca hears Ayscough argue that, contrary to the public opinion, she is most possibly the only person to consider Mr Bartholomew as a Christ-like figure, she responds firmly that she does not care about the public opinion:

Q. Despite most of all, that none other has seen this in them? I gave you truth there, mistress. The master disdainful of all expected of his noble rank, disobedient of his gracious father, disrespectful of God, rebellious to family duty, the servant [i.e., Dick] closer kin to a beast than to a human being; so might be said of them, so were they to all the world save you.
A. I care not what other people believed. I know only what I believe myself; and shall do, till I die. (422)

Rebecca's self-owned interpretation of life in general and its constituents in particular, including religion, also affirms her resoluteness both in her blunt responses to the accusation of heresy coming from Ayscough and in her brave efforts to redefine what is Christian and what is not:

A. I am proud in Christ, but naught else. I will speak for His light, notwithstanding I speak it ill.
Q. And in defiance of all common and prescribed belief?
A. Christ's kingdom is not must. If a thing must be, it is not Christ. A harlot must be always harlot, is not Christ. Man must rule always over woman, is not Christ. Children must starve, is not Christ. All must suffer for what they are born, is no Christ. No must by this world's lights is Christ. It is darkness, 'tis the sepulcher this world doth life in for its sins.
A. Now you would deny the very heart of Christianity. Doth the sacred Bible not prescribe our duty, what we must do?
Q. It tells what is best we do, not what we must; for many do not do it. (423)

To bring the discussion of this section to a close, it can be restated that, as a novel of crime investigation at bottom, A Maggot presents its readers with a fictional world of mysterious phenomena the components of which Henry Ayscough is supposed to find a way to interpret rightly so that he can understand their nature and form a conclusive opinion about them. His investigation leads him nowhere but to a point in

which he feels he has to admit that he has not been able to unearth the mystery behind the disappearance of Mr Bartholomew and the death of his servant. According to the argument of this section based upon Heidegger's propositions about authenticity and its ontological markers, the reason for Ayscough's failure lies in his inability to develop a genuinely self-owned code of interpretation with which he would be able to understand the case in his own way. In contrast to him, Rebecca Hocknell Lee emerges as the only person who can approach the case from her own angle, without ever compromising on her own code of interpretation. Ontologically speaking, as a criterion of the ontological definition of human existence as care, Henry Ayscough and Rebecca Hocknell Lee tend to interpret and understand phenomena in ways which are fundamentally different from each other. While sticking to the public for guidance in choosing a reliable way to find out the truth does not help Ayscough to escape the borders of inauthenticity, the authenticity of existence becomes the prize awarded to Lee for her refusal to deviate from her own self as the sole source of wisdom.

CONCLUSION

The affiliation of Fowles with existentialism in his adult life and its reflection in his fiction have considerably drawn the attraction of many scholars to his works since the publication of his first novel The Collector in 1963. Although much of the scholarly work on the fiction of John Fowles testifies that the questions of both existential authenticity and freedom are among the key issues which have been of tremendous significance to Fowles's fiction, the discussions have commonly been restricted to one single perspective—that of Jean-Paul Sartre and his existentialism. The Sartrean existentialism has been pivotal in the scholarly comparisons of major characters of his fiction with one another with regard to the varying degrees to which they gain, or fail to gain, existential authenticity. However, there appears to be a noticeable void of scholarly commentary on the major causes for the argued achievements or failures of existential authenticity from the existentialist perspective of Heidegger, who introduced the notion of authenticity of existence in his ontological study of human existence years before Sartre did it. In this respect, the present study ought to be regarded as an attempt to take the ontological perspective which Heidegger chose and intertwined with phenomenology, and to use it as the theoretical guidance for examining the possible ways in which the question of existential authenticity becomes noticeable as one of the major concerns in the fiction of John Fowles.

The first half of the theoretical chapter has been intended to provide the historical development of existentialism from its birth out of the thoughts of its earliest

proponent, Kierkegaard, to its current state of maturity in the views of its latest advocate, Sartre. The preliminary notes on all the major existentialists and their most significant contributions to existentialism have been followed by the narrowing down of the focus onto Heidegger in the second half, where the spotlight has been specifically turned on his lengthy exposition of the existential ontology in his Being and Time.

One of the most troublesome aspects of the choice of Heidegger and his ontological inquiry into the differentiation of the existential conditions of authenticity from those of inauthenticity has been, as Kellner has pointed out in his dissertational work on the concept of authenticity in Heidegger, the presence of "the prevalent interpretations of authenticity in the secondary literature" (1973: 3). Much of what has been written about Heidegger and his philosophy have been simply "more obscure than Heidegger," without being able to avoid the pitfall of repeating "heavy-handedly" what he has already written in Being and Time. Various attempts to explain the jargon of his philosophy have only added more mystification to it. Therefore, only those secondary sources which can successfully elaborate on Heidegger's already-difficult-to-penetrate terminology have been incorporated into this study as supportive of its overall argument. In addition to the difficulty which arises from the way in which Heidegger uses the words, he abstains from providing a fully-fledged definition of authenticity in his Being and Time. Although the whole of the work can be regarded as essentially being concerned with showing ways of authenticity, the definition of it appears to have been left up in the air for one reason or another. The absence of a fully-fledged definition of authenticity in Being and Time has therefore become one of the greatest challenges of using the ontological discussion of authenticity as the theoretical backbone for the present study.

More importantly, the disputed affiliation of Heidegger with the German National Socialist Party before and during his Rectorship at the University of Freiburg has become a major point of criticism. Part of the evidence for his engagement with the Nazi policies can be located in the essays which largely target the political implications of his existentialism. Although there is a lack of certainty about the duration as well as the depth of Heidegger's support for Nazism, it remains an incontestable fact that he supported the policies of the Nazi regime overtly for a while. In this respect, he

delivered speeches in support of Hitler and his policies while he travelled across Germany after he accepted the Rectorship at the University of Freiburg in 1933 (Wolin, 1993: 2). Furthermore, he published an appeal in demand of electoral support for Hitler and his party in the wake of Hitler's official announcement that Germany would leave the League of Nations (Löwith, 1993: 179). He even himself admitted in an interview that he had felt he had to make compromises to secure his position as the Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933. His compromises include the publication of his following words of praise for Hitler in a student newspaper: "Do not let doctrines and ideas be the rules of your Being. The Führer himself and he alone *is* the present and future German reality and its rule" (Heidegger, 1993: 96).

The criticism was not only directed at his dubious attitude towards the Jewish problem while he was in office but also at his integration of the terminology which he had previously used in his Being and Time into his political addresses which he delivered while he was in the office. His defence of the Nazi policies in his various speeches also offers evidence that he made use of the jargon of his theoretical arguments about the notion of death and its connection to the authenticity of existence when he praised those who died for Germany under the Nazi administration (Löwith, 1993: 179). Part of the criticism is therefore directed against his use of the ideas as he expressed them in Being and Time in a context which appears to be free from political connotations of any sort in order to establish the philosophical grounds on which the National Socialist Revolution would be planned to take place. In this respect, the transformation of his ontological discussion in Being and Time of the authentic existence into the jargon of a political propaganda in the manner just mentioned above is harshly criticized by Adorno. In his The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno unhesitatingly dismisses Heidegger's theory on the authenticity of existence as utterly ideological on the grounds of its reliance upon a particular jargon which "sells self-identity as something higher" (2007, 61).

Despite the abovementioned difficulties, Heidegger's ascription of existence exclusively to man—i.e., his view of man as the most single being with the unique ontological capability of existing—forms the backbone of the whole of his treatise. His ontological examination of existence in the human context has brought him to the

conclusion that it is bound to be either authentically or inauthentically owned up, with special care taken not to allow a value judgement of any kind to insert itself into his differentiation between the modes of existence as authentic and inauthentic. The ontological markers of the (in)authenticity of existence have become the clues with which the selected novels of Fowles have been analysed in the preceding three chapters.

The first part of the following chapter on The Magus has been devoted to the demonstration of the partial progress of Nicholas in his fulfilment of existential authenticity. The Magus appears to be the novel in which Fowles reflected the outlines of his existential stance on life in general in the most enthralling ways. It has therefore been discussed by various scholars from an existential perspective. The Magus seems to have been written with a major intention to emphasise that the existential premise of being a human entails the acceptance of human existence as consisting of chance, mystery and game. Scholars tend to vary in their evaluations of whether at the end of the novel Nicholas grows to a mature understanding as well as to the ensuing realization that existentiality is an issue of being able to see that you are part of a mysterious game in which you find yourself by pure chance. While some suggest that he remains blind to the existential grammar of life, some others are more benevolent in their judgements as they tend to express a partial success on his part. His failure to arrive at a complete level of authenticity issues from another failure of his—the failure to develop a genuine sense of direction out of the maze constructed by the magus, Conchis. His erroneous choice of Julie over Allison as the source of wisdom and his belated realization of it are among the major reasons for his deficient existential authenticity.

The purpose of the second part has been to discuss from the Heideggerian perspective the possible reasons for the deficiency in question. Since the fictional presence of Nicholas as a character in the larger narrative of The Magus by Fowles combines with his added fictional presence in the theatrical construction at Bourani of the godgame by Conchis, the fictional existence of Nicholas in both texts has been explained with reference to the ontological description of human existence as Being-in-the-world. The ontological perception of human existence as essentially being founded upon his or her worldly facticity has been linked to the insight into the ontological condition of Being-in-the-fiction to explain with textual references to The Magus how

and why Nicholas emerges as a double character in both of the fictional constructions. It has been argued that Nicholas remains unable to grasp the ontological inauthenticity of his fictional existence at Bourani until much later when he speaks to the mastermind behind all Conchis stands for, namely Lily de Seitas, after he returns to London from Bourani and the island altogether. In addition to the ontological concept of Being-in-the-world, two interrelated concepts—thrownness and falling—have also been borrowed from Heidegger for the purpose of covering the significance Fowles expressly attached to hazard in singling Nicholas out for a journey to the land of godgame. Nicholas's realization that he has been delivered by pure chance to the Greek island of Phraxos is followed by his interpretative attempts to work out the fictional dimension of the godgame which he finds out has been orchestrated particularly for him at Bourani. His endeavour to make sense of the situation in which he has found himself has been explained with reference to the ontological notion of understanding as an essential component of Being-in-the-world.

The French Lieutenant's Woman, the novel which reveals the abode of Fowles's fundamental perception of God—and similarly of the author—as "the freedom that allows other freedoms to exist" simultaneously, has been introduced in the first half of Chapter Three as a typical Victorian narrative of unreturned romance, despite the technical innovations of contemporary writing which Fowles has beautifully adopted and inserted into it to make it an existentialist novel of the 20th century in the postmodern sense of the word (Fowles, 2004b: 97). The comparisons which were drawn by scholars between Nicholas and Charles on the one hand and between Conchis and Sarah on the other hand have been pointed out in their general outlines. The usual tendency among scholars has been to compare Sarah with Conchis, and Charles with Nicholas. The comparison of Nicholas of The Magus with Charles of The French Lieutenant's Woman as the two characters who share the joint fate of having been "drawn into the psychodrama by artifice in the guises of mystery, pathos, and madness" is just one example among many others of the comparisons in question (Eddins, 1976: 222).

The relation of Charles to Sarah has been discussed by some scholars in psychoanalytical terms, while some others have regarded it as essentially existential. On

the one hand, the psychoanalytical reading emphasizes that Charles sees Sarah as someone who would fill the void left by the death of his mother while he was a little baby. On the other hand, the existential reading of the relationship between Charles and Sarah has been founded upon the ontological concept of anxiety. The existential interpretation suggests that after Charles met Sarah, he has seen the futility of his Victorian existence and has subsequently become acquainted for the first time with anxiety, as opposed to fear, as an essential initiator of his existential progression towards authenticity. Without Sarah, whose reputation both as a fallen woman and as the French Lieutenant's Whore, Charles could not have had the slightest chance of realizing that underneath his Victorian self is hidden the potential for a truer vision of existence—the potential to join Sarah in rising up fearlessly against the prevalent codes of seemingly proper thought and decent behaviour. It has been further suggested that Charles can be regarded as the avid reader of Sarah who owns a distinctly personal narrative of her own. What is peculiar about the narrative of Sarah is, however, that it is highly resistant to any determinate interpretations at all—i.e., the textual existence in which she has chosen to place herself manifests itself as impenetrable. The puzzlement in which Nicholas keeps finding himself whenever he enters the textual domain of Conchis at Bourani is echoed in the unrewarding confrontations of Charles with Sarah and her impenetrable narratives of her existence. Charles's persistence in attempting to discover the puzzling textuality of Sarah causes him to grow increasingly alienated from his Victorian possessions—the title, the class, the status, the inheritance, and the like. The chapter on The French Lieutenant's Woman has been brought to its close with the comment that it is the final ending to the novel in which Charles is portrayed as someone standing at the nearest threshold of existential authenticity, yet all alone.

His final novel, A Maggot, has been analysed with a similar concern in mind. A brief overview of A Maggot as a pseudo-historical novel has been followed by the comment that the extent of authorial assistance with which both the narrator and the reader can hope to explore the mystery in A Maggot is kept at a minimum. It is perhaps A Maggot which best confirms Fowles in his repeated emphases on the narratorial principle of refraining from explaining everything in a narrative. What has been left out of the narrative gains far more significance than what has been put into it in A Maggot. In this sense, it has been argued that A Maggot emerges as a work of detective fiction the purpose of which is to let the reader be assisted by the detective to fill in the blanks

with as much evidence and information as available. The analysis of A Maggot has been continued with a focus placed upon the similarities between the major three characters of A Maggot, namely Mr Bartholomew, Ayscough and Rebecca, and the major characters of both The Magus and The French Lieutenant's Woman. Mr Bartholomew has been compared to Conchis as well as to Sarah as the embodiment of an enigmatic figure on the one hand, and to Nicholas Urfe as the prodigal pursuer of the meaning of his existential situation in the world. Similarly, Ayscough has been compared to Urfe as the characterisation of a diligent detective, while Rebecca has been compared to Alison as well as to Sarah as the source of evolutionary female wisdom.

The description of the personality of Mr Bartholomew has been outlined as sexually incompetent, unhappy with his fate, content with the belief that the ancients knew the substance of existence much better than us, persuaded that the human existence is analogous to the existence of fictional characters in the narratives, and persistent that the contemporary methods of teaching the history has been maliciously designed to corrupt the society. The description of Henry Ayscough by the narrator as a representative product of his times has been combined with the emphasis placed upon his financially oriented conception of his job as a means of making money rather than as a means of settling the cases. The emergence of Rebecca Hocknell as the embodiment of evolutionary female wisdom has been supported with the textual evidence for the profound change in her personality from a whore to the mother of a daughter who would later establish the American branch of the Quakers. Like Sarah, Rebecca enjoys the freedom to write her own narrative into the fiction of John Fowles in her own way. She chooses to believe whatever she thinks is believable, without allowing herself to be beguiled by Ayscough as a representative of Enlightenment into changing her testimony.

It has been emphasized that despite his initial self-confidence, Ayscough fails to bring his investigation to the conclusion which he has believed he would eventually arrive at. His failure has been accounted for by the argument that he has maintained the position of an investigator whose understanding and interpretation of the case under his investigation have been devoid of the stamp of his authenticity. His persistent refusal to pause and think for a moment that in her depositions Rebecca might indeed be telling

the truth, however unreal her account may seem, makes it evident that that he has understood and interpreted the case just like anyone else would have been apt to understand and interpret it on an ordinary level. Ayscough's inauthenticity with regard to his tendency to ignore the need to understand and interpret the case in question from a fundamentally different perspective has been associated with the ontological definition of the human existence as care in Being and Time, in which Heidegger has postulated that the public understanding of phenomena has obscurity, rather than lucidity, as its first rule. Ayscough has been argued to be a man of his times, suffering from a state of complete loss of his self in the midst of his fellow citizens. His erroneous choice of the public consciousness over that of his own to lead him straight to the hoped-for destination while he probed into the matter at hand forms the main reason why his investigation has fallen apart. In contradistinction to Ayscough, Rebecca remains resolved not to be tempted by the public to become someone she has not chosen to be, to believe in the kind of things she has not chosen to believe, and to enjoy the code of ethics she has not chosen to enjoy.

To conclude, the narratorial reputation of Fowles as one of the most prominent post-war British novelists whose work bears the stamp of existentialism in postmodernist fiction should evidently match the philosophical enthusiasm of Heidegger as one of the most influential twentieth-century European thinkers whose pivotal work, Being and Time, bears the corresponding stamp of ontology in the continental existentialist thinking. The need to render intelligible the phenomenon of existentiality which combines existence and existing together shows itself up in much of Fowles's fiction in which the problematization of authenticity emerges as part of its central concern with reflecting the mysterious facet of human existence in a condition of space- and time-bound freedom. Despite the fact that the phenomenological exposition of the possibilities of achieving or failing the authenticity of existence is in fact the principal concern with which Heidegger maintained an ontological inquiry in Being and Time, the major thematic concern of Fowles's fiction with the question of existential authenticity and its possibilities appears to have been taken up and discussed solely in the Sartrean context by many critics of Fowles and his fiction, such as James Acheson, Pamela Cooper, Kerry McSweeney, Brooke Lenz, William Palmer, Mahmoud Salami and Susana Onega. The emphasis which Heidegger placed upon the long-neglected state of the ontological question of the meaning of Being as the main impetus for his decision

to write his Being and Time has translated itself into the determination to take up with vigour the question of the existential authenticity as the subject matter of this study and trace it to its ontological roots in the fiction of Fowles—something which has not been scholarly attempted before. Because one of the main postulations upon which Being and Time rests is that the conditions of the authenticity of existence are ontological, the fictional situations into which Fowles placed Allison and Urfe in The Magus, Sarah and Charles in The French Lieutenant's Woman, and Rebecca Hocknell Lee and Henry Ayscough in A Maggot have been explored both causally in the ontological terms set forth by Heidegger, and with respect to their impact on these characters' capabilities of grasping at their existential authenticities firmly or loosely.

This study is brought to its conclusion in the hope that it has been a step forward in the direction of adding a newer aspect to the available stock of scholarly studies on John Fowles and his fiction. It is also hoped that this study will become inspirational for others to carry out future studies which have the goal of shedding newer light on Fowles's fiction.

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