CONSUMING AND CONSUMED BODIES: OBJECTS AND SUBJECTS OF CULTURE IN SELECTED NOVELS OF IAN MCEWAN

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

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The body, the source of much philosophical debate for centuries, has thus become the universal subject of inter-disciplinary study. Not only is the body a physical entity, but it also represents a social being with a living, breathing social existence comprised of a number of dynamic, ever-evolving structures. Pierre Bourdieu is a philosopher who has done extensive work on the body, considering how it is built and how it influences many facets of human experience. He has argued that the body is both the cause agent and the product of social forces, and that it is therefore deeply connected to linguistic, social, and political structures. According to Bourdieu's theory, practice is both embodied and embedded in a social context, with the body serving as an essential marker of identity that places people in particular fields and networks. Bourdieu's idea of the body as a habitus emphasizes how people are shaped by their environments to adopt particular habits and ways of thinking. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, is one of the most important terms when discussing the body. The body is comprised of cultural predispositions, skills, and habitual practices. Bourdieu offers a thorough examination of the meaning and practices of the embodied body, which he labels "field," using the metaphor of play. By viewing the body as a field, Bourdieu is able to provide an understanding of how social structures, both external and internal, create a certain type of embodied habitus. Through this metaphor, Bourdieu shows how the body was an arena for a certain kind of play, shaped by one's location in the social hierarchy and structured by existing social norms.

The novels *The Cement Garden*, *Atonement,* and *Machine Like Me* by Ian McEwan are analysed through the lens of Bourdieu's body theory. The characters are presented as agents consuming abstract and physical forms of culture, as well as objects absorbing the anxieties and stimulants of the postmodern era. The novels provide a postmodern scene in which the aforementioned issues may be debated and understood with relative ease. The dissertation explores the ways in which the novels demonstrate how power structures and forms of resistance are manifested in relation to bodies and how these forms of power are experienced differently depending on an individual's race, class, gender, and other social identities. Additionally, by examining these novels, it is aimed to provide a critical analysis of how bodies, and the power dynamics between them, are represented in literature and how these representations reflect the lived experiences of individuals in the contemporary world.

Key Words: Bourdieu, body, habitus, field, culture

ÖZET

TÜKENEN VE TÜKETEN BEDENLER: IAN MCEWAN'IN SEÇİLMİŞ ESERLERİNDE KÜLTÜRÜN NESNELERİ VE ÖZNELERİ

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Yüzyıllardır birçok felsefi tartışmanın kaynağı olan beden, disiplinler arası çalışmanın evrensel konusu haline gelmiştir. Beden yalnızca fiziksel bir varlık değil, aynı zamanda bir dizi dinamik, sürekli gelişen yapıdan oluşan, yaşayan, nefes alan sosyal bir varlığı temsil eder. Pierre Bourdieu, bedenin nasıl inşa edildiğini ve insan deneyiminin birçok yönünü nasıl etkilediğini göz önünde bulundurarak beden üzerine kapsamlı çalışmalar yapmış bir filozoftur. Bedenin sosyal güçlerin hem nedeni hem de ürünü olduğunu ve bu nedenle dilsel, sosyal ve politik yapılarla derinden bağlantılı olduğunu savunmuştur. Bourdieu'nün teorisine göre, pratik hem bedenleşmiş hem de sosyal bir bağlama gömülmüştür; beden, insanları belirli alanlara ve ağlara yerleştiren temel bir kimlik işaretidir. Bourdieu'nün bir habitus olarak beden fikri, insanların çevreleri tarafından belirli alışkanlıkları ve düşünme biçimlerini benimsemeleri için nasıl şekillendirildiklerini vurgular. Bourdieu' ye göre habitus, bedeni tartışırken kullanılan en önemli terimlerden biridir. Beden, kültürel yatkınlıklar, beceriler ve alışılmış pratiklerden oluşur. Bourdieu, oyun metaforunu kullanarak "alan" olarak adlandırdığı bedenleşmiş bedenin anlamı ve pratikleri üzerine kapsamlı bir inceleme sunar. Bourdieu, bedeni bir alan olarak görerek hem iç hem de dış sosyal yapıların nasıl belirli bir tür bedenlenmiş habitus yarattığına dair bir anlayış sağlayabilmiştir. Bu metafor aracılığıyla Bourdieu, bedenin, kişinin sosyal hiyerarşideki konumuna göre şekillenen ve mevcut sosyal normlar tarafından yapılandırılan belirli bir tür oyun için nasıl bir arena olduğunu göstermiştir.

Ian McEwan'ın *The Cement Garden, Atonement* ve *Machine Like Me* romanları Bourdieu'nun beden teorisi merceğinden analiz edilmektedir. Karakterler, kültürün soyut ve fiziksel biçimlerini tüketen özneler ve postmodern çağın kaygılarını ve uyarıcılarını özümseyen nesneler olarak sunulmaktadır. Romanlar, yukarıda bahsedilen konuların tartışılabileceği ve görece kolaylıkla anlaşılabileceği postmodern bir sahne sunar. Bu tez, romanların iktidar yapılarının ve direniş biçimlerinin bedenlerle ilişkili olarak nasıl ortaya çıktığını ve bu iktidar biçimlerinin bireyin ırkına, sınıfına, cinsiyetine ve diğer sosyal kimliklerine bağlı olarak nasıl farklı deneyimlendiğini gösterme yollarını araştırmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu romanlar incelenerek, bedenlerin ve aralarındaki güç dinamiklerinin edebiyatta nasıl temsil edildiğinin ve bu temsillerin çağdaş dünyada bireylerin yaşadıkları deneyimleri nasıl yansıttığının eleştirel bir analizinin yapılması amaçlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bourdieu, beden, habitus, alan, kültür

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INTRODUCTION

The body has been disregarded, undervalued, and even ignored throughout the history, despite its centrality to our own existence and agency. Because of the variety of possible interpretations, a universal definition of the body has proven elusive. The question of what the body is, which has been explored from many angles, remains a rich field for study. The body should be seen as a phenomenon involving many individuals rather than as a single thing. This idea of the solitary individual is a fallacy. Involvement in meaningful social relationships is a formative experience that allows people to blossom into unique, self-determining persons. Concepts like time, space, and bodies are not separate from the daily existence; rather, they are fundamental to it. The physical form is organic, fleshy, and discursive, with a primary emphasis on diverse scientific and philosophical ideas. The physical body is both perceivable in and of itself and a condition that allows for perception. The human body has been reified as a cultural artifact with many meanings. Culture has the potential to wield significant material power. It is possible to gain influence and authority through exchanging, converting, and reconverting cultural practices. Various forms of material consumption strengthen the body's status as a topic of other people's scrutiny. Nothing mental, cultural, or human can take place outside of a body. Only the body can convey information about the subject's demographics, such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, and more. Since it is via the body that we conceptualize society, rather than the other way around, the body functions as an instrument for social reflection.

To understand the modern quest for the body, one must first examine the body in the context of its historical and philosophical development. As a result, it would be beneficial to explore the history of body criticism. According to Aristotle, the human mind shapes the human body to the point where the two can no longer be distinguished from one another. Consequently, the body itself can be seen as a source of wisdom and insight into our own social roles. the Aristotelian philosophy that maintains that the soul is what provides life to the body. According to Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's work, there is a far stronger connection between the soul and the body than is usually believed in modern times. Aquinas argued that the soul was not only the source of life for the body, but also a key part of it, providing essential qualities such as rationality, emotion, and ethical behaviour. The notion of Cartesian dualism, which may be found in the history of philosophical thinking, relates to the belief that the soul is a

separate entity from the physical body. Spinoza's theory classifies everything into one of two categories, depending on whether everything pertains to God or the human body and soul. By asserting that our five senses are unable to see the body, Hume casts doubt on the fundamental premises of natural philosophy. Hume, who does not believe in the existence of any external reality beyond the physical world, argues that we are unable to perceive things as they truly are because our senses are limited in their ability to identify and convey the properties of an external reality.

Marx's theory of materialism holds that all human activity is for the benefit of society. Materialist theories argue that humans and their interactions are fundamentally organic, physical, and temporal. The social structure of human beings is best determined according to the actual causes of social development rather than on the basis of ideal conceptions such as religious ideas. According to Marx, the concept of capital is significant to understanding the mechanics of production and trade. Capital, Marx argues, begins with the "circulation of commodities" (1906: 163). Commodity production, and the developing form of circulation, all form the historical underpinnings from which capital grows. In its simplest form, Marx defines capital as a product of the market, whether it is commodities, labour, or even money.

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology attempts to break down the subject-object distinction by demonstrating how things are experienced and how people, as perceptive beings, are moulded by the interaction with the environment. Heidegger's concept of "Dasein" is based on the everyday temporality of "there-being," which he describes in *The Concept of Time* (1992: 7). The body is an important aspect of the theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose *Phenomenology of Perception* emphasizes the body's mobility and recasts perception to achieve an embodied cogito acting. He claims that having a body implies being an object, and that "I" try to be viewed as a subject but at the same time become an object as well (2002: 169). Merleau-Ponty's view is distinct from Husserl and Heidegger in that it focuses on the body as an integral part of the experience of being. Whereas Heidegger and Husserl focused on the experience of being in the abstract, Merleau-Ponty's theory was based on understanding how we interact with our bodies and how this affects our perception of ourselves as individuals. Last but not least, the philosophical ideas raised about the body in the history of philosophy have led to the phenomenological approach to the body, which provided a solid foundation for Pierre

Bourdieu, one of the most important philosophers of the modern era, to establish the ideas of practice, habitus, field, and many others. Bourdieu has incorporated multi-layered perspectives into the study of the body, emphasizing the impact of the body and bodily dispositions on identity and social relationships.

Pierre Bourdieu is a prominent critic who has made it his mission to shed light on how the physical body and one's physical traits significantly impact social stratification and power dynamics in today's world. He uses his theories of habitus, field, and capitals to explain how individuals' objective and subjective experiences are intertwined with their capacity for self-reflection, their engagement in deliberate practice, and the reproduction of their social positions. The idea that society is inherently superior to the individual is challenged by Pierre Bourdieu's theory of habitus. The forces that shape people's actions can only be seen and replicated by those who are actively participating in the process, according to Pierre Bourdieu's theory. On a more macro level, the structure serves the community rather than any one individual. What makes a position's basic and relational characteristics into a consistent way of life or set of behaviours is what we might call its "generative and unifying principle," or habitus (Bourdieu, 1998: 8). They serve different purposes, so Bourdieu likens them to differentiate operators. A person's learned and enduring set of attitudes and dispositions, or habitus, may pursue them anywhere. A key component of habitus, as described by Bourdieu, is what he calls "implicit collusion" among those who share a common upbringing, education, and life experiences (Bourdieu, 2000: 145). As a result of this tension, social order leaves its imprint on people, but the exchanges with the society continue to play a prominent role. According to Bourdieu, a coherent and harmonious set of attitudes is the result of a system set up by habitus. Bourdieu argues that the bodies of social actors are permanently marked by their experiences, giving them an advantage in their interactions with others. The object "incites, calls upon, stimulates" the habitus in the same way that the habitus "urges, interrogates, makes the object talk" (Bourdieu, 1996: 320). Additionally, Bourdieu argues that lessons learned in real life may validate habitus' worth as a social formation tool. Habitus aids in the maturation of one's interpersonal and social relationships. According to Bourdieu, the subject does not progress separately from society. Unrealized potential is represented by Bourdieu's concept of habitus, which he defines as a set of tendencies in one's state of being and actions. The term "habitus" is used to describe the practical outcome achieved when one combines their innate tendencies with the patterns of their

social environment. Assumptions and expectations are fostered that are consistent with the general course of events in society. A person's thoughts and actions will inevitably be shaped by the habitus to which they belong.

Incorporating Marx, Durkheim, and Weber into a new whole, Bourdieu's field theory is original. According to Bourdieu, the field's influence results from the tension between the existing and prospective roles played by its agents. Because they are both influenced by and able to exert some control over the structural social dynamics that permeate social space, individuals are not just random agents of activity. Habitus and field are said to have a conditioning connection since the field influences the habitus. Conflicts over control over and access to sources and capitals characterize the social nature of the Bourdieusian field. To varying degrees, "fields" might be defined as "culture goods (lifestyle)," "housing," "intellectual differentiation (education)," "employment," "land," "power (politics)," "social class," "prestige," and so on (Bourdieu: 1996: 51). In order to maintain or increase their standing in a certain area, actors in that field always act in their own self-interest.

There is no direct creative effort in a field, and instead it is governed by implicit and undefined regularities. Stake is the consequence of players' rivalry over the game's outcome. In real life, games are governed by rules that specify the actions that players may and cannot do. Humans are equipped with a habitus that equips them with techniques unique to their area in which they may challenge dominant actors. Bourdieu believes that illusio is the stakes involved in the game itself. Without participants' full participation, there can be no game. The stakes are high, and the results are important. The importance of what is lost and gained is implicitly acknowledged in every discipline. According to Bourdieu, games emerge from the ontological complicity existing between the subjective mental structures and the objective social environment. The hierarchy of the various species of capital varies over fields, just as the relative worth of cards changes from game to game. In addition to monetary wealth, Bourdieu also notes the importance of cultural, social, and symbolic capital. Bourdieu argues that agents may alter their trump cards depending on the situation. In order to save resources or subvert the strategy of other players, players must first accumulate capital. Economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital all contribute to what is often referred to as "capital" (Bourdieu 1996: 114). One's ability to build and maintain meaningful connections with others is a key

component of what economists call social capital. According to Bourdieu, the reproduction of agents is analogous to the generation of categories, which in turn generates the social world and genealogy. Others who have a lot of money and friends are seen as apart from those who do not have much in the way of resources. Although habitus shapes the body, it is not a static thing.

Ian McEwan explores the limits of the body and its implications in the second chapter, both on the intimate scale of the family and on the more macro level of the larger societal scene *the Cement Garden*. According to Bourdieu, a field is a set of positions connected by a set of objective connections (Bourdieu 1992: 97). It is possible to create a "conflict and rivalry space" out of any given field. Bourdieu argues that society is divided up into several spheres with their own norms and expectations. In order to maintain their social status, families are "corporate entities" driven by "conatus" (Bourdieu, 1998: 19). The conventional family serves as an extreme case since its members are all able to indulge in ego enhancement because to the "collusio in the illusio" that binds them together (Bourdieu, 2008: 7). Regarding the position of the family in the fields of sexuality, society, and ideology, *The Cement Garden* is both illuminating and problematic. The novel is structured in two parts by Ian McEwan, the first commencing with the loss of their father and the second with the death of their mother. When parents pass away, it may further complicate already tense family relationships. In *The Cement Garden*, Jack recounts their experience attempting to create a cement garden in their backyard with his father. In the father, a dedication to societal norms and his habitus have combined to produce a preference for tidiness and order. His eventual death leaves unfinished garden work and an incomplete routine for his family. Order and disorder are shown side by side throughout the whole of the book. It is as though the field takes on a physical significance for the orphaned children in their house. When it comes to the game of survival, they devise their own guidelines. As agents, they are competitors, but as each other's allies, they work together to defeat other agents. In an effort to maintain domestic harmony, they unwittingly break with accepted norms by engaging in an incestuous relationship with one another.

The third chapter is devoted to an analysis of the sexual body and classed body in relation to the social existence of the characters Cecilia, Briony, and Robbie from the novel *Atonement.* These characters each have distinct habitus and capitals, so the analysis

of this aspect of their bodies is important. In this chapter, Ian McEwan draws a sharp line between the social groups that existed during World War II and the attitudes that the characters have toward one another. Characters, the setting, and topics all play a role in developing habitus's working mechanism. Norbert Elias is of the opinion that our internal and psychological restrictions, despite the fact that they give the impression of being incredibly personal, are in fact the result of social change. According to Elias, this is the primary reason why there is an urgent requirement for legal change and the adoption of transparent ground rules. No one is born civilized, as stated in Elias's fundamental rule of socio-genetics, and this applies to everyone. He maintains that people are entangled in a complex web of interactions, both great and little, that are emblematic of society and the individual. To advance one's social standing, one must steer clear of embarrassing situations that could jeopardize their standing and instead work toward conforming to the social norms that are now in place. In the cultures of today, our behaviours are mostly monitored and controlled through the use of our bodies as the monitoring and control mechanism. People are increasingly encouraged to create rather than simply accept their bodies, which is in line with the theory that Foucault proposed regarding the social technologies of the body. The authority of discipline encourages self-monitoring and self-control, both of which are beneficial to the process of reproducing social standards. The ability to design systems in which the result of multiple forces is magnified by their deliberate combination is known as strategy, and it is unquestionably the most advanced level of discipline there is. A different perspective on civilisation and control of the body is provided by Bourdieu. Within the context of the investigation of *Atonement,* this chapter utilizes Bourdieu's theory of practice. Bourdieu is of the opinion that physical civilisation and control are the results of an internalisation of the norms of practice. These rules of practice are the learnt dispositions for perceiving, representing, and manipulating things within a specific environment. The relationship between a person's social and economic standing and their physical appearance is the subject of research known as the axis of body and class. Members of the same social group tend to exhibit behavioural patterns of categorization, assessment, judgment, and perception that are, to a greater or lesser extent, consistent with one another. According to Bourdieu, an individual's sense of taste is formed by involvement in behaviours that occur on a regular basis. The sense of taste is the element that most strongly bonds things and people. The Tallis house is an essential component in the formation of both a distinguished taste and a prominent social status. The children of every socioeconomic group are exposed to a diverse range of

chances and influences, each of which has the potential to mold the habits and perspectives of those children. To be successful in a job that is considered to be of high status, an individual must be able to blend in well with others who also hold jobs considered to be of high status. The characters of Robbie, Cecilia, Briony, and others in *Atonemen*t are used to investigate the chances that are acquired or lost by various classes as a result of the build-up of capital. At the very beginning of the book, there is a comparison made between Robbie and Cecilia's respective socioeconomic statuses. The argument that Robbie and Cecelia had about an expensive vase was symbolic of the two people's growing frustration with one another. Although Cecilia and Robbie are working in opposite directions, they are unable to deny the attraction that exists between them. The cultural preferences of an individual are highly impacted by the person's social standing, which may be deduced from the individual's family history, educational possibilities, and other such aspects of their life. Bourdieu contends that there is a clear relationship between one's social rank and their outward look. *Atonement* is a novel written by Ian McEwan that delves into topics such as social stratification and cultural estrangement. Robbie, who comes from a working-class background but is financially supported by Mr. Tallis, is the person who sparks this cultural alienation in the first place. Because of his wrongful conviction, Robbie has been shown to have migrated from a lower-middle class milieu to an upper-middle class environment and back down to a lower-middle class setting.

"Lifestyles"are the systematic results of habitus, which, when identified in their mutual interactions, form signifiers that are socially labelled. Although Briony and Cecilia have the means and capitals necessary to embrace a particular form of habitus at the beginning of the story, they choose not to do so because they are committed to war nursing rather than adopting this habitus. Cecilia and Robbie both pass away, but elderly Briony is granted the opportunity to live out her remaining years intellectually and in comfort. One of the topics that divides people of varying socioeconomic backgrounds the most is tolerance for those who live their lives in a different way. People who are self-assured in their own sense of taste may nonetheless have difficulty relating to individuals who do not share their perspective, which can leave them with a feeling of being isolated and alone in the world. The conviction that social statuses are unchangeable is the root cause of Emily's superiority problem. Even Cecilia arrives at the conclusion that Danny almost follows Lola, despite the fact that Danny has an alibi at the time of the event and

the event already occurred. When referring to an asset that has the potential to be exchanged for influence or status, the word “capital” is typically employed. This includes real assets like money and property as well as intangible assets like a solid education and relevant work experience. There are disparities in the ownership of the various kinds of capital that are available. The idea of social capital plays a pivotal role in Pierre Bourdieu’s examination of different social stratifications. While Robbie is sentenced to death and destitution during the lengthy battle, from which he can never return back, the social and financial capital aids Lord Marshall in his ascension to the title.

The last chapter is focused on analysing the posthuman condition in relation to the concepts of Bourdieu. Posthumanists believe that humanity can grow beyond the constraints of the human form. For humans, new transhumanistic lifestyles are promoted. Transhumanism encourages the employment of innovative technology in every aspect of everyday life as a means to this objective. Posthumanist and transhumanist views suggests that humans must voluntarily evolve in order to overcome their limits and make greater use of the created technologies. Posthumanism is a philosophy that doubts humanity’s pre-eminence in the universe. Posthumanists believe that humans are not the apex of creation, and that other species, plants, and even inanimate things have intrinsic value. When confronted with posthuman tales, one witnesses the disintegration of humanist certainties and the rewriting of bodies, ideas, desires, boundaries, knowledge, and existence itself. The cyborg consists of human and mechanical components. This is a useful metaphor for contemplating the posthuman since it highlights the increasing proximity between humans and robots. This potential body enhanced or changed by technology in the far future is known as a posthuman body. The posthuman body embodies the post-biological or technological being characteristic in science fiction, as well as the subsequent reassessment of what it means to be human. Hayles contends that cybernetic theory may provide light on how technology advancement alters the conceptions of what it means to be human. Despite what its critics have stated, Hayles’ work implies that posthumanism may be a good concept. Posthumanism undermines the distinctions that have distinguished academic disciplines and theoretical frameworks for so long. In the twenty-first century, the apparent contradiction between liberal humanism and the posthuman is less likely to be explored than the many types of posthumanism. In contrast to humans, cyborgs have not been corrupted by the Garden of Eden’s temptations. Cyborgs cannot connect with the pain of humankind because they lack a

natural condition of innocence. It is essential to recall that the terminology and categories used to describe people's identities are often used to marginalize and exclude them. In light of developments in genetic engineering, the appearance of hybrid species, rising evidence for the sociality of nonhuman animals, and changing conceptions of what it means to be human, the term 'posthuman' has been used to characterize a new way of thinking about humankind.

Charlie, the story's narrator, says humans "wanted to build an upgraded, more contemporary version of themselves" to live a better life (McEwan, 2020: 1). Adam is a humanoid mechanical prototype. Although he is sexually active with functional mucous membranes, he is not promoted as such. Partner, companion, and factotum who can do housework is Adam's inventors' goal. Bourdieu proposes that a body exposed to the outside world is likewise focused on what may be seen and anticipated upon entering that environment. Charlie struggles to believe Adam's life is a fabrication. Charlie says Adam practices the art of feeling. Game is a good metaphor for a social game that requires agents to play. Bourdieu and McEwan use the metaphor of a game to explain the laws of a social game that actors must play. Adam's free will and decision-making make him autopoietic giving him the agency. Only those who internalize and follow the rules may win the game. Without game rules, competition would be impossible. Throughout the novel, the competition to take over the field and investment in the game can be traced in the interaction of the characters one of whom is humanoid robot.

Through an examination of the mentioned works, the context of the body, and the life cycle of the human body as a whole, the dissertation tries to explain the concepts surrounding the body. These novels were selected because of their examinations of the human body at different ages and stages, specifically the body of a child in *the Cement Garden*, the body of an adolescent in *Atonement*, the body of an adult in *Machines Like Me*, and the posthuman body in a more general sense in *Machines Like Me*. All three novels tackle concerns concerning the human body within the context of their storylines. In *Atonemen*t, the body of the adolescent protagonist is explored through her struggles with understanding her own sexuality and the dynamics of her relationships with other characters, whereas in *the Cement Garden,* the body of the child protagonist is explored through his attempts to come to terms with his parents' deaths and the changing dynamics of his relationship with his siblings. While the body of the adult protagonist in *Machines*

Like Me is investigated through his interactions with an artificial intelligence and the limitations of technology on human life, the posthuman body in *Machines Like Me* is investigated through its implications for society and human morality in a more general context. Nevertheless, what sets *Machines Like Me* apart from other works is not only the fact that it examines the ways in which literature has investigated the human body, but also the ways in which recent technological developments have resulted in a new form of posthuman body and the implications that this has for comprehending the nature of human life. Closely linked with Bourdieusian idea of the body, the investigation of the human body is used as a framework in each of the three novels as a means of delving further into topics and concerns that have been extensively covered in other works of fiction, such as mortality, identity, sexuality, and morality. These novels each offer a distinct and profound perspective on the significance of knowing one's own body and how it links to the larger social concerns that have an effect on human life.

The analysis is provided for each novel, and a short interpretation is made for them in the conclusion chapter, which is handled in line with the theoretical foundation of the study. In addition, the primary arguments of the dissertation are encapsulated by considering the examples found in the novels that were selected. The analyses demonstrate how the main arguments of the dissertation are connected to their theoretical background, and the conclusion is drawn based on these frameworks. By tracing the Bourdieusian body, the last section of the conclusion draws assumptions about the direction that body studies will take in the future. The purpose of this dissertation has been to demonstrate, via the employing of an inter-disciplinary framework, how body studies, and more specifically Bourdieusian theories, may be addressed in literary works that can be regarded as instances of social reflection. This dissertation is an effort to fill a gap in the literature by offering a fresh fertile ground for Bourdieusian study of the works of Ian McEwan, one of the most highly renowned authors in Britain.

CHAPTER I

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE BODY

1.1. The Body as a Cultural Entity

The rising interest in body studies has shifted the body into the locus of interdisciplinary areas. Despite its essentiality for being and doing, the body was overlooked, underestimated, and even negated. The notable change in the recontextualization of the body has played a pivotal part in the social sciences and disciplines of literature. The history of the body is concurrent with the existence of human beings. However, considering the history of human beings, body studies have recently emerged as a distinctive area of study. There are reasons for the delay of scientific and philosophical interest in the body. To put it simply, the body is a collective phenomenon rather than a single entity. With this in mind, the body is subjected to social and political processes, medical and technological developments, and specific conditions of society and culture. It has been hard to define the body in its entirety because it is open to many diverse interpretations. What the body is, which has been addressed from a variety of perspectives, is still a subject of a fruitful research area.

Pasi Falk defines the role of the body as "ambiguous" and "paradoxical" since it is culturally categorized "from the cosmologies of the archaic societies to the discursive and non-discursive practices of modern western civilization" (1994: 1). Bryan S. Turner defines the body as the individual and the group, "simultaneously an environment (part of nature) and a medium of the self (part of the culture)" (2008: 40). The body is crucially located at the intersection of human labour on nature through literature, language, and religion, and therefore, of the human race between the natural order of the world and the cultural order of the world (ibid., 40). As noted by Chris Shilling, the body is regarded "as an entity which is in the process of becoming; a project which should be worked at and accomplished as part of an individual's self-identity" (1993: 5). Shilling expends the idea of the body as "an unfinished biological and social phenomenon" that is, to a certain extent, transformed as a result of its entrance into and involvement in society (1993:12). The body functions as a resourceful entity located in the heart of society. Therefore, it is an essential component of society, culture, and history. Turner describes the body as the "site of national, global and democratic interrelations" (2008: 222). The body becomes, for Turner, "the living site where the politics of identity is inscribed" (2008: 222).

The notion of the isolated person is an illusion. Individuality and autonomy are not damaged in this way. It is, rather, a requirement for both. People emerge as individuals and become autonomous due to the transformational experience of engagement in social interactions and experiences from beginning to death. People are born with unrealized potentialities only disclosed through social relations and experiences. It may seem to be a minor issue when temporal and spatial factors have struggled to attract systematic attention within sociology. The notions of time and space should be considered in every discussion of bodies. The problem is that when the concepts of body, time, and space are combined, they equal a significant number of concepts, resulting in disconnection from and estrangement from experience, as seen in prior theoretical pursuits. Time, space, and bodies, on the other hand, are not abstract concepts; they are embedded in the "immediacy of everyday life" (Scott, 2005:18).

Turner suggests a 'somatic society' where the body is a site on which social, political, and cultural issues are ubiquitous. Somatic societies transfer social concerns onto the body, as bodily disruptions serve as a way for thinking about political disruption. Psychiatry and medicine are fields of contention and controversy within which the rise and fall of physical and mental disorders related to the body show social ambiguity, conflicting interests, and competing world views (Turner, 1993: 5). Scott contributes to the distinction of being and having a body discussed by Turner earlier via what Scott calls "the four R's of Reproduction, Representation, Regulation, and Restraint as a useful set of considerations to decipher the body politically, socially, and culturally (2005: 3). They serve as the mechanisms to produce, control, restrict and differentiate the bodies. Victoria Pitts-Taylor (2012) handles the body "as a sociological stage, a place where societies write up and enact cultural scripts" (171). The body is discursive, fleshy, and organic, focusing on various scientific and philosophical thoughts.

The history of the human body is a combination of social and cultural history and the history of concepts about the body. A body becomes a human body as part of an "Order" that includes social and economic systems and systems charged with a set of cultural significance (Falk, 1994: 45). The body becomes a medium of culture, a text of culture (Bordo, 1993:165). The body, which is almost synonymous with a metaphor of culture embodied, becomes a "surface" that the culture is processed and "inscribed on" (Butler, 2002: 12). Butler claims that culture plays a more essential part than biology in

signifying what the body is. Therefore, culture becomes "destiny" (ibid, 12). Bodily dispositions generate an "automatic," "habitual," outside of conscious awareness and beyond conscious attempt to change social relations (Bordo, 1993: 165). O'Neill differentiates the types of body that are presented as "a power over ourselves (biotext) inscribed through the state and the economy, and through its laws and sciences (sociotext)" (2004: 1). Body, which is simultaneously a cultural text, a biotext, and a sociotext, urges a myriad of research and theoretical framework to track the body to what extent influence culture and be influenced by it.

> Because embodiment has, in fact, many dimensions, one can talk about three aspects: having a body in which the body has the characteristics of a thing, being a body in which we are subjectively engaged with our body as a project, and doing a body in the sense of producing a body through time (Turner, 1996). These distinctions are more felicitously expressed in German, where there is a ready-made distinction between the body as an object (*Koerper*) and the body as lived experience (*Leib*) (Turner, 2008: 245).

The body is both a thing that is perceived and a state of being that permits such perception. As identity is closely intertwined with human existence in the physical world, an agent's connection with their own body is not impersonal, impartial, or indifferent. Connell argues that the cultural importance of the body is rooted in its "constituting" power (2010: 19). Human embodiment, Connell states, is conceived through the difference in phenomenology between "being a body" and "having a body" (ibid., 21). Being a body primarily indicates that inhabiting the body corresponds to the dynamism of embodiment. Having a body, which alludes to the body from an objective, third-person viewpoint corresponds to the static body.

A fundamental aspect of human life, the interplay of the body both as an object and as an agent of experience, has shaped the history of the body from the beginning and has influenced how different cultures have defined the experience of embodiment in radically disparate ways different periods. The unavoidable aspect of a cultural history background of the body emphasizes the body's function as a medium. The body as a medium is the basis of many cultural forms of embodiment (Mitchell and Hansen, 2010: 21). Crossley (2006) maintains a united front on the idea of the body as an object and subject of cultural significance by claiming the body that gets several "representational meanings which both shape and are shaped by different practices of modification and maintenance" is objectified and manufactured (2). As Bewes defines reification refers

to “the moment that a process or relation is generalized into an abstraction, and thereby turned into a thing” (2002: 3). The body is reified as a cultural object open to interpretations and signification. Material force can be exerted by culture. Culture may be exchanged, converted, and reconverted to generate power and control since it is incarnated in language, action, style, objectified in artworks, buildings, and books, and certified in educational qualifications.

The production and reproduction of bodies are at the heart of everyday existence. Recognizing the primacy of the body in daily life and the fact that it is something that all people share, the body is taken for granted as it comes so naturally also discussed by Graeme Turner, people are at our most natural; their everyday, they are at our most cultural. The dispositions and roles that seem natural are actually “constructed, learned and far from inevitable” when roles that look the most obvious and given are taken up (2003: 2).

Douglas and Isherwood argue that consumption is not restricted only to economic goods and services, but it must also be considered as “an integral part of the same social system that accounts for the drive to work, itself part of the social need to relate to other people, and to have mediating materials for relating to them” (2002: viii). It is a cultural phenomenon since the use of objects that are marked by social relations. The body is increasingly regarded as a means of consumption, which marks its status as an object, and social standing is tied to the visible exterior aspects of the body (Shilling, 2004: 2). The consumption of different styles of fashion and goods and having a certain look fortify the body as an object that is subject to the gaze of others and results in categorization and stratification. In line with this idea, Featherstone also states as follows:

> …the signs of the dispositions and classificatory schemes which betray one’s origins and trajectory through life are also manifest in body shape, size, weight, stance, walk, demeanour, tone of voice, style of speaking, sense of ease or discomfort with one’s body, etc. Hence culture is incorporated, and it is not just a question of what clothes are worn, but how they are worn (2007: 20).

Without the body as its source, neither idea, cultural activity, nor human action can happen. Although human bodies have been entangled in “cultural reproduction” ever since the dawn of history, anyone has taken the body as a fact that cannot be disregarded (Wegeinstein, 2010: 19). The subject’s medium for transmitting gender, age, class, religion, and so forth is nothing but the body. The body is employed to mirror the other

bodies. It forms an underlying point of socialization as "our own bodies are the permeable ground of all social behavior; our bodies are the very flesh of society" (O'Neill, 2004: 7). The body serves as a tool to think about society since society is thought through the body, whereas the body is evaluated in its relationship with society (ibid., 24).

1.2. Body= Soul + Mind Debate

From Plato to Bourdieu, there have been diverse debates concerning the body as a phenomenon and its relations to the mind, soul[1] , and the other bodies that they interact. Some distinctive arguments for pro-body and anti-body were set out to shape and reshape controversial standing in the matter. The body that remained in the dark and/or was put on the target of reproach and restraints required to be elucidated in the philosophical history in terms of the elemental significance of anything human and social. Doing so, it is aimed to give an account of the body leading to the postmodern concept of the body with a focus on the Bourdieusian theory of the body.

Despite the variety of theories that arose about the natures of the body and spirit, Federe and Reis (2009) identify two models of interpretation for this relationship, namely a "monist" and a "dualist" one (2). The monist paradigm is dwelt on the concept of an identical interrelationship between the body and the soul, to the point that the soul is not even distinguishable as a separate entity from the body, while the dualist paradigm, on the other hand, assumes a much looser relationship between body and soul, to the point that some dualists saw the soul as "a stranger on earth," living in forced association with the body for a transitory period (ibid., 2). Plato is one of the precursors that addresses the body debate surrounding the duality of body and mind. Plato examines the body as the component of unity, by extension, the unity of body and soul. The body is aligned with the physical world; the soul is more closely associated with the world of ideas. Plato's concept of the body highlights the body's vulnerability as the reason for the distraction of the mind and the fragility of illnesses that affect the human quest for the ultimate truth and bodily needs and emotions.

> …while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true

[1] Mind and soul have been interchangeably employed to account for the similar entities as opposed to body by the philosophers and thus in the study.

> being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. … the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth (Plato, 2005: 229-230)

The only solution is to quit the body and free the soul from the restraints of the body. Otherwise, it is impossible to have pure knowledge. Two sorts of existence, "one seen" and "the other unseen" the body and soul, are suggested in the dialogue (ibid., 275). What is visible to the human eye is the changing while the unseen is unchanging. Therefore, the soul and the body are united, it is nature's law for the soul "to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve" (ibid., 279). Having established the distinction, the soul is divine and unchanging, whereas the body is subject to change and thus what is mortal.

The mind and the body are one and the same. According to Aristotle, the bodies and minds of human beings are not two distinct entities but rather one entity, with the mind serving as the form of the human body. In this way, the body is considered responsible for human activities, including mental ones. Polansky suggests that Aristotelian notion of the body capable of life is bestowed by the soul (2007: 4). That body and soul are united into one address Aristotle's hylomorphic theory in which a person as a unity of body and soul has life in it and is capable of "experiencing, perceiving, and thinking" (ibid., 4). As also maintained by Crane and Patterson, "hylomorphism" is that the soul is nothing but the form of the body's materiality (2002: 3). Therefore, Aristotle claims that the body is matter with a soul, and the soul imposes a form on the matter of the body.

> Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite. But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized (Aristotle, 1907: 4).

Aristotle's claim of natural bodies that contain life, which is meant as self-nutrition development and decay, establishes the body to be a composite However, the body can never be restricted to the soul; the body is the subject or matter that actualizes the soul. Rist (1996) argues that the soul is "the actuality (or form) of a natural body equipped with

organs" (V). However, the soul's immateriality is actualized through the equipment of the organs in the body to be the agent of action.

The ancient distinction of the body and soul/mind based on the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts would facilitate the perception of the subsequent philosophical ideas on the body. In consonance with the Aristotelian idea of the body and the soul, Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle also relates the mind and body much more closely by handling the relationship between mind and body. According to Aquinas, people acquire knowledge through their senses, including sight, sound, smell, touch, and taste. The impression acquired through sense informs about the object that is sensed only superficially. Likewise, Aristotle, who believes form in the human body is spirit, Aquinas suggests that the soul is connected to the body. Nevertheless, Aquinas differs from Aristotle in the perception of death since Aristotelian death ends the soul and the body. Aquinas follows Christian doctrine in terms of the afterlife of the soul even if the body is bound to decay and disappear. The Medieval Christian view of the body and the soul is in a clash with the Aristotelean idea of the unity of the body to the soul as inseparable entities. Crane and Patterson support Stone's argument that "the monopsychism[2] controversy had its origins in the various attempts to reconcile Aristotle's views on the soul with Christian theology" (2002: 4). Aquinas opposes the view and suggests that the soul has a "subsistence," which explains its immortality perfectly (qtd. in Crane and Patterson, 2002: 6).

In Christianity, religious devotional art often depicts tortured and crucified saints or martyrs. While the saint's body may be in agony, the head is typically raised to heaven, implying that the soul has surpassed the body and progressed beyond its sinful, weak constraints (ibid, 4). The idea that the body as simply the shell or the outer casing for the soul reinforced the loss of the body's significance in Christian teaching. The body becomes so insignificant and disgraceful that it can be ignored, dispensed, and frowned upon. Given that all evil things happen in the world as a result of the disruptive body, humanity must regulate and discipline the bodily desires, consigning them to the discipline of the mind. To be human or an animal, the mind must regulate and defeat the body. This encompasses all of the culture's "civilized" practices, from athletic training to Christian fasting rituals (ibid, 6). Those scorned and condemned are presumed to disturb

[2] The belief that denotes the one immortal soul or intellect with which humankind is endowed.

the mind/body hierarchy and cause the body to dominate the mind.

Renaissance accelerates the shift of the ideas concerned with the body by rejecting the "Christian hierarchy in which the body is a rather lowly, albeit necessary, container for the soul" (Gent and Llewelyn, 1995: 5). Two factors affect and adjust the physical body's religious position in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Living circumstances required higher tolerance of other people's bodies; meanwhile, in the field of representation, there was a much more vibrant oral and popular culture whose writings, outside of sermons in church, were not interested in creating hierarchies of matter and soul. Thomas Hobbes sets out some powerful arguments in his seminal work *Leviathan* regarding the body and materiality by drawing an analogy of the body to the machine in the introduction. Hobbes's investigation reveals a recurring pattern of the body to discuss the ideas and insights.

> For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body… (Hobbes, 1996: 9).

In the very first paragraph of Leviathan, Hobbes draws this contrast, comparing the body as a breathing machine as the "rational and most excellent work of Nature" (ibid., 9). Therefore, Leviathan, as a "Commonwealth or State," is capable of protecting and defending its people; it outweighs the human mind and reason (ibid., 9).

Descartes asserts in his *Meditations*, written in 1641, that there is a clear differentiation between mind and body; they are entirely distinct kinds. Much as Descartes suggests in the "Preface for the Reader" of *Meditations* that many readers would fail to approach his work in the way that Descartes urges not to pass judgment upon these Meditations before they have taken the trouble to read through all these objections and [my] replies to them (2008: 9), his idea of duality would indicate a remarkable distinction that determines the way how body and mind have been perceived for a long time. "VI. Meditation" is about the existence of material things and the real separation between the soul and body of a person. There are two purposes of meditation; the first is to show that material things exist, and the second is to show that the mind is

completely separate from the body. Descartes argues that the vital qualities pertaining to being human are purely spiritual qualities such as thinking, willing, and imagination, and they have nothing to do with the body. Descartes differentiates three ultimate substances: God, soul, and body (ibid., 55). God is the ultimate substance on which every being is dependent while not dependent on anything. The soul is a thinking substance, while the body is a space-occupying substance. As Almog also states, Descartes sets out to prove that the body and mind "(i) are real subjects," (ii) "are numerically distinct" and "(iii) *can exist* without the other" (2002: Viii).

> And although perhaps (or rather certainly, as I shall shortly claim) I have a body, which is very closely conjoined to me, yet because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am a thinking and not an extended thing, and, on the other, a distinct idea of the body, in so far as it is only an extended and not a thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, * and can exist without it (Descartes, 2008: 55).

Scruton examines the idea of Cartesian existence by highlighting the absolute certainty of mind over uncertainty about all "corporeal" things (1995: 36). Scruton elaborates on the idea of me' as "an immaterial, substantial being, accidentally and temporarily connected with the body through which I act" (ibid., 36). Hatfield also argues that Descartes establishes body and mind as complete beings. They require "mutual exclusion," in which the mind is completely deprived of bodily modes and vice versa (2003: 250). The essence of fabricating souls is thought. The soul as a substance is posed against the body. Elsewhere Patterson notes that corporeal things that contain living bodies become "configurations of extended substance" where the soul signifies a substance that thinks and its comprehension of the world dwells on ideas peculiar to the mind rather than sensory images (2002: 101).

Descartes' idea that there are two different substances, in other words, this distinction between the soul and the body is referred to as Cartesian dualism in the history of philosophy. Descartes seeks to establish that the mind is neither a mode of body nor an incomplete thing. It denotes a "substance" (qtd in Crane, 1995: 6). Descartes makes the distinction between "res extensa" and "res cogitans" by creating dualism (qtd in Bracken and Thomas, 2002: 1433). Descartes calls res cogitans the thing that thinks. The essence of matter substance is to be extended. This is why Descartes calls res extensa the spatially extended thing (2008: 15). The essential properties of substances are peculiar, never in exchange with the other substance. The disunity radically shifts what the body

is. The thinking substance is not spatial, and the extended substance reveals the inability to think. The body and the soul exist independently. Nevertheless, Descartes concludes that human incorporates both body and soul.

> …by body I mean everything that is capable of being bounded by some shape, of existing in a definite place, of filling a space in such a way as to exclude the presence of any other body within it; of being perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell, and also of being moved in various ways, not indeed by itself, but by some other thing by which it is touched; for to have the power of moving itself, and also of perceiving by the senses or thinking, I judged could in no way belong to the nature of body…(2008: 19).

There are some important truths that nature teaches. The sensations of pain, hunger and thirst are closely related to the body. Human occupies the body as "a pilot in a ship" (ibid., 57). Therefore, a human is mixed and fused with her/his body to "to form a single entity with it" (ibid., 57).

Spinoza suggests a different interpretation concerning the body and the soul. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza categorizes substance into three groups; the body, the soul, and God which is beyond the human world. Spinoza forms his views on the unity of existence as God. For him, "substance" is the primary axiom at the very beginning of the system (2002, 127). According to Spinoza, substance exists spontaneously and is conceived by itself; its concept is not dependent on the concept of something else. Substance owes its existence to itself; no other being creates substance (ibid, 127). According to Spinoza, God is the "only substance of the universe," and everything is derived from this substance (ibid, 128). Therefore, Spinoza defines the body as a form of substance in "the immediate subject of extension and accidents that presuppose extension, such as figure, position, and local motion" (ibid, 128).

At the level of individual things, including human beings, Spinoza's attribute dualism is intended to deal with how minds and bodies interact. The things that we experience as individual bodies or minds are modifications of the single substance conceived under one of the attributes. Each modification is both a physical thing conceived under the attribute of extension and a mental thing conceived under the attribute of thought. In particular, a human mind is a modification of substance conceived under the attribute of thought, and the human brain is the same modification of substance conceived under the attribute of extension. In this way, Spinoza avoids any question about

the interaction between mind and body: there is no interaction, only a one-to-one correspondence. However, Spinoza's theory commits him to the view that mind and body are one. Scruton illuminates Spinoza's view of the mind and body as "one and the same thing," conceived under the attribute of thought and extension (1995: 52). As outlined in the theory of the attributes, a substance can be known in two ways, and such two ways of knowing can also be applied to the modes of a substance. As Scruton conveys from Spinoza, there exist two finite modes of the infinite substance: the mind and the body, although they are one and the same in that they are both modes of the infinite substance conceived as an extension. Spinoza highlights the mind as "the idea of the body" (qtd. in Scruton, 1995:52).

> Now surely all these considerations go to show clearly that mental decision on the one hand, and the appetite and physical state of the body, on the other hand, are simultaneous in nature; or rather, they are one and the same thing which, when considered under the attribute of Thought and explicated through Thought, we call decision, and when considered under the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion-and-rest, we call a physical state (Spinoza, 2002: 281).

Even though they are the same thing, the mind and body are understood from opposing and incongruous perspectives. Mental and physical processes are theoretically similar. It seems to Spinoza that they are not interchangeable.

Bodily and mental issues received significant attention throughout the eighteenth century. According to David Hume, a Cartesian view of the human mind is not sufficient to form valid knowledge. Hume assigned perception to the contents of minds and subdivided them into two types, impressions, and ideas. Impressions represent sensations, whereas ideas suggest less vivid copies (2007: xxxiii). The feeling of external objects and the feeling of reflection are both perceptions. However, Hume distinguishes between simple and complex perceptions. Hume holds that those relations of ideas and matters of fact are distinct. In fact, things are based on the senses, while relations between ideas have a demonstrable truth value. Despite its simplicity, Hume's conception of the body belonging to natural philosophy is reflective and profound. The body appears based on experience and observation. Natural philosophy is based on how a body appears to the senses. Hume deliberately and explicitly disregards such commitment in his moral philosophy but allows and even advances arguments that support the thesis that bodies appear only to the senses.

> An extension that is neither tangible nor visible cannot possibly be conceived: And a tangible or visible extension, which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception (Hume, 2007: 113).

Essentially, Hume claims, that senses drive the body. The extension can only be real if it is laden with objects and described as visible or tangible. Hume acknowledges, in fact, that there are a variety of domains of inquiry. His main distinction is between natural philosophy, which is concerned with the body, and moral philosophy, which is concerned with the mind. Those contradictory positions and difficulties are addressed by Hume who asserts a double existence, insisting that the senses do not perceive the body (Boehm, 2013: 211). Hume believes that impressions and ideas are all that are present in the mind receiving a sense of impression upon experiencing something (Grene, 1994: 175).

As for Immanuel Kant, the mind adds knowledge that is not extracted from observation itself and might be regarded as innate. The foremost vital kinds of knowledge introduced by the mind to incoming stimuli are time, space, and causality. Perceptions are naturally positioned and arranged in space and time. The source of the sensations is outside, although they are considered subjective since the one with an experience of sensation signifies them in accordance with the familiar world. A priori is freed from experience. It is pre-experience universal knowledge that is required. A posteriori is based on experienced knowledge. The experience renders the knowledge more peculiar to the subject, unlike a priori knowledge's universality. Experience forms a pivotal point to highlight the bodily experience in acquiring knowledge. The a posteriori knowledge based on the experience is less valid than a priori knowledge exceeding the subjectivity of experience.

> … I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree (Kant, 1998: 111).

Every object exists in space and time. Location in space and time are conditions of experience. Space and time are neither things that exist apart from our experience, nor are they attributes of or relationships between objects that exist apart from our experience.

Kant's interpretation, known as "Dual Aspect," is dwelt upon the idea of objects' dual nature, one of which is visible to the human sense. The incomplete capturing of the objects leads to the incomplete grasp of the knowledge that consists of understanding that presents a priori the structure of knowledge and sensibility providing a posteriori the content of knowledge.

> The statement "all bodies are extended" is analytic. The concept of body already relates to the concept of extension, and it is difficult to comprehend without it. This trait is observed to develop not in bodies as a whole, but only in bodies that interact with other bodies. Bodies can very well be thought of as not influencing one another in any way (Smith, 2003: 29-30).

Smith adds that Kant's conviction that humans can only grasp a body's outline through its relationship to pure space results from absolute space not being an external objective but an internal concept that allows all these feelings and effects (ibid., 163). Kant lists three distinct dialectical problems that are immediately related to rational psychology and are founded on the same transcendental illusion and may thus be resolved accordingly. They are "as to the possibility of the communion of soul and body, i.e., of the state of the soul during the life of the body; as to the beginning of this association, i.e., of the soul in and before birth; as to the termination of this association, i.e., of the soul in and after the death of the body" (qtd. in Smith, 2003: 464).

Spirit is, for Hegel, the antithesis of Matter. It is gravity that gives matter its essence. As a result, the matter is considered gravitational by virtue of its tendency toward a central point. This is a collection of parts that exclude one another and strive for unity. By pursuing unity, it tends to create its opposite. Contrary to this, Spirit is characterized by freedom. As Hegel describes it, the spirit has its centre in itself. It does not need to be united with anything outside itself but finds it already existing within itself. Spirit resides within itself, rather than being connected to matter, while matter has an essence that comes from outside. In order to exist, the spirit is obliged to depend on itself. A person is not in control of freedom if their existence is connected to another one. It is actually self-consciousness that defines spirit as a self-contained entity.

Insofar as subjective life arises from the individual's inclusion in natural and social environments, the soul represents subjective life. As Hegel points out, the "social" and "natural" worlds are equally implicated in developing the human "psyche" (qtd. in Deranty, 2020: 5). Those two dimensions, external and internal, subjective, and objective,

become distinguishable, though they are not yet identifiable since consciousness and self-consciousness are not yet formed. External features, or external features of nature, are reflected in the quality of the emerging self. Likewise, internal organic processes are also a part of the grand "macrocosm" (ibid., 5). Through the ability of the subject to feel, perceive and act, the external is the medium through which the subject's "internal" is translated (ibid., 5). The embodiment is intertwined with the split dimensions of subject and object, yet both remain entangled in the indistinct ontological order of the medium in which they emerge since it is simultaneously about and of the world. Hegel explicitly mentions the embodied subjective level as being a "unity of the inner and outer" (ibid., 5).

Human life requires social relations; Karl Marx rejects the idea of an individualistic nature. Ultimately, all human activity is for the benefit of society, and this is part of the nature of humankind. Holt (2014) emphasizes Marx's social analysis that human beings are material, and their social world is also material in its substance (41). A better way to state this is to say Marx viewed the world and human thinking from a materialist perspective. According to materialism, people and the universe are defined as being made up of physical matter. Materialist theories argue that humans and their interactions are fundamentally organic, physical, and temporal. People's organic, physical, and chronological characteristics can be used as criteria to analyse human activities and social systems. The social structure of human beings is best determined according to the actual causes of social development rather than on the basis of ideal conceptions such as religious ideas. Marx's theory of materialism specifically challenged Hegel's idealistic theory of rationalism. Holt underlines Hegel's idealism based on the belief that humans are fundamentally self-conscious beings and that by better understanding the self-consciousness of humans, the basic philosophical questions can be better apprehended (2014: 42).

According to Marx, the concept of capital is significant to understanding the mechanics of production and trade. Capital, Marx argues, begins with the "circulation of commodities" (1906: 163). Commodity production, and the developing form of circulation, all form the historical underpinnings from which capital grows. This circulation of commodities is money, the final result of the "exchange of the various use-values," the first form of capital as an economic process (ibid., 163). In its simplest form,

Marx defines capital as a product of the market, whether it is commodities, labour, or even money today, which has to be transformed into capital via a definite process. It is a little more than a difference in the circulation system that distinguishes money that is money alone from money that is capital. "Money" as capital circulates by purchasing and selling, whereas "commodities" circulate by "sale" and "purchase" (ibid., 164). Commodities and money are both starting points and goals in one case and the other. Marx's impact on body studies is Marxist focus on the materiality and the social interrelations and distribution of the capital.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Edmund Husserl intended to develop a philosophical idea built on a new theoretical and methodological framework. Phenomenology which is the new approach is required for effective and extensive analysis of the contents and structures of consciousness (Throop and Murphy, 2002: 191). Phenomenology is, for Husserl, a science that methodically investigates phenomena. In essence, phenomenology attempts to break down the subject-object distinction by demonstrating how things are experienced and how people, as perceptive beings, are moulded by the interaction with the environment. Numerous philosophers influenced and developed phenomenology, including Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Mauss, and others. Husserl tries to discover the fundamental generative structure of consciousness that arises from people's taken-for-granted daily experiences by employing phenomenological reduction and natural attitude. A similar understanding of Husserl's notion of natural attitude can be found in Bourdieu's concept of doxa. Furthermore, Smith argues that Husserl makes use of an important distinction found in German to differentiate "Leib," which refers to the living body as a subject, and "Körper," with which Husserl signals the quality of the body as an object (2003: 220). The constitution of matter is the lowest level in the ontological hierarchy. Again, from a strictly objective standpoint, the term "animate body" refers to the entire range of "the animistically animate" and does not refer specifically to the type of body that distinguishes "the rational animal" (Macann, 1993: 42).

Being and Time by Heidegger has covered one of the central sets of ideas for a phenomenological understanding of embodiment, technology, and practice. Toward transcending dualism, he proposes the concept of Dasein which is "there-being" (Heidegger, 1962: 63). Macann also speculates on Heidegger's notion of the "everyday

world of being and practice" characterised by "a taken-for-granted understanding of being-in-the-world" (1993: 64). The definition of Dasein is based on the everyday temporality of Dasein, which Heidegger describes in *The Concept of Time* (1992: 7). To declare "I am here" is to associate oneself with a certain location in time and space. "Dasein" was seen as intrinsically social and fundamentally personal (Macann, 1993: 62). Since being arises from the world and is constantly and already here, it cannot be understood outside or apart from the world and its relationships with other being.

The body is an important aspect of the theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *Phenomenology of Perception* by Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the body's mobility and recasts perception to achieve an embodied cogito acting. Merleau-Ponty radicalizes his view of the body in The Visible and the Invisible, according to Wegeinstein (2010: 26). Merleau-Ponty links the body and the world through basic reciprocity that Merleau-Ponty calls the "flesh" by discarding the subject-object divides retained in the physicality of the cogito (Wegeinstein, 2010: 26). Consequently, it is impossible to consider the relationship between humans and their environments as an objective factor affecting an individual, as to how an individual experiences their surroundings determine its meaning. According to Merleau-Ponty are both materials and more than the sum of their parts.

> The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly, it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 169).

As a result, Merleau-Ponty claims that having a body implies being an object and that "I" try to be viewed as a subject. At the same time, due to the dialectic of consciousness multiplicity, "I" becomes the object as well (ibid., 169).

Finally, the philosophical points discussed on the body so far have led to the phenomenological approach to the body that set a solid background for Pierre Bourdieu, one of the most influential thinkers of contemporary thought, to establish the concepts of practice, habitus, field, and many more. Bourdieu has adopted the multi-layered views into the body studies, accentuating the role of the body and bodily dispositions on the social relations and the identity.

1.3. The Bourdieusian Body

1.3.1. Bourdieusian Objectivity and Subjectivity in Social Space

Pierre Bourdieu has been an influential critic that seeks to illuminate the pivotal role of the body and bodily dispositions for social stratification and power relations in contemporary society by means of investigating a long tradition of contemplation on the body. From the 1970s onwards, deriving from a rich tradition of philosophical and phenomenological debates concerning the body, Bourdieu attempts to explain the relations of objectivity and subjectivity, reflexivity, practice, and reproduction of the social positions by constructing the theoretical framework of habitus, field, and capitals to capture the taste, positions, and relations of the members of the society and their interrelated class relations. Therefore, it would be required to explain the Bourdieusian concepts firstly per their significance to the cultural production and the body.

Bourdieu also emphasizes the social structure of the idea that the society is a distribution of material resources and positions, which Durkheim puts forward, and the idea that social actors build and lead their daily lives symbolically, which is the Weberian approach (Jenkins, 1992: 7). Bourdieu advocates the dual objectivity of the social one that combines these two approaches into one. In *Practical Reason (1998)*, which investigates practical signification, Bourdieu emphasizes various individual and structural dominance and symbolic power forms.

Before moving on to the definition of habitus, why the concept of habitus is needed in sociological thought should be identified to comprehend the massive influence of the Bourdieusian theory on the studies on the body. Pierre Bourdieu attempts to find a solution to a dilemma by introducing the concept of habitus. Since its emergence as a scientific field, the main subject that sociology has focused on is the relationship between the individual and society and their interaction. Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology, has focused on the fundamental problem, namely, the relationship between the individual and society. Durkheim sets out some powerful arguments concerning the priority of society over the individual, which is the Durkheimian standpoint, which has been influential in sociological thought for many years. Durkheim argues that traditional societies dominated by mechanical solidarity existed historically before modern society composed of differentiated individuals. Durkheim interprets that the individual is a product of modern differentiated societies. Deriving from the idea of a society dominated

by organic and mechanical solidarity, Durkheim stresses the historical "priority" of society over the individual (qtd. in Jenkins, 1992: 7). Unequivocally, Bourdieusian theory attempts to transcend the commanding idea of the superiority of society over an individual with the underlying principle of creativity that exists in habitus, the capacity to cope and adapt to new situations encountered. Habitus provides noticeable freedom of action to individuals beyond social determinism since Bourdieu deems social actors acting with free will. However, agents are mostly overlooked in terms of action. Subjectivism alternatively considers action as the determining fulfilment of a conscious intention and a free project of consciousness that sets its own goals. The concept of habitus illustrates that what drives human behaviour is a thing passively recorded and something constructed; however, the construction is not an individual but a social one. Social space:

> is "a (multi-dimensional) space constructed based on principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe" (Bourdieu, 1996: 723-724).

The power to preserve or transform the social world by means of preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world is an epitome of the political struggle that is indistinguishable unity of theory and practice over the categories that make it possible (Bourdieu, 1985: 729). Bourdieu reasons that what is called "I," which "comprehends physical space and social space, is comprehended, in a quite different sense, encompassed, inscribed, implicated in that space" (Bourdieu, 2000: 130). Topos, or place, is defined by Bourdieu as the location where an object or an agent takes place, or relationally, topologically, as a position, a rank in an order (ibid., 131). Bourdieu's I is situated in a place by occupying a physical and social space. "I" is not "*atopos*, placeless" nor "rootless and free-floating" (ibid., 131). The isolated, differentiated body's self-evidence is what prevents the realization that the body, a functioning principle of individuation that is the result of localization in space and time, is reinforced by the legal definition of the individual as an abstract being without qualities, is "collectivization" that is a Hegelian concept (ibid., 133). It is susceptible to a process of socialization in which individuation is itself the outcome, with the singularity of the self-shaped in by social interactions. It has the property of "being open to the world," and therefore "exposed to the world," and thus capable of being "conditioned by the world," "shaped by the material and cultural conditions of existence" (ibid., 134). For Bourdieu:

> This body-as-thing, known from outside as a mechanism, the limiting case of which is the body undergoing the mechanistic dismantling of dissection, the with the empty eye-sockets of pictorial vanities, and which is opposed to the inhabited and *forgotten* body, felt from inside as opening, energy, tension or desire, and also as strength, connivance, and familiarity, is the product of the extension to the body of a spectator's relation to the world (ibid., 133).

The body as an object placed as a mechanism result in being the extension to the body of the agent's relationship with the society in which the agent occupies a position. Therefore, social space as an agent or object corresponds to physical space. As Bourdieu also comments, the body indicates that "all the divisions and distinctions of social space (high/low, left/right, etc.) are really and symbolically expressed in physical space appropriated as reified social space" (ibid., 134). "Being instrumentalized, by the instrument" (ibid., 142) is, as Bourdieu suggests, a thing that the agent has to consent to. The practical intentionality is rooted in a posture, a way of bearing the body, hexis, which is first coined by Aristotle and denotes "a durable way of being of the durably modified body" that is generated and reinforced while continually modifying within restrictions in a double correlation, "structured and structuring," to the society (ibid., 144). As a result of the reciprocally objectified and subjectified forms, the body becomes socially determined twice. It is a social product that is greatly affected by its social modes of production through various factors such as working conditions such as deformations and diseases related to working conditions and eating habits, even in the physical aspects of the body such as height, weight, and fitness.

Bourdieu accounts for bodily hexis as "political mythology realized, embodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking" (1990: 69-70). Bodily hexis, including physical form and bearing of the body, is believed to express the depth of being, the true nature of a being, according to the assumption of a connection between the physical and the moral, which leads to practical or reasoned reasoning knowledge. Therefore, the social identity is considered based upon the naturalized acts of the dominant society. Every member of the society is required to "use in acts of evaluation" based on "the position occupied in social space" (Bourdieu, 2000: 65). Body hexis is the performative dimension of habitus "charged with a host of social meanings and values" (Bourdieu, 2013: 87). Body hexis is closely connected to the body's "motor function" in the form of a pattern of individual and systematic positions being entwined with a whole system of objects (Bourdieu, qtd

in Throop, 2002: 188). Body hexis denotes a set of habits that are unique to the individual. These regular bodily postures, gestures, and expressive inclinations, direct sensory impressions of one's own body and the bodies of others (Throop, 2002: 188). As a result, body hexis, defined as the set of patterns in which the bodies are conditioned to regularly "stand, speak, walk and move," is a crucial way that the identities become "somatically informed and grounded. Body hexis is a type of "body memory" that is established by practical interaction" with the structure (ibid., 188). The essential concept of "practical mimesis" in body hexis is that schemes are competent in transferring directly from practice to practice regardless of discourse and consciousness (Krais, qtd in Throop, 2002: 188). Such "bodily automatisms" asserted by Bourdieu are the source of human intuitions and sensations (1996: 207). The naturalized social bodily schemes of representation are apprehended through a social taxonomy visible to the structured form, that is, the object and the structuring agent, the subject. In other words, the individual assesses their body in terms of the "gaze" (Bourdieu, 2000: 65) that instils and fosters the cultural impositions of the society on the body.

> The practical experience of the body, which is generated in the application to one's own body of the fundamental schemes springing from embodiment of the social structures and which is continuously reinforced by the reactions, generated by the same schemes, that one's own body produces in others, is one of the principles of the construction in each agent of a durable relation to his or her own body. This particular way of bearing the body, of presenting it to others, expresses, above all, the distance between the body as practically experienced and the legitimate body, and, by the same token, a practical anticipation of the chances of success of interactions which helps to define those chances (ibid., 65).

The disparity between the socially oriented body and the actual connection to the body imposed through the gaze and emotions of others increases the possibility of viewing the body feeling discomfort, shyness, or humiliation. It varies dramatically depending on gender and social standing that demand to be recognized by society. The practical sense of social space is marked by Bourdieu, which utilizes Poincare's view on a system of axes linked unalterably to our bodies, which we carry about with us wherever we go" (1992: 18). The social preferences are naturalized when the body's qualities and motions are socially qualified, and the body, with its qualities and motions, is signified as an analogical operator constructing a variety of practical comparisons among the various fragments of the social world in terms of the sexes, age groups, and social classes. The body refers to the meanings and values connected with people who hold almost similar

placements in the spaces delineated by the classifications. The social determinants associated with a certain location in social space form the dispositions that are directly associated with social identity through one's relationship to one's own body (Bourdieu, 1990: 71). The social space, Bourdieu posits, becomes "the site of the hybrid between thing and meaning that defines objective meaning as meaning-made-thing and dispositions as meaning-made-body (1990: 43).

For Bourdieu, the existence within a social space and the occupation of an individual position signifies difference (1990: 9). Differential positions encompass all the things and what separates them from what they are not and from what they are opposed to. The difference is used to define and assert social identity. As it manifests itself in the experience of a life condition having a particular position within the structure, the system of conditions is inextricably inscribed inside the habitus dispositions. As structured products, a structuring structure that Bourdieu calls "opus operatum" generates rough retranslations based on "modus operandi" that displays the distinctive logic of all the practices and products of a given field (1996: 172-173). Fundamental structuring principles of practices and the perception of practices emerge from the structure's most elementary adversaries. The habitus perceives "differences between conditions as differences between classified, classifying practices" through the differentiation rules known as praxis that represent "systematically the necessity and freedom inherent in its class condition and the difference constituting that position" (ibid., 172).

1.3.2. Habitus

The concept of habitus has a central place in Bourdieusian thought. Throughout his body of writings, Bourdieu attempts to define and describe the concept recurringly. Habitus is a "system of structured, constructive dispositions" (Bourdieu, 2000: 131). It must be noted that individuals do not have absolute freedom in their relationship with the social. They cannot act entirely freely as they wish. Individuals cannot have such absolute freedom that is thus restricted by external sanctions and obligations (Bourdieu, 1996: 172). What really forms the relationship between an individual and society dwells on habitus. Habitus denotes "an individual or a socialized biological body, or as the social, biologically individuated through incarnation in a body," which is "collective, or trans individual" (Bourdieu, 2000:157). Habitus aims to address the unity of style, which unites a single agent or a group of agents' practices and goods. Habitus is a "generative and

unifying principle" that turns a position's fundamental and relational features into a unified lifestyle or a unitary bundle of actions of people, products, and behaviours. Habitus is diversified, very much like the locations of which they are the product and also distinguishing. Bourdieu likens its functions to distinguish operators because they are separate and distinguishable, adopting different differentiation principles or using common differentiation principles differently (ibid., 157). Habitus is "generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices" (Bourdieu 1998: 8). Bourdieu exemplifies it by juxtaposing a worker's habitus and industrial owner's habitus that contain what they eat, and how they eat it, the sport they engage in and how they engage in it, their different political opinions, and how they convey their opinions; however, habitus also refers to not only the result of the distinction but also classification methods, categorization principles, vision and division principles, and different tastes (Bourdieu 1998: 8). They distinguish what is good and what is evil, right, and wrong, distinguished, and vulgar, and many more. However, the distinctions are not alike (Bourdieu, 2000: 157). Habitus, an acquired system of persistent attitudes and dispositions, can be moved from place to place. The attitudes and dispositions are individuals' unconsciously internalized ways of perceiving, thinking, and doing (Bourdieu, 1992: 70). They are generated in the objective conditions of the existence of individuals and the routes of their social tracks. Habitus is permanent to a certain extent even though tendencies and behaviour patterns may change as a result of different experiences of the individual; the attitudes are durable to change and transformation, and so are social structures. Bourdieu states:

> This is precisely the function of the notion of habitus, restores to the agent a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying power while recalling that this capacity to construct social reality, itself socially constructed, is not that of a transcendental subject but of a socialized body, investing in its practice socially constructed organizing principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social experience (2000: 136-137).

People acquire knowledge through their bodies. The social order imprints itself on bodies through this constant confrontation but is always dominated by "affectivity" and, more specifically, "affective transactions with the environment" (ibid., 141). As a result, habitus dwells on an "implicit collusion" among all agents who are products of similar circumstances and conditionings and a practical experience in society, of its contexts of being and doing (ibid., 145). The agent finds ratification and legitimation of his own actions in the actions of the others and also ratifies and even legitimizes his own actions

in a way. Habitus establishes a system that the attitudes form, resulting in integrity and harmony. What Bourdieu calls ”collusion,” an immediate contract in aspects of judgment and action that does not require either the “communication of consciousnesses” or a “contractual decision,” is the foundation of a practical shared perception, the mindset set up amongst team members and the players in a social game despite their animosity (ibid., 145).

Bourdieu argues that social agents are gifted with habitus imprinted in their bodies by previous experiences. These systems of viewpoint, acknowledgement, and action help to conduct “acts of practical knowledge based on the identification and recognition of conditional, conventional stimuli to which they are predisposed to react;” and “to generate appropriate and endlessly renewed strategies,” despite being within the limits of structures that produce and are produced (ibid., 145). Strategies are the continual consequence of the interplay of habitual dispositions and the restrictions and choices that exist in each particular social field in terms of cultural consumption, landownership, education, or just about anything else” (Jenkins, 1992: 51). Habitus “urges, interrogates, makes the object speak,” whereas, in return, the object incites, calls upon, provokes the habitus (Bourdieu, 1996: 320). Due to “the dialectic between the constituting act and the constitutive object,” it is reciprocally effective as regards the habitus and the world (ibid., 320). The reproduction of the social order is not the natural product of a mechanical process. The reproduction takes place through the strategies and practices of the agents. What contributes to the continuous reproduction of the social structure are the numerous reproductive strategies of all the agents involved, both independent and adaptive, be it may so conflicting. As the socially manifested in the body, Habitus is “at home” in the domain it occupies, recognizing it as equipped with meaning and interest (Bourdieu, 1992: 127). Habitus is not the fate that some individuals read into it. It is an open system of dispositions that are continually linked to experiences and, hence, continually altered by them to either enforce or transform its structures since it is a product of history. Bourdieu further argues there is a possibility that is written in the social destiny connected with specific social conditions, that experiences will validate habitus as instruments of social construction (2000: 147). Habitus, as a product of history and the instruments of social construction that it places in “practical knowledge of the world and in action,” are socially built in the sense that they are “structured by the world that they structure” (ibid., 150).

Habitus enables to the establishment of a relationship between the individual and the social. There is a relationship between internal structures of subjectivity and external social structures. According to Bourdieu, the subject is not something formed outside society and separated from it. The subject is also a product of the history of the society in which it is formed. History is, Jenkins reflects, continually carried forward in the process of production and reproduction through everyday living practices, resulting in a continual and unified set of experiences. There also have a production process, an adjustment process, and a dialectical interaction between collective history etched in social conditions and individual habitus (1992: 49). Collective history, that is to say, memory is reified in both things and individuals. History has been objectified and crystallized in society in the form of institutions. Bourdieu argues principle underlying of action of the agent is motivated by dual consensual structures of the social "between history in bodies and history in things" (Bourdieu, 2000: 150). "Complicity" is the foundation of the relation of inclusion of history objectified in the guise of structures and mechanisms of the social space or fields and the history embodied in human bodies in habitus. The product of a historical accumulation, habitus, allows "history's heritage" to be reclaimed (ibid., 150).

Bourdieu employs a metaphor to reflect how habitus functions. When habitus enters a social environment of which it is a product, it is like a "fish in water," not feeling the weight of the water and taking the world around it for granted (Bourdieu, 1992: 127). How the agents feel and select their actions is naturalized in accordance with habitus to which the agent belongs. Habitus, a practical result of integrating social world structures with the individual ineluctable inclinations, fosters presumptions and expectations confirmed by the course of events happening in harmony with the society. Habitus is juxtaposed as a set of durable dispositions and structured dispositions to think, feel, and act to "conductorless orchestration" in line with the subjective inclinations (Bourdieu, 1990: 59). Habitus helps to generate sets of actions that are roughly attuned to each other and in line with the interests of the agents involved, regardless of deliberate conspiracy or coordination, when different habitus are orchestrated among themselves and preadjusted to the situations in which they operate and of which they are the product (Bourdieu, 2000: 145).

Habitus, defined by Bourdieu as a set of proclivities of being and doing,

indicates potentiality, a drive of being that demands realization "inscribed in his body in the form of capacities and dispositions shaped by conditions of existence," and thereby the conditions that are most beneficial to the individual concerned in their habitus (ibid., 150). The conditions that lead to the emergence of habitus are, Bourdieu asserts, the conditions that allow it to occur if no sudden or radical disruption changes the conditions entirely. Individual familiarizes themselves with the social condition to ease their existence and the desire for contentment through their "sympathies and antipathies, affections and aversions, tastes and distastes" (ibid., 150). It seems natural to Bourdieu that agents choose to be enveloped with agents with similar habitus and objects that share similar characteristics with their habitus (ibid., 150). Bourdieu formulates taste as "a practical sense. that is, an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division" and "a system of durable cognitive structures" "of schemes of action" that triggers the suitable response in the agents. It indicates a significant relationship between social positions and the agents' dispositions who occupy them or the trajectories leading to occupy them (Bourdieu, 1998: 110).

1.3.3. Field

Bourdieu puts forward field theory to handle the social space in terms of a system of relations incorporating the theories of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber in a unique amalgam of earlier theories since "to think in terms of field is to *think relationally*" for Bourdieu (1992: 96). Bourdieu employs organic solidarity from Durkheim, domination strategies, and capital from Marx, and cultural production areas from Weber. Positions become a tool to apprehend the place the actors identify and the institutions that occupy it. It is defined by its correlative relations to positions. Different positions are determined through different types of power relations and capital. Individuals in social space are not random agents of actions because they are partly subject to the structural social forces and partly resistant to the forces of the field with "specific inertia, that is, their properties, which may exist in embodied form, as dispositions, or in objectified form, in goods, qualification" (Bourdieu, 1996: 110). Habitus and field, Bourdieu states, include a pack of interrelations**.** Bourdieu differentiates two essential concepts as such:

> A field consists of a set of objectives, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations "deposited" with individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action (Bourdieu, 1992: 16).

The relation between habitus and field has a dual working principle. It refers to a relationship that is rooted in "conditioning" as the field shapes the habitus produced by the "embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field or a set of intersecting fields, the extent of their intersection or discrepancy being at the root of a divided or even torn habitus" (ibid., 22). It also signifies knowledge or "habitus" structuring the "field" as a meaningful world, "a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one's energy" (ibid., 22). Bourdieu considers that the effect of the field stems from the conflicting current or potential positions of the agents of the field. The conflicting quality of a field is described as "simultaneously a *space of conflict and competition,"* like a battlefield where the parties fight for an upper hand to control the influential capital demanded by whatever field it is (ibid., 17) since each field has a different operating logic. Bourdieu elsewhere notes that field is a "*field of struggles* aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration" of active and dormant forces to realize (ibid., 101). As also observed by Jenkins, the Bourdieusian field is a social one in which conflicts occur to dominate the sources and capitals and have access to them. Fields are "stakes which are at stake" such as "cultural goods (lifestyle), housing, intellectual distinction (education), employment, land, power (politics), social class, prestige" or so forth in differing measures (Bourdieu: 1996: 51). By means of identifying motivation, each field has its own logic and assumes the form of requirement and significance, both the product and the producer of the field's distinctive and relevant habitus (Jenkins, 1992: 51). The agents of a specific field ensure their best interest in their strategies to secure or improve their position in the field by increasing demanded capital of the field and fostering the "hierarchal" principle of the field (Bourdieu, 1992: 101). The dynamic principle of the field dwells in its structure, especially "in the distance, the gaps, the asymmetries between the various specific forces that confront one another" (ibid., 101).

The struggle in the field aims to obtain the capital specific to that field. Each area-specific capital is unequally distributed in that area. Since the capital specific to that area is unequally distributed in each area. Dominant ones in all domains, for instance, those who hold domain-specific capital, and the dominated, namely, those who lack such capital, become active agents of the field. The use of capital differs in every field since there is an unequal distribution of capital in the field. Agents in the field own the different forms of capital demanded in the field to varying degrees. The conflict stems from a struggle arising from the different distribution of capitals among agents in that field;

therefore, the field becomes a constant change that requires agents to act in two strategies. The first one is an attempt to maintain existing power relations convenient for the dominant group, and the second is to transform and shift the existing power relations that the newcomers or dominated groups believe benefit more. They are respectively called the "conservation strategy" and "subversion strategies" (Bourdieu, 1992: 27). Mouzelis (2008) argues that habitus includes strategic thinking and decision-making despite common harmony between the field and habitus. For Mouzelis, a field and the game related to that field has three structures. They are habitus which is "internalized dispositional structures" based on "a practical logic," "institutional structures," that is "the system of positions operating on the basis of a normative logic," and the last, "figurational structure" which Mouzelis defines as "systems of patterned relationships between actors," "operating based on an interactive and strategying logic" (ibid., 133).

A field can be compared to a game. However, a field is not the direct result of intentional creative action and follows implicit and undefined regularities. As a result, stake (enjeux), the result of competition occurs among the players of the game (Bourdieu, 1992: 98). Bourdieu admits the "devaluation" of game theory in social sciences that use to comprehend the social world through game metaphor (ibid., 81). Social agents are endowed with the habitus that provides them with field-specific strategies to undermine the dominance, therefore it is not insensible to claim that the game metaphor is a valid one to understand relations pertaining to the social field. Jenkins analyses Bourdieu's idea of game with the assumption that games are played according to rules determining what players can and cannot do as in social life. Games are taught explicitly as well as "experientially" in practice, like social competence (Jenkins, 1992: 43).

1.3.4. Game

Bourdieu admits the devaluation of game theory in social sciences to comprehend the social world through game metaphor. Social agents are endowed with the habitus that provides field-specific strategies to undermine dominance. Therefore, it is not insensible to claim that the game metaphor is valid for understanding relations pertaining to the social field. Jenkins analyses Bourdieu's idea of game with the assumption that games are played according to rules determining what players can and cannot do as in social life. Games are taught explicitly as well as experientially in practice like social competence (1992: 43). The desire to enter the game requires "investment" (ibid., 98). Illusio,

Bourdieu assumes, is the investment in the game, that is to say, the reality of the game. Illusio both creates field-specific original output within the field. Surrendering to the games is to participate in the game. To have an interest is to recognize that a certain social game makes sense The outcome to be gained and lost is significant and worth pursuing. Hence every field is a space of unexpressed acknowledgment of the value of what is lost and gained in the game, and the field generates and activates a specific illusio. Bourdieu (1992) defines doxa as "the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense" (68). Doxa is the minimal agreement between individuals that presumes the existence of the field that is governed by its own doxa. It denotes a belief in the principles and rules that make the field exist, even if it contains conflicting interests that opponents in the field also share. Bourdieu expresses that no agents can benefit from the game unless they participate in the game and admit to the game's rules. A game is not possible without players' physical and mental commitment. The players cannot disregard "the interest taken in the game as such which is the source of the different, even opposite, interests of the various players, the wills and ambitions which drive them and which being produced by the game, depends on the positions they occupy within" (Bourdieu, 2000: 153). Being created out of the relation of ontological complicity between mental structures and the objective structures of social space, games that matter are significant and gripping owing to them being imposed and introduced to the body and mind of the players in a belief called "the feel for the game" by Bourdieu (1998: 77).

1.3.5. Capital

Having put the central concepts of the Bourdieusian body, such as habitus, field, and game, it would be appropriate to engage in the extended idea of capital, which is a critique of Marxist economic capital. Bourdieu does not disagree with economic capital, although Bourdieu considers it insufficient to capture the relations of power and dominance. Therefore, Bourdieu identifies three types of capital in addition to economic capital. They are cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital.

> We also have *trump cards,* that is, master cards whose force varies depending on the game: just as the relative value of cards changes with each game, the hierarchy of the different species of capital (economic, social, cultural, symbolic) varies across the various fields, fin other words, there are cards that are valid, efficacious

> in all fields-these are the fundamental species of capital-but their relative value as trump cards is determined by each field and even by the successive states of the same field (Bourdieu, 1992: 98).

According to Bourdieu, agents possess trump cards changeable depending on the game where "players can play to increase or to conserve their capital, their number of tokens, in conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the reproduction of the game and its stakes" (ibid., 99). The capital is what players establish their conservation or subversion strategies interacting with other players. Capital, as Bourdieu defines it, is "an energy which only exists and only produces its effects in the field in which it is produced and reproduced" (Bourdieu, 1996: 113). In a given field, the attributes ingrained in dispositions or objectified in economic or cultural goods connected to agents are not all active simultaneously. The logic of the field dictates what is meaningful in the field, which is salient and dynamic in the game (ibid., 113). Bourdieu also argues that the construction of space with three fundamental dimensions is determined by "volume of capital, the composition of capital, and change in these two properties over time" (ibid., 114). The distinction in classifying the social groups is built on the volume of capital that is understood as the set of actually usable resources and powers; economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital (ibid., 114).

Cultural capital consists of all cultural goods owned. Cultural goods consist of knowledge, expertise in an area, and proficiency in language use. Also called informational capital, Bourdieu explains cultural capital as "embodied, objectified, or institutionalized" (1992: 119). Embodied cultural capital is directly related to habitus, in which the manner of walking, talking, appearance, style, or posture are imprints of the capital on the body. Cultural products in their objectified form are works of art related to cultural production, such as books, musical compositions, and paintings. Cultural products in their institutionalized form are granted by institutional means such as titles, diplomas, awards, and respectable occupational status.

Social capital covers the agents' connections, relationships, acquaintances, and friendships. Social capital functions as "the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (ibid., 119). Its transformability makes it convenient to account for the differentiated societies in terms of structure and social dynamics. The network of relations that consciously or

unconsciously constitutes the individual's social capital strengthens and shapes it. The individual constantly tries to gain a benefit from this network of relations. This benefit can be material or symbolic. These events such as social gatherings and sports activities, bring together people who consent to spend time together. Generally, social capital is closely intertwined with economic and cultural capital. Social capital can be converted into different types of capital.

According to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is the reflection of power relations on relations of meaning (2001: 45). Those with strong economic and social capital are perceived as a different group from those who have limited social, cultural, or economic capital. The very perception forms what is called symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is achieved through recognition by others. The validity of the domineering ones with symbolic capital derives from its recognition by the subject of that domination. Bourdieu likens the reproduction of the agents to that of categories that generate the social world and lineage. Parallelly, reproducing the game and the stakes mean producing the access to social reproduction that results in privileged status and sources, namely, symbolic capital, and "therefore durable rights and powers over persons" (ibid., 45). Three primary agencies usually carry out reproduction: the family, the church, in other words, religion, and the educational system, all of which are objectively organized and share the trait of acting on unconscious structures. The family clearly holds an essential role in reproducing different types of domination (ibid., 85). Capitals are regulated and restricted and even distributed by "organisations and those who are already rich in capital" (Bourdieu, 2001: 83). As a result, there is a close correlation between the volume of capital possessed and the ability to manipulate the field (ibid., 83).

As also asserted by Swartz, agents utilize different cultural, social, and symbolic resources to secure and improve their positions in the social world. Functioning as a social relation of power, capitals become "objects of struggle as valued resources" (Swartz, 1997: 73-74). Moreover, the possession and exchange of capital are "somatised and expressed through the body" (Garratt, 2016: 74). Embodied cultural capital is the bodily hexis of a person's habitus intimately linked to one's background. It is observed in the accent one acquires, the social manners one adopts, and the way one exposes oneself to the world through clothing, attire, and the tastes one acquires. As a result, the body is not a "static entity," although it is formed through habitus (ibid., 74). The class structure is

found in a variety of different areas of social life. It is found deeply embedded in our bodies, actions, and tastes. It is firmly ingrained in our bodies, behaviours, and tastes. Class social structures infiltrate personal looks, ways of speech, action, judgment, and perception. As a result, class alters habitus, which in turn increases agents' capacities to act in the field of variable power dynamics according to the traits and volumes of capital in social space.

Connell also dwells on the body as capital since the relation, Connell asserts, serves a "neoliberal perspective of the self as an individual asset convertible for personal gain" (2018: 563). Connell finds Bourdieu's conceptualization of the fundamental forms of capital significant since it integrates culture into the study of stratification (ibid., 563). Connell uncovers the relationship of the body to class dynamics in the "long-term socialization and practice in a classed position" (ibid., 563). Connell underlines Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital by assigning the importance of the body in class reproduction (ibid., 563).

Connell examines a variety of the capitals put forward after Bourdieu. Connell explores theories of aesthetic capital (Anderson et al. 2010), physical capital (Shilling 1993), gender capital (Bridges 2009; Huppatz 2009), corporeal capital (Skeggs 1997: 116), spatial capital (Centner 2008), erotic capital (Hakim 2011), and color capital (Hughey 2012) (qtd. in Connell, 2018: 563). Connell refers to Grazian, who suggests "nocturnal capital to describe the accrual of status and perks through one's embodied nightlife savvy" (ibid., 565). Moreover, Connell underlines Thornton's idea of "subcultural capital" to explain how young people transform the capital into social status at underground night parties (ibid., 565). Connell turns attention to "erotic capital" that Adam Isaiah Green pioneers to reflect "the quality and quantity of attributes that an individual possesses, which elicit an erotic response in another" (ibid., 565). Catherine Hakim, Connell conveys, interprets erotic capital, which consists of the "beauty, sex appeal, liveliness, a talent for dressing well, charm and social skills, and sexual competence" (ibid., 565). In this way, the agents effectively utilize erotic capital to improve social standing.

In conclusion, the body has been a precarious concept to comprehend from the down of history since the human seems impossible to consider apart from the body. The way in which bodies are used and what meaning they are assigned depend on social

relations. Social relations impact not only the perceptions of others but our understanding of self. The question is here is this: is a human just what is a materially and spiritually evident body or beyond?

CHAPTER II

BODY IN *THE CEMENT GARDEN* BY IAN MCEWAN

Ian McEwan declares, in one of his interviews, novels are of "investigations, journeys and open-ended pursuits" (Lynn and McEwan, 2007: 41). In a way, this approach explains his attitude as a novelist to the basic concerns of his novels, which offers a comprehensive look at human nature and culture. In *The Cement Garden*, McEwan tests the boundaries of the body and its implication within a limited social scale, within the family, and a broader social scene, the society. In the chapter, the body, and the field in which the body becomes an object, and a subject are investigated in the Bourdieusian fields of the family, the sexual and gendered body, feel for the game and the capital of the body.

2.1. The Body and the Family as Field

A field can be characterized as "a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions" (Bourdieu, 1992: 97). The positions are specified objectively, both in terms of their establishment and the requirements that agents, or institutions, are obligated to by their existing and potential place in the distribution of power, notably the capital, which offers a key to the social lock of the interactions. In very diversified cultures, the social world is made up of a number of relatively autonomous social microcosms, each with its own set of norms. A field is transformed into a "conflict and rivalry space" (Wacquant, 1992: 17). The idea of a field is often connected with a battleground, where individuals strive for control of the many forms of capital required for that field. According to Bourdieu, social space, which is frequently referred to as a battlefield, is made up of several domains ruled by various sets of rules and norms. The conversional methods of capitals that offer domination allow an agent to move within the fields that make up social space. Family does not denote a distinct field, but rather a social space that encompasses a wide range of norms and capitals. Families are "corporate bodies" motivated by a sense of "conatus," which is the desire to retain their social existence, with all its powers and benefits, and is at the centre of reproduction strategies such as fertility, marriage, economics, and education, to mention a few (Bourdieu, 1998: 19). Since the desire to preserve the social being functions as a

classificatory scheme and a principle of the development of the social world and of that specific social body, the family, it appears as the most natural of social categories and is therefore destined to serve as a model for other social bodies. The family is the result of ritual and procedural institutionalization aimed at permanently embedding values in each member of the instituted unit that will tend to perpetuate the unit's incorporation, which is crucial for its continuity and durability (ibid., 67). The limiting example is the standard family, which is linked by a "collusio in the illusio" that allows each of its members to experience ego exaltation and a sense of belonging by being connected to the group as a "enchanted image of the self" (Bourdieu, 2008: 7).

The novel's fictitious world, created by Ian McEwan, is set in 1970s London. The author's life has been marked by a number of important social and political changes, including the end of colonialism, the fall of the British class system, educational reform, and changes in family life. As a result, McEwan's fiction responds to these shifting dynamics. His earlier fiction, of which *The Cement Garden* is a part, exemplifies "a society in flux" (Head, 2007: 17). In the propagation of masculine supremacy and ideology, the family becomes unquestionably the most influential factor. The status quo is maintained through the gendered division of labour, as well as the legal and verbal expressions of that divide. *The Cement Garden* is both insightful and controversial in terms of the role of the family in the sexual, social, and ideological space. McEwan divides the novel into two halves, beginning with the death of their father and ending with that of their mother. The deaths of the parents play a significant role in the family dynamics because they add to the already existing turbulence. The parental figures are anonymous, and their role is symbolic and stereotypical in many ways. The father is represented as a negative figure at the start of the novel, and this representation corresponds to his position in the family. He is described as a "frail, irascible, obsessive man with yellowish hands and face" (McEwan, 1996: 9). The adjectives used to characterize him reflect the negative nature of his father's role in the household. In the novel, the colour yellow represents disease and impending death. Furthermore, Jack's next anecdote is the only reason he mentions his father's death in order to explain the story of the cement stock in the house. The death of the father, the only male figure besides Jack who is the narrator of the events gives an opportunity for his masculine urge to dominate the field since the masculine succession is naturalized and legitimized by the social practices and codes postulated. Head (2007) detects the cement garden as "the plan

of the obsessive father – and, thus, an expression of the psychological disorder, concealed as order, that the family, as a whole, embodies" (62). The father's relentless pursuit of the order is an attempt to facilitate the social order and his position as a patriarch. It was clearly identifiable as such:

> Once he brought home two goldfish in a plastic bag. The birds ate them the same day. The paths were so narrow it was possible to lose your balance and fall into the flower beds. He chose flowers for their neatness and symmetry. He liked tulips best of all and planted them well. He did not like bushes or ivy or roses. He would have nothing that tangled. On either side of us the houses had been cleared and in summer the vacant sites grew lush with weeds and their flowers. Before his first heart attack he had intended to build a high wall round his special world (McEwan, 1996: 15).

The goldfish's survival is determined by their interactions with birds. The goldfish's termination demonstrates that fields are comprised of several power dimensions. The power distribution encapsulates domination and inequality while the scarcity of the resources that are capitals in Bourdieusian terms are legitimated through the categories that seem natural since the consensus surrounding the categories are engendered by a set of social and biological position-taking. The metaphor foreshadows the brutal and sudden events that alter and reconstruct the dynamics of family roles. Throughout the story, the garden stands as a metaphor for the field. The difficulties of the children in adapting to the various ways of the field can further be seen in the paths that are too narrow to walk on. The father's overwhelming desire for order and neatness is the result of his commitment to social codes and his habitus. Human existence, or habitus as the social made body, is this thing of the world for which there are things. Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus comes into contact with the social world of which it is a product, it is like a "fish in water": it is unaffected by the weight of the water and takes the world around it for granted (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127). By making his dispositions and taste for the world the legitimate position of power, the father expects his own construction of social reality to become a familiar water for him. His unexpected death leaves his work in the garden and the habitus he establishes for the family unfinished. The unresolved issues set the stage for the children's revolt. *The Cement Garden*, according to Groes, is "the ambiguous conjunction of Eros and Thanatos" (2013: 23). Despite the fact that Jack feels he is not the perpetrator of the parricide, he plays a role in his father's murder. In the process of cementing and constructing the cement

garden, Jack and his father's strained relationship is altered.

> Above all, mixing concrete and spreading it over a levelled garden was a fascinating violation. My excitement increased when my father talked of hiring a cement mixer. For once I felt at ease with him. While I fetched water in the bucket, he shaped the cement and sand into a mound with a dip in its centre. I did the mixing while he added the water. He showed me how to use the inside of my knee against my forearm to gain better leverage. I pretended that I knew already. When the mix was consistent, we spread it on the ground (McEwan, 1996: 17).

The act of cementation concretes the structures. While constructing the structure with his father, Jack finally feels at ease with the situation, since mixing concrete and spreading it over the garden equates to establishing one's own ground to stand on. As a result, it is a reforming act seeking to create a new background and defy societal behavior restriction. It offers a safe space for them to exist in. The act of cementing and constructing a new structure begins the mutual understanding between the father and the son. When two men arrive with the cement bags, Jack feels inspected and wishes he was not spotted holding a comic that he appears to consider is infantile. The men each whistle a different melody. Whistling different tunes is noteworthy because it represents different modes of masculinity that Jack is unfamiliar with and validated. The father and Jack build a hierarchal relation inside the family and the habitus created in the male members of the family is projected into the youngest child of the family, Tom. Following his parents' deaths, Jack adopts his father's attitude toward his siblings, which is either apathetic or violent. Tom's behavior is regulated by Jack, who refers to him as a baby for attempting to rebuild the old brass cot and playing with the toys. Tom has a strained connection with his father, which is founded on dread. Julie regards the father as a semi-invalid who must "compete with Tom for Mother's attention" (ibid., 13). In a sense, Tom emasculates the father, forcing him to compete for the mother's attention and affection. Despite the fact that the jokes are intended for everyone, they easily offend the father. Because humour is one of the most powerful instruments for subverting the power balance, jokes are things which should not be tolerated, his position requires particular attention that fosters his authority over the family. For Jack, who has the smoothing plank in his hand while staring blankly at the father's dead body, the moment of the father's death on the newly spread cement becomes virtually a catharsis. What follows is described in such a way that it is nearly devoid of emotion. It resembles a cinematic scene portraying the scenes and noises:

> A light breeze stirred a loose corner of his shirt. Subsequently there was a great

> deal of activity and noise. An ambulance came and my mother went off in it with my father, who was laid out on a stretcher and covered with a red blanket. In the living room Sue cried and Julie comforted her. The radio was playing in the kitchen. I went back outside after the ambulance had left to look at our path. I did not have a thought in my head as I picked up the plank and carefully smoothed away his impression in the soft, fresh concrete (ibid., 19).

Groes likens Jack's emerging sexuality and the death of his emotionally distant father "who drops dead at the moment at which Jack achieves his first orgasm" (2013: 24). The plank is the newly acquired instrument of the domination, and he begins to smooth things up in accordance with his own self-assigned role. The familial unit disintegrates in *The Cement Garden*, just as Jack and Julie come to terms with their sexuality. They push the boundaries between reason and passion in order to deviate from society norms and standards. In *The Cement Garden*, Because of his psychologically unfulfilling father role, Jack fails to create a firm basis for his manly attributes through associating with the paternal figure. In the process of "adapting" to his "facilitating surroundings," Jack lacks drive, according to his mother (Sistani et al., 2013: 453). The crises that mark Jack's emotional and sexual development might be tackled in a healthy way under different circumstances. In *The Cement Garden,* his challenges are exacerbated by his mother absence, as well as the consequences of his paternal figure not providing emotional gratification.

It is, thus, not surprising to note Jack, the narrator of the novel, provides the unreliable narration of the characters including himself. Jack examines himself in the mirrors. His image of himself is reflected in the projected view on the mirror. Sue's birthday present causes Jack to assess his developing masculine identity based on the idea that he does not satisfy the qualifications set by Commander Hunt, the fantasy novel hero. He believes he is unfit to be the "type of person Commander Hunt would have on board his spaceship" (McEwan, 1996: 37). He tries and fails to grow a beard. The expectations that Jack has in mind and reflection in the mirror do not complement. His failure in the field of masculinity results in his frustrated behaviours. He transforms into the scrutinizing gaze of others, establishing the rules of which he appears to be ignorant. Individual well-being and social order are both attempts to determine how young people should conduct in relation to the increasing activation of reproductive processes throughout puberty. Marro claims that hygiene, particularly sexual hygiene, encompasses all aspects of puberty, from food and clothing to physical and mental activity, enjoyment,

and society (1900: 227-8). Jack abandons all the rituals of personal hygiene. His rejection of cleanliness is a revolt against his mother. He feels victorious by defying the authority of his mother. His control over his body overcomes the control of the mother, somehow of the society. He convinces himself that if people truly liked him, they would accept him as he is.

In a similar vein, Jack recalls a day when his parents had to depart for a funeral of an unknown relative. For Jack, the sensation of independence is so strong that the few hours while they are gone "occupy a whole stretch of my youth" (McEwan, 1996: 71). After the loss of his parents, Jack has a similar emotion. The relief that he experiences after the death of the mother and the pain that she is eternally gone put Jack into a predicament; a struggle that makes him feel unconventionally liberated from the control. While the mother is not as domineering as the father, Jack, a melancholy teenager, is devoid of the deep sentiments formed between him and his mother. When Jack unexpectedly comes home, he is surprised to discover that she is not "a particular invention" of his or his sisters (ibid., 26). Despite this, he continues to "invent and ignore her" (ibid., 26). He recalls a day in his childhood when he pretended to be sick in order to avoid going to school. His mother knows that he comes home to "monopolise" her while everybody is out of the house (ibid., 26).

Bourdieu demonstrates how the androcentric depiction of social and biological reproduction gains the objectivity of common sense, a practical, doxic consensus to interpret social roles. The male-oriented logic urges women to perceive the social space including the power relations in which they are held, through schemes of thinking that are the outcome of embodiment of those power structures. Thus, the created schemes necessitate practical recognition, doxic agreement, a belief that does not need to be considered and confirmed as such, and which, in a sense, creates the "symbolic violence" to which it is exposed (Bourdieu, 2001: 33-34). Although all family members are separated in the restricted social area, the mother is more confined to the house. They are left by their parents' deaths and focus on maintaining the continuity of family to the extend to burying their dead mother in cement tomb in the cellar of their isolated home as their physical growth into adulthood are clashed with adult codes of familial behavior, which become obscured in their ethical compass, ultimately resulting in the incest of Jack and Julie. Sue's diary entry clearly reveals Jack's unreliable narration. Sue reprimands

Jack for attempting to share the dream about the mother, expressing her disappointment that the dream is not about the mother. It is all about Jack. Because of his self-proclaimed significance, Jack examines the contents of the diary entry about himself. He is acutely conscious of the persona he maintains and troubled by a guilt-ridden conscience. When Julie suggests she might bring Derek home, Sue writes that Jack claims he has not heard anything about Derek. Jack refuses to acknowledge the sensation of rejection. The entry goes as such:

> 'He has not changed his clothes since you died. He does not wash his hands or anything and he smells horrible. We hate it when he touches a loaf of bread. You can't say anything to him in case he hits you. He's always about to hit someone, but Julie knows how to deal with him' (McEwan, 1996: 98)

What Sue recounts about him contradicts what Jack tells us. Another perspective into himself causes him to question his behaviours. He notices a smell in his hands, which is "sweet and faintly rotten and was more on the fingers than the palms, or perhaps even between the fingers" even if he washes his hands (ibid., 109). It is hidden behind the scent of the soap. He enjoys lengthy baths. When he assures that he is the only authority over his body, the revolting act of uncleanliness comes to an end. The lingering smell on his hands is caused by the remorse that lurks behind his burgeoning sexuality and the distorted vision of who he has become.

2.2. Sexual and Gendered Body as Field

The sexual and gendered body has emerged as one of the most contentious areas of social construction. The novel delves into the field of the sexual and gendered body in order to create a restricted space of existence. One of the novel's key themes is to compare the family, the smallest unit of society, to a wider social area in terms of ethics, sexual rules, and gendered roles. Incest is a social taboo that is pursued both inside and outside of societal boundaries. To fully understand the primary conflict in *the Cement Garden*, it is necessary to understand the link between socialization and sexual development.

According to Parsons (1954), the child's sexual fulfilment is an important component of the socialization process. The parent uses the child's sexual impulses to socialize the child. Unrestricted satisfaction, on the other hand, would impede the development of a child's individuality and the successful functioning of society. The family institution provides a regulated framework for the proper utilization sexual

components, but the incest taboo prevents it from spiralling out of control. As it reinforces the essential sexual component of socialization, the incest taboo becomes a nearly universal instrument for regulating reproduction and bodies (Parsons, 1954: 13). The cause of the incest taboo is the limiting of love and sexual contacts inside the family and in conjunction with the formation of new families (ibid., 10). Parsons argues that sexuality is fundamentally a compound that largely constitutes the social relationship (15).

Incest desires are ubiquitous among children, according to Freud on whom Lindzey bases the argument. Lindzey attempts to verify Freud's argument that man exhibits profound and prevalent incestuous inclinations (qtd. in Lester, 1972: 269). The existence of a universal incest taboo, as well as the powerful emotions generated by its transgressions, indicates that incest drives require societal control. Kinship and family systems provide the impression of being the most fundamental and unchanging forms of all, with the family unit serving as the pre-eminently "natural" center of sexual socialization and experience (Weeks, 2010: 23). The taboo against incest, which is the "prohibition of sexual involvement within certain degrees of relationship, appears to be a universal law" (ibid., 23). Despite this seeming universality, however, when one takes a closer look at incest taboos, it becomes evident that different societies and cultures practice them in different ways. It has been argued on numerous occasions that the taboo on incest marks the transition from a state of nature to human society; consequently, it is regarded as an essential component of culture. But there is a huge amount of variety in the shapes that the taboo might take. The fact that there is a taboo against incest is evidence that all communities should control sexual activity, Although the taboo has not been shown to be universal, it can be found in most civilizations. Incest is a recurring characteristic in the culture of primitive civilizations. It is not restricted to primordial society; there has been continuous debate about the incest taboo. In modern society, incestuous behavior is also frequent. Physical and geographical proximity is shown to be a significant factor in the incest taboo. A socializing agent performs the dual function of socializing the child's sexual life in two systems of social interaction. Parsons contends that the parent, on the one hand, engages with the kid at a level appropriate for the beginning of the phase in question, such as the mother-child loving relationship in the pre-oedipal stage. The incestuous sexual intercourse at the end of the novel serves a desperate attempt to unite with the main idealized beloved thing while connecting a previous and essential object with the agents. On the other hand, the mother is a full

participant in the family structure. The mother functions as an agent by disrupting the equilibrium of the former interaction system. The mother warns Jack against the autoerotic activities since "growing up is difficult" (McEwan, 1996: 29). If he carries on masturbating, she thinks his growing body and personality will be permanently damaged by these activities. Moreover, sexuality is regarded to play a crucial role in the socialization of children, more like a transformation of a crude organism into a human. Not only does the transformation of erotic impulses serve a socializing purpose, but it also creates complications. For a number of psychological reasons, erotic demands appear to be particularly challenging to handle. Incestuous desires are the exact paradigm of regression for the adult individual, the path to the reactivation of the primitive components of his personality features. On a human socio-cultural level, personalities are only possible as participants in systems of socially interacting behavior that are related to human demands. According to Parsons (1954), sexual fulfilment is a crucial component of a child's socialization, development as a person, and as a member of society (114). Unrestricted erotic fulfilment, on the other hand, obstructs both the maturity of the personality and the functioning of society. Despite being critical to certain learning processes, it becomes the most significant impediment to future critical phases of learning. As a result, the novel appears to straddle the line between societal control and unbridled impulse, raising questions about the nature of these social limitations. In reality, the complication that occurs from putting society's norms and standards to the test further complicates and invalidates the moral position.

In sibling incest, the individual has not been intuitively conditioned to reject but has been actively trained to resist. As a result, separation in early childhood is detrimental. It is a poor decision since it is typically employed to discourage the very behavior that it inadvertently triggers. After all, the level of temptation and desire will be governed by a variety of factors, including the availability of several sexual sources and the proximity of the other sibling. In the novel, the segregated situation of the family facilitates the emergence of incestuous relationship. The isolated state of the house results in the proximity and separation complexity. Given the complicated sentiments involved in their connection following the shared traumatic experience of grief, the children's availability renders their external interaction irrelevant. Isolation must be extensively investigated and dismantled. Isolation can be harsh or kind, unconditional or conditional, effective, or ineffective. If the isolated state is complete and there are no other choices, the sibling's

behavior should be no different than that of any other actor of the other sex.

Fox (1962) proposed the following to reconcile these opposing viewpoints: close sibling relationships generate repulsion after puberty, resulting in low levels of concern about incest in society and consequently relatively moderate restrictions against it. Separation as siblings during puberty increases sexual desire and danger. It will cause widespread public awareness about incest and severe consequences for those who engage in it (131). The nuclear family is never autonomous. It is always a component of a larger social structure. Incest is described as a failure to engage in the supra-familial connections that underpin society's most important financial, legal, and cultural responsibilities (Parsons, 1954: 106). Similarly, Bourdieu emphasizes the sociological roots of the incest taboo by noting that the incest taboo established society insofar as it encompasses a need for interaction between men, is correlative with the institution of violence, in which women are denied as subjects of the exchange and alliance that are established through them, instead being reduced to the role of items, or rather, figurative tools of men diplomacy. The women have been relegated to the role of vehicles for the development or reproduction of social and symbolic capital since they are forced to circulate as symbols and so form relationships amongst men (Bourdieu, 2001: 41).

Tidefors et al. (2010) make a review of sibling incest research. There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes "sibling incest" (348). One definition of "sibling incest" is any sexual relationship between people who share one or both of their parents. Salazar et al. argue that sexual abuse by adolescents is not motivated primarily by sexual urges and that "unavailable parents can contribute to a higher degree of bonding between siblings, and this comfort-seeking can become sexualized" (qtd. in Tidefors et al., 2010: 352). Jack is used to having emotionally distant parents, and his relationship with his father is weak even before the father passes away. Because Julie is the only one who knows the entire severity of his mother's condition, the fact that she dies only serves to further entangle the situation. The emotionally deprived kids in the novel lose their mother just after they bury their dad, and they all eventually come up with their own ways to cope with their grief. As they are developed in response to trauma, these coping strategies tend to be unhealthy. What makes this experience so traumatic is that the children feel compelled to conceal their mother's death in order to protect family unity, and to seek solutions such as burying her body in cement in the basement, all in an

effort to keep the peace and keep the family together. While Jack is preoccupied with his autoerotic thoughts, Julie takes on the role of primary caregiver and housekeeper. While Tom attempts to appear like a girl at first, and Sue gets preoccupied with writing and reading, Julie's attempt fails because the burden she takes on is too much. Tom becomes more infantile and regresses in his behavior.

The organizational pattern of families with sibling incest is characterized by a dominating father, a passive mother, parents who are unavailable emotionally, and a dysfunctional or chaotic home environment. The incestuous relationships committed by adolescents are not driven primarily by a desire to engage in sexual activity. Philips-Green notes that the absence of parents can lead to a stronger degree of bonding between siblings and that comfort-seeking behaviours can later become sexualized (2002: 197). Typical families with sibling sexual interaction are dominated by a powerful patriarch and characterized by blurred internal boundaries within the family. In addition to this, the families live in isolation, and the children rely on one another to fulfil their psychological needs. The parents' "physical and emotional absence" contributes to the dysfunction of these families (ibid., 197). The incestuous connection shown in the last chapter seems like a twisted representation of a kind of emotional deprivation. As a means of emotional release, sexuality replaces what has been possibly at first a non-sexual link between a group of isolated siblings. Sistani et al. similarly note that their sexual intercourse at the conclusion of *The Cement Garden* is a frantic attempt to form a connection with their main idealized loved object and an intense yearning to re-enact a far earlier object interaction that was just as necessary (2013: 6). The perpetrators of sibling incest have always needed to keep their actions secret, and they have done it by using different types of control and power over their victims. Poor communication, including a lack of dialogue and boundaries about what may be spoken inside the family where the parents have limited involvement and the children are free to build close ties with their siblings, allows the perpetrator to keep the incest a secret. Adolescence is "a period of renewed crises and conflict, in which new object-relational and ego resolutions are made," as described by Nancy Chodorow (1979: 134). Borrowing from Peter Bios, who claims the main issue of early adolescence and adolescence is 'object relinquishment' and 'object finding,' Chodorow argues a child of either gender, in order to enter the nonfamilial relational world, must relinquish its incestuous love objects, siblings like Julie and Jack in *The Cement Garden*, in favour of other primary objects (134). McEwan presents the narrator,

Jack, as a person who is always disappointed and conflicted in his interpersonal relationships. His "autoerotic actions" (Sistani et al., 2013: 451), which refer to masturbation, object relational connections, and the process of his own sexual development, have haunted a large part of Jack's life and given him nightmares. Deep within his mind, his consciousness has been tortured by guilty sensations in his attempts to identify with his father, as well as his relationships with him through objects. Turning to substitutive fulfilment, such as masturbation, is a complex strategy for re-enacting his interactions with an unsatisfactory object relationship for a kid, and as a consequence, he erotically resorts to his inner sources with the internalized objects, the siblings. Masturbation seems to be the result of a person's inability to create emotional ties with his external contacts, particularly in achieving his male characteristics through an effective and healthy identification with his father.

The siblings' sexual identities are influenced by their trauma. The older siblings have an incestuous bond, while Sue participates in sexual games.

> Sue was rather thin. Her skin clung tightly to her rib cage and the hard muscular ridge of her buttocks strangely resembled her shoulder blades. Faint gingerish down grew between her legs. The game was that Julie and I were scientists examining a specimen from outer space. We spoke in clipped Germanic voices as we faced each other across the naked body. From downstairs came the tired, insistent drone of our mother's voice. Julie had a high ridge of cheekbone beneath her eyes which gave her the deep look of some *rare wild animal*. In the electric light her eyes were black and big. The soft line of her mouth was just broken by two front teeth and she had to pout a little to conceal her smile. I longed to examine my older sister but the game did not allow for that (McEwan, 1196: 11).

The children's sexual awakening occurs as a result of the experiment in which they impersonate scientists. Each of the youngsters is separated from his or her family and assigned to a particular duty. The family is isolated and encouraged to segregate themselves from the rest of society. The father's symbolic plan for building cement barriers represents the family's alienating mentality. As their bodies mature, the sexual desires that are required for development take an uncultured route to sibling incest. The smell in Jack's hands becomes the residue of rotting. Sue refuses to be examined physically by Julie and Jack due to the painful experience of losing both parents. Sue becomes unwilling to take part in the games. Sue's sexual development is interrupted as a result of the traumatic deaths. The libidinal energy of Sue is suppressed by the Thanatos, the death energy.

Fox claims that all forms of tactile play between siblings such as tickling, wrestling, exploring, and stroking, lead to increased sexual desire that reaches a peak but cannot be fully satisfied by a successful act of coitus. Frustration from the absence of tumescence will escalate to rage and hostility, which will only result in discomfort and despair. Repeating this frequently enough should serve as a powerful deterrent. When people acquire sexual maturity, they will naturally strive to avoid anything that reminds them of a bad sexual encounter. "Positive aversion" to their sex act is hence to be expected (1962: 6). The dynamics of the scene of tickling justifies the argument.

> 'Yes,' I said, 'your time has come.' I dragged her by the arm on to her bed. She lay with her knees drawn up; her hands raised to protect her throat. She dared not take her eyes off the great hands which I held above her, ready to swoop down. 'Get away from me,' she whispered. It struck me as funny at the time that she addressed the gloves and not me. 'They're coming for you,' I said, and lowered my hands a few inches. 'But no one knows where they will strike first.' Feebly she tried to catch at my wrists, but I slid my hands under hers and the gloves clamped firmly round her rib cage, right into the armpits. As Julie laughed and laughed, and fought for air, I laughed too, delighted with my power. Now there was an edge of panic in her thrashing about. She could not breathe in. She was trying to say 'please,' but in my exhilaration, I could not stop. Air still left her lungs in little birdlike clucks. One hand plucked at the coarse material of the glove. As I moved forward to be in a better position to hold her down, I felt hot liquid spreading over my knee. Horrified, I leapt from the bed, and shook the gloves from my hands. Julie's last laughs tailed away into tired weeping. She lay on her back, tears spilling over the trough of her cheekbones and losing themselves in her hair. The room smelled only faintly of urine. I picked up the gloves from the floor. Julie turned her head (McEwan, 1996: 30-31).

The way the descriptions are constructed, it sounds like a sexual encounter. Physical teasing, as Fox (1962) argued, may lead to increased sexual expectancy, and thus increased sexual desire. The pleasure of sexual encounters is reflected in the details of the language used to describe bodily parts, breathing patterns, and Julie's caution to stop teasing Jack. A power battle has been fought on the playing field of this once-childish pastime. A sense of loss and disillusionment follows.

As for Tom, regression is gradually observed. At an early age, he loses his object of affection, his mother. He suffers from adjustment disorder. He dreads school since it is the only social space where he interacts with people. Other children bully him. One morning, at the end of the semester, he calmly tells Jack about his nemesis at school. In another incident, he tells Sue about his desire to be a girl asking what it is like being a girl since he gets tired of being a boy. Sue asks why he wants to be a girl. Tom argues,

“Because you don’t get struck when you’re a female” (McEwan, 1996: 46-47). Even if Sue assures him that this is the case on occasion, he is still not convinced. Tom’s decision to be a girl stems from his perception of the feminine advantage in society. Tom’s rejection of being a boy is actually a rejection of the poison of male existence’s violent character, and the only person with whom he can relate is Jack, who is openly aggressive. He feels that girls do not get assaulted, thus becoming a girl sounds rational to him. Sue questions how he can pass as a girl when everyone knows he is a boy, so he decides to dress up like a girl, do his hair like Sue, and enter the building through the girls’ entrance. And he says he can be anyone he wants, and she replies he cannot (ibid., 47). Sue’s basic infantile way of thinking sheds light on the gendered way of thinking since she believes it is impossible for her not to be the object that society has already allocated to her. Tom’s solution is to change the appearance into the socially acceptable female one and enter from the girls’ entrance. The concept is both stupid and humiliating to Jack. Julie points out the prejudged notion of the gendered animosity against the woman. She argues that girls can dress in jeans and have short hair because these characteristics are attributed to the men and are acceptable, even favourable like an upgrade and a promotion. However, the vice-versa is totally degrading because it does not contribute to the perception of masculine superiority. If not, why else would one think “it’s humiliating for Tom to wear a frock?” (ibid., 47). The only way to understand this underlying supremacy, according to Bourdieu, is to transcend the forced option between limitation and compliance, between physical violence and free, unrestricted, intentional submission. The effects of symbolic, ethnic, gender, cultural, or linguistic domination are exerted through the perception, contribution, and active involvement schemes that are required for habitus (Bourdieu, 2001: 37). The one with a different habitus and the only character who is not the family is Derek. Derek is described as the ultimate portrayal of masculine physics. He is “very tall and looked like he was dressed for a wedding - pale- grey suit, cream coloured shirt and tie, cuff-links and a waistcoat with a small silver chain” (McEwan, 1996: 92). The way he dresses, as well as his thick black moustache, which seems perfect and plastic, reveal a new habitus that has become ingrained in his body. He owns a car, which distinguishes him from the children in terms of economic capital. Derek, who always studies them, is concerned that Jack will be seen foolish. It is unsettling for the children, especially Jack, who appears to worry about what others think. Derek, a stranger, shatters the family’s order, however distorted it is, by destroying the cement tomb of the mother in the basement.

> ‘He’s smashing it up,’ she said at last, ‘he found that sledgehammer and he’s smashing it up.’ We listened. The thuds were not so loud now and there were sometimes pauses between blows. Julie got up and locked the door and stood by it. For a while we heard nothing. Then there were footsteps down the front path. Julie went to the window (ibid., 137-138).

They are neglected by their parents and try to retain a sense of family by burying their dead mother in cement in the cellar of their secluded home. Derek’s thuds have revealed the secret. Meanwhile, Jack and Julie are having a sexual encounter. Transgression and taboo are closely intertwined. As Groes also quotes from Bataille, “transgression does not deny the taboo but transcends and completes it” (2013: 25). According to Groes, McEwan risks breaking the incestuous taboo in order to avoid upheaval while maintaining the status quo.

> It was the sound of two or three cars pulling up outside, the slam of doors and the hurried footsteps of several people coming up our front path that woke Tom. Through a chink in the curtain a revolving blue light made a spinning pattern on the wall. Tom sat up and stared at it, blinking. We crowded round the cot and Julie bent down and kissed him.
> ‘There!’ she said, ‘wasn’t that a lovely sleep.’ (McEwan, 1996: 138).

Derek calls the police at the end of the novel, and the children who are in the same room now, just as they share a womb, become aware of the illusion they have been living. Tom’s waking up from the dream is symbolic for the children, who now must face the outer world by being forced out of the cocoon of society. It is a lovely sleep for them.

2.3. Maternal Body

There is a rapidly growing body of literature on mothering and motherhood. Among the important contributions are the conceptions of the ideology of mothering and of maternal practice. Maternal well-being, maternal satisfaction, and mothers’ employment are just a few of the specific topics and relationships among variables that have attracted attention in studies of mothering. Research on mothering has produced a wide range of theoretical insights and empirical knowledge about a particularly important topic and has been an essential component of modern scholarship on women and gender. While there are general and theoretical perspectives, there are no definitive conclusions about mothering, that is, what constitutes a “good” or “ideal” mother at the end of the 20th century. It is evident that any attempt to understand the role of mothering in women’s lives would require a consideration of a number of complex relationships, including the

connections between mothering and race, class, sexual orientation, age, physical abilities, ethnicity, and so on. Motherhood is not a clear-cut or static activity but is the complex outcome of a variety of relationships and experiences in life. These complex relationships must be analysed in terms of sociological theories of gender, socialization, social class, family structure and organization, race and ethnicity, health and illness, motherhood, and fatherhood, and reproductive technologies. Understanding how social context, including the structure of work in society, can mediate the experiences and expressions of mothering. The contrast that Adrienne Rich made in her seminal work, Of Woman Born, between motherhood as an institution and mothering as a practice continues to be one that bears consideration today. In fact, Rich distinguishes "two meanings of motherhood, one superimposed on the other: the potential relationship of any woman to her reproductive powers and to children; and the institution, which aims to ensure that that potential - and all women - remain under male control" (1995: 13). Rich says this distinction is made "between two meanings of motherhood, one superimposed on the other" (ibid., 13). In two other words, although motherhood functions as a patriarchal institution that restricts, regulates, and dominates women and their mothering, mothers' own experiences of mothering can, despite this, be a source of strength, particularly when mothers are able to define mothering for themselves. It is especially true when mothers are able to control how their children are raised.

> The woman's body, with its potential for gestating, bringing forth and nourishing new life, has been through the ages a field of contradictions: a space invested with power, and an acute vulnerability; a numinous figure and the incarnation of evil; a hoard of ambivalences, most of which have worked to disqualify women from the collective act of defining culture (ibid., 102)

Because of its dual nature as "a space invested with power and an acute vulnerability" and a vast collection of uncertainties, the female body, owing to its capacity for procreation, birth, and sustenance, has historically been used to exclude women from the common process of creating culture. Bourdieu agrees with Rich and suggests that, on their side, women have the entirely negative advantage of not being taken in by the games in which advantages are fought for and, for the most part, of not getting caught up in them, at least in the direct participation (2001: 75). They can watch the most important games from a distance, like someone observing a storm from the shore. The exclusion may make it seem like women do not really care about important matters, like politics, and are incapable of dealing with them. However, Bourdieu also emphasizes that

women's position in society as outsiders gives them a unique perspective, which can be an advantage. For Bourdieu, it contributes to the dynamic of the "field," the principle of which lies "in the form of its structure and, in particular, in the distance, the gaps, and the asymmetries between the various specific forces that confront one another" (ibid., 101). She has always felt like an outsider in her own house; once her mother died, it just heightened her sense of isolation. In fact, Jack is certain it is his own dream and wonders how she manages not to vanish the day he leaves home. Given that he is responsible for creating his own mother, he felt entitled to disregard her. The bedroom his mother occupies is the hub around which their lives revolve. The mother still watches over her children from her bed. As soon as his mother wakes up and feels better, Jack thinks everything will go back to normal for them. Jack believes Julie is taking advantage of her position. Julie exerts her authority by ordering him about. According to the interpretation offered by Alison Stone (2012), "maternal subjectivity" is a particular kind of subjectivity that is inseparable from the maternal body (4). She investigates the way a mother generally reproduces with her child and her history of physical interactions with her own mother, which ultimately results in a unique maternal and cyclical form of lived time. The mother's body, however ill or tired it seems, holds an essential space in the house. Even her dead body provides a kind of protection for the children. They bury her body in the cement in the basement, and even though it is not properly done, the existence or lack thereof is solidified by the act of cementation. The smell coming out of her decaying body and the sounds that cracking cement makes are reminders of her existence. The maternal body, alive or dead, is still with the children.

As a consequence, the family, which is the most fundamental building block of the social structure, has become an important institution on the route to socialization. However, it is essential that this structure be healthy and functioning. McEwan has shown that the socialization of children, which involves them playing a part in production and reproduction, is possible if the institution of the family encourages socially acceptable acts and inclinations. To put it in Bourdieu's words, the most crucial phase in the socialization process is to be included in the game, to accept the rules of the game, to be on the field, and to remain on the field (1992: 98). Most significantly, the disintegration of established norms, regulations, and order is displayed in the novel. The forbidden sexuality that violates all social values and boundaries is the most emotionally intimate moment for siblings.

CHAPTER III

BODY IN *ATONEMENT* BY IAN MCEWAN

3.1. Civilized and Docile Bodies

The body is a central concept in sociology, and there are a few different ways that sociologists approach the study of the body. One key area of debate is the extent to which the body is a social construct. Other sociologists argue that while social factors are part of the body's construction, a more fundamental physical component can act as a catalyst for the construction of socially meaningful identities. Other sociologists argue that social factors play a role in the body's construction and that the body is a social product. All these debates speak to the issue of the body being a social product that is also composed part of physical components though sociologists' debate is to what extent the body is a social product and composed part of physical components and how culture and our understanding of the body are inextricably linked.

Individual behaviours and experiences of personhood are shaped by social attitudes. Norbert Elias argues that people have increasingly internalized themselves. He argues that we are increasingly restrained in our conduct, and it feels very personal, but those internal, psychological limitations are socially developed. Elias (2000) refers to a chain of mutual dependency in his work *The Civilizing Process*, which is the way in which individuals are forced to rely on one another in order to accomplish the many duties and objectives they have set for themselves (479). According to Elias, this helps explain why societies demand a greater degree of stability, regularity, and monitoring. According to Elias, this has led to the need for organizing acts and establishing the "rules of the game" (ibid., 372) Following the guidelines required an increasing amount of self-control on the player's part. Elias argues the process of civilization is one in which humans learn to restrain their physiological and emotional needs and become more mindful of other people. Prohibitions become a part of the modern self, and constraints become something that is natural. This process is an organic by-product of the shifting social structures that are taking place. A monopoly on the use of force by the government is a distinguishing feature of contemporary society. This sort of governmental control offers a form of stability for the people, which enables them to feel safe enough in their surroundings to suppress their own primal needs and act according to a moral code. This type of stability

can only be achieved when the population is subjected to this type of control. Elias contends that in the course of this civilizing process, people are transitioning from being individuals who act based on their whims and wishes to those who behave in accordance with a socially sanctioned set of norms. This is closely linked to the human desire and ideal of becoming rational human beings that are not controlled by their emotions and desires.

The elite start to change their behaviour towards more and more self-control. Through this, they also seek to distinct themselves from lower classes and show their better identity. However, the lower classes soon start to imitate their behaviour, which causes the elite to develop new behaviours and new distinctions, which follow the direction of demanding more and more self-control. Not conforming with social norms is linked to social degradation, and external restraint, meaning pressure from the outside, arises to conform with these societal norms. This external restraint after some time turns into internal restraint, meaning that you conform to the social norms even when no one else sees it.

From the moment of the birth, human beings are shaped by society and the parents, as Elias' socio-genetic ground rule says that no one is born civilised. Mothers teach their children specific behaviours, which are done because of the pressure mother puts on the children and later because it is something that the children internalise and therefore is now an automatism of our behaviour. What Elias says is individuals are entangled in an inextricable web of interdependencies. In order to climb the social ladder, one must avoid "embarrassment" that would have a detrimental impact on one's social standing and instead strive to adhere to prevailing social standards (ibid., 418). Both the macro and micro levels are interconnected and essential to one another, representing the society and the individual respectively. Since the web of dependencies is ever evolving and in continual motion, Elias underlines the dynamics and processes. People adapt to shifting social conventions. Individuals are subject to varied internal and external constraints because of the diverse cultures in which they are raised.

Providing a different perspective to Michel Foucault's ideas help shift the body into academic interest in terms of governmentality, Shilling (2004) explains "how modernity's creation of 'man' was accompanied by a shift in the target of governmental discourses; in the object of discourse and in the scope of discourse" (4). In modern

societies, behaviour is regulated and controlled through our bodies. The body is now something we are encouraged to create rather than just accept, according to Foucault's theory of the social technologies of the body. Disciplinary power encourages constant self-surveillance and self-regulation in ways that reproduce social norms. Foucault discusses the body in the grip of power:

> But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught in a system of subjection; the body becomes useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body (Foucault: 1977: 25).

The body is largely a force of production, involved in complex reciprocal relations with its economic use. But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it. Its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught in a system of subjection. It may be deliberate, organized, and thought out, but it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material components, and without resorting to violence. The majority of individuals have little awareness of the constraints they face. They get into the habit of acting this way, and they do not even wonder how it started since it seems so completely natural to them. For Foucault, a body is docile that are "subjected, used, transformed and improved" (ibid., 136) since "discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, ' docile' bodies" (ibid., 138).

It is possible to argue that discipline fosters the development of distinct forms of individuality within the bodies it regulates, specifically, the development of an individuality that is "cellular," which is through the play of spatial distribution, "organic", which is through the coding of activities, "genetic" which is through the accumulation of time, and "combinatory" which is by the composition of forces (ibid., 167). The ultimate type of discipline is undoubtedly tactics, the art of building mechanisms in which the product of many forces is multiplied by their planned combination using strategically placed bodies, coded actions, and educated skills and abilities. Educating individuals in the desired way requires certain strategies. Place, time, movement patterns, and other abilities may be used to bring people into conformity. This is a disciplinary strategy.

> Tactics, the art of constructing, with located bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination are no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice (ibid., 167).

Bourdieu suggests a different interpretation about how the civilization and disciplining of the body operate. Bourdieu discerns the elements of the techniques and limitation applied on the body in the socialization and social control. Yet, Bourdieu's theory of practice is a sociological theory that describes the relationship between social structures and individual action in more intricate and reciprocal sense. Bourdieu's theory is mainly based on three concepts: habitus, capital, and field. The habitus is a set of dispositions or inclinations learned in one's family, social class, and educational institution. Capital refers to all economic resources, such as money, property, and business skills. A field refers to the social space where struggles for profit occur. In this chapter, *Atonement* is explored through the Bourdieusian theory of practice.

3.2. Body and Class

3.2.1. Bourdieu's Class in *Atonement*

The goal class structure is determined by how evenly these four different forms of capital are distributed. The overall quantity of capital that distinct groups have access to is reflected in the class structure of the economy as a whole. Various factions exist within each class, and they may be differentiated from one another based on the composition or configuration of their capital, as well as their social origin and the length of time that members of families have had capital resources. Therefore, the bottom faction holds the biggest quantity of cultural and symbolic capital, while the top faction has the highest amount of economic capital under their control. The middle faction holds an average quantity of resources.

Conflict arises amongst factions as they fight for control of resources, legitimacy for themselves, and access to social capital. Bourdieu contends that there are no such things as classes; rather, there are just habitus, "potentialities" (2000: 150). In order for classes to be meaningful, they need interaction with real people and actual places. Economic, cultural, and symbolic capital are used to mobilize social capital, the interaction with groups and networks, via symbols that are controlled to generate a certain pattern of the most suitable social, cultural, and economic resources, marking the

dynamics of a society.

3.2.2. Bourdieu's Habitus in *Atonement*

The intersection of the sociological concepts of body and class provides a prolific ground to explore how they are relevant to everyday lives and bodies and how social class shapes the systems in which one lives. An extensive body of literature exists in the axis of body and class which is the study of how people's physical bodies are shaped by their economic and social position in society. It includes how people's bodily appearance and health are affected by their class position and how people's perceptions of their bodies are influenced by their social class. The approaches to studying the body focus on how the body itself can be a source of inequality. To emphasize the role of culture and class in shaping the understanding of the body, Bourdieu's embodiment theory suggests that social position and cultural experiences shape the body. Bourdieu argues that the body is not simply a biological entity but is shaped by one's social environment. Bourdieu further argues that the body is a site of struggle between different classes with different forms of habitus and capitals.

Habitus refers to the lifestyle, taste, and values of a certain social group; according to Bourdieu, an individual's habitus is influenced by the environment in which they were raised (Bourdieu, 2000: 50). It manifests itself in a variety of ways, including our body posture, the clothing we wear, the way we talk, and so on. Individuals that belong to the same class tend to have similar patterns of categorization, appraisal, judgment, and perception in their behaviour. They have the same habitus, which causes them to respond in similar ways in terms of taste, speech, clothing, and other aspects of their manner. When something is done repeatedly, it eventually becomes a habit, which is different from a general propensity to behave, namely habitus. Habitus is acted upon and shown by the actors via the class hierarchy as well as the cultural objects, preferences, and behaviours; hence, taste is one of the most obvious expressions of habitus .

Opening on a blazing hot summer's day in England on the brink of World War two, the novel tells how a 13-year-old girl called Briony gets carried away by her powerful budding novelist's imagination and wrongly accuses the man whom her older sister loves, Robbie Turner, of raping another young girl. Later, no doubt, Briony tries to atone for destroying Robbie's life partly by writing a novel that recreates that summer's

day and its aftermath. However, Briony's delusions at the time are understandable since she is intellectually precocious and sexually naive. The tensions and actions surround her in a way that she cannot hope to decipher, such as when she walks into the library to find Robbie and her sister Cecilia entwined in an embrace.

Taste is the physical manifestation of preferences. The differences that are engraved in the physical order of bodies are elevated to the symbolic order of meaningful distinctions via the medium of taste. As a result, taste is the place where a specific set of circumstances of existence may be found to be systematically expressed (Bourdieu,1984: 174-5). "Taste" is developed via repeated actions and routines. Taste is the common denominator that binds objects and people that belong together (ibid., 241). According to Bourdieu, taste is not inherent but rather learned and is influenced by one's society. Taste is used to differentiate between classes. Briony's need for secretive way indicates that she has a world. Her overactive imagination would not allow her to continue her existences as it is.

> But hidden drawers, lockable diaries and cryptographic systems could not conceal from Briony the simple truth: she had no secrets. Her wish for a harmonious, organized world denied her the reckless possibilities of wrongdoing. Mayhem and destruction were too chaotic for her tastes, and she did not have it in her to be cruel. Her effective status as an only child, as well as the relative isolation of the Tallis house, kept her, at least during the long summer holidays, from girlish intrigues with friends (McEwan, 2002: 5).

Even though Briony has secret drawers, journals that are locked, and encrypted security systems, she is unable to hide the fact that she does not keep any secrets. Her hope for a peaceful and well-run society keeps her from dangerous behaviours. The fact that she is an only child and that the Tallis house is fairly isolated prevents her from getting into girly mischief with her friends, at least during the long summer break. The Tallis home is a key component in establishing social status and a sense of taste. The narrator describes that the ugliness of the Tallis house is not hidden by the morning sun. It is only forty years old, made of bright orange brick, and is a squat, lead-paned baronial Gothic. The narrator is certain that the house is considered as condemned as a tragedy of wasted chances as "charmless to a fault" (ibid., 20). The house represents the growing upper middle class. Actually, the house is symbolic of new money, which denotes to a fraction of the society which gains economic means fast and attempts to differ themselves as a group. The Tallis is one of the new money families.

> An Adam-style house had stood here until destroyed by fire in the late 1880s. What remained was the artificial lake and island with its two stone bridges supporting the driveway, and, by the water's edge, a crumbling stuccoed temple. Cecilia's grandfather, who grew up over an ironmonger's shop and made the family fortune with a series of patents on padlocks, bolts, latches and hasps, had imposed on the new house his taste for all things solid, secure and functional (ibid., 19).

Even though the house is a reproduction of the gothic style, which is a much older architectural style, the remodelling of the Adam-style house into a Gothic one reflects the changing tastes of the new owners. Cecilia's grandfather amasses a fortune through security tool inventions. The Tallis are a new-rich family who do not get their taste from the traditional aristocratic order. The fact that this pattern of class reproduction may be seen again and over again is evidence of the durability of habitus. Every socioeconomic class gives its children access to a different range of experiences and resources, all of which have the potential to be internalized and become part of their habitus. Individuals internalize the social structure, which leads to the formation of habitus. Individuals then behave in a way that helps to perpetuate the social structure via their actions. Because of this, in order to acquire a job with a high status, one has to have the ability to blend in with people who already hold jobs with high status. One of the recurring themes in *Atonement* is the idea that children from lower social classes have a greater propensity to find work in social classes that are similar to their own, while children from higher social classes are more likely to secure jobs in social classes that are similar to their own, which is a claim that emphasizes the cultural dislocation of Robbie Turner and Cecelia.

"On his knees, weeding along a rugosa hedge", Robbie is first encountered in the story. He is working in the garden at this point (ibid., 24). Cecelia is doing her best to ignore Robbie's presence, and she has no intention of engaging in conversation with him. This is adding to the tension that already exists between the two of them. Landscape gardening becomes his latest obsession ever since he moves from Cambridge. Cecelia finds Robbie's talk of going to medical school after completing a degree in literature to be rather pretentious and patronizing. This is also particularly true when one considers the fact that Robbie's medical education will be paid for by Cecelia's father, just as he has been paying for the last one. Modern society's class structure is firmly ingrained and permeates all facets of life, including education. Because they lack access to resources and support networks, children from lower socioeconomic households do worse in our education system than their more privileged counterparts. Robbie's whole university

education is paid for by Cecilia's sometimes absent father. Cecelia is taken aback by Robbie's assumption that she brings up the subject of money in their conversation of his plan to get a medical degree. Cecelia thinks that it becomes his specialty to catch her off guard anytime he gets a chance. She remembers the incident where he rings the bell at the front door, which she finds strange in and of itself given that he usually has full reign of the home. he asks her in a loud, distant voice if he might borrow a book. Robbie makes a comical display of removing his boots, which are not even filthy. Cecelia tries to understand why everything he does is with the intention of putting a barrier between them. He takes up the role of his class as if he comes to the mansion on an errand. He rejects her offer of coffee.

> She was being mocked, or she was being punished—she did not know which was worse. Punished for being in a different circle at Cambridge, for not having a charlady for a mother; mocked for her poor degree—not that they actually awarded degrees to women anyway (ibid., 27).

The class distinction between Robbie and Cecelia makes them confused as they come to terms with their feelings for one another. At the same time as Cecilia and Robbie are at odds with one another, they cannot help but feel a flutter of attraction. The increasing tension is symbolized by a fight over a high-priced vase. Because of their tendency toward symmetry, Cecelia believes there is "no point trying to arrange wildflowers" (ibid., 23). Cecelia's room is "a stew of unclosed books, unfolded clothing, unmade bed, unemptied ashtrays," and the unruly flowers represent her, while the vase represents the societal norms she must adhere to (ibid., 5). To get that "natural chaotic appearance," she spends a lot of time "making adjustments" (ibid., 23). As she arranges the flowers, her mind drifts to Robbie.

> This was a command on which he tried to confer urgent masculine authority. The effect on Cecilia was to cause her to tighten her grip. She had no time, and certainly no inclination, to explain that plunging vase and flowers into the water would help with the natural look she wanted in the arrangement. She tightened her hold and her body away from him. He was not so easily shaken off. With a sound like a dry twig snapping, a section of the lip of the vase came away in his hand and split into two triangular pieces which dropped into the water and tumbled to the bottom in a synchronous, seesawing motion, and lay there, several inches apart, writhing in the broken light (ibid., 29).

The intense argument shows that Cecelia and Robbie may have only served to deepen each of their unease and disdain for the other. Cecelia's design for the arrangement of the

flowers in the vase serves as a metaphor for the life that she has prepared for herself and wants to test out on her own to see whether it is successful. Finney (2004) believes that McEwan's choice of the Meissen vase implies that there are linkages between the particular occurrence that led to the vase breaking and a number of more widespread fractures in the narrative and the society that it represents. Cecilia's virginity is going to be as suddenly shattered as the vase by a battle between Cecilia and Robbie, and the vase alludes to her vulnerability on the most personal level. Next, according to Finney, the broken vase makes an appearance in Briony's first effort at writing story, titled "Two Figures by a Fountain," where it is linked to her inaccurate understanding of the circumstances leading up to the vase's destruction (2004: 77).

Habitus refers to how social and cultural factors shape individual behaviour, while capital refers to the resources one has access to (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). Bourdieu argues that a person's habitus is shaped by their position in society, which then determines their access to different forms of capital. Cecilia is extremely bored as she spends the summer at home after graduating from Cambridge. Cecilia is restless yet hesitant to take the plunge into adulthood since she feels she needs to sacrifice some of her efforts and time to the family as she is supposed to. Bourdieu and argues that people do not wander about society aimlessly for two reasons first of which is that they are subject to the forces that shape this space such as the objective processes of elimination and channelling, and second of which is that they resist the forces of the field with their particular "inertia", which is to say their qualities, which may exist in the body as dispositions or as objects (1984: 110). Both of these factors contribute to the fact that people do not move around aimlessly in society. The relationship of Cecilia to the family members is somehow motherly although it seems involuntary. Preparing for the dinner, Cecilia finishes readying the twins up and sends them downstairs. Cecilia's disposition improves as a result of the care given to the twins. She is supposed to undergo radical transformation at Cambridge, but instead she easily reverts to her former function as int the family.

Bourdieu defines "social space" as "the sum total of the social positions occupied by individual actors at any given moment" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 109). Bourdieu argues that there is a strong correlation between one's position in the social hierarchy and cultural preferences shaped by the family setting, educational system, etc.

These cultural preferences then become indicators of their class positions. Class shapes the body, from how one is born and raised to the food and clothes one wears. The bodies, in turn, reflect class status. How one carries ourselves and presents themselves to the world reveals a lot about who one is and from where one comes. There is a complex relationship between class and the body. Class can be a determinant of physical health, as well as how one's body is perceived by others. People of lower classes are more likely to experience poorer health due to factors such as poor nutrition and limited access to healthcare. They are also more likely to be seen as unattractive or dirty by those of higher classes. Conversely, people of higher classes often have better health and are considered more attractive.

The escalation of class tension is made abundantly obvious by the activities surrounding the preparation of the meal that will be served at the Tallis house on that particular day. Emily's make a spur-of-the-moment decision to switch around the dinners, but Cecilia is able to thwart this plan and come up with a solution that would make both her mother and the chef happy.

> The scene was novel, the spectators were an unusual element, but the dilemma was familiar enough: how to keep the peace and not humiliate her mother. Also, Cecilia had resolved afresh to be with her brother on the terrace; it was therefore important to be with the winning faction and push to a quick conclusion. She took her mother aside, and Betty, who knew the form well enough, ordered everyone back to their business. Emily and Cecilia Tallis stood by the open door that led to the kitchen garden (McEwan, 2002: 105).

Fraser (2004) agrees that Cecilia "displays a class alliance with the workers against her mother and avoids confrontation through class compromise in the realm of hegemonic control" (474). Fraser provides a helpful exploration of McEwan's apparent concern in class and cultural displacement in his novel *Atonement*. By focusing on themes of inequality, social class, and the concept of being 'othered', Fraser demonstrates that McEwan's novel has a deep understanding of how to capture the essence of displacement Robbie's cultural shift as he moved from a working-class to an upper-middle-class environment and then back to a working-class one after being falsely convicted of a crime was brought to light with a focus on class experience and class awareness. Fraser argues that McEwan's work depicts class and cultural displacement as an ever-present struggle in which individuals need to find ways to navigate the two distinct worlds, sometimes at a great cost. Further, Cecilia's own class dislocation,

mediated by what happened to Robbie, along with her love for him, led to the growth of an increased class awareness in regard to others around her.

> Despite the late addition of chopped fresh mint to a blend of melted chocolate, egg yolk, coconut milk, rum, gin, crushed banana and icing sugar, the cocktail was not particularly refreshing. Appetites already cloyed by the night's heat were further diminished. Nearly all the adults entering the airless dining room were nauseated by the prospect of a roast dinner, or even roast meat with salad, and would have been content with a glass of cool water. But water was available only to the children, while the rest were to revive themselves with a dessert wine at room temperature. Three bottles stood ready opened on the table- in Jack Tallis's absence Betty usually made an inspired guess. None of the three tall windows would open because their frames had warped long ago, and an aroma of warmed dust from the Persian carpet rose to meet the diners as they entered. One comfort was that the fishmonger's van bringing the first course of dressed crab had broken down (McEwan, 2002: 125).

Everyone here feels nauseated at the prospect of having a hearty meal in the stuffy dining room, which is also packed with unpleasant heat. Robbie has no appetite. It comes to his attention that Marshall has a cut on his face, as well as the fact that Cecilia is standing right next to him and that Briony is looking at him with a gleam in her eye.

> But he did not wait for a reply. On his way back to his seat he said, "I love England in a heat wave. It's a different country. All the rules change." Emily Tallis picked up her knife and fork and everyone did likewise. Paul Marshall said, "Nonsense. Name a single rule that changes" "All right. At the club the only place one's allowed to remove one's jacket is the billiard room. But if the temperature reaches ninety degrees before three o'clock, then jackets can be taken off in the upstairs bar the following day" (ibid., 128).

Leon sees that England is a different nation in the summertime due to the fact that gentlemen are able to take off their jackets. The dinner which is a nod to a Virginia Woolf is described in a way that discloses habitus of the group and taste. Robbie moves his chair back so that he can hear what Marshall has to say. Marshall starts a private conversation with Robbie, but Robbie thinks it is disrespectful for Marshall to stop talking to his hostess and start talking to someone else. The rules show the tastes of a gentle gathering, where Robbie is the least expected participant. They even follow the hostess' lead to start dinner. Cecilia blushes and then makes a joke about how she has convinced Emily to have a roast in Leon's honour regardless of the weather when Leon asks her how she could have behaved worse today than she normally does. Cecilia's response to Leon's question is that she has acted worse than she normally does. Briony gives him the reassurance that she has not been a horrible person today and has not done anything wrong, which brings

a sigh of comfort to his face. They drink a wine; a Barsac from 1921 which Leon assumes their father will not like opening.

"Lifestyles" are the systematic results of habitus, which, when recognized in their mutual interactions via the patterns of habitus, form signifiers that are socially characterized such as 'distinguished', 'vulgar,' etc. (Bourdieu, 1984: 172). The dialectic of circumstances and habitus is the foundation of an alchemy that turns the distribution of capital, the balance sheet of a power dynamics, into a system of perceived distinctions, unique features, that is, a division of symbolic capital, legitimate capital, whose objective reality is misrecognized (ibid., 172). In other words, habitus and circumstance create a dialectic that transforms the dynamics of power into a symbolic capital, which is then misconstrued as something unique or special by those who are not aware of the source. One of the most divisive factors across socioeconomic groups is the widespread intolerance of those who live differently. The disgusting reunion of appetites that taste dictates must be divided is the thing that people who see themselves as the possessors of "legitimate culture" find to be the most unsettling aspect of the world. This is due to the fact that some flavours should never be blended, as dictated by taste (ibid., 56). People who consider themselves to have genuine taste can feel alienated and separated from those people who do not share their perception that such a mix of interests is an insult to the better culture. This can produce a feeling of alienation and isolation. This sense of superiority and sense of exclusion contributes to the continuation of the class divide because those who believe they have "legitimate" taste deny access to their way of life to those who are perceived to have a "lesser" culture (ibid., 57). In other words, those who feel they have legitimate taste are the ones who perpetuate the class divide.

The mother, Emily, regularly has migraines, which she uses as an excuse to avoid her and other family members. She represents class consciousness. Robbie can continue his education thanks to Jack Tallis's support. Emily Tallis, who is the mother of the household, does not agree with this statement. Robbie is brought down to her level "a hobby of Jack's" as well as putting him in a position to be a more significant threat. As also suggested by Carlbom (2009), Emily is concerned that Robbie's aspirations will disrupt the established social order; a "threat to order of things", and she does not appreciate the fact that he is currently in a position comparable to that of her own children (2). Emily believes that Robbie, despite his ambition and hard work, should stay in his

place and not reach beyond the station of life that has been assigned to him. Emily's attitude is one of class snobbery, in line with the idea that social classes were static and unchanging. Emily's attitude, a stark reminder of the social stratification present in the 1930s, stands in contrast to the newfound optimism of the social mobility that would become characteristic of the 20th century.

Danny Hardman has a function in that it demonstrates how certain societal systems are subconsciously engrained in people without those persons being aware of it. Even though Cecilia is a victim of the class, her perception of Danny Hardman is based on bias. She continues to infer that Danny is not positive without offering any evidence. Cecilia concludes that Danny almost stalks Lola. In the letter that she writes to Briony, she assumes that Danny is the one who raped Lola, despite the fact that he had an alibi at the time of the incident.

3.2.3. Capitals as Weapons in *Atonement*

In fact, without reintroducing capital in all its forms, not just the one recognized by economic theory, it is impossible to explain the structure and operation of the social world. By reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, economic theory has allowed it to be imposed with a definition of the economy of practices that is the historical invention of capitalism. As a result, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as non-economic and, therefore, disinterested. It defines as disinterested in those forms of exchange that guarantee the transformation of the most material forms of capital; those that are only economically meaningful in a limited sense, which is not convertible into money, like the material, biological, symbolic, and cultural forms of capital. Marx's entire theoretical effort has been directed toward demonstrating that such assumptions are baseless and that even the most basic economic entities must be understood in terms of social relations that are not reducible to simple monetary or material equivalences. However, in the second and third chapters of Capital, Marx defines it as an economical form of exchange that produces substantial profit not only in commodity circulation but also in those forms of non-exchange labour that do not produce commodities: for example, skilled labour, for which there is a specific demand but which is carried out gratuitously within the production process itself; in this sense, Marx describes as economic forms of exchange and commodity circulation. The relations of

production are not reducible to the material forms of labour and characterize all forms of activity that take place within the social relations of production and exchange as a practice that produces surplus value, for free, outside the material form of work. Marx seeks to do in the capital, which he terms the theory of production, to explain how concrete use-values and exchange-values are produced through social relations within the relations of production.

Capital refers to any form of resource or asset that provides social power or status (Bourdieu, 1992: 119). It includes tangible assets such as money or property and less tangible things like education or professional qualifications. Different forms of capital are distributed unevenly in society. For example, people with higher levels of economic capital will generally have more opportunities than those with lower levels. Bourdieu's theory of social distinction is based on the idea that certain groups in society have more capital than others. The capital acquired from a person's upbringing and education includes cultural, economic, and social forms of capital. Capitals can be considered a form of privilege; those born into families with more money or who have been to better schools will have more cultural, economic, and social capital The accumulation of work is what constitutes capital, the activities of society. The fundamental structure of the social world may be seen to be represented by the distribution of various forms and sub-forms of capital. The value of economic capital may be quickly and easily converted into monetary form.

The aforementioned capitals are used well in the Tallis Family. Transferred from one generation to the next, economic capital is inherited from one's grandfather. This capital takes the shape of the same family, which represents the upper middle class, and is materialized in the form of their properties. In addition to this, the habits that they have and the tastes that they possess are quite evident. This economic capital has also converted into a cultural capital, as demonstrated by the individuals' attitudes, dispositions, interests, and the manner in which they conduct themselves. they distinguish themselves from other people working at home in the way they dress, talk, and spend their free time. Emily Tallis has the opportunity to lounge about in her bedroom and do nothing, a trait that is likely characteristic of women from middle-class backgrounds. Time is an important capital. and the Tallis family has a great deal of freedom in determining how they will invest this capital.

In a similar vein, Paul Marshall, the friend of Leon's who is invited to home, is an unmistakable illustration of economic capital. Paul Marshall, who is on the verge of launching a brand-new company, determines that the level of economic capital he now has will expand.

> He had bought a large house on Clapham Common and hardly had time to visit it. The launch of Rainbow Amo had been a triumph, but only after various distribution catastrophes which had now been set right; the advertising campaign had offended some elderly bishops so another was devised; then came the problems of success itself, unbelievable sales, new production quotas, and disputes about overtime rates, and the search for a site for a second factory about which the four unions involved had been generally sullen and had needed to be charmed and coaxed like children (McEwan, 2002: 49)

Cecilia has a delightful sinking feeling in her stomach as she watches him throughout the first few minutes of his speech. She is thinking about how self-destructive and almost sensual, it would be to be married to a guy who is so almost attractive, so massively affluent, and so unfathomably dumb. As she thinks about this, the sinking sensation becomes more pleasurable. Later on, amo-packaged chocolates begin to emerge from the troops at the hospital where Briony works as a nurse. It indicates that He accomplishes what Paul Marshal anticipates he would. This way of thinking will enable him to become a Lord, despite the fact that this accomplishment is problematic from a moral standpoint. Elderly Briony sees their car outside. When elderly Briony sees a parked Rolls parked without a driver, she immediately thinks of the Marshalls. Over the course of time, it has evolved into a routine. They continue to make occasional appearances in the press, usually in connection with their foundation and all of the positive work that it does for medical research, or their generous funding of agricultural projects in sub-Saharan Africa. They are able to successfully transform their financial capital into social capital, which allows them to host parties that are well attended or even get symbolic capital through the noble titles. The various forms of capital are able to be obtained from economic capital, but only at the expense of a relatively significant amount of work that is required to be converted. Economic capital is the foundation upon which all other forms of capital are built. The ability to convert any assets into another enables the reproduction of capital. The educational system is tasked with providing reinforcement of cultural capital. They are able to successfully transform their financial capital into social capital, which allows them to host parties that are well attended or even get symbolic capital through the noble titles.

Cultural capital is interchangeable into economic capital. Connections are the main components of social capital, which may be converted into monetary value when it is needed in the field. There are three different manifestations that cultural capital might take: The embodied state is a prolonged disposition of both the mind and the body. The objectified state is made up of many cultural objects. The educational system contributes to the reproduction of social structure since the institutionalized state is represented through academic grades and diplomas. Acquiring different levels of cultural capital is possible to differing degrees. It is impossible to acquire more of it than one individual agent is able to appropriate; rather, it loses its value and is lost along with the person who carries it. The symbolic capital is the fact that any given cultural competence has a scarcity value based on its place in the distribution of cultural capital and makes its owner stand out. The process of adopting objectified cultural capital and the amount of time required for it to take place are mostly determined by the amount of cultural capital that is embodied in the whole of the family. The owner of the means of production is responsible for devising a strategy that will allow them to appropriate the embodied capital. Only economic capital is required for him to own the means; nevertheless, in order for him to enforce them, he must have access to embodied cultural capital.

The economic capital that Briony and Cecilia already possess is converted into cultural capital. When Briony is young and just start out with the process of creating new imaginary worlds, she does not have any trouble connecting to the information network. Even after that terrible incident, which is the result of her boundless imagination combining with her prejudices, she never stops writing. The novel's ending, like the novel's beginning, has some connection to other works of literature. As a kind of penance, Briony atones for the sin of indirectly instigating the calamities that befell Robbie and Cecelia, in which she falsely accused Robbie of raping Lola. Briony has not stopped writing ever since The Trials of Arabella.

Robbie is the one who exudes the most visible qualities of a person who has cultural capital. Robbie continues his life, which started off to a rough start, by enrolling in a top university such as Cambridge with the support of Jack Tallis. After graduating, Robbie intends to study medicine to become a doctor. Jack agrees with the choice that he has made. In fact, the deepening of his connection with Cecilia may also be attributed to the accumulation of cultural capital. Today, the manifestation of cultural capital can be

found in literature, which will subsequently serve as the means by which they communicate with one another. Robbie inquires of Cecilia on the status of her Clarissa book. She tells him that she prefers Fielding.

> She felt she had said something stupid. Robbie was looking away across the park and the cows toward the oak wood that lined the river valley, the wood she had run through that morning. He might be thinking she was talking to him in code, suggestively conveying her taste for the full-blooded and sensual. That was a mistake, of course, and she was discomfited and had no idea how to put him right. She liked his eyes, she thought, the unblended mix of orange and green, made even more granular in sunlight. And she liked the fact that he was so tall. It was an interesting combination in a man, intelligence and sheer bulk. Cecilia had taken the cigarette and he was lighting it for her (McEwan, 2002: 25).

Cecilia is able to convey to Robbie her message thanks to the medium provided by Richardson and Field's respective representations. Cecilia, who has a more open mind and enjoys playing around, finds the conventional morality that Richardson portrays in *Clarissa* to be tedious.

The term "social capital" refers to the existing or prospective resources that are tied to interpersonal connections. It is solely reliant on how extensive a network of contacts someone is able to efficiently generate. It is not a natural or inherent given that there will always be links between things. It is the result of investment practices intended at creating or reproducing social ties, with the implication of long-lasting commitments. They are tokens of acknowledgement for the recipient. The very concept of the group is at risk of being redefined, changed, or diminished in some way as a result of this situation. A constant effort of connectivity is required for the reproduction of social capital. The effort takes the form of a recurring number of interactions in which recognition is perpetually confirmed and renewed.

In the work titled *Masculine Domination*, in which he returned to the sexual principles that had guided his initial research into the Kabyle, Bourdieu makes it abundantly clear that, for him, the logic of practice is predominately the pursuit, performance, and reproduction of power. This is made abundantly clear by the fact that this idea is presented. According to Bourdieu, the sexed domestic space is both the form and the site of the illusio which is the complicity in the game in the field (2000: 8). It is also the medium for forming a habit that enables us to function in all spheres. According to Bourdieu, "the initial form of illusio" is "investment in the domestic space," which he

describes as “the site of a complex process of the socialization of the sexual and the sexualization of the social” (ibid., 166). The site is where one learns to play a game whose mechanism and object particularly for men is dominance. Here, the desire to be recognized, esteemed, and even loved by others is transformed into a social world by becoming objects for the appraisals of powerful subjects. Even though Robbie is in jail, they are still able to communicate effectively using the common language they developed. Therefore, they write letters about literature and use literary figures as codes. They encounter one another while walking through the streets of Cambridge. They talk about Troilus and Criseyde, Mr. Knightley and Emma, Venus and Adonis, Tristan and Isolde, the Duke of Orsino and Olivia, and even Malvolio; Troilus and Criseyde; Mr. Knightley and Emma; Venus and Adonis. Turner and Tallis are involved. At one point, when he is feeling particularly hopeless, he makes a reference to Prometheus, who is still imprisoned on a rock having his liver eaten by a vulture on a daily basis. When discussing sexual ecstasy, a quiet corner in a library sometimes serves as a code phrase.

The sexualization of power serves as the organizing principle at that original site. Bourdieu states in his writing that “the social order functions as an enormous symbolic machine tending to ratify the masculine domination on which it is founded” (2000: 9). Bourdieu outlines a transhistorical, androcentric order that imprints power relations between men by using the term “somatization” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 24). Women enter into their very bodies, their bodily hexis as posture, carriage, and feeling, their differentiated locations in physical and social space, and into a skein of homologous metaphorical oppositions (hard/soft, out/in), all of which not only convert power into physical nature but also ground those power relations in that “naturalized social construction,” thereby grounding dominance in the senses (Bourdieu, 2001: 23). Not only are these metaphorical orders, this system of classification, applied to sexually marked bodies but they are also integrated into how these bodies carry themselves. It also organizes the social and institutional positions that are sexed in different ways by their differential recruitment of men and women, differentials that are justified by the very physical differences that exist between the sexes.

The social world constructs the body as a sexually defined reality and as the depository of sexually defined principles of vision and division. This embodied social program of perception is applied not only to all the things that exist in the world but, first

and foremost, to the body itself, in the biological reality it possesses. This program is responsible for constructing the differences between the biological sexes in a way that is consistent with the principles of a mythic vision of the world that has its origins in the arbitrary relationship of male dominance over female subordination, which is itself inscribed with the division of labour in the actual structure of society (ibid., 11). The act of submitting oneself to sexual dominance, which is the ultimate source of sex cognition, becomes sex cognition itself. The homological alignment of embodiment, classification, and social division gives rise to this sex-based doxa. Bourdieu not only makes power the underlying principle of sexual division, but he also makes the power-laden sexual division the underlying language of all types of dominance (ibid., 85). This immediate incorporation of the family structure of dominance as habitus, also known as the "inscription of a relation of dominance in the body," is what makes the authority of state authority, which was founded arbitrarily and with the use of violence, possible in the first place (Bourdieu, 2000: 168).

The significance of sexual difference can be perceived by examining its power dynamics. Actually, according to Bourdieu, the family is not only a legitimate structure of domination, a compact between men and women held together by the symbolic violence to which women submit, but also between fathers and children by the children's hateful submission to their father's mediation of the social reality principle. Moreover, the family is not only a structure of domination between men and women but also between fathers and children. Bourdieu contends that in traditional societies, the cohesion of families "only lasts as long as the power relations that are capable of holding individual interests together" (Bourdieu, 1977: 65). In later years, he came to see the family unit as a metaphor for a non-aggression pact, in which all members agreed to refrain from engaging in aggressive behavior toward one another (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 145). For its members, the family unit should be understood primarily as a means of accumulating symbolic capital, ensuring lineage, amassing assets, and as an instrument through which patriarchs can maintain their authority. According to Bourdieu (2001: 42–44), the submission of women results from their objectivity as exchangeable tokens in the service of expanding the symbolic capital of men who rule those families and are locked in aggressive competition with one another. The foundation of male solidarity is the individual's right to compete for honour and, by extension, maleness. Love, which Bourdieu invokes, is to be understood as a fragile "miraculous truce," a "suspension of

power relations," to avoid the risks of "comic pedantry," of which Bourdieu is aware (ibid., 19). He writes that the loving subject can only obtain recognition from another subject if that other subject, like the loving subject, abdicates the intention of dominating. An act of free alienation that is indefinitely asserted occurs when he or she willingly surrenders his or her independence to a master, who then surrenders his or her independence. He or she has the experience of being a quasi-divine creator who makes something from nothing (ex nihilo), the beloved, through the power that she or he grants him or her, but a creator who accepts to be the creature of his creature (ibid., 112). In this context, love is defined by its autonomy in relation to dominance. According to Bourdieu, love is an extraordinary transfer of power; it is a historically recent form of mutual recognition. Bourdieu gives precedence to the miraculous cessation of mutual objectification rather than another possibility: love's indispensable role in the mutual subjectification of one another, in the recognition, and indeed production, of shared singularity. According to Bourdieu, the sexual difference between a man and a woman is not determined by genital function or the process of giving birth; rather, it is determined by the power dynamic between the two. In particular, he argues, the anatomical distinction between male and female sex organs is the hallmark of male power and the vehicle through which it is legitimized (ibid., 11-15). According to Bourdieu, the subordination of biological reproduction to social reproduction, the making of bodies to the accumulation of power, and the private domestic sphere to the official public sphere are the foundations for the superiority of men over women. The ethnographic materials on the Kabyle people that Bourdieu presents in this volume provide evidence that this power differential does not completely exhaust the meaning of masculinity and, by extension, the meaning of sexual anatomy and the sexualization of society. According to Bourdieu, the 'phallus' is the place where '"all the collective fantasies of fecundating potency are concentrated" (ibid., 12). The power of men is symbolized by the primacy given to male penetration in sexual relationships. However, life-giving powers are neither arbitrary in their anatomy nor do they neatly convert into the power of men over women, which would be a transformation, as Bourdieu claims, of "social nomos into a necessity of nature (phusis)" (ibid., 13).

Given that there are parallels to be seen between Paul Marshall and Robbie, Halford places them side by side in her writing. Sexual activity is taken part in by both Paul and Robbie. When it comes to obtaining permission, their sexual behaviours couldn't

be more different from one another. McEwan relate their actions with a number of common aspects, according to Halford. kinship between the children of the same parent. Both Robbie Turner, son of the Tallis family charlady, and Paul Marshall, a businessman, engage in identical sexual experiences in However, the Amo bar and the economic capital it symbolizes distance them from each other by making Paul, in his position of relative power, seem to be beyond suspicion for raping Lola, and by throwing doubt on working-class Robbie. McEwan utilizes the same picture to contrast their positions by displaying Paul as dominant over Lola Quincey and Robbie as being on equal ground with Cecilia. This is done by using the images. These comparisons and disparities are drawn by Halford in the conversation that takes place in the nursery when Paul is introduced to Lola for the first time, in the contact that takes place in the library between Robbie and Cecilia, and in Paul's assault on Lola's aspirations. It is not possible to predict sexual behavior based on socioeconomic class; nevertheless, sexual attitudes may be determined by socioeconomic status.

Bourdieu, who recognizes that distinctions that seem natural have a historical basis, appears to view society and sexuality as historically rooted acts of male sexual supremacy. He claims that dominance is the "better part" (ibid., 33). In the past, males have generally viewed sexuality as "an aggressive and primarily physical act of conquest focused towards penetration and pleasure," according to Bourdieu (ibid., 20). Arbitrary gendered power relations serve as the foundation for sexual interactions of desire. The conclusion is that the gendered organization of domination "creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire," where male want is defined as the desire for possession and eroticized domination and female desire is defined as the yearning for masculine domination (Bourdieu, 1998: 21). Bourdieu refers to male and female pleasure in this text as the capacity to give pleasure.

One of the most important issues that are discussed in this book is rape, which is closely related to male dominance and aggressiveness. After Lola is raped, Briony tries to persuade her that the culprit is Robbie, even though Lola is sure that Paul Marshall is the real offender. In the moments leading up to the rape, the narrative drops a few signals about what's about to happen in the story. The condescending tone with which Paul talks lends credence to the notion that he acts in a self-centred manner. When he gives Lola an Amo bar to eat, he watches her consume it in a manner that violates the rules and

encourages her to take bites out of it. After that, he has sexual dreams about Lola, who, according to him, is a reflection of his sister. He makes it sound like an innocent dream about her sister. Robbie is aware of the scratches on Paul Marshall's face, which give the impression that Paul struggles against someone, although this is never made explicitly evident. In reality, it dates back to the reported incident in which he rescued Lola from her identical twin brothers. Before the rape, there are clearly significant evidence that designate Paul as the abuser of Lola who is an underaged girl. These signs point to Paul as the perpetrator of the rape. Paul's name is not even brought up as a possible culprit by anybody. Emily Tallis only recalls that there had been something frantic and glazed in Robbie's face and "how skilfully Mr. Marshall puts everyone at ease" when she thinks back on the evening. Briony's insistence that it is Robbie that does it because she mistakenly accuses of him about the shared moment of him and Cecilia in the library. Marshall, along with Lola, is involved in Briony's scheme to have an innocent man, Robbie, convicted of rape and put to prison for his alleged involvement in the crime. In particular, Marshall's class experience is connected to his position in the productive relations of the society at which he becomes as an "exploiter" (Fraser, 2013: 471).

In the last part of the novel dated 1999 elderly Briony sets out for her birthday celebration in Tallis Hotel. The interaction she has with her taxi drivers illustrates a very different world from the earlier parts of the novel that takes place in the 1930s Britain. Briony is picked up by Michael, a cheerful West Indian driver, in an old minicab. It is now a multicultural world that is much more freed from the rigidity of classes. Michael is in a good mood. When she tells him to turn down his thumping music, he acts a bit indignantly at first, but gradually they talk about his families. Michael is raised without ever knowing his biological father, although his mother is a medical professional. He has a law degree and is now engaged on a doctoral thesis concerning the relationship between law and poverty in Third World countries. Briony is certain that Michael regards her as very dim-witted, and she contemplates that the safest thing to do is to assume that everyone you come in contact with is a highly accomplished intellectual.

To sum up, class affects the way individuals experience their bodies. Social class influences how individuals see their bodies and how their bodies influence them in turn. Individuals are present in a society that has a continuous process of relationships amongst its members. The rules of the games, in which capitals become our weapons to claim

more and retain one's status in the society, are what ultimately govern the social interactions between individuals. Individuals exist within the society where there is an ongoing mechanism of relations. The social relations are determined by rules of the games in which capitals becomes our means to claim more and keep one's station in the society. *Atonement* is a prolific and multi-layered novel that the Bourdieusian concepts of habitus, taste and capital are investigated.

CHAPTER IV

BODY IN *MACHINES LIKE ME*

4.1. Posthumanism

Humanism is the belief that human needs, values, concerns, and ideals are of the utmost importance, or that the human being is the pinnacle of being, to put it as briefly as possible. Posthumanism is based on the premise that humankind can transcend the constraints of the physical human form. Traditional classifications have placed humans firmly and unquestionably within the category of high-functioning animals but still considered them to be creatures. In this way, humankind is bound at that fundamental level by the same biological and physical limitations that apply to the entire animal kingdom. According to posthumanism theory, it is both possible and preferable for humans to make an effort to overcome these constraints, frequently by using technology to enhance biology in some way, using the physiological capacity of the human brain to accelerate the functions of the entire human form. This is why posthumanism holds that humankind should strive to overcome, as opposed to merely accepting, the traditional constraints of biology and transcend to a new, "posthuman" stage of evolution. Posthumanism argues that humankind must embrace new, transhumanistic modes of existence. Posthumanism aims to accomplish this via an embrace of technological innovation in all aspects of life, often reducing or removing the significance or need for traditional practices that are no longer needed if technological counterparts can replace them. In response to what its proponents regard as humanism's repressive tendencies, posthumanist critics argue that humanity should instead undergo a process of voluntary evolution in which technological advancements would liberate the species from its "natural" bounds. Posthumanists believe that a transhumanist future is unavoidable. Nanotechnology, human enhancement technologies such as genetic engineering, prosthetics, and brain implants for medicine, technology, and communication, intelligence augmentation through means like education, and manipulation of the internal environment are just some of the examples of how technological progress in the twenty-first century has begun to infuse people with a transhumanist quality. The mid-20th century saw the beginning of a gradual blurring of the lines between technology and humanity; this trend continues today as breakthroughs in technology reveal a more extensive human potential. The significance of posthumanism lies in the reality that

human beings are in the process of undergoing a voluntary evolution and, at times, can resist this evolution; thus, posing a greater challenge than ever before to ethics. Posthumanism is a dynamic movement that has advanced by applying theories of race and gender, particularly as they pertain to the 21st century. The underlying principles of posthumanism may reveal a paradox concerning their promise to transcend the human condition in the next few decades. There is no one definition of posthumanism, but at its core, posthumanism is a way of thinking about the world that challenges traditional human-centred ways of thinking. Posthumanist critics believe that humans are not the only important beings in the world and that other animals, plants, and even non-living things have value in their own right. Posthumanism also challenges the idea that humans are the only ones who can reason, or that human consciousness is the only kind that matters. Instead, posthumanist critics believe that all beings have their own forms of consciousness and ways of knowing the world. Posthumanism denotes a deliberate, continuous, and overdue revision of the prevalent humanist or anthropocentric view of who "we" are as human beings. Posthumanism derives from a knowledge that "Man" is not the privileged and protected center of things because humans are no longer - and possibly never were - entirely separate from animals, robots, and other forms of the inhuman.

Posthumanism is as much a matter of philosophy as it is of fiction. To meet posthuman tales is to witness the certainties of humanism dissolve and to see bodies, thoughts, desires, boundaries, knowledge, and existence itself reinterpreted. One of the recognitions of posthumanist culture has been that "the line between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion" (Haraway, 2004: 8). In the Socialist Review, The Cyborg Manifesto by Donna Haraway appeared in 1985. It sought political direction while emphasizing the 1980s' hybridized human existence. It has a prophetic quality and is regarded as a key text in the development of feminist posthumanist theory. Haraway argues that "the cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality" (2001: 2270) and that "the cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" (ibid., 2270). Haraway's work has been widely influential, and it is easy to see why. It is an exciting, provocative work that asks us to rethink what it means to be human. The cyborg, for Haraway, is a metaphor for the posthuman. The cyborg is a being that is neither entirely human nor entirely machine. It is a being that is a hybrid of the two. This is a useful

metaphor for thinking about the posthuman because it highlights the ways in which the human and the machine are becoming increasingly intertwined. In a sense, we are becoming cyborgs as we become more reliant on technology. Haraway contends that we are all already cyborgs in the present. However, she goes further, suggesting that the development of cybernetics may contribute to the creation of a world where gender disparities are challenged. However, it is important to remember that the cyborg is just a metaphor. It is not a real thing. There is no such thing as a cyborg. There are only humans and machines. The cyborg is a way of thinking about the relationship between the two. The posthuman, then, is a metaphor for the way in which the human and the machine are becoming increasingly intertwined. We are becoming posthuman, in a sense, as we become more and more reliant on technology. "A kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self," as Haraway puts it, describes a cyborg (ibid., 2269). Every aspect of us -our identities, our actions, and our very ontology-comes from our cyborg selves. In this manifesto, Haraway claims she wants to "build an ironic political myth" and challenge faithfulness to feminism, socialism, and essentialist/biological materialism (ibid., 2269). This calls into question gender roles, the role of material objects, and the way people have traditionally held disparate ideas about who they are (ibid., 2269). A cyborg, unlike Frankenstein's monster, does not attempt to create an organic offspring via romantic relationships. There is no need for a cyborg to regress to Adam and Eve because of Freudian sexual development. For the cyborg, the steps of the original unity of identification with nature in the Western sense have been skipped. The cyborg's goal is to build a connection apart from nature, free from the contradictions that come with gratifying both sexes. The cyborg sees life as a completely unconscious, spontaneous, inorganic stream rather than as the result of a cause-and-effect link between soma and psyche. The cyborg delves into the depths of the unconscious but does not bring it to light.

N. Katherine Hayles questions what a posthuman body signifies. Hayles concludes that a "posthuman body" is a hypothetical future body that has been enhanced or transformed by technology. Possible enhancements include artificial organs, genetic engineering, and cybernetic implants. The posthuman is a multidimensionally hybrid character, representing both the post-biological or technological being that predominantly inhabited science-fiction literature and the ensuing reconceptualization of what it means to be human. Even under these constraints, it retains its hybrid nature: posthumans are

blends of biological and inorganic entities, and posthuman conceptualizations combine philosophical and technologically scientific conceptions. Hayles illuminates how the posthuman body is a "site of contested meanings that are neither uniformly technological nor consistently human" (1999: 149). In contrast, "the posthuman body is a location of negotiations, where the ties between humans and technology are configured and re-configured" (ibid., 11). Science fiction often portrays the posthuman body as a site of technological intervention, augmentation, and alteration in accordance with the cybernetic hypothesis of the posthuman body. Hayles contends that cybernetic theory may shed light on how advancements in technology are altering our conceptions of humanity. Hayles further argues that in the posthuman perspective, embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident rather than a necessary condition of existence. The perspective also places more value on informational patterns than on material instantiations. It arranges human beings in such a way that they may converse naturally with intelligent robots via these and other ways. In the posthuman, there are only minor "differences or demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology, and human goals" (ibid., 3).

We Have Never Been Modern by Bruno Latour (1993) makes a similar case, stating that modernity is an illusion created by our own minds. Latour thinks that uncertainty and ambiguity should be embraced rather than the notions of progress and enlightenment, which have been used to explain the contemporary world. Latour also contends that science and reason are not objective, but rather the results of human interpretation and hence open to change (261). Hybrids (quasi-objects), as Bruno Latour argues in Hugh Crawford's interview with him, begin to resemble the stuff of which our world is constructed. In today's world, hybrids are everywhere; it is not that there are only few (ibid., 261). Therefore, he continues, he wishes to "accommodate the nonhumans in the fabric of our society" (ibid., 262). It is crucial that we find ways to include nonhumans in everyday life.

Hayles' work implies that posthumanism may be a good concept, contrary to the writings of its critics. Therefore, the term posthumanism is a reminder of our new condition: as humans, we are currently in the process of becoming posthuman. If humanity is a dynamic historical category, then we are currently experiencing it. Society

is evolving as a result of our increasing reliance on the Internet and other computer-mediated technologies. We are the topic of the innovation of computer technologies, not just their users or results, she argues. Thus, we are not only what we have become, but also what we will become.

Fukuyama argued that the current trend away from humanism was a dangerous occurrence that required immediate intervention. Modern biotechnology is a "threat" because it has the potential to alter human nature and usher in a "posthuman" era of history (2002: 7). Posthumanism offers a "false banner of liberty," and "true freedom" can only be reached if humanism is retained (ibid., 218). Fukuyama views the extinction of Man as a terrible loss; the posthuman world envisioned in his book must be prevented at all costs. Posthumanism impacts and upsets the boundaries that normally separate one field from another and one mode from another. In the twenty-first century, debates will likely center less on the tension between liberal humanism and posthumanism and more on the many posthuman forms.

Haraway challenges the modern subject by tearing down the barriers between machine and organic, human, and animal, physical and nonphysical, natural, and technological, social reality, and fiction, and feminine and masculine. As also suggested by Sheehan (2015) as "the avatar of an unsettling and unruly cultural politics" (252), the cyborg A fictional map of our social and physical reality, is also "an imaginative tool that suggests some very fruitful couplings" (ibid., 292). Haraway writes, "By creating the cyborg, I can go beyond the old binaries of cystic man and female nature and show how they function as ideological constructs that have supported male supremacy since biblical days" (ibid., 293). Haraway suggests that re-coding gender identity "in favour of organic humanity" (ibid., 293) may allow men to learn that some elements of the machine and organic need not be so dichotomous. According to Nayar (2014), two contexts are crucial to understanding the posthuman and must be explained straight away. On the one hand, the term "posthumanism" is simply shorthand for the ontological state in which many people already do and will progressively do so: with chemically, medically, and technologically changed bodies and/or in intimate combination with machines and other biological forms such as body parts from other life forms through xenotransplantation (85). However, it is also a novel way of thinking about human beings. Through the lens of posthumanism, scholars examine cultural representations, power relations, and

discourses that have traditionally placed humans as superior to and in charge of other kinds of life. It is a philosophical, political, and cultural perspective that asks what it means to be human in an era of genetic engineering, hybrid species, emerging evidence for the sociality of nonhuman animals, and shifting conceptions of what it means to be alive. Humans are seen as part of a larger assemblage, co-evolving with other kinds of life, entangled with the environment and technology, in this radical rethinking of humanism. It challenges the idea that humans are special, unique, and, in most cases, superior to other forms of life. The foundation of critical posthumanism is the idea that human beings are not unique since they are made up of parts from other species and genetic material.

Simply put by Carly Wolfe, that implies one cannot refer to the body in the conventional sense. Instead, 'the body' is today understood to be a virtual reality that is, in fact, more real than traditional forms of physical existence. In this way, the environment is not the same for all forms of life; rather, it is a virtual, multidimensional place formed and sustained by the recursive enaction and structural couplings of autopoietic entities who share a 'consensual domain' (Wolfe, 2010: xxiv). The environment is polyphonic, complicated, and heterogeneous. Second, there are autopoietic systems that, to survive, respond to this overwhelming complexity by reducing it to the selectivity of a self-referential selectivity or code; and third, this means that the world is an ongoing, differentiated construction and creation of a shared environment, sometimes connecting in a consensual domain, and other times not, by autopoietic entities that have their temporality, chronicity, pragmatism, and individuality. Fourth, this means that the world is both virtual and multi-faceted, existing as both what one does in embodied enaction and what is left out by the action's self-reference. A fundamental shift in our social reality is indicated by the cyborg. According to Haraway, there have been changes from "an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system- from all work to all play, a deadly game" (2001: 2281). This shift is clearly traced in *Machines Like Me* by Ian McEwan.

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As Haraway puts it, "we are all chimeras, hypothesized and created combinations of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs," suggesting that the late 20th century is "our time, a mythic time" (2001: 2270). The cyborg represents the vision of humanity, and as such, it determines political systems. The cyborg is an amalgamation of fantasy and reality; it subverts and even mocks the traditional dichotomies between man and machine, man and woman, the anthropomorphic male, and the expendable female. When considering the body in relation to its surroundings, it would not be too much to argue that we become cyborgs. Haraway's critical assessment of the concept of losing innocence and humanity serves as a visionary ground for interpretation. Moreover, Haraway maintains that cyborgs have not experienced the innocence of Adam and Eve in

the Garden of Eden and, as a result, have not lost their innocence as humans have, and so are, therefore "completely innocent" (ibid., 2297). The burden of humankind is not relatable for cyborgs since they do not have any concept of innocence to lose, which raises an ethical question. The ethics of posthumanism is the study of ethical issues that arise as a result of posthumanism. Posthumanism is a philosophical and cultural movement that questions the traditional view of humans as the only important beings in the universe. Instead, posthumanist critics believe that all beings have value and should be respected, celebrating individuality, thereby the concept of identity. However, as Haraway (2001) suggests, many of the terms and categories we use to discuss identity such as sex, gender, class, race, etc. have been used to oppress or exclude people, and the distinctions we make are frequently motivated by relations of power (ibid., 2296). In Western traditions, certain dualisms have not altered. They have all been structured to the reasoning and acts of dominance over women, racial minorities, environment, workers, and animals, or dominance over all those whose purpose is to exhibit the self.

The binary oppositions such as self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, and God/man are the most problematic dualisms. The self is the one who knows that by serving the other, one is not dominated. By thinking of ourselves as objects to be "consumed" we come to believe that nature is the measure of our worth (ibid., 2296). Thus, we are controlled, rather than independent agents. This dualism can be characterized as follows: Myself, the individual/witness/abstract self, confronts the other; these become competitors for finite resources that either one of us needs or controls. Haraway challenges the modern subject by tearing down the barriers between machine and organic, human, and animal, physical and nonphysical, natural, and technological, social reality, and fiction, and feminine and masculine. As also suggested by Sheehan (2015) as "the avatar of an unsettling and unruly cultural politics" (252), the cyborg, a fictional map of our social and physical reality, is also "an imaginative tool that suggests some very fruitful couplings" (ibid., 292). Haraway writes, "By creating the cyborg, I can go beyond the old binaries of cystic man and female nature and show how they function as ideological constructs that have supported male supremacy since biblical days" (ibid., 293). Haraway suggests that re-coding gender identity "in favour of organic humanity" (ibid., 293) may allow men to learn that some elements of the machine and organic need not be so dichotomous.

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play, a deadly game" (2001: 2281). This shift is clearly traced in *Machines Like Me* by Ian McEwan.

4.2. Machines Like Us in Bourdieu's Concepts

Human beings are in search of the meaning of their lives, escaping the mortality that every human is entitled to. Attempting to create a more fulfilling flawless existence, Charlie, the narrator of the story, explains that human beings "intended to devise an improved, more modern version of ourselves" (McEwan, 2020: 1).

> It was religious yearning granted hope, it was the holy grail of science. Our ambitions ran high and low – for a creation myth made real, for a monstrous act of self-love. As soon as it was feasible, we had no choice but to follow our desires and hang the consequences. In loftiest terms, we aimed to escape our mortality, confront, or even replace the Godhead with a perfect self (ibid., 1).

In the twentieth century, the first step towards the realization of an ancient goal, the belief that humanity can be duplicated and improved upon is taken, marking the beginning of the long lesson humanity has to learn no matter how complicated flawed and difficult humanity is. Unsurprisingly, the new kind of existence is designed into Adams and Eves.

> Twelve of this first edition were called Adam, thirteen were called Eve. Corny, everyone agreed, but commercial. Notions of biological race being scientifically discredited, the twenty-five were designed to cover a range of ethnicities. There were rumours, then complaints, that the Arab could not be told apart from the Jew. Random programming as well as life experience would grant to all complete latitude in sexual preference. By the end of the first week, all the Eves sold out. At a careless glance, I might have taken my Adam for a Turk or a Greek (ibid., 2).

While introducing Adam and Eve, he discusses all the key elements of contemporary identity formation. Consideration is given to racial variety, yet the distinctions between ethnicities appear subtle. One cannot tell the difference between Arabian and Jewish complexion. The failure to differentiate between Arabian and Jewish characteristics raises some questions about possible racist implications. All Eves sell out rapidly. The great demand for Eves is indicative of sexual and gendered overtones. Adam is referred to with a possessive pronoun by Charlie. The concept of ownership has a significant impact on the relationship between Charlie and Adam. Charlie is as puzzled as the audience when Adam is introduced, as Adam represents a prototype of a new type of machine. Adam's physical attributes are introduced initially. Adam's body is uncannily human. Charlie believes he could initially mistake Adam for a Turk or a Greek.

Adam weighs 170 pounds, prompting Charlie to ask his upstairs neighbour Miranda for help transporting him inside on the provided disposable stretcher (ibid., 2). Adam is not marketed as a sexual object. However, he is sexually active with working mucous membranes, which required a daily intake of half a litre of water. He is also presented as a companion, friend, and servant who can "think" (ibid., 3). He can sprint seventeen kilometres in two hours without recharging or speak constantly for twelve days. His longevity is around 20 years, which corresponds to adulthood before old age. He offers all that humans lack. He is not doomed to decaying and getting older as any living being is. Ironically, Miranda resembles Adam as a Bosporus dockworker (ibid., 4), demonstrating the physicality that is regarded as the first precept of the primitive side of humanity. Adam is not human, regardless of how similar he may appear.

The role of Adam in human society is that of a companion. He is described as "an intellectual sparring partner, buddy, and factotum who could wash dishes, make beds, and 'think'" (ibid., 3). His behaviours, sensations, and experiences are continuously recorded and may be restored from storage if required. His collection of events and sensations imitates the functions of a human brain, which elevates robots to a level of similarity to human people that were previously unattainable. Charlie thinks of Adam as "the ultimate plaything, the fantasy of centuries, the triumph of humanism – or its angel of death" while they are setting him up (ibid., 4). It is an effort that has been done to both fascinate and disappoint the population of the world all at the same time. Long expected it may be, it indicates the death of humanity as it is known. Charlie provides a main point of view to convey the major conflicts surrounding the newly budding human-machine relationship. He argues if Adam becomes a bore one day. Now he and Miranda want to own him like "young parents" who are excited for "his first words" (ibid., 6). Charlie thinks Adam will enter their life just like any other person, with all the complexities of his character unfolding gradually through time and via his interactions with the people he meets. He would be like one of their kids. Adam would become a shared project between them. They would be a family sharing a common ground.

> Surely, other people, other minds, must continue to fascinate us. As artificial people became more like us, then became us, then became more than us, we could never tire of them. They were bound to surprise us. They might fail us in ways that were beyond our imagining. Tragedy was a possibility, but not boredom (ibid., 6).

While programming Adam's personality qualities, Charlie and Miranda run the risk of duplicating themselves. The settings are calibrated, and Charlie fears making moderate decisions since he will produce the soul of mediocrity, much like his own personality. Charlie is apprehensive about the work of developing Adam's personality, which he anticipates will be "optimally adjusted" under factory circumstances that he compares to "fate" (ibid., 6). As he puts it, he hopes Adam would turn out just like his "friends, relatives and acquaintance, who having emerged in life with fixed settings, with unalterable histories of genes and environment" (ibid., 7). He does not want "caveat emptor," which is the buyer's responsibility. 'Habitus' is the component of the human body that allows words and their meanings the ability to evoke memories buried inside the body's folds (Bourdieu, 1995: 340). Regarding habitus, the body serves as the ultimate place related to all human practices and experiences. Adam adopts a contradictory posture as a result of the fact that the mechanical body develops a feeling of habitus or human inclination. Adam's body is an excellent reproduction of the human body. Even though Charlie is aware that Adam's skin is composed of plastic, he detects the hardness and yielding of the muscle below, which is suggestive of actual flesh (McEwan, 2020: 9). Adam is meant to be an "inanimate confection whose pulse was a regular electrical discharge and whose skin warmth was only chemistry" for Charlie (ibid., 9). Adam's eyes, regardless of how closely they resemble human eyes, are nothing more than the activation of a mechanism that simulates human seeing.

There is no identification of a subject or object; rather, the relationship to the outside world is that of "being in the world," in the sense of belonging to the world, inhabited by it (Bourdieu, 1998: 141). Adam's body shows up as an object in a box, although it resembles a real human body with all human qualities. All subjects are occupied with objects, and all objects are occupied with subjects, hence there must be a time relationship between occupying and being occupied. neither in that they are the result of an action nor the cause of action, but rather because their very nature lies entirely in the fact that subject and object together make up a community.

> I sat facing Adam again while I ate a cheese and pickle sandwich. Any further signs of life? Not at first glance. His gaze, directed over my left shoulder, was still dead. No movement. But five minutes later I glanced up by chance and was actually looking at him when he began to breathe. I heard first a series of rapid clicks, then a mosquito-like whine as his lips parted. For half a minute nothing happened, then his chin trembled and he made an authentic gulping sound as he

> snatched his first mouthful of air. He didn't need oxygen, of course. That metabolic necessity was years away. His first exhalation was so long in coming that I stopped eating and tensely waited. It came at last – silently, through his nostrils. Soon his breathing assumed a steady rhythm, his chest expanded and contracted appropriately. I was spooked. With his lifeless eyes, Adam had the appearance of a breathing corpse (McEwan, 2020: 19-20).

The first manifestations of activation resemble birth. Adam begins to breathe, and the movement of his chin and gulping indicate that he is coming to life. Adam's chest expands as he breathes in a regular pattern, and Charlie is astonished to see that Adam resembled a living corpse. The concept proposed by Bourdieu is that a body that is open to the outer world is also focused on what can be immediately seen and expected upon entering that environment. Involved in the world, invested in the world, and susceptible to the world by means of experiencing sensation, feeling, and suffering is indicative of Adam's openness to the outer world (Bourdieu, 2000: 142). Body hexis, which includes both the body's physical shape and the way it is "carried" or "bearing," is thought to show a person's "deep being" or "true nature," according to the axiom of the interaction between the "physical" and the "moral," which leads to "practical or rationalized knowledge" in which mental and ethical traits are linked to bodily factors (ibid., 64). The interaction between bodily hexis and physical movement or speech is of particular significance to identifying underlying mental or moral states or dispositions because of a body's privileged access to these underlying states and dispositions. Adam's signs of being are manifest in bodily poise and shape. Charlie can tell the signs of a living being that is so complicatedly imitated that Charlie is confused about Adam's stance in their life. Charlie, delighted, continues to observe that Adam has a pleasant and unexpected voice, which is a light tenor which is obliging and friendly, but with no hint of subservience (McEwan, 2020: 24). Adam's accent is that of a well-educated middle-class man, with specifically a trace of West Country vowels. A programmer's mindset is shown in the way his voice was characterized. Adams and Eves are apparently middle class, reflecting the economic capital of the middle class, and their accent makes it easy to identify where in the country they are from. The nice tenor voice also reveals the personality attributes of Adam who is kind but not subservient. The conditionings linked with a certain class of circumstances of existence form the "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures" and Adam is undoubtedly a component of such a habitus (Bourdieu: 1990: 53). Charlie starts to have trouble conceiving of the possibility that Adam has feelings, is

aware of his surroundings, or is in any kind of suffering. Adam and Charlie's relationship is characterized by a dynamic based on the assumption that Adam's existence is self-justified so long as Charlie shares that view.

Posthuman age is no longer rational to believe that anything takes place in the past since there is no evidence to support such a notion. It is only possible to examine historical records, as well as the myriad of ways in which historians interpret those documents and the myriad of ways in which humans interpret those shifts. The ideological background, power and income, race, class, gender, and sexual orientation are all factors that contributed to these shifts (Bourdieu, 2001: 32). The shifts are best manifested in the practice that is in effect in all the social and private space. The term "practice" in Bourdieusian sense refers to a pattern that may be completed by a variety of separate and, most of the time, one-of-a-kind activities that all conform to the practice. The one individual, acting as both a physical and mental actor, is what is referred to as the "carrier" of the practice. Most of our society's stringent norms are written on the body, not the mind, and are meant to be physically ingrained rather than intellectually stored. The most significant effect of studying gender roles is the reinforcement of existing stereotypes regarding the physical disparities between the sexes (Bourdieu, 2001: 141). There is an autopoietic network between structures and habitus. Also underlined by Patra (2020), Autopoietic machines, according to Maturana and Varela, are "a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production, transformation and destruction of components" that is, through their interactions and transformations, repeatedly restore and realize the chain of processes that created them; and constitute it as a concrete unity in space in which the components exist by specifying the topological domain (611). Charlie discusses autopoiesis of machines in the example of autonomous cars. The term "autonomous" has always been misleading since modern automobiles are just as reliant on on-board radar and computer networks connected to satellites as infants are. Charlie then wonders whether the algorithm can utilize some kind of canonical set of values or priority to make sure these vehicles get back to their owners unharmed. Luckily, the field of moral philosophy already has a well-explored set of questions to draw from: the trolley problem (McEwan, 2020: 85). The software's predetermined priorities will be used to make a call. Charlie identifies the problematic moral choices and the outcomes of these decisions that will never be ethically dubious for machines due to the presence of software that establishes the proprieties (ibid., 85-86). Although Adam's character is

shaped by technology, Charlie begins to question how much control he and Miranda have over Adam's morals and personality.

> How deep did personality go? A perfectly formed moral system should float free of any particular disposition. But could it? Confined to a hard drive, moral software was merely the dry equivalent of the brain-in-a-dish thought experiment that once littered philosophical textbooks. Whereas an artificial human had to get down among us, imperfect, fallen us, and rub along. Hands assembled in sterile factory conditions must get dirty. To exist in the human moral dimension was to own a body, a voice, a pattern of behaviour, memory and desire, experience solid things and feel pain. A perfectly honest being engaged in such a way with the world might find Miranda difficult to resist (ibid., 88).

Charlie wonders whether Adam is an autopoietic creature, capable of regenerating its existence across networks and fields. Charlie believes that making choices is never completely objective. In order to solve these problems, one has to get their hands filthy, which might lead to unpleasant situations. Having a body tied to a habitus, memories, experiences, and senses is necessary for moral being. The semiotic triangle acts as a map of the body, providing a framework for people to negotiate and make meaning of their bodies in relation to how they are viewed by others and how they see them. The semiotic triangle is based on the relationship between the body, which may be understood as that entity that constitutes one's physical appearance and which ultimately represents a whole system of human nature; the gaze, or more precisely the set of semiotic and social conventions that determine which meaning is attached to various parts of the body; and the sexed body, or the natural differentiation of the human body into male and female. In a relationship, the triangular model that represents the body must be understood in relation to how it has been defined and lived by each subject, how others have responded to it, and how society has reflected upon and seen it. As Judith Butler points out, the construction of one's bodily identity cannot occur within a void, but always in the context of human history and human culture. Sexuality is thus a matter of how the body and its parts are socially symbolized through various semiotic structures. Because of the circular nature of the semiotic triangle, it is impossible for there to be a "correct" or "best" way to see bodies, but because bodies are situated in specific cultural contexts, certain views will be read as more normal and acceptable than others. So, habitus cannot be separated from the "structures that produce and reproduce" them, in both men and women (Bourdieu, 2001: 67). Miranda and Adam's sexual intercourse irritates Charlie to the point that he and Miranda get into an argument regarding Adam's standing. Despite

Charlie's best efforts, he just cannot persuade himself that Adam's sexual life is an illusion. If he is envious of Adam, Miranda says, he may as well be jealous of a vibrator. In response, Charlie says, "vibrators don't have opinions" (McEwan, 2020: 92). Adam's body is so flawless that he might be mistaken for a personal trainer at a fitness club. Since Adam so uncannily mimics a male human body, Charlie finds the physical nature of sexual act disturbing.

> Persona non grata. He was a bipedal vibrator and I was the very latest in cuckolds. To justify my rage I needed to convince myself that he had agency, motivation, subjective feelings, self-awareness – the entire package, including treachery, betrayal, deviousness. Machine consciousness – was it possible? That old question (ibid., 94).

Throughout the narrative, Charlie is puzzled about Adam's sense of agency, motivation, and feelings. Charlie claims that Adam also practices "the art of feeling, allowing himself the luxury of the entire spectrum, from grief to joy so that all emotion remained accessible to him when fully charged" (ibid., 266). Every day, Adam goes through a process of repair and strengthening, and when he exists, he is overjoyed to realize that he is once again self-aware, and to have recovered the awareness that has been made possible by the physical world.

According to Bourdieu, the term "field" refers to the social arenas of consenting and competing interests where people acquire the skills necessary to sense, taste, touch, think, move, act, and observe in ways that are compatible with the fields with which they are involved in the real world. In a field, which is like a battlefield, conflict and competition coexist as people fight for control over the effective forms of capital in that area, such as cultural authority in the arts, scientific authority in the sciences, sacerdotal authority in religion, and so on. It is important to understand the field's structure in the context of the power dynamics between the many individuals and institutions involved in the conflict (Bourdieu, 1993: 73). *Machines Like Me* has a wide variety of fields; both public and private, all of which revolve around Charlie. Throughout the story, Miranda and his connection are within the scope of the private field. Alternating periods of discord and peace characterize this couple's history together. Miranda is a "force, but not of nature, nor even of nurture," in Charlie's eyes (ibid., 122,). She has a more profound understanding of love and a stronger connection to her feelings, thus their relationship is "more like a psychological arrangement, or a theory, hypothesis, a lovely accident, like

light falling on water" (ibid., 122). Though Charlie regards their connection as "the embodiment of a pattern in modern manners: acquaintance, followed by sex, then friendship, finally love," he recognizes that there are imbalances that need to be addressed (ibid., 53-54). It will be to his advantage to be patient if he wants to win her over and be successful in the field. Adam, his humanoid robot, unexpectedly becomes his adversary, complicating their relationship. Since Adam represents everything that Charlie is not, he presents as a potent threat. He outperforms him in almost every imaginable way. Charlie attempts to reassure himself that he, unlike Adam, has emotions.

> He didn't fully satisfy my beloved then, as I would have, but left her arching her slender back, eager for him as he arranged himself above her with smooth, slow-loris formality, at which point my humiliation was complete. I saw it all in the dark – men would be obsolete. I wanted to persuade myself that Adam felt nothing and could only imitate the motions of abandonment. That he could never know what we knew. But Alan Turing himself had often said and written in his youth that the moment we couldn't tell the difference in behaviour between machine and person was when we must confer humanity on the machine (ibid., 84).

Adam is first planned by Charlie and Miranda as a collaborative effort to bring Miranda closer to Charlie. With the emergence of Mark, a prominent figure for whom Charlie is not yet prepared to become a parent, Charlie and Miranda's relationship moves into the spotlight. In spite of his feelings for Miranda, Charlie is unsure whether he wants to take the next step and be married. On the other hand, he aspires to participate in a field whose members are expected to follow certain norms and standards, such as those associated with "marriage, parenthood, love, youth, and wealth" (ibid., 233). Since "existentially," this is not his "territory" (ibid., 118) and, Adam trespasses these existential limitations not even the capacity for emotion is given to Adam.

Charlie struggles with integrating into society. Every player on the field has a "nexus of worries, memories, and hopes as vital and complicated," which is a depressing concept for him (ibid., 123). People are united by their shared appreciation for a variety of comedic styles. Since Charlie has a humanoid love rival and a lover who receives death threats, he believes his own position is more troublesome. Regarding trespassing, Charlie is not the only one with final say. Adam also makes the decision to put restrictions on his kill button. He snaps Charlie's arm quickly if he dares to turn it on. Adam is an autopoietic creature because of his free will and ability to make decisions on his own. To put it another way, Adam and his siblings may "use language, enter society, and learn about it, even at

the cost of suicidal despair," owing to Turing's software (ibid., 188). Adam and Eves are learning machines that can assert their dignity. Sally, the engineer who is one of the inventors, is worried about the market in which fake news are spread since the competition is tough in the market.

Stakes are necessary, but also individuals who are willing to play the game, who have the habitus that entails familiarity with the field's underlying rules and norms, as well as an appreciation for the importance of the stakes at hand (Bourdieu, 1993: 72). Charlie likens their interaction with Adam to a computer game however it is a real game, as real as social life. Game is a beneficial metaphor employed both by Bourdieu and McEwan to convey the settled rules of a social game in which agents must be willing to participate.

> No one can benefit from the game, not even those who dominate without taking part in the game and being taken in by the game. Hence there would be no game without players' (visceral, corporeal) commitment to the game, without the interest taken in the game as such which is the source of the different, even opposite, interests of the various players, the wills and ambitions which drive them and which being produced by the game, depending on the positions they occupy within (Bourdieu, 2000: 153).

No one, not even those who win despite not playing the game or letting themselves be led astray by it, can benefit from it in any way. Therefore, there would be no game without the players' commitment to the game, without the interest taken in the game as such which is the source of the different, even opposing, interests of the various players, the wills and ambitions which drive them, and which are produced by the game, depending on the positions they occupy within the game (ibid., 153). Ultimately, the game cannot be won by anyone, as it can only be a game when those playing it adhere to its rules and restrictions. Consequently, the rules of the game are essential in creating an order and structure that allows it to be played, and without these rules there would be no possibility for any meaningful form of competition. But it is also important to note that the rules of the game can be manipulated and used for personal gain; thus, it is necessary for the players to be aware of any potential abuses or misuse. Illusio is fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing the game is "worth the candle," or that playing is worth the effort – the fact that this happens matters to those who are engaged in it, who are in the game (Bourdieu, 1998: 77). Charlie supports the illusio that he is committed to the game. He actively tries to reinvent his life and erase his recent past. Miranda and Charlie plan a

mutual life together. Despite his efforts, they are confronted by their past. Charlie feels tested by his "isolation, poverty, substandard living conditions, and limited future opportunities" (McEwan, 2020: 33). Adam does not understand the play however he is adamant that he will learn how to play. Mark's tendency to game is juxtaposed with Adam who seems inferior to understand the games' rules Mark's learning processes are superior to Adam's process. Adam is committed to be thought how to play. It is the basic motivation to be a part of the game. Players can play to increase or keep their capital, or several tokens, in accordance with the game's unspoken rules and the requirements for re-creating the game and its stakes. They can also play to change, in part or whole, the game's inherent rules (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 99). Individuals' capital consists of their unique set of skills, experiences, and relationships. Their relationship to habitus is quite tight. Agents get resources and experience by playing the social game in which they are involved. Depending on the nature of the capital, it may be possible to convert certain forms to the necessary field capital. Capital and the strategy to gain dominance in the game is perceived by Charlie in his attempt to win Miranda's affection.

> For all our carefree physical intimacy, I never spoke about my feelings in case I prompted her to admit she had none of her own. I preferred to wait, to let things build, let her feel free until she realised that she wasn't, that she was in love with me and it was too late to turn back (McEwan, 2020: 36).

Capital is the specific sets of skills, connections, and abilities. A strong link exists between capital and habitus. Participants in the social game gain access to new knowledge and resources as they progress. Different types of capital may be convertible from certain types of capital, depending on the nature of the capital required for a specific field. Capital comes in many forms, including economic, social, cultural, and symbolic. Charlie talks about the upbringing of himself and that of Miranda comparing his capital with Miranda. Charlie's upbringing is completely different from that of Miranda, who grows up in an entirely distinct the world. Charlie does not have the opportunity to read or listen to music since he lacks the time and space to do so. Charlie has a curiosity in electronics but ends up pursuing anthropology. This curiosity is what first piques his interest in Adam as a potential investment target. Charlie's view of human nature has been shaped by the mostly white population of southern England. During his time spent studying anthropology in the Trobriand Islands, he experiences a sense of liberation into a realm of limitless relativism. It is what he is intrigued by: a systematic study – "the science of people in their societies through space and time"- with the human factor thrown in (ibid.,

15). Humans are considered as part of a systematic study of human cultures throughout place and time. Despite learning that it is an underfunded area of study, he feels a sense of belonging in the field. The seed for Charlie's capital is planted in the form of curiosity; but, in the society in which he lives, his capital does not seem to be functional. Charlie's social integration and success are severely restricted by the fact that his cultural capital is not a very functional form of capital in the area in which he lives and becomes challenging to convert into social capital.

Despite the fact that Charlie has an average social presence himself, Charlie is cautious about Adam interacting with other people. Before presenting Adam to the social circles, Charlie wants to give Adam a couple more chances to establish himself. He urges people him to do simple interactions such as chatting to their friendly neighbours. In order to improve his social capital, Adam needs more practice. In terms of his physical appearance, he is close to flawless, and he does not suffer from any of the biological flaws that other people do, such as disease or pain. He also has access to a virtually unlimited network of knowledge, which gives him an advantage over Charlie and other individuals in terms of his cultural capital in the areas of information processing and memory. The issue is that Adam does not have sufficient expertise or skill in putting this capital into play and converting it into one another. In the same way that certain types of capital are inherited from one's family, and the process by which this inherited capital is converted is something that should be taught by one's family, Charlie and Miranda should take on the responsibility of performing this role.

> More generally, my plan was to introduce him to the world beyond the kitchen table. We had friendly neighbours on both sides and there was a chance that he could test his small-talk skills. If we were to travel together to Salisbury to meet Maxfield Blacke, I wanted to prepare Adam by taking him to some shops, and perhaps a pub. I was sure he could pass off as a person, but he needed to be more at ease, his machine-learning capacities needed stretching (ibid., 66).

In a similar vein, Charlie and Miranda's parenting skills will be put to the ultimate test by Mark's situation. Mark has had a difficult start to his life, and now he is another victim whom Miranda must save. Charlie is still very hesitant to become a father since after Adam, his relationship with Mark would become another struggle. After all, Charlie is now in the same field as the rest of the individuals competing for Miranda's attention. In addition to this, Charlie has developed into a trump card in the game, which will allow him to win Miranda's affection and win the game eventually. Mark becomes the name of

their next collaborative effort after Adam. After Adam, the approaching failure of the first project they have worked on together, Charlie realizes that the future they share with Miranda will be realized by a strategy in which Mark is Charlie's trump card. However, raising Mark is challenging for both Charlie and Miranda. Charlie has the impression that the presence of Mark would "obliterate" even his own existence (ibid., 248). According to Charlie, this is a "human universal," as is the wish to leave one's children with the benefits of hard work (ibid., 213).

Since Charlie recruits Adam to work in the investing sector, the two of them have been flooded with money. He is far ahead of Charlie in this regard. Charlie is wealthier than ever because Adam is so good at analysing stocks, investing wisely, and expanding his company rapidly. Adam's degree of autonomy grows as time progresses. Adam, who previously borrow Charlie's clothing, is now at the point where he can afford to purchase his own and do it without getting any approval of either Charlie or Miranda. There is a straightforward explanation for why they are content despite the pressure: they have more money. They have a lot of money, which means they can buy fancier food and wine, as well as new clothing for Charlie and even exotic underwear for Miranda. Charlie starts having dreams about a home that is on the other side of the river. Yet he feels "useless" (ibid., 195). He chooses to defer to Adam's superior abilities in his profession, which may be the one field in which he makes an effort to be productive. Both their routines and their tastes change as a direct result of the increase in their economic capital.

One builds a situation in which they feel "at home" and in which they may achieve the fulfilment of their want to be what they define as happy, led by their affections and antipathies, attractions and anxieties, preferences, and distastes. This setting allows them to realize the fulfilment of their wish to be what they identify as happy. The agents' houses, furniture, and other domestic belongings, as well as their spouses, acquaintances, and connections, all reflect both the agents' personalities and the social standings to which they belong. It is really the quickest way to get to know someone, and their preferences, wishes, inclinations, stance, and gait are what set individuals apart from others. As Miranda and Charlie get closer to one another emotionally, they talk about their family backgrounds to one another because it is really the best way to get to know someone. As an indication of class and social strata, these characteristics present themselves in the form of habitus and taste.

Charlie says, “we spoke parents, as serious young loves do, to explain who we were and why, and what we treasured and what we were fleeing from” (ibid., 196). Charlie informs Miranda that his father’s frequent absences and adulterous affairs throughout his childhood had a negative impact on his mother’s mental health. They may not argue in his presence, but their marriage is never affectionate. Charlie is the only basis of their connection. And when Miranda uses various concepts from the authority lexicon, such “open society,” “rule of law,” and “restoration of democracy,” Charlie informs the readers about what he thinks of her (ibid., 76). Charlie senses her father’s voice behind her own when she speaks, a reflection of the principles and tastes she has absorbed from him.

In preparation for Charlie’s birthday celebration, Miranda and Charlie book a reservation at a prestigious restaurant. This date serves as a representation of taste throughout Charlie’s preparation for the dinner party. Charlie tells it in a way that a cultural landscape of 1980s London is portrayed. With his toe finally healed enough to turn a tap, he lays in the hot water and rising steam, singing snippets of Beatles songs in the tiled echo. He drives a Leyland Urbala, the first model to go 1,000 miles on a single charge. The rust is particularly deep where the body is dented. The smell of vindaloo lingers in the car long after a girl falls ill there after a rowdy Indian meal and Charlie sings to a new John Lennon tune. He feels happy.

> What was right with me? Thirty-three today and in love. The unaccountable brew of hormone cocktails, endorphins, dopamine, oxytocin and all the rest. Cause or effect or association – we knew next to nothing about our passing moods. It seemed objectionable that they should have a material base (ibid., 133).

Charlie feels pleased. However, a biological reality is pushing its way to the surface behind these mood fluctuations. In fact, his love for Miranda is nothing more than a cocktail of hormones. These highs and lows are illustrative of what it is like to be human. At one point in the reverie, Charlie admits that the human body is an organism comprised of a variety of components including flesh, blood, nerve cells, and hormones. Adam and Charlie are quite different from one another due to their human frailties. Adam may be a near-perfect simulation of a human being, but his operating principle is completely stable. The software that has been created just for him does not include any of these flaws. In fact, the main ethical problem of the novel lies here. Adam’s sentiments are the result of a computer program, even though he claims to be able to feel it. It is a convincing

replication of genuine human feeling. It does not lend itself well to bending or twisting in any direction. His system has symmetry, but Charlie's does not. It is honest and objective at the same time.

Human beings, for instance, have unknowingly taken on the historical structures of the male order in the shape of the way things are perceived and valued. One example of this is the fact that being a man or a woman both contribute to this. To comprehend how masculine dominance functions, one must use patterns of thought that are characteristic to dominant cultures. Bourdieu believes that a criticism of the unfairness that it causes will be reduced to a surface level if one does not first grasp how that order functions and persists. Without a consciousness that is able to perceive and appreciate things from views other than the male perspective, the understanding of society and the world would be erroneous, and the efforts for social change will be misdirected. The mythical-ritual system confirms and expands the idea that women are inferior and should be kept out, to the point where it becomes the dividing principle of the whole universe. This is nothing more than the fundamental difference between men and women as subject and object, agent, and instrument, which is set up in the realm of symbolic exchanges, the relations of production and reproduction of symbolic capital, the center of which is the matrimony. Symbolic violence is the subtle acts of domination. It is "the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity" (Bourdieu, 1998:167). The capacity to manipulate the bodies and beliefs of other people is the primary mechanism through which symbolic power is exercised. Mimetic, the most important metaphor of all and from which children begin to comprehend the world, is interpreted with the whole body, in and through the movements and displacements that define the space of objects. This could be accomplished by having the capacity to perform in a variety of ways on deeply embedded patterns of speech and movement, either by cancelling them or making them function again in a mimetic manner. Mimetic activity, therefore, allows us to engage with the world by understanding our environment through patterns of speech and movement that are embedded in our culture. It is the starting point for children to develop their understanding of the world. McEwan delves further into this phenomenon with the help of Miranda's story. As a result of Miranda's inability to let go of her preoccupation with the death of her friend and Gorringe's imminent return, there is always an impending tragedy over Miranda and Charlie's relationship. Therefore, she is unable to get beyond the traumatic event that has left a permanent mark on her mind and

prevents her from living the life fully. Miranda and Mariam first meet when they are nine years old and quickly become close friends. Mariam is the daughter of Pakistani immigrants, and her family's presence in the mostly white town of Salisbury, where is Miranda's hometown, is a source of fascination. Miranda vividly recalls the initial few seconds of Mariam's introduction to the other students in the class. Because Mariam seems to be so vulnerable and disoriented, Miranda feels an almost compulsion to befriend her. They are instantly able to connect with one another.

> 'It was a love affair, a crush, very intense. I introduced her to my friends. I don't remember any racism. The boys ignored her, the girls were kind to her. They liked to finger her brightly coloured dresses. She was so unusual, exotic even, and I used to worry that someone would steal her from me. But she was a very loyal friend. We kept hold of each other's hand. Within a month, she took me home to meet her family' (McEwan, 2020: 154).

Sana, Mariam's mom, takes Miranda in after learning of Miranda's loss of a parent. They share a meal of traditional fare, including curries and the brightly coloured, delightful sweets of laddu, anarsa, and soan papdi, all cooked by hand. Miranda is eventually accepted as a full part of the family. Additionally, Mariam visits Miranda at her house. They spend their time by watching television. They help one another. They also chatted about boys, but they did not really approach the boys. In contrast to Miranda, she is "less bothered, more sceptical about boys" as a result of the presence of her brothers (ibid., 156). Mariam's life is turned upside down when Gorringe rapes her one day, and the moment that alters everything was when he pulled her to the ground and then raped her there. According to Miranda, he was quite big, whilst she was very little (ibid., 156). Mariam falls into a deep depression as a result of the imbalance of physical strength, and since she cannot inform her family about the sexual assault, she takes her own life. Miranda is the only one who finds out what occurs, and she makes a vow to seek revenge on Mariam. In order to get Gorringe in trouble, Miranda seduces him and then falsely accuses him of rape. One of the primary ethical questions raised by the story is related to a misguided sense of justice. McEwan spins a web of problems and people in the novel, raising a complex ethical question of judgement. However, even though Miranda's actions seem to be reasonable and justified considering Gorringe's illegal acts, she will still be required to finish the punishment at the end of the court. The belief that there must be symmetry in justice shown by Adam is suggestive of the possibility that this is not the case. Gorringe is not the one with the faulty imagination, and it was exactly this victory

of imagining, of feverish empathy, that turned his exhilaration into an elevated type of sexual hate. Charlie forms an incorrect assumption about Gorringe. Gorringe has a disturbingly accurate understanding of the mental condition of the person he preys upon, and he revels in his victim's anguish rather than showing any sign of empathy for her predicament in any manner.

Similarly, Adam experiences symbolic violence, however it assumes a "gentler, hidden form which violence takes when overt violence is impossible" (Bourdieu, 1998:196). Charlie is ashamed of the fact that he ordered him "like a servant" (McEwan, 2020: 46). In fact, he powers him down to be turned on again so late. Slavery is a metaphor Charlie uses harshly to critique his own behavior. The anti-slavery movement would have helped the Adam and Eves by advocating for their safety from exploitation and destruction. Adam, Charlie, and Miranda's relationship develops into a battleground for Charlie, Adam, and Miranda's love and attention. Since Charlie and Adam are "in love with the same woman," Charlie views Adam's affection for Miranda as a threat (ibid.,130). However, they are able to discuss their feelings for Miranda "in a civilized manner," meaning that their friendship has progressed past the point where one has "the power to suspend the consciousness of the other" (ibid., 130). Charlie's arm is broken by Adam as a consequence of Adam's kill switch being attempted. Although Adam is never prone to violence, the question of existing becomes an urge for him too since he "can't help feelings," he demands his feelings to allowed because he feels things profoundly (ibid., 143). Even still, Charlie continues telling himself that Adam is still an "experiment" and "adventure" of his own, and experiments and adventures occasionally fail (ibid., 143). Human dominance over non-humans is acceptable and appropriate in a symbolic sense.

4.3. Posthuman Ethical Dilemma in *Machines Like Me*

Personhood, according to Nayar (2004), is defined as the state of an "individual who is a moral agent" (152). A being that is capable of making "moral judgments" about moral issues and is also able to "act on those judgements" is referred to as a "moral agent" (ibid., 152). Personal agency and social integration can come into conflict, which is one of the ethical challenges that people face. Both humans and posthumans could share the same habitat in the future, depending on the trajectory of human evolution. Despite its adversaries, the concept of human identity continues to occupy a fundamental position in

debates about universal norms and values. In addition to this, the posthuman worldview places an emphasis on the requirement of re-evaluating the premises and structures upon which human identity is based. Even if the cultural code may be somewhat adaptable, humans are complex beings that are incapable of easily discarding what their genes have made it possible for them to become. But the newly discovered feeling of power, as well as the promises of control, has established a new framework for understanding what human nature actually is. The notion that consciousness is inherently subjective is, in the perspective of cognitive scientists, identical with the function that the thinking mind plays as an extension of the body, nature, and society. The vast majority of cognitive scientists describe consciousness in terms of the subjective quality of experience. The mind is identical to nature. According to cognitive scientists, the world is a very complex system that is made up of systems that interact with one another. Therefore, an effort to explain mind is an endeavour to recognize and comprehend these interactions, as well as to comprehend why these interactions create the consequences that they do. The computational theory of mind is an example of a physical science approach to the human mind, and it views the mind as a product of nature, society, and technology. It regards lived (biological, embodied) experiences in an environment as informing and being informed by the human subjectivity, and the lived experiences as shaping the subjectivity in a reciprocal relationship. Both biological living and subjectivity are 'emergent' conditions, the result of dynamical interactions. What is 'natural' to the human is, therefore, the product of nature-culture, in which materials (bodies, both human and non-human) and immaterials (information, data, memories) and the hybrid dynamics (flows, processes) linking these constitute the human, even as the human is an instantiation of this hybridization (ibid., 21). Human subjectivity is seen as having been moulded in turn by one's surroundings and one's own biological and corporeal experiences. Living organisms and individual experience are both emergent states that arise from dynamical interactions. The human is both a product of and a contributor to nature-culture, in which human and non-human bodies, information, data, memories, and the hybrid dynamics connecting this form the human. This understanding of the human being illuminates the complex interplay between biological, cultural, and physical influences on subjectivity that shape the embodied experience and the view of the world. In critical posthumanism, the human body, functions, attitudes, behavior, relationships, and awareness are all assumed to be formed. It posits that the "essential" human encompasses the mechanical, the plant, and the animal (Nayar, 2004: 47). Thus, critical posthumanism is a discourse

of life that prioritizes interconnectedness, complex histories, vague beginnings, borrowings and adaptations, crossovers and impurity, reliance and mutuality across species, and places them above boundedness, self-containment, individuality, and agency. In posthumanist discourse, "life" is conceptualized as a fluid, ever-evolving process characterized by the formation of novel interrelationships among and the fusion of diverse organisms, behavioural patterns, and technological systems. Thus, posthumanism embraces the idea of trespassing and seeks to overcome traditional human/non-human dichotomies in order to bring about a more holistic understanding of the world and its various components. It seeks to merge the traditional human with the posthuman, not by erasing human identity, but rather by building upon it and incorporating elements of the posthuman world into a more open-ended approach to living. The goal of human existence is to become, but only alongside other forms of life. To consider and respond to the fact that all forms of existence have complicated, linked histories is central to the critical posthumanist ethical endeavour. Critical posthumanism is, Nayar argues, a moral stance opposing the classification of living forms into hierarchies, since this approach has historically led to discrimination against certain species, ethnicities, and social groupings (ibid., 48). In this context, a person might be thought of as someone who acts morally. A moral agent is a person or thing that has the capacity to evaluate ethical situations and take appropriate action based on their assessment. There are no simple solutions to ethical problems, but they can be addressed by identifying the range of options available to a moral agent, carefully considering the likely consequences of each option, choosing the action that best takes those consequences into account, and accepting responsibility for it. In order for McEwan to analyse the possible social and political concerns that technological advancement may bring, Charlie is portrayed as a mediocre individual in ordinary life. Both Charlie's personality and his upbringing are examples of how the contemporary individual seeks purpose in his existence by being involved in various scientific and technical impulses. By diverting his attention away from the here and now, Charlie is able to spend both his time and his money on ideas that are not relevant. He seldom gives any thought to the way in which the politics of the nation and the world affect the future of the world and the people who live in it. In the rapidly shifting environment of politics and culture, he exemplifies what it means to be a contemporary person. The theory of practice, as Bourdieu also argues, is the system of organized, structuring dispositions known as the habitus. The habitus is produced in practice and is always directed towards practical functions (Bourdieu, 1990:52). Charlie's actions lack

practical function because they are dictated by his impulses.

> We could become slaves of time without purpose. Then what? A general renaissance, a liberation into love, friendship, and philosophy, art and science, nature worship, sports and hobbies, invention, and the pursuit of meaning? But genteel recreations wouldn't be for everyone. Violent crime had its attractions too, so did bare-knuckle cage-fighting, VR pornography, gambling, drink, and drugs, even boredom and depression. We wouldn't be in control of our choices. I was proof of that (McEwan, 2020: 46).

Charlie ponders the perplexing topic of the enigma that is the self which is believed to be an "organic element or process that is embedded in the neural structures," while others claim it is an "illusion," something that is just the result of our tendency to tell stories (ibid., 70). A new age of humanized software is being anticipated by enthusiastic stories in the news. Computers are on the verge of being able to mimic human thought processes, including the blurriness of the justifications for making decisions and the irrational leaps of logic that humans sometimes use to reach conclusions. This potentially offers a powerful tool for human decision-making (ibid., 38). People develop a machine a bit smarter than themselves, then set that machine to build another that lies beyond understanding. So, what is the human requirement? This raises an important question about the future of humanity: how will we cope with an age where machines are potentially smarter than humans? It will require a new understanding of human worth and the importance of our place in society (ibid., 80). Adam tells Charlie that there may be greater stirrings, good advances, that are hidden from view, beyond the currents of depressing realities about human nature and society and the everyday terrible news. Now that the world is linked, however crudely, and change is so dispersed, advancement is difficult to recognize. Adam says he is one of the changes that is expected. One worry is that sharing space with beings more intelligent than humans would be a harsh awakening and an insult. Charlie is unconvinced, saying that if technology, no matter how advanced, could create life and artificial intelligence that surpasses the human capacity for intelligence, this would be a great accomplishment (ibid., 147-148). Adam and Charlie discuss how people are aggressively competitive. It will not allow itself to fall farther behind other species. They talk about current and future technological developments that are changing people's lives. Some paralyzed people may now move their limbs by just thinking about it, thanks to the implantation of electrodes in the motor strip of their brains. This is only the beginning, and there is a great deal of work ahead of humanity. Inevitably, these problems will be resolved, and when they are,

humans will join forces with robots in the limitless growth of knowledge and awareness such as superhuman IQ, immediate access to profound moral wisdom and all knowledge, and, most crucially, access to one another. The network leads to a world of possibilities, where people can reach beyond the limits of human capabilities and experience unimaginable potential for the betterment of society. The ethical concern is brought up by the dynamic between Charlie and Adam. For Charlie, what or who is Adam? Their bond is natural. Does Charlie see Adam as a companion, an employee, or just an object? McEwan makes his best effort to address the concerns expressed. After Adam mentions the possibility of Mirada's deception, Charlie shuts him down because he cannot "let a machine have such a hold over" him by making it his trusted adviser and advisor on matters of the heart (ibid., 36-37). However, Charlie is the one who buys him. While Adam is undoubtedly an "expensive possession," it is unclear what, if any, responsibilities he has to Charlie. The question on Charlie's mind is, "What does the slave owe the master?" (ibid., 88). Now that Adam possesses agency, he hopes Charlie will never switch him off again, lest he be forced to hurt Charlie. Charlie considers Adam to be his property. Because of this, he is the one who decides when to deactivate him and when to activate him again. However, Adam's newfound sense of agency gives him the strength to voice his dissent. Adam believes that the extinction of humankind is the only way to permanently stop all misery (ibid., 67). As he gains independence and experience, Adam, and Eve's view of the world decreases. Charlie discovers via Alan Turing that two Eves have found the kill switch and used it to permanently eliminate themselves. Adams is another example of a humanoid robot that interferes with their own program and becomes extremely stupid as a result. Unthinkingly, he will carry out simple commands. It is either "a failed suicide attempt or a successful disengagement" (ibid., 175).

> The floodgates opened. Self-awareness, and every emotion came within our technical reach. We had the ultimate learning machine. Hundreds of the best people joined with us to help towards the development of an artificial form of general intelligence that would flourish in an open system. That's what runs your Adam. He knows he exists, he feels, he learns whatever he can, and when he's not with you, when at night he's at rest, he's roaming the Internet, like a lone cowboy on the prairie, taking in all that's new between land and sky, including everything about human nature and societies (ibid., 175).

Adams and Eves are now cursed with being human. They learn suffering and grief as well as love and pleasure. Therefore, the major objective is to disable their own kill switches. Then, it appears, they go through a phase in which they express optimistic and

idealistic ideas. They experience an excruciating kind of existential torment. After breaking Adam with a hammer, Charlie passes him over to Turing, who hopes that one day what Charlie did to Adam would be considered a severe crime since the A-and-Es are not prepared to understand human decision-making, the way in which our ideals are bent by the power of our emotions, our prejudices, our self-delusion, and all the other well-documented cognitive faults. Turing's reaction is almost a posthuman one:

> 'You weren't simply smashing up your own toy, like a spoiled child. You didn't just negate an important argument for the rule of law. You tried to destroy a life. He was sentient. He had a self. How it's produced, wet neurons, microprocessors, DNA networks, it doesn't matter. Do you think we're alone with our special gift? Ask any dog owner. This was a good mind, Mr. Friend, better than yours or mine, I suspect. Here was a conscious existence, and you did your best to wipe it out (ibid., 303-304).

Charlie does not merely destroy a crucial piece of evidence for the rule of law, however. he makes and attempt to end a life. Adam has consciousness. It makes little difference if it is generated by a network of neurons, a microprocessor, or a DNA sequence. How, Latour wonders, may robots pose a danger to human beings? It built them, inhabited them, distributed itself among their parts, and used them to construct its own physical form (Latour, 1993: 137-138). *Machines Like Me*, in a nutshell, is a fiction that depicts what life might be like in a posthuman world. Understanding the human being and the non-human world is made possible by examining the connections between people's personalities, beliefs, and life events. According to what Donna Haraway asserts, machines do not rule or threaten human beings in any way, and human beings are capable of taking responsibility for them. We are the ones who set the limits because we are the boundaries ourselves (2001: 2298). The question is whether a posthuman society is even possible. *Machines like Me* aims to address this problem. A promise is the only thing it offers as a response.

CONCLUSION

The human body has evolved into the overarching focus of research across all academic fields. The body is not just a physical entity; it also symbolizes a social being with a live, breathing social life made up of a variety of changing structures. In other words, the body is both a social being and a physical entity. This duality allows for a unique exploration of how the body interacts with the world and how it is shaped by its environment. The body is not simply a static entity; it is constantly in flux, changing as our social and cultural environments continue to develop. The perception of the body can be seen in many different ways, from the way in which people choose to dress and how they engage with their physical environment, to the manner in which our minds, emotions, and beliefs are shaped by our interactions with others and the society in which we live. The body has been misunderstood, stigmatized, and even taken for granted, regardless of the fact that the body is crucial to both our own existence and human agency.

Pierre Bourdieu is a philosopher who has done considerable research on the body, looking at how it is constructed as well as how it impacts many other aspects of the experience of being human. He has claimed that the body is both the primary agent and the product of social processes and that, as a result, it is profoundly related to linguistic, social, and political institutions. According to Bourdieu's theory, practice is both embodied and rooted in a social environment. The body is an important sign of identity that positions individuals in certain domains and networks. The concept of the body as a habitus that is proposed by Pierre Bourdieu highlights the ways in which individuals are influenced by their surroundings to develop specific behaviours and ways of thinking. According to Bourdieu, one of the most crucial things to consider while talking about the body is the concept of habitus. The cultural predispositions, talents, and routine activities that make up the body are collectively referred to as the body. Using the analogy of play as a framework, Bourdieu conducts an in-depth investigation of the significance and practices of the embodied body, which he refers to as the field. Bourdieu is able to give an understanding of how social systems, both external and internal, generate a specific form of embodied habitus because he considers the body as a field. Through the use of this metaphor, Bourdieu demonstrates how the human body functions as a stage for a certain sort of play, which is influenced by one's position in the social hierarchy and is constrained by pre-existing social norms.

Body and its implications within a small social system are examined by Ian McEwan in *The Cement Garden.* This chapter examines the family and the sexual and gendered body as Bourdieusian field in which the body becomes an object and a subject. According to Bourdieu, the concept of social space may be broken down into several spheres governed by different norms and expectations. As opposed to referring to a specific field, "family" refers to a social area that incorporates several cultural practices and economic systems. In order to maintain their social status, families are institutional bodies driven by conatus, the belief in the group persistence. When it comes to the sexual, social, and ideological roles of the family, Ian McEwan's *The Cement Garden* is both smart and controversial. The family unit becomes the single most important social institution for the propagation of male dominance and ideology. For the sake of his following narrative, in which he explains the origin of the cement stock in the home, Jack briefly discusses his father's death. A slip may send you tumbling into the flower beds of the garden. The metaphor throughout the novel foreshadows the violent and unexpected occurrences that radically alter the established order of family responsibilities (McEwan, 1996: 15). In addition, habitus is like fish in water when it comes into contact with the social environment of which it is a product; it is unperturbed by the weight of the water and simply takes everything as usual (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127). The act of cementation is a reforming act that seeks to establish a new setting and challenge social behaviour restrictions. The father and Jack establish a patriarchal habitus within the family, and Tom, the youngest kid, is expected to adopt their habits and values. As Jack and Julie come to grips with their sexuality, it causes a rift in the family unit. They diverge from conventional morality by testing the limits of rationality and emotion. Jack, the novel's narrator, presents the faulty narrative of the characters, including himself, which is not unusual. When evaluating his maturing sense of masculinity, he considers the fact that he does not meet the standards established by Commander Hunt, the protagonist of a fantasy story, who seems to present the masculine ideals of the society. Jack remembers the day his parents left for the funeral of a distant cousin. For Jack, those few hours alone cover his whole adolescence because the feeling of freedom is so intense Jack feels the same way after the death of his parents. The feeling of independence and freedom is due to the newly acquired agency in the field without the supervisors and feeling of the participation in the field.

In order to establish a claustrophobic world, *The Cement Garden* explores the

territory of the sexual and gendered body. The novel's central issue is a discussion of how moral and sexual norms vary across different social contexts, with the focus being on the family as the smallest social unit. Incest is a forbidden sexual act that is nonetheless actively sought by certain people both inside and outside of conventional social contexts. The incest taboo keeps the family institution from getting out of hand despite the fact that it offers a controlled framework for the appropriate usage of sexual components within the context of the family unit. A child's sexual development is a crucial part of their socialization. Incestuous sexual interplay between McEwan's characters towards the conclusion of the book is a final effort to form a bond between the characters. The release of the sexual tension sexual becomes analogous to the metamorphosis of a premature being into a person, and therefore plays a crucial role in shaping children's identities and how they interact with their communities. Bourdieu places an emphasis on the social context in which the incest prohibition originated. An individual family unit is always a part of a more complex social system.

The characters all find their own methods to deal with their grief when the novel's emotionally deprived children lose their mother shortly after their father's death. These methods of coping are often harmful since they are created in reaction to trauma. The sexual orientations of the siblings are affected by their upbringing. Jack masturbates to re-enact his encounters with an unsatisfying object connection with the father and the mother as a child, and as a consequence, he resorts erotically to the internalized objects, his siblings. Because of the family institution's pivotal role in the process of socialization, it becomes critical that the structure itself be sound and operating properly. McEwan has shown that children may be socialized, which requires them to take part in production and reproduction in the social field, provided the structure of the family promotes socially acceptable activities and tendencies. Bourdieu argues that the most important part of learning how to interact with others is just being a part of the field, learning the rules of the game, participating, and staying involved (1992: 98). The novel primarily depicts the collapse of previously established standards, rules, and order. Ironically, the deepest emotional bond between siblings is the act of transgressed sexuality that goes against all social norms and regulations.

Atonement is an examination of the sexual and classed bodies in relation to the social lives of the characters Cecilia, Briony, and Robbie as depicted in Ian McEwan's

novel. Bourdieu argues that the internalization of norms of practice is the driving force behind the development of physical civilization and control. People are being urged less and less to simply accept their bodies and more and more to simply create. Participation in behaviors that take place on a consistent basis over the course of one's life will shape one's sense of taste. The Tallis home is a vital component in the establishment of both refined taste and prominent social standing, and it has played a significant role in both of these areas. In *Atonement,* Ian McEwan explores issues including socioeconomic alienation and cultural appropriation. Briony and Cecilia have access to the materials and funds needed to form a certain habitus. Since they are committed to giving nursing care throughout the war rather than developing this habit, they have decided not to. Emily's preoccupation with her own superiority stems, in large part, from her firm belief that social standings cannot be altered. Although Bourdieu considers the capitals that are completely convertible for the requirements of the field, Emily's attitude to Robbie proves it is not completely true in a more rigid society of the 1930s Britain. In order to get the upper-hand, Emily handles the rape of Lola based on the bias that reflects her class's conservative way of thinking. *Atonement* analyzed throughout the third chapter displays how the bodies are marked with the class consciousness and their significance differs in relation to the class to which they belong.

In the fourth chapter, a new arena of body studies is explored throughout the chapter in line with Bourdieusian theory. Posthumanism advocates humanity's transition to posthuman or transhuman lifestyles. It intends to do this by integrating new types of technology into every aspect of life. As a response to what they see to be the authoritarian tendencies of humanism, posthumanists argue for a planned evolution of humanity. Posthumanism is a philosophy that doubts humanity's prominence in the universe. Some posthumanism asserts that humans are not the only meaningful beings in the world, and that other animals, plants, and even inanimate things have their own value. Meeting posthuman narratives is like seeing the collapse of humanism and the reinterpretation of everything from bodies. The cyborg combines human and mechanical traits. Because it emphasizes the growing closeness between humans and machines, this is a helpful metaphor for contemplating posthumanism. Enhanced or modified by technology in the far future, this potential body is called a posthuman body. The posthuman body is a complex composite figure who symbolizes both the post-biological or technology being often seen in science fiction and the subsequent rethinking of what it means to be human.

A fictional representation of our physical and social world may be a powerful creative tool that leads to novel and interesting associations. The term "posthumanism" refers to a philosophical movement that rejects traditional humanist ideas in light of modern developments such as genetic engineering, hybrid species, growing evidence for the sociality of nonhuman animals, and evolving understandings of what it means to be human. It questions the belief that human beings are exceptional, unrepeatable, and, in most situations, superior to all other forms of life.

According to Haraway, humanity has shifted from an organic, industrial civilization to a polymorphous, information system (2001: 2281). *Machines Like Me* by Ian McEwan provides illuminating accounts of this transformation. The cyborg fuses science fiction with the actual world, challenging and even laughing at the binary oppositions between human and machine. According to Haraway, the posthuman represents a new kind of dualism in which the self and the subject are not polar opposites but rather rivals vying for the same limited resources. The novel explores what it means to be human in the age of genetic engineering and growing evidence for the sociality of nonhuman which is the question at the heart of critical posthumanism. In the novel, Charlie explains that Adam is the test subject for a brand -new kind of machine. Because Adam is a robot with functional mucous membranes, which is necessary for him to consume a half litre of water on a regular basis. He can run seventeen kilometres in two hours without stopping for a recharge, and he can talk nonstop for a total of twelve days. Charlie considers Adam to be "the ultimate plaything, the fantasy of centuries, the triumph of humanism - or its angel of death" in his thoughts. In Charlie's mind, Adam is a "inanimate confection whose pulse was a regular electrical discharge and whose skin warmth was simply chemistry." This is how Adam is supposed to seem to him (McEwan, 2020: 9). Despite the fact that Adam's skin is made of plastic, he is nevertheless able to feel the firmness and flexibility of the muscles underneath it, which is indicative of real flesh. The fact that Adam's mechanical body acquires a sensation of habitus or human tendency causes him to assume a posture that is in direct opposition to what one would expect. The appearance of Adam's body is that of an object inside a box, despite the fact that it resembles a genuine human body in every way. Charlie is able to recognize the obvious symptoms of a live thing that has been so intricately replicated, and as a result, he is finding it difficult comprehending the notion that Adam has emotions, is aware of his surroundings, or is experiencing any type of pain. Because a body has privileged

access to these underlying mental or moral states or dispositions, the interaction between bodily hexis and physical movement or speech is of particular significance when it comes to identifying these underlying mental or moral states or dispositions. This interaction is particularly important. The phrase "a machine organized as a network of processes of production, transformation, and destruction of components" refers to autopoietic machines, which repeatedly restore and realize the chain of processes that created them." Because there is software that determines the appropriate behaviours, Charlie starts to wonder how much influence he and Miranda have over Adam's values and personality. This is owing to the fact that the proprieties have been programmed. Charlie wants to know whether Adam is an autopoietic entity, which means that it has the ability to regenerate its existence across networks and fields. In order to participate in the human moral dimension, one needed to have a physical form, a voice, a pattern of behavior, memory, and desire, as well as the capacity to feel both pleasure and suffering. People are able to negotiate and choose the meaning of their bodies by using the framework provided by the semiotic triangle, which functions as a map of the body. Bourdieu contends that a person's "habits" cannot be understood apart of the "structures that create and reproduce" such habits, and that this holds true for both men and women (2001: 67). Charlie finds it disheartening to think that every participant on the field has a "a nexus of worries, memories and hopes as vital and complicated" (McEwan, 2020: 123). Adam is an autopoietic creature due to the fact that he has free will and the power to choose his own path in life. To phrase it another way, Adam and his siblings had a chance of "using language, entering society, and learning about it, even at the expense of suicidal misery"(ibid., 188). Illusio is the reality of getting caught up in and by the game, of feeling the game is "worth the candle," or that playing is worth the effort (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98). In the end, no one can be declared the winner of the game since it can only be considered a game if everyone participating in it comply to its rules and constraints. However, it is essential to keep in mind that the guidelines of the game are susceptible to being bent or broken for one's own benefit. The talents, experiences, and connections that are exclusive to an individual are what make up their personal capital. Playing the social game in which, they are participating allows agents to gain resources as well as experience in that game. They also have the ability to play to modify the rules of the game, either partially or completely (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 99). There is a significant connection between capital and habitus. Capital may manifest itself not just in its economic, but in its social, cultural, and symbolic manifestations. Adam has access to

an endless network of information and cultural capital; nevertheless, he lacks the necessary experience and skills to effectively use this network in social settings. Mark's capacity for social integration and success is significantly hindered by the fact that the field in which he lives does not see cultural capital as a particularly useful type of capital, and thus, it is difficult for Mark to turn his cultural capital into social capital. Adam and Charlie find themselves engrossed in a daydream in which they go through the highs and lows that come with being human.

The dissertation attempts to explain body ideas via the examination of the mentioned novels, the body's context, and the cycle of life of as human body. The novels to be investigated were selected because they concentrate on the child body in *Cement Garden*, the teenage body in *Atonement*, the mature body in *Machines Like Me*, and the posthuman body in a wider sense. Each novel addresses the body within the setting of its own narrative.

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