

Claus Schönig/Ramazan Çalık/Hatice Bayraktar (Hg.)

Türkisch-Deutsche Beziehungen



Perspektiven aus Vergangenheit
und Gegenwart

Studien zum Modernen Orient

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ZUM GELEIT

Die Beziehungen zwischen „Deutschland“ und der „Türkei“ gehören zu den am häufigsten bemühten Themen an der Schnittstelle zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik in den letzten Jahren. Mit der zunehmenden Bedeutung der sogenannten Sozialwissenschaften und dem damit verbundenen Rückgang an philologisch-historischer (und auch soziologischer) Kompetenz ist dabei besonders natürlich in den eher politisch-öffentlichen Teilen der Diskussion das Wissen darum in den Hintergrund getreten, wenn nicht gar verlorengegangen, dass Begriffe wie „Deutschland“ und „Türkei“ zeitlich nur eine sehr begrenzte Gültigkeit besitzen. Gewiss sind sie als völlig anachronistisch abzulehnen, wenn es um das Eindringen der Kreuzzugstruppen Friedrich Barbarossas in Konya, der Hauptstadt des Staates der anatolischen Seldschuken (Rum-Seldschuken), geht – etwas anderes ist es, wenn die Rezeption dieser Ereignisse im 19. oder 20. Jahrhundert betrachtet wird. Entsprechendes gilt etwa für die preußisch-osmanischen Beziehungen im 17. Jahrhundert, auch wenn wir hier auf dem Weg zu wirklichen deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen bereits ein gutes Stück zurückgelegt haben. Mit der Gründung des Deutschen Reichs 1871, der allmählichen territorialen Reduktion des Osmanischen Reichs und dem Übergang der Macht von der Familie Osmans in die Hände von Militärjuntas – bis etwa in die 1950er Jahre – treten wir dann graduell in die Phase der Geschichte ein, in der man mit vollem Recht von deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen sprechen kann; die Gründung der Türkischen Republik mit ihren vor allem religiös motivierten Säuberungen schließt türkischerseits diese Entwicklung dann formal ab.

Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei sowie zwischen deren unmittelbaren Vorläufern auf den Gebieten von Politik, Militär, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft scheinen weitgehend bekannt, umfassen aber eine Unzahl interessanter Details, die bisher kaum beachtet wurden bzw. ganz der Aufmerksamkeit entgangen sind. Um einen Überblick über die verschiedenen Aspekte dieser Beziehungen zu schaffen, gründete auf Initiative von

INEVITABLE (RE)CONCEPTUALIZATION: FROM TURKS IN EUROPE TO "EUROPEAN TURKS"

Serkan Güzel
Haldun Soydal

Introduction

During World War II, a lot of "Fremdarbeiter" (foreign workers) from all over occupied Europe were employed in Germany in the heavy industry and the armaments factories as well as in agriculture; otherwise, the "Third Reich" would not have been able to carry on with the war for such a long time. The working conditions of the "Fremdarbeiter" were in general not much different from those of forced labour – as was their reputation in general public.

The employment of the "Gastarbeiter" in the middle of the 1950s was introduced under different circumstances. The first Recruitment Agreement with Italy in 1955 was firstly intended to make up for the urgent need of working force in the agricultural sector due to rural exodus in south-western Germany; besides, there was a bundle of other economic, national, and foreign-policy related reasons – on the side of the sending country as well.

Shortly later in 1960, it was not agriculture calling for additional working force anymore, but the thriving heavy industry producing the German phenomena called "Wirtschaftswunder". The hard and dirty shift-work- and piece-work-jobs were not to be done by well organised workers, showing capitalist's unwillingness to paying appropriate salaries. Unskilled labor with poor knowledge of German and a low level of organisation promised to fuel the big machine much more profitably.

With the German-Turkish Recruitment Agreement in 1961, foreign-policy motives of BRD came to the fore explicitly: Turkey, the partner in NATO and applicant for associate membership in EWG was to be integrated in the Western alliance system and had to be economically strengthened. Within

short time the call for hands echoed over the Anatolian highlands and magnetized hundreds of thousands of young men to leaving their meager compounds or poor jobs for a lucent look-ahead abroad.

Parallel to the opening of the well-oiled Sublime Porte in western direction another portal closed with an ugly rattling: The Berlin Wall cut off the continuing exodus of hundreds of thousands of skilled workforce and high-trained white collars from East Germany to the West in August of 1961.

The Turkish-European Dimension

Although Turkey as a sending country eased her overpopulation and unemployment rate via sending large amount of labour force to the several European core countries, Europe received this labour force only for a short time. However, the immigration policy of several European core countries has gone out of control, since Turkish labour force who had been appreciated as a "temporary settlers" and/or "guest workers" began to take their family members with them, or have them followed later on. That's why not only Turkish labour force but also Turkish population in whole Europe has notably increased even in the very early period of labour immigration process.

This new dimension of Turkish immigration to several European countries was completed within a short time and should be estimated as a crucial turning point in which forthcoming generations would take the opportunity to influence European societal life by their increasing education and income, changing behaviour, extending economic and political rights, relationships, and lifestyle preferences. So, differences between first generation Turks who restricted their targets with only material savings to return back to their home-land as soon as possible and residence willingness of following Turkish generations in Europe are getting clearer day by day.

Taken together, this paper examines not only the differences between first and following generation Turks' role but also offers remarkable solutions trying to establish reliable peace or to improve current peace level in whole European societal life. As known, using immigration as a rough tool is one of the most important styles in understanding European Turks. In this context, several social approaches, techniques and indicators, including statistics and datas, are implemented in accordance with the (hi)story as well

as the societal and cultural changes of European Turks. "Intergenerational mobility" approach developed by Bertaux and Bertaux is for defining job differentiation between first and following generations, "symbolic interaction" approach launched by Mead is for determining alienation level throughout generations and for solving work life circumstances of following generation European Turks. So, timely Turkish labour force immigration particularly from Turkey's rural areas to the European mass labour markets that has lately begun to turn into societal issue, which may be distinguished into third stage as differentiation, alienation, and integration, may become clear. Technique of this paper is immigration process that lets researcher compare between Turkey's timely socio-economic policy as sending country and the absorption capacity of several host countries. Official statistics and data that reveal unemployment rate from 1960s to 2000s are appreciated to attain significant underlying factors of labour immigration process from Turkey to the well developed European countries. All of these efforts, at the same time may make a significant contribution to both sides to recognize each other better than before; and this new process will be able to offer sufficient instruments for social researchers to understand and compare these two distinctive cultures.

Endless Story of Developing World: Labour Immigration to Europe

Based on local and traditional boundaries, pre-capitalist European countries experienced a process of major change and transformation brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Emerging industrial mode of production and revolutionary transformation of the old social relationship raised concerns about the place of the individual in the sea of mass production and marketing; and this means, profitable goods has responded the labour force demand of factories in developed countries. So, mass movement of people from rural to urban areas where factories needed workers create a new multiple division of labour, in a manner of speaking.¹ However, the impacts of post WW II have deliberately expressed to the European core countries that only the advantages coming from Industrial Revolution would not be enough in im-

1 Kamali, 2003: 216

proving their economic level; namely, contribution of developing countries, including social (labour force) as well as material (natural resources), are required. On the other hand, finding jobs became a fundamental common problem, especially in peasants' life of developing countries after the impacts of Industrial Revolution in general and WW II, which adversely affected agricultural life in special. That's why employment opportunities began to attract peasants either to the city centers of their countries or to the labour markets of well developed countries. Indeed, regulation of the flow of labour and capital all over the world forced many workers of developing countries to (im)migrate to the European core countries in spite of blocked development in least developed countries.² Numerous European core countries received this immigrant labour force, most of whom came from developing or underdeveloped countries, in order only to fill its labour force shortage in the middle of the 1960s. Like any other, the immigration process from Turkey towards European core countries from the rest of the world may not be accurately explained without the effects of Industrial Revolution, the political economy of sending countries, the improving economy of Europe and the political changes in Middle and Eastern Europe.³

Sustainable increasing rate of immigration studies from ancient period through very early beginning period of modernization to today might not be independent from finding the golden reason and certain results of migration that would be applied to every country as an universal model.⁴ Though more and detailed quantitative and qualitative studies are required in immigration process to enhance our understanding, the main underlying motives of immigration particularly in the present-day history seems heavily psychological, including finding better and safer place to live, as well as economic and political.⁵ Admittedly, fundamental reason of every (im)migraton is not independent from meeting individuals' and their families' needs, in spite of differences as regards periods, generations and societal structures. Similarly, labour immigration from Turkey to the several European core countries is highly based upon underlying factors of work

2 Bolaria & Bolaria, 1997: 11

3 Tosun, 1994: 27

4 Marsella and Ring, 2003: 3-10

5 Schmitz, 2003: 23

life, including economic, psychological, social, and cultural needs of individuals and their family, as mentioned above. Unalan,⁶ who is heavy in support of this point, emphasizes that 41% of Turkish immigrants working in Europe were unemployed before leaving, 35% of them emigrated to find a job and to earn income, and 13% of them emigrated to increase their current low income, which was inadequate in Turkey to support necessary needs of their families. He also draw attention to the job/income opportunities that could be a major reason for choosing the country of destination (28%). In fact, education may be appreciated as a secondary factor, excluding finding job, earning income and therefore meeting personal needs.

Several qualifications of immigration process that lead to long term residency in receiving countries temporarily or permanently make the issue multidisciplinary that deliberately demand methodological and theoretical support from sociology, economy, history, demography, political economy, and political science.⁷ Even if traditional demographic approach over immigration was decisive to obscure the certain contribution of immigrants to the development level of several receiving countries, today's economists, led by Jones and Smith, Portes, Castells, and Jenkins, have tried to change the attention of immigration researchers from the cost perspective of immigrants to their efficiency. Moreover, the functions of immigrant labour is very clear in Alling, Jonas and Dicksons' viewpoint, putting forth exploitation of Third World workers in the labour market of western countries, including compulsory overtime work without overtime paying. While Jones and Smith put forward that immigrants make an accurate contribution to the work force, to the production and to the capital accumulation process, Portes tries to pay attention to the purpose of immigrant policy not only due to increasing the supply of labour, but also to increasing the supply of cheap labour in receiving countries. Similarly, Castells expresses that immigrants are not simply an extra source of rapid economic expansion times; furthermore, this low-cost labour is often used to replace high-cost labour and weaken organizational efforts of the domestic work-force. In relation to this point, Jenkins highlights that immigrants have also regulated the level of class conflict by directly undercutting the collective actions launched by domestic workers'

6 Unalan, 2003: 146-15

7 Halfman, 2005: 129-135

organizations. All of these characteristics reveal that immigrant labour force has become an inevitable part of the socio-economic structure of many receiving countries, and therefore their contribution to the development level of these countries may not be easily overlooked.⁸

Foreign workers constitute a significant part of the labour force in many advanced capitalist countries, as they are above all individuals whose sole purpose in moving is to sell their labour capacity. However, labour immigration contains several obstacles to migrant workers who are not incorporated into the labour-market in a homogeneous way, in spite of providing employment opportunities. In fact, they enter segmented labour-markets or are specifically brought in to fill low-paying jobs that are not available for native-born labour force, and are generally structured by their legal-political status, place of origin, gender, race, and labour-market opportunities. Anyway, they accept low wages since their alternative job opportunities are locked; many of them are also afraid that they may be deported if they complain about their working conditions. Boncich expresses that a split labour-market is the main characteristic of the advanced capitalism, in which the price of labour for blacks is less than that for whites. Dupin is another social scientist who highlights the eagerness of immigrant labour force in taking blue-collar jobs, which are inappropriate to natives. The efficiency of foreign labor force is still very important, especially in vital industrial sectors of French economy, as Girard, Charbit, and Lamy and Hollifield draw our attention to statistics that 70% of the roads were built and 25% of the cars were manufactured by immigrant labour force in France between the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, the utility of foreign labour in different production units did not cease even after the recession of the 1970s, which would possibly decrease the role of immigrants in core western labour markets. Nonetheless, certain parts of society, particularly trade unions, still condemn migrants because of working for low wages.⁹

No matter how the impacts of immigration to destination are more complex, many studies have tried to get remarkable consequences just by comparing the socio-economic situation of before and after migration. Indeed, large amount of social scientists like decision makers are deliberately in-

8 Bolaria & Bolaria, 1997: 5-12

9 Bolaria & Bolaria, 1997: 194-206; Hein, 2004: 77; Unver, 2003: 86

clined to assess immigration only as a potential threat to the sovereignty of nationstates, instead of focusing on significant outcomes of labour force stemmed from emigration, including job, income, unemployment, savings and capital information, structure and composition of industry, as well as in urban services or fertility, such as levels of government revenue and expenditure.¹⁰ In order to differ appropriation level and legal status of foreigners, many policy makers as well as social scientists of host countries nowadays are eager to utilize the concept of "immigrant" or "emigrant" which highlights legal status of resident and provides them with equal opportunities as natives, instead of the concept of "migrant", which has no legal status. Only if the national identity that heavily bases upon 'legal' citizenship and organizations and that leads to definite differentiation between natives and foreign groups is considered, then serious attention of several nation-states over the danger of sovereignty-eroding issue become inevitable. In this respect, nation-states attempt to prevent the sovereignty-eroding impact stemmed from global mobility of capital, goods and persons by shoring up their borders and by forcing immigrants to become legal citizens. Even though making immigrant worker a legal citizen of the receiving country as regards legitimacy seems to be a solution, integrating them into new societal life requires further public efforts, including regulation and redistribution of scarce resources, in reality.¹¹ Furthermore, making immigrants legal citizens means putting immigrants and natives into the same category, especially with respect to social, economic, and political rights. So, the most difficult question for the politicians that emphasize how to sustain the natives' consciousness to nation-states will appear. In any case, under more circumstances, this kind of conceptualizations and efforts do not seem as solution; on the contrary, they will be able to deepen the current discrimination level.

The Role of Turkey's Socio-Economic Policy in Labour Immigration

Turkey's timely socio-economic policy that urged a large amount of labour force to emigrate is essential in understanding specific characteristics of la-

¹⁰ Billsborrow et al., 1984: 24

¹¹ Halfman, 2005: 135-146; Marsella and Ring, 2003: 10-11

bour immigration from Turkey to the well developed European countries. Taken the picture of Turkish modernization process that began in late 18th century, shaped in 1920s and has begun to materialize since 1950s together, the functions of populism, which has escalated dependence level of socio-economic policy and conceal it's dependent characteristics from public naked eye, may be easily understood. Above all, the different characteristics of Turkey's modernization process will become clear comparing the economic development of western bourgeoisie and the formation of working class to Turkey's development style. As generally known, western bourgeoisie experienced that they would not achieve capital accumulation process unless benefiting from cheap labour force and also learned clearly that the continuity of capital achievement heavily depended upon the prevention of capital-labour conflict. So bourgeoisie, not willing to give some concessions to the labour force particularly in economic unit, chose preventing capital-labour struggle by offering some kind of significant social and political rights to labour force. These rights, restricted only with the working condition of labour force specifically in the beginning period of capital accumulation process, began to extend to increasing wage, promotion, and social assurance in the following periods. This process, conceptualized as a "bourgeoisie democracy" by European social scientists, in turn began to function not only as a formation of modern working class but also as a accurate demands of new labour force from bourgeoisie and state, including privileges, prizes and concessions.¹²

Differentiation between European and Turkish struggle in achievement of capital accumulation process may unveil the results of Turkish specific populism that would separate into two parts as labour and capital.¹³ In this sense, the most important obstacle in the way of development of working class and emerging widespread entrepreneur group was socio-economic policy that was merely in accordance with neither western capitalist development model, which put forward the importance of capital, nor socialists model, which highlighted the importance of labour force. Indeed, the main reason of inexistence of Western class structure stemmed from differentiation process of capital and labour in neither the last period of Ottoman Em-

¹² Berkes, 1975: 95; Boratav, 1990: 148-149; Thernborn, 1989

¹³ Güzel, 2008: 123-140

pire nor the beginning period of Republic of Turkey was a socio-economic policy that was inadequate to emerge widespread entrepreneur class, who would achieve capital accumulation process and thus form organized working class who would contribute to the capital accumulation process. Based upon the unwillingness of Turkish political system in accepting western class structure, Berkes¹⁴ expressed that there was strong desire for fulfilling industrialization level on one hand; and fear from labour force due to general danger of proletariat revolution as though Turkey had become industrialize throughout, on the other hand.

There are numerous micro-reasons as well as macro ones resulted from active role of different legislation makers. To put it in a different way, inexistence of organized working class could not be explained without the functions of impressive public perception that encouraged nearly allmost of individuals to acquire stable and reliable state employment position. Putting forth the impacts of the state employment policy named "devlete kaplanmak" by mainstream society that offers an opportunity to be recruited in state departments, Insel¹⁵ is heavily in support of Berkes' viewpoint mentioned in previous paragraph. He also put forward the privilege of working class as the main reason of this kind of employment policy that give several advantages just for state workers. Distinguishing themselves from other private business enterprise workers, this perception at the same time provide privilege for workers who acquired the support of state. So, the power of working class stemmed from all of these privileges began to change the route of socio-economic policy from capitalist controlled to working class controlled. Particularly with the influential role of left wing socio-economic policy in 1970s, this increasing significance of labour was also due to achieve new western style of social class structure.¹⁶ However, unconsciousness of working class in the struggle of capital accumulation process as well as the declaration of Turkish entrepreneurs over the impossibility of socio-economic policy, which was in charge of increasing the power of working class, undoubtedly prevented this left wing socio-economic policy.

14 Berkes 1975: 95-134

15 Insel 1995: 200

16 Kongar, 1995: 375

So, specifically soon after this period, unemployment became a widespread public issue as seen in the following table:

Year	Labour Force	Employment (active)	Amount of Unemployed	Rate of Unemployed
1960	*	12.501.561	15.868	*
1965	*	13.557.860	55.720	*
1970	*	15.118.887	*	*
1975	*	17.098.364	285.464	*
1980	19.212.193	18.522.322	689.871	3,6%
1985	21.579.996	20.556.786	1.023.210	4,7%
1990	24.726.601	23.381.893	1.344.708	5,4%
2000	28.544.359	25.997.141	2.547.218	8,9%

The indicators regarding 1960, 1965, 1970 include "those looking for a job". Figures for these years are estimated for population of age >15. All other years show estimations for age >12. * Indicators were not published throughout these years

Table 1: Unemployment indicators of Turkey from 1960 to 2000. Resource: Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation (DPT), 2008

All of these indicators functioning as an obstacle in evolution of Turkish labour force in socio-economic policy unveils the unawareness of working class that was much more important than the role of policy makers in the struggle of capital accumulation process. Compared this Turkish style development process to western picture lasted nearly about two hundred years, the first fundamental question to ask to ourselves should be: "Why has appropriation of labour populism of workers still been so easy, though national socio-economic policy does not offer observable opportunities for them to make their living conditions better?" And the second question should be; "Why has the working class not demanded their rights, instead of waiting for state policy?" These two questions definitely indicate Turkey's socio-economic policy shaped without benefiting from production stage, on one hand; and has considerably become dependent upon foreign capital like any other developing countries, on the other hand. So, Turkey's socio-economic policy has become inadequate to achieve capital accumulation process throughout its own resources even today. Besides, Turkey could not easily avoid dependency of the capitalist system managed effectively by core countries like any other developing countries.¹⁷ In any case, collapsed two-polarized world

17 Kongar, 1995: 375-376; Berkes, 1975: 178-185

system undoubtedly accelerated the role of capitalists in Turkey's socio-economic structure in which labour-capital contradiction has been tried to solve by neglecting the importance of labour. Taken all of these parts of Turkey's socio-economic policy picture together, no alternative for Turkish labour force, who was accustomed to wait for their rights from the state without any demand, other than flowing to the several core European labour markets might be easily explained.

Turks in Labour Markets of European Countries

Several European core countries made labour agreements with different developing countries, owing to their declining tendencies of general population pyramid and inadequacy in filling the lack of unskilled labour force through its own resources. In this respect, Germany was one of the first European country signed labour force transfer agreement with Italy in 1955 and with Turkey in 1961 since work force transfer restricted only with Eastern Europe was inadequate.¹⁸ Accordingly, between late 1960s and early 1970s, about 1.5 million Turk, one third of whom were labour force, emigrated to Germany and elsewhere in Europe.¹⁹ The increasing rate of Turks employed in labour markets of several European countries, including in Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria between 1963s and 1966s may be estimated as a reliable indicator that reveals the functions of Turks in western labour markets. Statistics also confirmed that nearly 900 000 Turkish workers were recruited through official channels from 1961 until November 1973 in spite of the negative impacts of Oil Crisis period.²⁰ Furthermore, nearly all of them were young males who had left members of their family in home-land country to work in well developed European labour markets, according to Seifert.²¹

More than half proportion of Turks' contribution to the socio-economic structure of several European countries, such as Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands, and Belgium, is undoubtful. However, comparing their last job

18 Akkaya, 1992: 40; Herwartz, 2003: 168; Ünver, 2003: 84-85

19 Tosun, 1994: 27

20 Ünver, 2003: 88

21 Martin, 1991:25-26

in Turkey to their new job in Germany, it may be easily declared that their new jobs in receiving country require much more division of labour.²² Even though many Turkish immigrants had the ability to be employed in semi-skilled jobs upon arrival, most were employed as an unskilled labour force in manufacture units.²³ Nevertheless, time passed, considerable amount of Turks have found opportunity in attaining vocational training that would make their presence safe in host country.²⁴ Mehrlander emphasizes that 30% of Turkish labour force has moved from unskilled jobs to semi-skilled ones, though this rate is relatively less than other immigrant groups. He also points out that the ability of upward mobility is higher among following generation Turks than that among first generation. Appreciation of Şen over the success of following generation Turks who have adopted the working principles of German society in a short time confirms several European social scientists' point of view, in a manner of speaking.²⁵ In fact, it is better for social scientist to determine, examine, understand and explain the changing characteristics of work life as well as increasing amount of intergenerational mobility among Turks in European labour markets via implementing micro sociological theories that are more sufficient than grand theories.

Theory Using in Understanding Intergenerational Mobility

Theory using that facilitate evaluation process of whole societal life in general, or its several dimensions in particular, is crucial in socio-economic studies. However, one theory is not enough, as it was in the very early period of urban-based society in order to explain general social change such as immigration, which provide an accurate opportunity for researcher to make comparison between the situation before and after. In any case, social scientists have admitted that limiting any societal issue with one theory and/or variable is not desirable; moreover, particularly post-modern period often urges researchers to interdisciplinaire analysis. Taken the increasing importance of micro approaches in social sciences into account, intergenerational

22 Hein, 2004: 78

23 Abadan, 1964: 69-73

24 Ünver, 2003: 93

25 Martin, 1991: 97-100

mobility and symbolic interaction theories have been utilized in this paper in order to determine changing role of European Turks in 21st century.

Sociologists who first attempted to social stratification examine not only the individualistic characteristics but also the family of origin and its societal outcomes, in which primary socialization takes place, including economic, education level, and cultural resources, as well as access to public facilities and therefore to different segments of the labour market. Bertaux and Bertaux,²⁶ who focus on the transmission and reappropriations of family assets in successive generations, tried to unveil underlying factors of French male lineage from a rural background, which was able to create a small family business, develop it, and eventually move to the educated middle-class. In this way, they examined 10 families in a small town of Sauveterre in central-southern France, in which transformation process from craft to capital is fairly clear. They utilize fathers' occupation as a rough variable in multidimensional variations with using comparative technique. Even if the history of this families seemed to demand a thorough analysis, they achieved remarkable results, most of which emphasized how small 'family' business influences the destinies of the family descendants. The most significant result of these intergenerational mobility is new kind of following generations who make themselves definitely different than their predecessors. For example, the bakers' son becomes a seed merchant, the son of the small manufacturer becomes a real estate broker, the dentist's daughter becomes a doctor, the writer's son becomes a reporter, the cutter's son becomes an engineer, the nurse's daughter becomes a radiologist, the policeman's son becomes an internal revenue agent.

As well known by social scientists, actions of human beings' are heavily surrounded with meaning and interpretation. So, individuals' action may be appreciated as a significant outcome of interpretative world that set by women and men who are the source of meanings of jests and symbols. Furthermore, individuals do not only recognize things but also assess themselves as a thing, according to Mead.²⁷ Being aware of the consciousness and reflexive characteristics of individual, Mead put forward the concept of "self indication" as an active and communicative process, in which individuals pay at-

²⁶ Bertaux and Bertaux 1997: 62-93

²⁷ Alix, 1995: 33-34; Giddens, 1999: 85-89; Kinloch, 1977: 146-151; Poloma, 1993: 223-230

tion to, focus on, appreciate, and therefore act with each other with regard to significant meanings. So, individuals who implement her/his awareness often involve in symbolic interaction with themselves as well as others. The concept of self that shaped as regards contribution of biological and psychological "I" and sociological "me" persists only if individual learns the others' role to play within mainstream society. This means symbolic interaction that functions as a tool in carrying symbols, jests and meanings of the culture materializes, just by using language and other conventional symbols of the culture. Taken all of these assumptions of symbolic interaction theory together, it is clear to see that Mead calls the attention of sociologists to the functions of symbols and language in social behaviour, and thus puts forward symbolic interaction theory as an interacting instrument by which human beings size up all of the meanings of symbols. This qualification of the theory will particularly make an efficient tool to compare and understand different cultures as well as to examine cultural changing process that come into effect soon after immigration.

Impacts of the Changing Characteristics of Work Life on European Turks

One of the main dimensions that make individuals' everyday life reality clear is the function of the concept of work that increased its importance accurately in modern period rather than in pre-modern. Anyway, particularly in modern times, social dimension of the concept of work makes limiting work life only with production process definitely uneasy. To put it in a different way, the concept of work restricted only to earning daily bread particularly in the very early beginning period of human existence has begun to extend to meet psychological, social, and cultural needs as well as material ones in today's further urban based society. The concept of work formed only with respect to wage in time has begun to influence individuals' everyday life in today's societal context specifically because of escalating high unemployment rate that mixed work life with non-work life.²⁸ Actually, statistics of several European core countries confirm that the unemployment rate in Germany is over 10%, in France 12.6% and in Spain 20%. Massive unemploy-

²⁸ Güzel, 2008: 25

ment after the economic recession in the 1970s considerably changed the role of immigrant labour force in the labour market of receiving countries. However, emergence of the labour market of Eastern European countries that consists of well educated labour force who are ready to work even for low wages should be taken into account as a fundamental variable in explaining this certain high unemployment rate of Western European countries. There are also certain statistics revealing an unemployment rate among immigrant groups that was three to four times higher than among native population. That's why nearly all immigrant groups in European countries began to search alternative sources of sustainable income other than selling their labour in a regular labour market.²⁹

Several social scientists have begun to discuss this high unemployment rate that would lead to inevitable unemployment crisis in the labour market of several core-Western European countries in detail. Indeed, three theoretical traditions over immigrant businesses such as the "concept of middle man minority", "assumptions of class and ethnic resources" and the "notion of ethnic enclaves" might be considered. The first estimated as a result of other two concept is launched by Bonachi to explain several consequences of self-employment stemmed from accurate discrimination against ethnic minorities in host societies. The concept of middle man minority, however, expresses the immigrant groups who are highly engaged in intra-ethnic relationships, for instance in business partnership. No matter how intra-ethnic characteristics of this kind of business make immigrant groups successful in itself, their integration into mainstream society may be difficult or impossible in reality, if other immigrant groups are considered together. Whereas the main issue should have been minimizing or in more hopeful respect ignoring intra-ethnic relationships and overemphasizing the ethnic solidarity. Admittedly, many researchers such as Mind and Jaret, Ward and Jenkins, and Light highlight multifunctional role of ethnic resources as regards differences among immigrants' small and ethnic business.³⁰

High unemployment rate in Western European labour markets mentioned above has affected the role and location of immigrants, on one hand; and has accelerated the establishment possibilities and abilities of new busi-

29 Kamali, 2003: 227; Whitney, 1995: 23

30 Kamali, 2003: 229-231

ness enterprises in whole European labour market as in the rest of the world, on the other hand.³¹ All of these macro and micro changes in labour markets of several European countries at the same time has given way to the private small and medium sized business enterprises that are launched and run by several immigrant groups. As a matter of fact, great amount of Turks in mine production like in any other unskilled units have attained the opportunity to establish their own business enterprise lately. Certain level of social mobility among European Turks during last decades of the labour immigration process may be appreciated as a beneficial indicator of increase in establishment of private business enterprise of European Turks. No matter what the reason may be, there are 60 000 European Turks who run mostly small and partly medium-sized companies only in Germany.³² The Zentrum für Türkeistudien³³ also put forward that Turks in Germany who have launched their own business enterprises have begun to employ nearly about 300 000 work force, including members of different ethnic groups and natives.³⁴ This means Turks, constituting the largest group of immigrants, have begun to be represented in almost every sector of German society. In fact, compared to 20 years ago, there is much greater Turkish representation in the service sector than in the manufacturing and construction sectors.³⁵

The population of Turks, who do not only consist of labour force but also include all age groups ranging from children to pensioners, reveals the dominance of economically active second and third generation, who will actively take part in labour market in a short time. Anyway, the influential position of European Turks may be easily seen, if taken into account that over 50% of newborns were of Turkish nationality in 1992 and that 10% to 15% of all newborns in Germany have had foreign parents since 1970. So, general age structure of nearly all of receiving European countries show growing percentage of elderly natives and a smaller percentage of children, and young and adult natives in contrast to growing percentage of European Turks, who have actively begun to take place in the labour markets of sever-

31 Bolaria & Boaria, 1997:205

32 Ünver, 2003: 95

33 Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1990: 52

34 Martin, 1991: 99-100

35 Ünver, 2003: 93-94

al European core-countries since 1997. Furthermore, the number of children, young and adults increased disproportionately in the 1990s, in spite of increasing number of immigrants from the first-generation reaching retirement age during 1980s, according to Nauck.³⁶ Eventually, labour immigration process that began in the later period of 1960s has reached crucial turning point nowadays; for instance, France, England, Netherlands, Austria and Belgium come respectively after Germany as regards holding great amount of Turks. Furthermore, the rate of Turks in whole Europe is estimated to reach 4,5 million in 2010, 5,5 million in 2015, and 10 million in 2020.³⁷ In fact, just decreasing population of some European nations, including active work force, may be adequate in describing the rapid growth of Turkish population in Europe, and this amount is even more than the native population of some small European nations.

Conclusion

Immigration is one of the most important rough as well as safe comparison tool to unveil differences between before and after situation, specifically with respect to occupational structure, including capital, industry, job, income, unemployment, and urban services. As seen, examining Turkish labour force immigration to the several labour markets of well developed countries became easier particularly comparing the socio-economic policy of Turkey to the absorption capacity of host European countries. In this respect, Turkey's socio-economic policy that shaped without experiencing and/or taking the advantages of production stage, unwillingness of politicians in appropriation of western capitalist or socialist model merely and therefore inadequacy in achieving capital accumulation process through its own resources and failure in existing widespread powerful entrepreneur class as well as inexistence of decisive organized working class due to the attitude of workers to employment opportunities may be appreciated as one side of the labour force immigration process; need for enormous public efforts in host country, including regulation and redistribution of scarce resources like education and financial support in order to integrate newcomer labour force into new so-

³⁶ Herwartz, 2003: 168

³⁷ Kongar, 2000: 505; Tosun, 1994: 28-3

cial life may be assessed as the other side of the labour force immigration process from Turkey to Europe.

At least, examining the changing role of European Turks particularly in 21st century depends heavily upon putting this two fundamental dimensions of immigration process together. In fact, combining these two significant dimensions mentioned above at the same time may offer three specific advantages for researcher in explaining the changing role of Turks in European societal life. Utilizing this advantage, after all, will facilitate understanding the life struggle of rural Turkish peasants who were too poor to form any kind of private business enterprise in Turkey. Afterwards, it reveals the willingness of European Turks in launching small and medium sized private business enterprises in several sectors after working for a long time as an unskilled labour force. So, employment of Turkish labour force in labour market of well developed European countries has provided an opportunity for European Turks to realize their past dreams that seemed impossible in Turkey owing to weakness of timely socio-economic policy. And finally, it unveils the validity of the issue evaluated as a potential threat to the sovereignty of nation-states due to raising functions of transnational community resulted from global mobility of material and social capital. In this sense, this paper has attained two significant results that may take both European Turks and native Europeans to the peaceful level much more easy than thought before.

One of the most important results of this paper bases upon changing characteristics of work life, including the impacts of high unemployment rate of Europe that notably accelerated the possibility of new private business enterprises in whole European labour market, launched and run successfully by Turks. As a matter of fact, European social scientists as well as Turks point out that large amount of Turkish labour force took vocational training to the successful intergenerational mobility. So, Turks in Europe who had been recruited as unskilled labour in factories for the second term of 1970s became employers who might offer job opportunities not only to several kind of (im)migrant groups but to the native Europeans as time passed. Above all, just achievement of European Turks particularly in establishing and running private business enterprise clearly demonstrate the certain level of upward social mobility in intergenerational context that has begun to ma-

terialize for last period of the labour immigration process from Turkey to European core countries.

Second result in relation to the success of following generation Turks highlights the crucial turning point throughout labour immigration process. This means the dominance of economically active forthcoming generation Turks, including young and adults, in labour market of several European core countries since the 1990s; in contrast to increasing number of first generation Turks beginning to reach retirement age after 1980s getting clear day by day. First generation Turkish labour force concentrated just on daily bread by selling their labour; whereas the following generations have begun to influence general European societal structure by their increasing education and income, changing behaviours and preferences, extending economic and political rights, comprehensive relationships and so on. At last, widespread appropriation of following generation Turks in working principles besides in general societal life make them successful in intergenerational mobility that might be easily appreciated as one of the most crucial milestones throughout societal change nearly all over the contemporary world.

In short, particularly second and third generation acquiring European citizenship rights in time that is not definitely different from natives' and may create next generations who will be born as a native European, namely as a legal citizens of host country. However, as our observations besides significant results of this paper teach us that further measures should be set not only by Turks but also by European legislation makers, apart from offering/acquiring legal citizenship to reach ideal peace level of Europe. If European Turks are fairly examined and reconceptualized, instead of appreciating them just a potential threat to the peace level of European social and cultural context, it may not be impossible both for social scientists and European decision makers to find out useful tools and/or opportunities that would facilitate integration obstacles of following Turkish generations in European societal life. In any case, whole labour force immigration from Turkey to Europe is clearly different from other several accidental and illegal migrations to the European continental. Even though first generation Turks were willing to return back to their home countries after saving enough money even now, forthcoming generation Turks are more eager than their predecessors particularly in attaining citizenship of host country and are ready to stay

and live in Europe throughout their life. Whether it is accepted or not, Turkish labour force immigration process that was limited to a short time has turned into integration issue, in which both sides will be able to obtain a chance to know and recognize each other well, particularly soon after the changing preferences of forthcoming Turkish generations both in work life and in non-work life. Actually, the multifunctional qualifications of work life from the viewpoint of sociology will be able to be the most stable bridge that may take both sides at last to the ideal societal integration level. At the same time, this bridge may also function as a comparison tool in understanding European Turks' upward mobility that began with selling labour and has turned into setting private business enterprises, which will be able to put them in higher socio-economical position in near future.

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