

**EXISTENCE AND SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN LADY
CHATTERLEY'S LOVER AND WOMEN IN LOVE BY D.H.
LAWRENCE**

Pamukkale University
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Master of Arts Thesis
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

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
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Seçil ÇIRAK



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ABSTRACT

EXISTENCE AND SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER AND WOMEN IN LOVE BY D.H. LAWRENCE

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Together with the modernist social order that reveals itself especially in the twentieth century, the place of the individual in the society has been structured unquestioningly in accordance with the parallel perspective. Bourgeoisie and modern society marks out the limits of the individual indisputably and in a planned way, the individual has been offered a readymade identity and is expected to embrace it without any objection. The individual has been exploited both materially and spiritually in such a social order. This is because of the ostensible effort that is to build up a society planned and organized by eliminating the social and economic chaos in society after World War II. However that effort under the guise of escape from the chaos and corruption accompanies much more serious problem such as the reason and the aim of being. In other words the physical battle in the field transforms into a cold war between the individual and society. The reason for this is that modernism promising to bring social order and welfare is actually nothing but an effort to passivize the individual and to homogenize the society. In this way the “essence” of the individual is lost in the social existential ideology and therefore the individual slides into an existential chaos.

In this sense the aim of this thesis is to analyse D.H. Lawrence's Women in Love and Lady Chatterley's Lover with regard to the sense of self, the conflict between social and individual identity and the fact that who/what the individual really is, the identity seek of the individual, self-fulfilment and the effort to explain the meaning of his/her existence. For this reason the roots of ideological and the individual existence will be investigated and applied to the novels.

Keywords: Existence, identity, essence, ideology, Lawrence, Sartre, Kierkegaard

ÖZET

D. H. LAWRENCE'IN ÂŞIK KADINLAR VE LADY CHATTERLEY'İN SEVGİLİSİ ROMANLARINDA VAROLUŞ VE KİMLİK ARAYIŞI

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20. yüzyılda kendini iyice göstermeye başlayan modernist toplum yapısı ile birlikte bireyin toplum içindeki yeri paralel bakış açısıyla tepeden inme bir şekilde şekillendirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Burjuvazi ve modern toplum bireyin sınırlarını kesin ve planlı bir şekilde çizmiş, bireye hazır bir kimlik sunulmuş ve bireyden onu kabul edilmesi kesin bir şekilde istenmiştir. Böyle bir toplum düzeni içinde birey hem maddi hem de manevi yönden sömürülmüştür. Bunun sebebi ise özellikle II. Dünya Savaşından sonra meydana gelen toplum içindeki hem sosyal hem de ekonomik kaosu ortadan kaldırarak daha planlı ve düzenli bir toplum oluşturma çabası olmuştur. Ne var ki bu kaos ve bozulmadan kaçış adı altındaki çaba çok daha vahim bir problemi de beraberinde getirmiştir; bireyin varoluş sebebi ve amacı. Başka bir deyişle savaş alanındaki fiziksel çatışma birey ve toplum arasındaki soğuk savaşa dönüşmüştür. Bunun sebebi ise yüzeyde sosyal düzen ve refah sözü ile yola çıkan modernizmin aslında bireyi pasifize etme ve toplumu homojen bir hale getirme çabası olmasıdır. Böylelikle bireyin özü sosyal ideolojide kaybolmuş ve bu ideoloji bireyi varoluşsal bir kaosun içine atmıştır.

Bu bağlamda bu çalışmada D.H. Lawrence'ın Âşık Kadınlar ve Lady Chatterley'in Sevgilisi adlı romanlarındaki bireyin kimlik arayışı, kendini gerçekleştirme ve varoluşunu anlamlandırma çabası ele alınacaktır. Bu sebeple bu tezde ideolojik ve bireysel varoluşun temelleri araştırılacak ve romana uygulanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Varlık, kimlik, öz, ideoloji, Lawrence, Sartre, Kierkegaard

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1

CHAPTER ONE EXISTENTIALISM

1.1. The Influence of Kierkegaard and Socrates.....	4
1.2. The Influence of Jean-Paul Sartre.....	16
1.3. Jean-Paul Sartre’s Humanist Revolt: <u>Existentialism and Humanism</u>	21

CHAPTER TWO THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE IN LADY CHATTERLEY’S LOVER

2.1. The Problem of Existence in <u>Lady Chatterley’s Lover</u>	30
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CHAPTER THREE HEADING FOR ONTOLOGICAL EMANCIPATION THROUGH WOMEN IN LOVE

3.1. Heading for Ontological Emancipation through <u>Women in Love</u>	55
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CONCLUSION.....	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	69
VITA.....	71

INTRODUCTION

It would not be incorrect to claim that the history of philosophy starts with man's arrival on earth. From the moment that he is sent to this world, man has tried to attach a meaning to his existence in order to comprehend his function in the world. "What am I? Why am I created?" are the questions man has been asking for centuries. Therefore, we can also say that man's creation is the beginning of his existential questioning. However, it is also clear that the philosophical theorizing of such questioning is not just as simple as a mere contemplation, for man's creation, both body and mind, is quite complicated in its essence. Existentialism, as one of the most significant philosophical movements in the 20th century, tries to be a theoretical remedy for such problem. The term "existentialist" is used for those who suggest that the truth can only be found in the actual, living man. 20th century existentialism, therefore, rejects classical philosophy that decentres man and relies on the absolute knowledge. In this sense, existentialism has nothing to do with abstract theorizing of man's being; instead, it concerns itself in the very concrete individual act. For the movement individual mind is the only measurement for his life and therefore it re-evaluates such concepts as truth, morality or religion.

Within the scope of this dissertation, the first chapter deals with Kierkegaard, as being regarded as the foundation for Existentialism in the 20th century, and the place of Socratic and Hegelian thought in his philosophy, and then it discusses Jean-Paul Sartre in detail by referring to the fundamental concepts exercised in existentialism. This chapter aims to reveal the conflict between subjectivity and objectivity, the importance of individual truth, realization of the self and the unpredictability of human nature with reference to abovementioned philosophers.

The second chapter aspires after the ontological identity problem in D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover. The chapter draws attention on the insincere nature of modern world that reduces every possible humanly feelings and severs men's organic connection with himself. In the novel, Lawrence presents the reader the insensitive relationship of a newly-wed couple, Lady Chatterley and Sir Clifford,

broken when Clifford returns crippled from the war, both physically and spiritually, and his wife's infidelity with the gamekeeper Mellors. However, as Charles Burack suggests that the novel intends "to purge the readers' consciousness of conventional sexual ideas and emotions and to generate new numinous responses" (Burack, 2005: 14). No matter how notorious for its excessive sexuality when the novel is published, it overreaches the plot story and raises a question mark in minds concerning identity and existence. In order to disclose the conflict between the individual identity and social identity together with the problem of existence the novel offers us plenty of other dichotomies in parallel with existential theory. Within this regard, we will handle the novel by shedding light on the ontological dichotomy between the object and the subject, past and future, death and life, function and action, self-discovery and instruction, certainty and possibility, pure knowledge and relativity and so forth. Through existential philosophy, this chapter aims to reveal the existential crisis inherent in the characters and their struggle to save themselves from being an object. In this sense the novel strives for organic life, wholeness, concreteness and what should be done to possess an authentic, individually determined organic life. The existential mental revolt is associated with sensual anarchism in the novel. To that end we will emphasize the importance of spiritual ejaculation together with the physical one on the way to gain an ontological consciousness.

Lastly, in the third chapter, in parallel with some notions as in Lady Chatterley's Lover, we will continue restoring the organic connection man has lost in Women in Love, but this time we will largely discuss it "through mediation of other" (Sartre, 2001: 45). In line with this objective we will try to reveal how sensuality is operated with the intention of reaching a transcending sensual love. In such mediation we will discuss the importance of the other serving as a mediator between consciousnesses and in addition we will unearth how an individual can work out for one's ontological salvation through transcendental sensuality. Lawrence proposes such metaphysical journey since he suggests that "sensual reality that can never be transmuted into mind content" (Lawrence, 1995: 320). By this way, we will try to emancipate the characters from all collective feelings and desires in order for them to reach their organic primordial states. At the end of the chapter we will attempt to

relieve sensuality of being a mere animalistic desire or physical interaction and reveal how it turns out to be a spiritual transmutation on the way to gain self-knowledge.

There are several studies with regards to the ontological dilemmas in Lady Chatterley's Lover and Women in Love among which we should include "*Lawrence in Another Light: Women in Love and Existentialism*" by John B. Humma, "*Being Perfect: Lawrence, Sartre, and Women in Love*" by T.H. Adamowski, "*Ontological Incoherence in Women in Love*" by Eric P. Levy "*Lady Chatterley's Lover: The Deed of Life*" by Julian Moynahan. However this study is one of the rare studies that attempts to reveal how Lawrence's works are the embodiment of existential theory in terms of ontological object and subject interrelation. For this reason this dissertation will mainly focus on the ontological dilemma between object and subject and how such dilemma incarnates in the novels.

CHAPTER ONE

EXISTENTIALISM

1.1 The Influence of Kierkegaard and Socrates

Kierkegaard does not ground his philosophy neither on the idea nor the abstract generalizations as Classical Philosophy does, but on man and his very existence. Classical philosophy gives precedence to essence and conscious as being the constant resort for the truth. What existentialism does is to “overcome the prejudice that the human being is primarily a theoretical knower” (Michelman, 2008:205). Kierkegaard is largely regarded as one of the first philosophers to renounce such precedence over existence and as the founder of existentialism with his attitude towards the understandings that do not start with individual existence. His understanding is highly subjective as he tries to reach the core of an individual by concretizing all the abstractions and by individualizing all the generalizations and the absoluteness inherent in Socratic and Hegelian philosophy. Though he seems to be a theologian in one way, we cannot deny that his works have highly philosophical traces concerning existentialism.

Alastair Hannay mentions in the introduction of Concluding Unscientific Postscripts, in which Kierkegaard writes under the pseudonym Climacus, that as a source for his philosophy Kierkegaard both “raises himself on the shoulders of Socrates” and Hegel and at the same time argues against their philosophy from various aspects. (Hannay, 2009: XXIII) She states that:

Still, the two seem to be somehow combined in Climacus, the Socratic side correcting any impression that the Hegelian style here is doing what Hegelians take themselves to be doing with it, arriving at the truth, and not, as Climacus proposes, just as far as the point where truth must then be grasped in ignorance and faith (XXIII).

Kierkegaard takes a stance against Hegelian philosophy in that his philosophy is rather “theoretical and systematic” (Schroeder, 2005: 208). While

existential philosophy finds its roots in the absurdity, uncertainty and the unpredictability of human condition, Hegelian philosophy constructs a precise theory of which limits are predetermined beforehand. Kierkegaard rejects such an approach towards the amorphous human nature as it neglects the potential human mind and tries to mould it. However, Hegel constructs a theoretical and applicable theory within a “unified system” (209). This “unified system” requires a universal approach, or we may say a collective determinism which contradicts Kierkegaard’s notion of authenticity. She states that:

According to Hegel, consciousness ‘becomes Spirit by *finding* itself therein’, in an ‘*aware [ness]* of the reconciliation of its individuality with the universal’. Its ‘joy’ is then found in the ‘peace’ of ‘self-assurance’, and its ‘blissful enjoyment’ is that of perfect ‘vision’ (Hannay, 2003: 27).

It is understood that, as Hannay also suggests, Hegel’s urge for consciousness “reconciled with” universality and the subsequent “self-assurance” diminish the mission of philosophy in solving the problem of existence (27). In addition, Kierkegaard states that Hegelian philosophy is unable to explain the individual existence as a whole by simply limiting it under “Pure Thought” and “puts the existence into confusion through not defining its relation to someone existing” (2009: 259). In this respect, he states

But, then just look: pure thought, for someone existing, is a chimera when the truth is to be existed in. Having to exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Denmark with a small map of Europe on which Denmark shows no larger than a steel pen-point – yes, even more impossible (260).

Kierkegaard assumes that “pure thought” as being idealized and universalized has not much to offer concerning human existence (260). As his example suggests it gives only the destination point, not the road to be taken. However, existentialism is not interested in the destination to be arrived for it cannot be anticipated, but it concentrates on the way; namely, how you arrive. In addition, it gives a kind of certainty with regard to truth, which, for Kierkegaard, is the source for losing the passion to exist. The reason is that Kierkegaard suggests that human life is grounded on striving and therefore man aspires after something in order to sustain his

existence. However, it is not something to finish a thing and to start another; rather it is to sustain the desire to chase after the uncertain. The sense of wonder and doubt are one of the strongest drives that prompt man to exist since they encourage man's desire to discover something. However, stimulated by the desire to know, man does not expect to reach a conclusion in this process.

If we are to give a non-philosophic example, let us suppose a man who is about to commit suicide, who thinks that there is nothing left to be after in life, that everything is finished for him. Suppose that you find something that would certainly dissuade him, something that you are sure he would certainly like to know even on the edge of death, a fact that he will surely wonder so much that he can, at least, suspend the decision for a while for death is certain but life is a probability. This moment is when the passivated individual is activated by an existential drive; he is dissuaded. If we are to take this example as a metaphorical sense regarding Kierkegaardian understanding of uncertainty, we might say that he is dissuaded, as he cannot resist chasing after the uncertain for the sake of knowing what it is. Similarly Hegelian objectivism is like being dead as it follows the certain; however Kierkegaardian subjectivism is to exist as it chases the uncertain. With this regard Kierkegaard states that:

It is enough to bring a sensate person to despair, for one feels a constant urge to have something finished, but this urge is of evil and must be renounced. The continual becoming is the uncertainty of earthly life, in which everything is uncertain (73).

It is clear that Kierkegaard suggests that one should not chase after certainty for it is the end of his existence. It is highly convincing in that when we look into the essence of what it means to exist, we see that it requires some kind of continuation. If we are to turn back Kierkegaard's notion, which we might say in his absence on behalf of existentialism that to exist is not the destination but the journey. For this very reason, in order to sustain "continual becoming" he urges man to renew his existence by making his own way (73). He harshly criticizes "objective thought" for it "invests everything in result, and helps all mankind to cheat by copying and rattling off result and answer by rote" (62). This means that "objective thought"

“omits” the individual and turns him into an object who can but imitate the way he is offered (62). On the other hand, Kierkegaard suggests that “subjective thought invest everything in becoming and omits the result” and therefore it is what it means to exist freely and authentically (62). Kierkegaard does not only reject objectivism for being result oriented but also for that it follows what is certain and experienced beforehand excluding individual thought and decision.

Just this uncertainty, when it is to be understood and held fast by an existing individual, and hence enter into every thought, precisely because, as uncertainty, it enters into everything, and therefore also even into my starting on world history, so that I make it clear to myself whether, if death does come tomorrow, I am beginning upon something that is worth starting on [...] (139).

Kierkegaard also renounces objectivism as it offers “universal concepts “that in practice may not be valid for all humanity. Such totalitarian approach can only appeal to “certain man in certain conditions” (Schroeder, 2005: 209). In this sense according to Schroeder, Kierkegaard suggests that as each man experiences the age he lives in differently, to be able to reach authenticity the human mind must be trained in order to possess a sense of interpretation of the things that possibly affect his world. While touching the core of existentialism, Kierkegaard thinks that Hegelian universal determinism disregards man’s actual being that is changing and living simultaneously. Instead of objective, absolute or a universal truth man must struggle to reach his own reality. Though it is not possible to anticipate whether man will succeed or fail, to exist requires challenge and action. It is possible to claim that to exist is an art and therefore it needs authenticity, individuality, free choice and interpretation of the world one lives in. For this reason as an artist for existing, man cannot be taught how he should live or which way to follow. However, in Hegelian philosophy one cannot attain such freedom in that:

The passionate question of truth does not even arise because philosophy has first tricked the individuals into becoming objective. The positive Hegelian truth is as illusory as was happiness in paganism. Only afterwards does one get to know whether or not one has been happy; and similarly the next generation gets to know what truth was in the preceding generation (Hannay, 2009: 30).

As the above quotation suggests it does not seem possible to reach an authentic truth as the truth is not only conditioned but also determined. In this respect, we can include not only the personal truths but also morality and religion that an individual is after. It suggests that man learns what is what by historical, national or familial predecessors. Man learns the ways of happiness or the ways of being moral by observing and internalizing the ways that his predecessors follow. It is not a criticism of what is followed, that is, for example, being moral may mean whether an excessive devotion to religious morality or to wickedness, here the question is not which one is chosen but how is obtained. This is not only a blind devotion to something but also an unconscious existing. The claim is that it does not matter whether man follows the greatest good or the wicked way, so long as man does not question and decide which way to go he does not truly exist. Therefore Hegelian understanding of attaining truth as indicated above reveals its own inadequacy by rendering an individual into an object that has the full capacity to learn but the least to discover. In this context, Kierkegaard suggests that:

The path of objective reflection now leads to abstract thinking, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of various kinds, and always leads away from the subject, whose existence or non-existence becomes, and from the objective point of view quite rightly, infinitely indifferent – yes, quite rightly, for as Hamlet says, existence and non-existence have only subjective significance. This path will lead maximally to a contradiction, and in so far as the subject fails to become wholly indifferent to himself, this only shows that his objective striving is not sufficiently objective. At its maximum this path will lead to the contradiction that only the objective has come about and that the subjective has been extinguished, that is to say, the existing subjectivity that has made an attempt to become what in the abstract sense is called subjectivity, the mere abstract form of the abstract objectivity. And yet, the objectivity which has thus come into being is at most, from the subjective point of view, either a hypothesis or an approximation, because all eternal decision lies in subjectivity (Kierkegaard, 2009: 163).

Kierkegaard's rejection against objectivity becomes his source for what he calls subjective thinking. He draws a distinction between "the objective reflection" or "speculative philosopher" and "the subjective thinker (Michelman, 2008: 7). "Objective thought" ignores "the thinking subject and his existence" on the other

hand “subjective thinker” concerns for his own existence and possesses “the reflection of inwardness, of possession, by virtue of which it belongs to the subject and no other” (Kierkegaard, 2009: 62). He requires subjective thinking as the primary condition for individual existence and he adds that that subjectivity cannot be degraded into an “objective form by philosophy or science” (Michelman, 2008: 7). The real subjectivity, for Kierkegaard, can only be obtained by religious and ethical adhesion. According to Kierkegaard the authentic subjectivity is, as Michelman states that

[...] deepened through acts of ethical and religious commitment and is obscured by the “speculative philosopher,” who seeks to subsume the individual within universal categories, e.g., to reduce the subject to an expression of objective “spirit,” as Hegel had attempted (7).

It is impossible to disregard the living, existing nature of human mind and man is not a thing that can be fashioned under universal criteria. As Alastair Hannay asserts the major point where he contradicts Hegel is that according to Kierkegaard “the choice of the ethical is personal one not the outcome of a philosophical insight” and therefore man should not surrender and should not orient himself to those abstractions and generalization determined before him if an authentic and free man are in question (Hannay, 1995: 442).

The existential concern is that individuals “are threatened by the loss of individuality and self-understanding” and therefore it may cause “a misconception of the world and their relationship to it” (Schroeder, 2005: 207). With this regard Kierkegaard clearly expresses that his aim is to “awaken” his people and “reveal to the society” by presenting the Church and Monarchy “as merely finite institutions” that distance the individual from his own reality (Hannay, 1995: 443). By using “the pseudonymous authorship” as Hannay calls it, he proposes himself as midwife in the Socratic understanding in order to enlighten the people about the real nature of faith and existence. For this reason in his work Sickness Unto Death, he lays bare the nature of human spirit. Kierkegaard attaches much importance to the realization and the revelation of spirit in that, as Hannay indicates, when the human spirit is taken over by “spiritless society”, then “it tends to find its outlet outside such forms of

madness, religious intoxication, the cult of the aesthetic, or in utopian politics” (443). This means that when man is distracted from his real self and the real sense of faith, he seeks solace in false conceptions and leads a life that is “spiritually emasculated” (443). The emphasis here is that the individual must be fully aware of himself; he has to confront his reality and he should seek the truth only in himself. Michelman asserts that:

For Søren Kierkegaard, the existing individual is the actual living person who exists in time, suffers, enjoys, decides, acts, feels responsible for himself or herself, and feels anxiety over his or her death. The existing individual is contrasted to the “speculative philosopher,” who acts as if he or she were a disembodied mind, able to comprehend existence from a perspective outside of it, without participating in it (2008:146).

Mostly Kierkegaard constructs his theory on the nature of faith by revealing the ethical necessity that should be in the belief system. He tries to uncover what it means to be a real Christian. He is highly critical of the prevailing belief system as it suppresses the individual passion that emerges only in tranquillity, when man is naked before God. However, Kierkegaard’s theory not only possesses religious inclinations but also highly philosophical intentions. Within this context he implies that man needs only himself in his encounter with God as such direct relation to God primarily requires man’s direct relation to himself, which is essential in existentialism.

In addition to this, As Hannay states, Kierkegaard believes that faith is a spiritual satisfaction and man must be naked “because the individual is aware that no empirical or rational inquiry can support acceptance or assurance” (Hannay, 1995: 475). This lack of assurance and justification is the essential point in existentialism, which we will discuss later in detail in Sartre’s philosophy. Man must be refined when he tends to encounter with himself. In other words, we can say that it does not matter whether one wants to discover who s/he is or to reveal the faith in him/her, it is like taking an inner photo of yourself; thus, you yourself should trigger the shutter for a better resolution. In this sense, his theory revolves around an individual system that clears away the obstacles to reach his authenticity. In such a system, truth must be derived “directly from an unconditioned transcendent source” and must be the

result of pure self-contemplation and self-understanding (476). As Hannay mentions it is essential that: “[...] the relation to the unconditional source of value be one of inwardness and personal devotion both to the source itself and, through it, though distributably rather than collectively, to mankind (444).

Another important point in Kierkegaardian philosophy is Socrates, as being both the model and counterpart for his philosophy. Rebecca Elleray mentions that Socrates is a crucial figure in Kierkegaardian philosophy as he “held Socrates in the highest regard as a model philosopher, a model which he understood to be distinctly lacking in his contemporaries” (Elleray, 2007: 1). According to Elleray, Socrates has started, though has not completed, the relation between human to human as well as human to human mind. Namely he possesses what is lack in Hegelian philosophy that is, we may say, the interrelation between existences. Kierkegaard states that:

However, truly to exist, that is, to permeate one’s existence with consciousness, at once eternal as though far beyond it and yet present in it, and nevertheless in the course of becoming – that is truly difficult. If thinking in our time had not become something strange, something learned parrot-wise, thinkers would make a quite different impression on people, as in Greece, where a thinker was also someone inspired in existing and impassioned by his thought, as was once the case in Christendom, where a thinker was also a believer enthusiastically seeking to understand himself in the existence of faith (Kierkegaard, 2009: 258).

Kierkegaard appreciates the way that Socratic philosophy is following in that it urges man to question his existence. We see that, both in Kierkegaard and Socrates, a kind of passion for knowledge is essential in that that passion will prompt the individual into another desire that is to discover his identity. This is what Kierkegaard admires in Socrates as he paves the way for self-searching. It is clear that the attainment of truth lies not in the objective reflection of the things; that is to say, not how they appear in the world, it lies in the subjective contemplation; namely, how we perceive them. In this respect, Socrates awakens both the consciousness and the passion that might provoke self-awareness. Socratic identification of individual, as Kierkegaard asserts ironically, is what contemporary philosophy lacks. Kierkegaard indicates that because of the lack of self-awareness, objective man has lost his essential relation to himself; the subjective one therefore he is ready to

embrace Socratic philosophy even with its errors:

Socrates, Socrates, Socrates! Yes, we may well call your name three times; it would not be too much to call it ten times, if it would be of any help. Popular opinion maintains that the world needs a republic, needs a new social order and a new religion—but no one considers that what the world, confused simply by too much knowledge, needs is a Socrates. Of course, if anyone thought of it, not to mention if many thought of it, he would be less needed. Invariably, what error needs most is always the last thing it thinks of—quite naturally, for otherwise it would not, after all, be error (Kierkegaard, 1980: 92).

Elleray mentions that Socratic understanding of self-understanding has its origins not in “the precept” ‘know thyself’, which indicates that man should be careful in his conduct with himself as he “must remember their mortality and thus ward off any inclination to presume too much of their strength”. (Elleray, 2007: 2). Alternatively, as Elleray suggests that “it stipulated a rule of conduct, warning humans against hubris” (qtd. in Foucault, 2001: 4). However, in Socrates’ philosophy this “know thyself” has another connotation, which can be associated with existential self-knowledge to some extent, or with, as Elleray calls it, “the philosophical significance as the foundation of the relation between the Individual and truth.” (Elleray, 2007: 2) That is why Socrates is after the greatest good and morality. Socrates finds it essential to have an intimate relation to oneself if one is to reach some knowledge about one’s existence. Socratic urge on questioning is the key point that distinguishes us from being an object. Otherwise, unaware of what he is, man is condemned to be an object in his own life. Shortly, for Socrates man should follow the greatest good in his journey. They should not be after what is immortal but mortal; namely their souls and morality. In order to improve his soul, in order to reach the greatest good, man must renounce his wealth and reputation, devote himself to self-questioning and should notice his ignorance. However, as it is mentioned before, Socrates perceives this duty as something religious and therefore it is guided by an eternal divinity that would never be mistaken. Thus by assuming his duty as a divine command:

Socrates would not have bothered to inquire into the meaning of the oracle had he not presupposed that the god knew what he was talking about. The decision to philosophize is thus in no way an “existential” one, in the sense that it is not made spontaneously and independently of any support in a world that may ultimately prove

to be meaningless. On the contrary, Socrates is confident that the philosophical quest is meaningful because he is confident that there is some truth to be uncovered. His confidence, moreover, is not rooted in any sort of independent understanding, but rather in his trust that the god knows what he himself does not (Howland, 2006: 67).

Within this perspective, he uncovers the nature of truth regarding its attainment in Kierkegaard and his model Socrates. Socrates suggests that, as we understand from the writing of Plato, “his philosophizing” is a divine command, which aims to bring together thought and Eros (58). In this sense his philosophy, as Howland states, is “answerable to and authorized by the god, but also by what Socrates calls Eros” (59). Eros, according to Socrates “is not simply human desire, [r]ather it is a daimonic or intermediate passion that binds human with the divine and the self with that which transcends it” (59). Howland indicates that the divine nature of eros mirrors the omnipresence of “transcendent truth in our souls” with which we acquire anamnesis (59). For Socrates this passion of truth is encouraged by the divine rather than *motu proprio*. Therefore, he assumes that man can never be inclined to evil so long as he is guided for what is right and what is wrong, besides he has the desire to be complete. He believes that “sin is ignorance” which means that if a man commits sin it is not because he is corrupted but because he has not known yet what is right (Kierkegaard, 1980:87). Kierkegaard finds it rather pure-minded and adds:

What constituent, then, does Socrates lack for the defining of sin? It is the will, defiance. The intellectuality of the Greeks was too happy, too naive, too aesthetic, too ironic, too witty—too sinful—to grasp that anyone could knowingly not do the good, or knowingly, knowing what is right, do wrong. The Greek mind posits an intellectual categorical imperative²⁴ (90).

We understand that Kierkegaard appreciates Socrates up to this point. Hannay suggests that “he [sees] himself as returning to and continuing from where Socrates [has] left off” (2003: 27). In this sense it is possible to claim that his starting point with Socrates is identical; however, they reach different conclusions. It is identical in that they both try to attain some sort of self-knowledge by relying on self-discovery, but Socrates reaches the realms of beauties and perfections, he totally confides in man with regards to the fact that he will attain morality if he follows the Socratic way. On the contrary, Kierkegaard confronts the amorphous nature of human existence and takes his reader to the realm of possibilities and regards that “sin is not

a matter of a person's not having understood what is right but of his being unwilling to understand it, of his not willing what is right" (1980: 95). As above quotation suggests Kierkegaard finds, as Elleray mentions as well, Socrates is rather naive in that he skips over the fact that man possesses will. Kierkegaard suggests that man can be inclined to evil even if he is fully aware of what is right and wrong regarding either morality or religion as he has the will to act contrary to religion or morality.

Socrates does not take into consideration that man may not find the virtue, for he believes that every individual possesses the ideal morality in him but he has just forgotten it. In this journey, Socrates assigns himself as "midwife", who uncovers the existing truths in man (Bett, 2011: 217). From a Kierkegaardian perspective we may say that this recollection in its nature is not a self-discovery but a rediscovery, which indicates that man is not the full possession of himself. It does not have any significance for man, as Kierkegaard states it is "something accidental, a vanishing point, an occasion"; thus leaving not any individual significance (Kierkegaard, 1985: 13). Additionally Kierkegaard, as being fully conscious of human will, doubts that an individual can so easily be inclined to goodness. This is because, for Kierkegaard will does not mean a congenital inclination that always arrives at the good but it means a congenitally probable inclination to either good or evil. That is why he urges that authenticity and self-knowledge can be obtained by composing the ethical and the religious. It not only neglects human intentionality but also the freedom of choice. It reveals that it is not a complete interior relationship to oneself in that at the end man encounters with the divine or we may say absolute. In other words, the exterior truth namely the divine truth is internalized as subjective truth. However, it is clear that existentialism does not seek a relationship between the exterior and the interior rather it chases after fully intimate and naked inner connection. Socratic notion perceives human mind something that lacks evaluation or that does not need evaluation for everything with reference to goodness, morality or virtue is prepared, evaluated and introduced into man thanks to the divine morality. In this sense, Socratic philosophy not only neglects man's free will but also idealizes morality. However, Kierkegaard believes that man possesses free will and morality is a very difficult term to define.

Kierkegaard states that “every human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because his self-knowledge is God-knowledge” (11). As it is understood, if the Socratic man reaches something concerning morality he is sure that man would reach his self-knowledge as well in that the truth resides in the divine; man just needs to go and take it. As Elleray quotes

Hidden in the eternal, assimilated into it in such a way that, I so to speak, still cannot find it even if I were to look for it, because there is no Here and no There, but only an *ubique et nusquam* [everywhere and nowhere] (qtd. in Kierkegaard, 1985, 11).

As the above quotation suggests, one can claim that Socratic notion of philosophy idealizes morality and renders it untouchable by “hiding” it “in the eternal”, which also renders it unquestionable (13). If we are to return to Hegel, he does not leave anything to be evaluated either as he suggests a unified system for all humanity. In this sense, each philosophy has idealistic tendencies. In this context, it can be suggested that Socratic approach to morality resembles Hegelian philosophy in that each suggests a unified system for highly differentiated human beings. In this sense, by uncovering the ambiguous or we may say unpredictable nature of man Kierkegaard reveals the impracticability of both Socratic and Hegelian philosophy as both of them render human existence only possible within the realms of the idealized and the good and associate it only with the ideal truth. However, for Kierkegaard to exist requires individual choice and commitment. Whether to attain the absolute knowledge or the divine knowledge do not give any clue regarding what is behind human action as it is only will that we can observe and evaluate. This is because it is impossible to anticipate whether it is knowledge that prompts the action. Neither Hegelian absolute knowledge nor Socratic divine knowledge can be authentic as it is never clear whether it is out of an independent will or dependent logic. Nevertheless, will is the freedom of choice. For this reason he rejects not only Hegelian or Socratic philosophy but also that of Cartesian in that “an existing individual is not an idea; surely his existence is something other than the thought-existence of the idea” (Kierkegaard, 2009: 276). Kierkegaard suggests the idea alone, as it is in Cartesian philosophy, cannot be the reflection of the individual with his entire existence as the

individual is neither a concept nor a term but a living entity. As a result we can say that for Kierkegaard to exist is not something that is to be contemplated but exercised. This is also the starting point for Sartre's existential philosophy.

1.2. The Influence of Jean-Paul Sartre

Thomas R. Flynn suggests that Sartre was deeply influenced by Husserl's phenomenology as it "enabled him to philosophize about concrete, individual reality" (Flynn, 2005: 62.) Flynn suggests that "intentionality allowed him to escape the 'principle immanence' that entangled idealist philosophers in a mind-referring world" (62). We understand that Husserl's phenomenology provides him to theorize his highly subjective theory by rejecting Neo-Kantian, and we may add Cartesian philosophies that treat man as an idea. As we mentioned before, in Kierkegaard and Socrates traditional philosophy in which here we can include Descartes and Hegel observes reality as totally "mind-referring" (62). However, as Flynn points out, Sartre rejects this mental treatment of men and suggests that such idealism contradicts "the principle of intentionality" as "consciousness is essentially other-referring" (62). In this sense, existential theory is a revolt against "the absurdity of Pure Thought", which takes individual thought, not the "logic of thinking", as a basis and disregards "conditioned thinking" so that man could be aware of his own consciousness and existence (Blackham, 2002: 2). As opposed to Hegelian philosophy, which mainly focuses on "objective reflection" (Kierkegaard, 2009: 161), Sartre's philosophy is rooted in "the insight of individual reflective consciousness (Flynn, 2005: 64). Flynn uncovers this dichotomy as follows:

Sartre's dialectic differs most from Hegel by its insistence on the primacy of individual activity in a dialectical advance and its denial of any 'end' to the dialectical process so long as consciousness/praxis sustains it (Flynn, 2005: 65).

As it is understood, Sartre centres his philosophy on the actual human activity and decentres any objective conduct directed against its individual reflection. In this sense Flynn draws a distinction between "concepts" and notions" and it is stated that concepts are "static" limiting individual mind while notions have "dynamic"

tendencies that render actual individual conduct possible (65). This idea recalls Kierkegaard's notion on the subjective thinking that stresses the necessity to reject "objective reflection" in order that human existence gains significance (Kierkegaard, 2009:162). He states that

The path of objective reflection makes the subject accidental and existence thereby into something indifferent, vanishing. Away from the subject, the path of reflection leads to the objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth becomes that too, and just this is its objective validity; because interest, just like decision, is rooted in subjectivity (162-163).

We understand that "objective truth" dehumanizes man in that in his own world, man becomes what he may not and he surrenders himself to the absolute knowledge. Sartre shares the same belief with Kierkegaard and therefore he centres his philosophy in actual individual conduct (163). In addition, objective truth contradicts with Husserl's understanding of intentionality as being "the defining character of mental" (Flynn, 2006: 80). This means that human mind cannot be categorized by concepts as concepts objectively neglect human intentionality as well as his freedom. The truth, for Sartre, must be the consequence of personal contemplation with full responsibility. This means that it should not be learnt as in Hegel, nor should it be rediscovered as in Socrates; it should be invented.

With regard to being, we can say that Sartre gives us two basic categories that are *pour-soi* and *en-soi*. Blackham defines Sartre's definition of consciousness as something that "refers to and separates itself from something not itself" and he adds that "to be conscious of something" is at the same time to be conscious of what one is conscious of" (Blackham, 2002: 111). He continues that as "consciousness cannot become an object to itself", it comes into being as "No", and thus it does not have any relation other than itself (111).

It is a form of being which implies a form of being other than its own. Itself, it is a mode of being 'which has yet to be what it is, that is to say, which is what it is not and which is not what it is'. On the other hand, the object of consciousness is what it is; it is wholly there, totally given, without any separation from itself; it is not possibility, it is itself, it is in itself; 'uncreated, without any reason, without any

relation with another being, being-in-itself has been eternally *de trop*'. (111)

In the first place “no” hints that it is the negation of an affirmation thus, as it is suggested, it is “uncreated” yet contingent upon its object as we become aware of consciousness by looking at the object it refers (111). In this sense, it is clear that consciousness cannot be found what one is conscious of but what there is behind that consciousness. It comes before the object it refers and their relation is highly paradoxical in that consciousness exists independent of its object, yet it can only be comprehended by its object. This means that the consciousness is both bounded and boundless at the same time. However, consciousness is not the outcome of its object; it just needs the object to be realized. The object acts as a mirror and we see the reflection of consciousness by looking its object. In a way if the object is essence then the consciousness is existence. Therefore, it would be erroneous to take the mirror as the core of existence.

Another paradoxical condition similar to that relation is that, as Blackham explains in the chapter as well, though *pour-soi* is contingent with *en-soi*, *pour-soi* exists only if it is detached from *en-soi* in that *en-soi* cannot be fully internalized as being an object. If we are to give an example parallel to the one Blackham states, we can say that the consciousness of being an MA student is not because that one is utterly a MA student but because that he is not a PhD student. That is to say that the existence of consciousness can be comprehended by the negation of its object. In addition, it can be defined as a term, which it is not. So the object, here being an MA student, is only used to detach the object from its consciousness.

Another important point that Blackham mentions is that *pour-soi* “can only be found in its own nothingness”, the fact that it is “uncreated”, “by its relation to the *en-soi* which is gratuitously given, just what it is” (113). This is the foundation of Sartre’s rejection to Cartesian cogito” (Sartre, 1973: 44). Blackham asserts that Sartre rejects it since it suggests that one’s existence is contingent upon his thinking, here referred to as idea, however Sartre requires “to be”, that is “I am”, as the obligatory condition for he thinks that without existence idea cannot exist. Thus in Sartre “I think therefore I am” changes as “I am therefore I think” (44). Actually, it

can be a proper example to abovementioned paradoxical relationship between consciousness and its object. One understands his existence by his contemplation but it does not mean that his contemplation creates his existence. His contemplation is the outcome of his existence yet it is its shape in flesh and bones. In this mutual relation consciousness “precedes” its object (52). In addition, to be stuck in the object that consciousness refers to estranges us from our actual existence. It is as if one is trying to internalize the reflection of our existence, as it is Plato’s cave image. In a metaphorical sense, this consciousness and object relation resembles to making a sentence in its simplest way. That is, in order that the sentence is grammatically correct and meaningful as the obligatory condition we need a subject and a verb. This means that “I” alone and “to write” alone does not carry a meaning, I need to combine them in a grammatical order and say, “I write”. This sentence is grammatically correct and meaningful. I may also add objects or adverbs in order to elaborate the meaning, for instance I may say, “I write a poem”, however grammatically I do not need them if the main aim is to form the smallest meaningful unit. Therefore, without question, we need the subject and the verb primarily. This subject and verb, namely its object in a philosophical sense, are inseparable yet “I” has precedence over “write” in constructing the meaning of “I write”. At first sight, it seems that none has precedence over the other but with further analysis it is clear that in order to give the abovementioned meaning, “I” needs to have precedence. It can as well be understood from the fact that the verb is conjugated according to the subject not according to the verb itself or we do not decide the subject according to the verb. Thus, its creation depends upon the subject. This means that when we exclude the subject verb does not have any significance. Similarly, giving priority to the objects is as if one is trying to make meaningful sentences without the subject. Without the existence, there is no individual significance. Therefore, one needs to detach himself from all the objects that define his existence because those definitions are the simulacrum of what they define.

With regard to Sartre’s understanding of the maintenance of the existence, Blackham asserts that consciousness possesses a probability because of the negation and this probability prompts man to sustain his existence.

My consciousness of myself thus already implies a projection of myself towards my possibility, what I lack in order to be myself identified with myself; and this is the structure of desire and the movement towards fulfilment. The ideal project which defines our existence and is the meaning of human presence in the world is the nisus towards some form of unity of the pour-soi with the en-soi in a totality which saves both. (Blackham, 2002: 113)

Blackham also suggests that the composition of pour-soi is not time dependent. “It is always present, but it has a past and a future by which it generates a self and a world” (113). The past has finished concrete and unchanging yet interpretable, on the other hand future is a possibility.

The past is the inverse of value, of the human ideal, for it is the pour-soi congealed in the en-soi. That is why the past can be idealized, for it seems to be wholly given and solely what it is and at the same time human. The future is constituted by the lack which the pour-soi is; it is open, problematical, essentially a project. (114)

The past is “idealized” as it now becomes an object finished thus; its fashioning project has completed (114). However pour-soi appears to be a future project, thus “is constituted by” what it lacks or what it is not, which makes it “essentially a project” (114). It is not clear, it is a probability yet it is to exist. We may liken it to the nature of life and death for life is a possibility but death is a certainty. In addition, death is the totality of actions without future, but life is the future fashioning project to be explored. The maintenance of existence is provided with this desire to explore the future. On the other hand, Blackham states that the en-soi is the façade of the pour-soi therefore it cannot be wholly internalized; it needs its future, namely pour-soi.

When one consciousness encounters with another the mutual identification cannot be like the one that is between pour-soi and en-soi. For, this encounter neither of them can be object to the other, nor can they be totally pour-soi. Thus, the existence of other is nothing “but a being torn to pieces between two negations” (119). This is because one cannot possess the full knowledge of himself when another consciousness is involved for now I have other me, whose knowledge can only be determined by the other. That is to say in this encounter one is not alone with

his own consciousness for the other's perception of one's consciousness is involved as well and I cannot control *me* in the other. It is suggested that the reason for one's inability to possess full knowledge of himself when he encounters with another consciousness is because one lets his consciousness be limited by the other consciousness. This limitation discloses itself in the feelings such as "shame, fear, pride" which do not have any significance in the absence of the other for they need in their essence a third party to be reflected (Sartre, 1992: 387). The existence of other consciousness and man's awareness that he may have non-identical perception other than he has constitutes such feelings. That's why all the ideologies, religions, social moral codes are third-party consciousness for human existence. The pure knowledge and action seems impossible in such an understanding.

The relationship with the other has two dimensions. The first one is to try to subdue the other's liberty by turning the other into an object. This is because when one becomes aware of the other's consciousness he feels that he needs to control the other-him/he in the other consciousness. Within this perspective, we may claim that this is the reason why all ideologies, religions and social moral codes limit human existence and action, for one feels some sort of responsibility to justify himself before those institutions. For this very reason Sartre believes that, man should be free of those institutions as they limit human consciousness and freedom.

1.3. Jean-Paul Sartre's Humanist Revolt: Existentialism and Humanism

In Existentialism and Humanism, Jean-Paul Sartre tries to defend his theory against some reproaches (Sartre, 1973, 23-24). Existentialism has been accused of being a pessimistic philosophy that worsens human condition for, as Sartre states, their philosophy is equated with "sad wisdom" that may misguide humanity. In addition, in terms of religion, they are "reproached" as well, for they disregard "the commandments of God and all values prescribed as eternal" (23-24). In its essence Sartre mentions that existentialism "does render human life possible" and for this reason it appeals to highly subjective human existence (24). Sartre is against the idea that man "must not oppose the powers-that-be" and that man " must not fight against

superior force; must not meddle in matters that are above” his “station” because within this perspective man is considered to be a potential anarchist, who, if given the chance, could destroy the harmony in society (25). The reason, Sartre explains, is that the absolutes argue that

[...] any undertaking, which has not the support of proven experience, is foredoomed to frustration; and that since experience has shown men to be invariably inclined to evil, there must be firm rules to restrain them, otherwise we shall have anarchy (25).

In such an understanding, men could only contemplate within secure limits in order not to destroy the thinking order in the society. However, it is certain that Sartre has an excessive trust in human consciousness that is enough to be referred in every respect. For this reason in *Existentialism and Humanism*, he does not only defend existentialism against the accusations that degrade it to mere anarchism, but also lays bare the real nature of the philosophy.

Existentialism gives men the chance to choose and to question what to choose. Sartre states that this is “what is alarming” for “it confronts man with the probability of choice (25). For many years with objective philosophies men is expected to surrender his mind to the absolute. For example, as we mentioned before, Hegelian philosophy regards men as something as if it were an idea abstract and universal; thus subjugates his consciousness. This highly objective treatment of man renders him incapable of deciding his own life for, his road is pre-determined and he is expected to reach the universal objective truth. However in Sartrean existentialism each human existence possesses subjectivity and there is nothing that man can rely on regarding the truth. For this reason in order to explain the real nature of subjective truth and human existence Sartre coins such terms as existence precedes essence, bad faith, abandonment and anguish.

First of all we will start with his notion that is “existence precedes essence” in that it is at the core of his philosophy. Sartre criticizes, as we stated before, the philosophies that degrade human existence into an object. In *Existentialism and Humanism*, in order to reveal that objective treatment he starts by giving an example

of a “paper-knife” and an “artisan” (26). He suggests that an artisan who produces the paper knife has “a conception of it” and therefore it is obvious that the object is “producible in a certain manner” and “serves a definite purpose” for one cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper knife without knowing what was it for” (26). Sartre continues and adds that God “creates” man with the same “conception” and the place of man in God’s mind is in this way “comparable to that of the paper knife in the mind of the artisan” (27). This implies that man can be nothing but an object that exists within divine limits. Sartre states that, that omniscient “notion” is disregarded by “eighteenth century philosophical atheism” for they believe that not the creation of God the existence but the essence precedes (27). However, this idea cannot free man from limitations in that it possesses the notion that there is a “conception of human being” “found in every man” suggesting that man is the production of a “universal conception” that is “human nature”(27). We may say that in their logic, there is no difference between the divine creation and the universal inclination of man for each of them turns man into an object at the end; man is unmoulded from the same model. For this very reason, as being a revolt against such deterministic understanding concerning human existence, Sartre claims “existence comes before essence” because in order to define the essence man must exist first (26). For this reason, man is nothing until he is able to define who he is and additionally there cannot be any formula for all men. What Sartre focuses on is that, man is neither an idea, nor an object like paper knife and therefore he does need neither a creator nor an external thinker. Man is not something to be formed like an idea or a timber; he cannot be contemplated but he is the one who contemplates.

In existentialist philosophy, it is possible to resemble the relation between existence and essence to that of body and soul but not it is as in the religious context. In divine religions the soul comes before the body and could only be perceived by man when it comes into existence in the body and in return the body needs soul for its own existence. However, in “atheistic existentialism”, of which Sartre presents himself as a “representative”, this mutual dependence is just the contrary; the essence does not precede existence since the existence is the prior condition for the existence of essence (27-28). Therefore Sartrean existentialism does not speculate whether God

exists or not for

[...] even if Go existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe Go does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God. In this sense, existentialism is optimistic. It is a doctrine of action, and it is only by self-deception, by confusing their own despair with ours that Christians can describe us as without hope. (Sartre, 2001: 45)

In addition to the ignorance of God's existence, Sartrean existentialism revolts against Christian doctrine regarding the original sin inherent in man on his arrival on earth, as well. The idea suggests that the essence does not possess a universal definition, but rather a unique explanation for every individual being. The essence is not the prior condition for existence but the other way around. If we are to turn our example, the body may need soul for its existence to be perceived but existence does not need essence, as it is existence that identifies the essence. Therefore, Sartre suggests that existence is much more dignified for being a "conscious decision" within man's will whereas creation is something beyond man's will (Sartre, 1973: 28). The underlying reason for the mistrust on the divine explanation of man's existence is that religion could only disclose man's creation but it could not reveal his very existence. Sartrean existentialism, in this sense, rejects not only the universal conceptualization but also the divine interference because it follows the idea that "man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be" (28). Therefore, man is both the creator and the created when it comes to his existence. With this regard, Sartre states that

The first effect of existentialism is that it puts everyman in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men (29).

However, we understand that, despite the strong emphasis on subjectivity and responsibility, Sartre states that man is not "in isolation", nor he is accountable only to his own subjectivity as the decisions he takes inevitably affects other men thus the individual choice must be "for all men". (29) The fact that man is in full

responsibility for all men in his decision refutes that existentialism “consider[s] man in isolation” (23). By subjectivity existentialism understands that “man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity” (29). Thus, it is not an excessive self-indulgence, which would drag man into pessimism, because it clearly indicates that man is responsible “for all men” (29). Here what Sartre tries to emphasize is that man is highly human and therefore nothing eternal, universal or celestial could interfere human subjectivity.

Sartre indicates that this responsibility is the reason for what he calls anguish, abandonment and despair. According to Sartre “man is in anguish” for he decides utterly without any “justification” other than himself (34). As it is exemplified in “what Kierkegaard called ‘the anguish of Abraham’” there is neither anyone nor nothing that can “prove that” whether he is really Abraham or whether it is “indeed an angel” (32- 34). There is no proof except that he himself decides that he is Abraham and it is an angel that “addresses” to him (32). However, the fact that man must decide for himself does not require God’s non-existence. Sartre clearly specifies that existentialism “finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all the possibility of finding values” (33). Although he argues that humanity will surely attain “the same norms of” morality even in the absence of God, he inescapably needs him to clarify his doctrine. He puts forward that

It is nowhere written that “the good” exists that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon a plane where there are only man. Dostoevsky once wrote “If God did not exist, everything would be permitted”; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. For indeed the existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism — man is free, man *is* freedom. (34)

In order to concretize the notion of abandonment, anguish and despair, Sartre gives us two examples. He mentions about one of his students who comes him to consult on his dilemma. His father is “inclined to be a ‘collaborator’, his brother [has] been killed in the German offensive of 1940” and therefore he flames with

vengeance (35). However, at the same time, we have his mother who is “living alone with him” and “deeply afflicted by the semi-treason and by the death of her eldest son”; thus, the only solace for her is to have the only living son beside her (35). The student is aware that his mother is living only for him, he is her source of life yet on the other hand, he is dying for his brother’s vengeance. He cannot decide whether he should join the army or to stay with his mother. He knows that whichever he chooses it would be for the benefit of his mother. However one is “ambiguous”, that is to join the army, for it “might vanish like water into sand and serve no purpose”, though it might serve to “an end infinitely greater, a national collectivity” (35-36). On the other hand, the other is “directed towards only one individual” and it has one certain accomplishment that is the happiness of his mother (35). He could find an answer neither in social nor in individual morality yet he has to choose one of them. As we see neither the religious morality nor Socratic greatest goods or Hegelian universal concepts could help him. No value can anticipate his devotion to his mother or his passion for his brother’s vengeance by looking at the choice he has made. With this regard, as we said before, religion could not go beyond explaining man’s creation. There is nothing that neither religion nor objective truth can offer for man’s existence as life is full of such dilemmas that forces man to decide on his own. Therefore, it is clear that man’s existence is in its essence “ambiguous” and cannot be limited either by religion or by any kind of morality (35). It may be further argued that Sartre’s notion does not only reveal the impracticability of any kind of conceptualization either religious or secular, but also it discloses their nature, that is even if man devotes himself to any religion or morality he needs to adjust or interpret the rules with his own mind all the same. For this reason all the moral codes, religious doctrines and objective truths are incapable of constructing man’s very being. However, neither should it be understood as an anarchist revolt nor as a blind rejection as it gives man the full responsibility of his decisions and its results. This is the origin of man’s anguish and “that is what abandonment implies, that we ourselves decide our being” (39). As man is not “a paper knife”, of which purposes can be anticipated before his creation, his existence cannot be predicted nor can it be predetermined (27). The idea also suggests that the concept of destiny that man can take refuge in does not exist except that man is destined to determine his life. In this

sense man is “[c]ondemned, because he did not create himself, yet nevertheless at liberty and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does” (34).

Man’s future is but in his own hands; there is nothing external that man can hold responsible. Thus, he feels that he is “forsaken”, there is nothing to justify his actions or to cover the consequences of what he chooses; man sinks into despair (Sartre, 1973: 35). Moreover, nothing changes even if man consults before he decides. This is because, in either condition man gives the final decision, as it is man who decides what advice to take or if he is going to consult. As in the example of Sartre’s student, he is aware that what Sartre would advise him, he just hopes to find an excuse or an assurance for his actions, yet in the end he does not exercise what Sartre advises but what he chooses. This explains why morality, religion or any kind of external authority cannot determine man for it cannot trigger individual action in a moral or religious way even when man meets their standards. There we have man all alone in the world without any objective standard, or moral, or religious formula that we can ground his actions but his own judgment. He is both the reason and the result of “what he fashions himself to be” (Sartre,) for “nothing can be imposed on [man] from outside”, nothing can stimulate him to act. “Man is nothing but he purposes, he exists in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is” (41).

As the quotation argues Sartre requires not only personal judgment and individual decision but also the actual acting as “there is no reality except in action” (41). We may argue that the underlying reason for Sartre’s insistence on action may stem from his rejection to Cartesian and Kantian thoughts. As it has been mentioned before, those philosophies consider man as an idea thus they are deterministic and mind referring. However, Sartre argues that man is not an idea to be contemplated, but he is the very being to act and exist. In this way action serves as the proof of his actual existence and man distinguishes himself from all abstractions. If we turn back to the student’s case there is nothing that can prove his love for his mother unless he stays with her. This is because “[...] feelings are formed by the deeds that one does;

therefore, [man] cannot consult it as a guide to action” (37). In addition, as quoted before, “man is “the sum of his actions”; therefore there is no use to say what you might be because at the end

“[...] there remains with [man] a wide range of abilities, inclinations and potentialities, unused but perfectly viable, which endow with [him] a worthiness that could never be inferred from the mere history of [his] actions” (41)

To conclude, what Sartre disagrees in Cartesian and Hegelian thought is that it revolves around an absolute truth, which in effect foreshadows his future. Existentialism on the other hand, perceives man as a being highly ambiguous and unpredictable unlike an object as he cannot serve for a specific purpose as “a table or chair” does (45). In this sense, Sartre positions his doctrine into a very dignified level by differentiating man from “the material world” (45). According to this notion, man is a free individual accountable to every action he exercises. However, this subjectivism should not be understood as mere isolated individualism that ignores the existence of others. In contrast, Sartre believes that the individual existence could only be perceived in the “presence of others” (45). He indicates that his “point of departure” with regard to “subjectivity” is due to that he does not build his theory on perfect yet impracticable truth as suggested in Cartesian philosophy (44). However he does deny that the subjective choice inevitably possesses “a universal value” yet the notion does not suggest a universal “human nature” for what Sartre means by “universality” is not that each man shares exactly the same “purposes” but that “every purpose is comprehensible to every man” (46). For this reason, we can also argue that Sartre’s notion on universality and subjective truth in this regard serves as a defence against the reproach that his philosophy renders man isolated and pessimistic, since his notion suggests that the inevitable universal nature of the subjective truth requires the other for itself to be revealed. This is because Sartre points out that man should “choose” himself and “understand the purpose of any other man” for “human universality” (47). However he also suggests that it is not possible to refer to an absolute truth; what is certain is the absoluteness of perceiving other consciousness. In the light of all these Sartre outlines his philosophy as “the ethic of action of and self-commitment” which can be achieved through “inter

subjectivity” because “the intimate discovery of” self “is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom” (44- 45).

CHAPTER TWO
THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE IN
LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER

Ours is essentially a tragic age, so we refuse to take it tragically. The cataclysm has happened, we are among the ruins, we start to build up new little habits, to have new little hopes. It is rather hard work: there is now no smooth road into the future: but we go round, or scramble over the obstacles. We've got to live, no matter how many skies have fallen. (Lawrence, 1968: 37)

From the very beginning of the novel, Lawrence justifies our attempt to interpret Lady Chatterley's Lover in terms of existentialism by suggesting the same issue on what Sartre does at the beginning of Existentialism and Humanism. As stated in the theory chapter, in Existentialism and Humanism Sartre defends his theory against some "reproaches" that charges existentialism with being highly "pessimistic" and isolated (Sartre, 1973: 23). Sartre replies that his theory rather than being pessimistic, it is the opposite because it gives man the chance to face his own fact that is his freedom. By coining such terms as anguish, bad faith and abandonment, he clarifies what lies behind such confrontation. "It is rather hard work" (Lawrence, 1968: 37), however, regardless of its hardness, Sartre finds it essential if an actual existence is in question. This means that man should not refrain from confronting his freedom and the responsibility it brings in order to exist. As for "tragedy" that Lawrence states above, in a metaphorical sense, we may argue that it coincides with what Sartre suggests concerning the nature of man's being, that is he is not responsible for his creation "yet nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does" (Sartre, 1973: 34). Tragic it is since man does not choose to descend to earth nevertheless he has to sustain his existence by assuming the full responsibility. When he is created, he is an object and the difficulty is in turning himself into a subject. However, according to Sartre, man should "refuse to take it tragically" in order to overcome the anguish it causes and "scramble over the obstacles" for "[...] there is a future to be fashioned, a virgin future that awaits him (Lawrence, 1968: 37; Sartre, 1973: 35). Within this context, the novel is the embodiment of one's struggle to subjectify

himself/herself by de-subjectifying everything that objectifies his/her individuality. Within this regard, we will handle the novel by shedding light on the ontological dichotomy between the object and the subject, past and future, death and life, function and action, self-discovery and instruction, certainty and possibility, pure knowledge and relativity within Sartrean and Kierkegaardian notion on existence in order to reveal the existential crisis inherent in the characters and their struggle to form an authentic existence.

To begin with, when we analyse the relation between subject and object within Sartrean perspective, as stated before, there is a mutual relationship between the object and subject however, this interconnectedness does not render the subject bounded or boundless. Consciousness, the subject, exists independent of its object as its existence “precedes (52)” the object. The object acts as a mirror and we see the reflection of consciousness by looking its object. Therefore, it would be erroneous to take the mirror as the core of being. As for Kierkegaardian existentialist philosophy, it rejects the idea that man is “a theoretical knower” that would reach certain conclusions by following a specific philosophy (Michelman, 2008: 205). This is because individual mind is not to be contemplated like an idea. Such highly mind-referring attitude towards independent individual existence generates controlled and predetermined existences. For this reason, what Kierkegaard urges is to detach ourselves from objective inclinations and to possess an authentic individuality. He raises those objections against Hegelian determinism as it renders man mentally inactive and ontologically non-existent for it generates predetermined codes for unpredictable human nature. The Kierkegaardian rejection against determinism echoes in the novel not only as identity search and identity crisis but also as patriarchy, social/gender roles, institutionalized concept of marriage and negative class awareness. This is because objectivism is result oriented ,in a way it is after the destination as opposed to existentialism which follows the road, and appeals “to certain man in certain condition” which inevitably leads to subordinated and passive individualities (Schroeder, 2005: 209).

Ontological objectivism in Kierkegaardian philosophy coincides with Wragby

Hall as being the decision-making mechanism where everything is predetermined by the absoluteness of high social codes. Besides patriarchal and aristocratic determinism, it also portrays the loss and change caused by industrial growth and World War I and its effects on individual identity. In the novel, Lawrence presents reader the insensitive relationship of a newly-wed couple, Lady Chatterley and Sir Clifford broken when Clifford returns crippled from the war and his wife's infidelity with the gamekeeper Mellors. In this sense, Clifford represents the injured individual mind that loses the sincere relation with himself and gives his individuality in the insincere nature of modern world, which reduces every possible meaning regarding human life and mind. The war and modern world destroys man's dynamism and therefore he cannot act upon his primordial impulses, in return, the society turns out to be a suppressive organization that limits individual existence and misjudges humanly affairs such as love, sex and marriage. Excessive adhesion to patriarchal and socio-economic demands inevitably render every humanly relation meaningless and for this reason man loses his organic relation with both himself and world and eventually he mutates.

Within this regard from the very beginning of the novel Lawrence portrays sharp and strongly determined social boundaries even between Clifford and Connie. In this social order, everyone is expected to possess class-consciousness for "it is not who begets us that matters, but where fate places us" (Lawrence, 1968: 197). In addition, it is understood that although Constance is presented as an intelligent woman, her intelligence loses its importance before Clifford, as he is "aristocracy" (6). In this regard, Clifford perceives himself as the financial god of his man as he provides money, education and life. He believes that they should grateful for what he does for his colliers and Connie as he maintains the social order with his aristocratic determinism.

As stated before, one of the reasons for such conventional understanding is "the bruise of false inhuman war" for it empties everything regarding humanity, intimacy and spontaneity (51). As a result, people chase after success, wealth and reputation in order to sustain so-called social order. The only important thing in

one's life become something unavailing and unaware of the fact man sacrifices his life for "the bitch-goddess" (152). The driving force to survive is something vanishing thus the individual vanishes in the hands of this "absolute necessity". We can say that though Lawrence does not actually aspire after social criticism he depicts the inorganic aspects in the society for he believes that man should deny everything incompatible with his nature.

In this field, men were like gods, or demons, inspired to discoveries, and fighting to carry them out. In this activity, men were beyond any mental age calculable. But Clifford knew that when it did come to the emotional and human life, these self-made men were of a mental age of about thirteen, feeble boys. (113)

As the above quotation urges Clifford's generation is taken by the glory of winning and maintaining their social power. They have lost their organic connection with their life and the machinery they are leading mechanizes them inevitably. The only thing they are after the decency, the protection of their social title and economic welfare and therefore there is nothing left humane. Lawrence portrays them as "feeble boys" for on behalf of emotional intelligence they do not possess anything (113). As the representative of such men, Clifford is depicted as sensationally childish and spiritually inhuman. We may argue that Lawrence intentionally presents Clifford as paralyzed in that his impotency and physical disability stands for his mental impotence and spiritual disability. His personality, as well as his body is motorized as his chair and therefore he could only be presented with his function not with his action.

The inactivity that Connie suffers drags her into an existential questioning which also discloses in the novel the attitudes towards man and his identity. For this reason, a close look on Connie's ontological dilemmas and discontent reveals the dichotomy between individual and social identity, as well.

To begin with, the relationship between Connie and Clifford is nothing beyond "my-husband-my-wife sort", cold and without intimacy (39). They are connected with each other "in the aloof modern way" (39). In fact this is not unique to Connie

as he does not establish a real humanly relationship with any other people as well, neither with his equals nor below his rank. However, the general inclination is that men, whether from lower class or high class, are prone to stick in their social boundaries in order to secure themselves and such readiness for social security estranges men from one another. This is the general perception of man regarding his position and thus determined actions yet when it comes to Clifford the physical and emotional wound he receives intensifies this “strange denial” (12). For this reason though being raised in aristocracy he appears to be diffident when it comes to be utterly in the “landed aristocracy society” and “nervous of all that other big world” which involves middle and working class (7). Being aware of his physical disability and “defencelessness” he negates human contact and hesitates to share his world with the rest (9). For this reason “[h]e [is] remotely interested; but like a man looking down a microscope” (13). Connie is aware of that Clifford has lost something in his soul and he has been surrounded by the nothingness. It is like an infectious disease and it infects Connie.

Within this regard, we observe an analogical relation, between that of consciousness and its object, in respect of Sartrean notion of *pour-soi* and *en-soi*. Despite his lordly appearance Clifford needs Connie, as without her he could not ensure the matrimonial integrity, which appears to him as the social obligation on the way to be Clifford Chatterley, the lord of Wragby. For this reason, ontologically Clifford assumes Connie as the object of his consciousness, for he cannot become self-sufficient and he can only perceive his existence with her objectified presence. Therefore, he always needs Connie as a reassurance in order to sustain his existence. That is why “all he wanted was for Connie to swear, to swear not to leave him, not to give him away” no matter what happens (117). In this sense, Clifford cannot form an authentic existence independent of its object. As Connie functions only as the object of Clifford in their marriage their relation is nothing more than a “habit of being in the same house with one another” and Connie perceives it as an “empty treadmill” which takes them nowhere (56). For this reason, their marriage lacks affection and any kind of emotional attachment; it is just the practice of matrimony. Connie cannot feel the actual sensation of any kind with Clifford. The war paralyzes Clifford and

consequently Clifford paralyzes her feelings. Veins of life are stopped and she is suffocated by the nothingness that the life with Clifford drags her into. For this reason, she could not feel whether she is alive or not and whether the very existence of hers makes any sense at all. She is far away from the core of her existence and therefore she could perceive only the reflection of her being. This is because from an ontological aspect her subject cannot manifest itself as Clifford objectifies it.

In addition they are “bodily” and spiritually “non-existent to one another” though being so close and intimate (16). Their relation lacks tenderness and compassion and therefore they are unable to establish an actual relationship. As abovementioned Lawrence describes Connie’s feelings regarding her relationship with Clifford as an “empty treadmill”, which suggests that the life with Clifford takes Connie to nowhere no matter how they struggle. Their marriage cannot advance, it spins around a definite circle and there is no way out. It recalls us Kierkegaard’s notion on the continuity and the significance of existence. Kierkegaard criticizes Hegelian notion of “pure thought” as it is idealized and universalized thus it has nothing to offer for individual existence (2009: 260). Therefore, he states that “having to exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Denmark with a small map of Europe on which Denmark shows no larger than a steel pen-point” (260). As we stated before “pure thought” shows only the destination not the journey (260). However, existentialism is not interested in the destination to be arrived for it cannot be anticipated, but it concentrates on the way; namely, how you arrive. Kierkegaard points out that the emphasis on the destination would reduce the passion to exist as it offers a kind of certainty, which offers the individual safe but insignificant way. He also indicates that man is inclined “to have something finished” yet he insists on that man should “renounce” this “urge” (73). This is because he believes that the sense of wonder and being unsure of anything are one of the strongest drives that prompt man to exist for it stimulates man’s desire to discover something. In this sense, Kierkegaardian approach towards “continual becoming” conflictingly coincides with Laurentian “empty treadmill” (73).

First of all treadmill recalls stability and certainty as it spins around repeatedly

yet arriving nowhere. It is like a vicious circle that draws Connie into its vortex. For this reason, there is no actual action and progress in terms of existence. Her being together with her feelings perishes in this vortex. However, Connie longs for the journey, namely the action and she wants to save herself from this “simulacrum of reality” and touch the real earth (Lawrence, 1968: 16). In addition if we consider “treadmill” as the one that we have now in our age it is just like a simulation, the machine makes you feel that you are walking which actually you are not. In a similar way, Connie is under the impression that she is living. However, the actual being is when you express, or manifest your existence. For the time being Connie suppresses her feelings and desires, she cannot manifest her identity within the walls of Wragby Hall. Their life is dreamlike, far removed from reality. For this reason she is unable integrate with her being.

And thus far it was a life: in the void. For the rest it was non-existence. Wragby was there, the servants . . . but spectral, not really existing. Connie went for walks in the park, and in the woods that joined the park, and enjoyed the solitude and the mystery, kicked the brown leaves of autumn, and picked the primroses of spring. But it was all a dream; or rather it was like the simulacrum of reality. The oak-leaves were to her like oak-leaves seen ruffling in a mirror; she herself was a figure somebody had read about, picking primroses that were only shadows or memories, or words. No substance to her or anything . . . no touch, no contact! (16)

Wragby Hall appears to Connie as “non-existent “because it has lost the organic touch with the life itself. Connie can perceive only her objectified reflection in the Wragby Hall. This is because there is no individual action and decision in Wragby and their lives are predetermined according to its social codes. In order for a better understanding of what Lawrence tries to evoke in reader, it would be worth recalling Sartrean and Kierkegaardian notion of action and free choice. To begin with, Sartre urges the importance of free choice and action by assuming the full responsibility because it is the only thing that differentiates man from an object like “a paper-knife” (Sartre, 1973: 26). There is not any objective standard or ideology of any kind that we can ground the individual action on. For this reason man is both the reason and the result of “what he makes himself to be” and nothing can be imposed on [man] from outside” and nothing prompts him to act. However, within this regard we observe that in Wragby Hall, there is not any kind of individual action and

decision as everything continues in a “mechanical cleanliness” and “the mechanical order” without any mistake (Lawrence, 1968: 14). In this order running like a clockwork Connie cannot find an individual place for herself to express her identity as it has been suppressed by Clifford’s ancestral control and for this reason she feels that she is nothing more than “a figure” that is shaped and controlled by such ancestral mechanism. She feels detached from the core of life and she just plays the role of Lady Chatterley. She is surrounded by “[a]n inward dread, an emptiness” which haunts her soul (50).

As she realizes that her life with Clifford eradicates her vitality, she feels much more depressed. Julian Moynahan depicts it as the conflict between “the abstract, cerebral, vital” and “the other concrete physical and organic” (Moynahan, 1959: 66). We may argue that this is because Wragby Hall, as being the maintainer of economic field, tries to control ideas and feelings. This is the reason why Wragby Hall represents the objective thought that Kierkegaard denounces and Clifford considers Connie as “a theoretical knower” who must learn and obey what to live in Wragby Hall requires (Michelman, 2008: 205). In this sense, it has its own set of rules for the maintenance of patriarchy and lordship institution that allows individual only to deliberate over certain ideas and within secure limits. Connie is expected to fulfil what her social position demands and therefore she cannot form an authentic identity within the rigid walls of Wragby Hall.

The others tell one who one is. Later one endorses, or tries to discard, the ways the others have defined one. It is difficult not to accept their story. One may try not to be what one ‘knows’ one is, in one’s heart of hearts. One may try to tear out from oneself this ‘alien’ identity one has been endowed with or condemned to, and create by one’s own actions an identity for oneself, which one tries to force others to confirm. Whatever its particular subsequent vicissitudes, however, one’s first social identity is conferred on one. We learn to be whom we are told we are. (Laing, 2002: 78)

In this context, Connie portrays two different identities; the one is having potential life energy and desiring sensuality, the other is her persona; Lady Chatterley with whom she just fulfils the requirements of ideal “lady” definition. She is in between the desire and duty. Clifford is unaware of what Connie suffers from as

he cannot perceive her as subject. For this reason, he treats her as if she were an idea that he can think over and shape. Within this regard it is possible to associate Connie's objectification with Sartre's rejection of "Cartesian cogito" (Sartre, 1973: 44). What Sartre strongly emphasizes is that essence does not have precedence over the existence yet "Cartesian cogito" favours idea by assuming it as the prerequisite for being (44). Similarly Clifford presumes that he has dominance over Connie for her existence as "think" has precedence over "to be" in "cogito" (44). As Sartre renounces that one's existence is contingent upon his thinking, Lawrence despises Connie's dependence on Clifford in every aspect. As a result of Clifford's abstraction of Connie, she becomes nothing more than an object of which boundaries are limited to Clifford's ability to generate ideas, a quality which he lacks. However, the ontological mutation is not limited to human existence but also for "all the great words" which Lawrence presumes as what makes one human. For this reason determinism echoes in the novel not only as identity search and identity crisis but also as patriarchy, social/gender roles, institutionalized concept of marriage and love.

All the great words, it seemed to Connie, were cancelled for her generation: love, joy, happiness, home, mother, father, husband, all these great, dynamic words were half dead now, and dying from day to day. Home was a place you lived in, love was a thing you didn't fool yourself about, joy was a word you applied to a good Charleston, happiness was a term of hypocrisy used to bluff other people, a father was an individual who enjoyed his own existence, a husband was a man you lived with and kept going in spirits. As for sex, the last of the great words, it was just a cocktail term for an excitement that bucked you up for a while, then left you more raggy than ever. (Lawrence, 1968: 63- 64)

As a result of subversion vital primordial values the individual is torn between what s/he desires and what s/he musts thus at the very moment humanity retires from the scene. While Connie is distressed by the "hypocrisy of words", all Clifford fancies is to flatter himself with his "dead words", maintain his seed and therefore to preserve the "wood" (51- 98). The wood bears a crucial meaning for Clifford; as it is impossible for him to have an original Chatterley seed, he assumes the wood as his potential heir that he inherits "through generations" and therefore he feels that urge to seclude it from the rest of the world (42). The epiphany of Clifford's desire for ancestral protection of the wood in Connie is highly contrastive. Clifford wants the

wood to remain “untouched” and “nobody to trespass in it” like the way that he secludes Connie. In this sense the wood arouses Clifford’s desire to possess. However, for Connie the wood reminds her of her lack of tenderness and touch, her being “demi-vierge”, which Clifford does not even notice (16). Just as the wood Connie is fertile and teemful, but she lays herself fallow as there is no seed to inseminate her. For this reason she feels her womb is always in pain and realizes that her body decays as she remains “half-virgin” (17).

But the front of her body made her miserable. It was already beginning to slacken, with a slack sort of thinness, almost withered, going old before it had ever really lived. She thought of the child she might somehow bear. Was she fit, anyhow? (73)

As there is nothing emotional and spiritual to keep Connie and Clifford together she can satisfy neither her soul nor her body just with that marriage title. As for Clifford, he is not even aware that Connie is uneasy and desperate with him. He has so much indulged into his own narrow world that he is unable to notice neither her being nor the existential agony that preys on her mind. In a way he cannot see Connie but Lady Chatterley for the latter is enough to sustain the integrity and the decency. For this reason he just requires Lady Chatterley who would stand by him as his wife in the crowds. Connie’s presence gives him strength, the feeling of being integrated yet this is nothing beyond simulation. For this reason her life is nothing but acting, pretending or fulfilling what to be Lady Chatterley requires. However, Connie is disturbed by that Clifford treats her like a knickknack for he is “awfully kind to Constance Reid or to Lady Chatterley; but not to her womb” (129). Connie has “played this woman so much” and now it is “almost second nature to her” therefore she would like to unmask herself and embrace her real self (128). Her existential and sensual distress increases when she pretends Lady Chatterley once again while Clifford and his friends discuss about body and sensation. At first Connie cannot grasp what Tommy Dukes intends when he says “the democracy of touch” and the resurrection of body, but all the same she is thrilled by his speech (78). The “touch” and “the body” are keywords that will unlock her soul. However it is not only the physical touch, she also lacks the spiritual one that attaches two people to one another. For this very reason we might claim that Lawrence discusses

not only physical virginity but also the existential and the spiritual one. In this sense, what we argue is that Connie is existentially virgin within the scope of Sartrean existential philosophy since there is no individual choice, action and responsibility for what she experiences. The lack of a tender touch paves the way for that kind of virginity as Connie cannot find an addressee to reveal her subject. At this point according to Sartre, personal “truth” can be acquired “through the mediation of another” thus in revelation of the self, one consciousness needs the other (Sartre, 2001: 45). Similarly in an organic sexual relation that Lawrence urges we need the other, otherwise we just masturbate. In this sense it might be claimed that Connie’s submissive being masturbates itself and Clifford his; therefore they cannot ejaculate their subjects in Sartrean terms. Within this regard Sartre states that

The *pour-soi*, being related to the other in this way either as subject or as object, tries to escape becoming an object to the other, strives to assimilate the other or to make the other the object, engages in love or hate. In love, it is the liberty of the other that I want to assimilate or to possess as liberty; for it is the liberty of the other that separates the other from me and constitutes me an object revealing my outside to the other. In loving, I demand that the one I love shall exist solely to choose me as an object, and thus be the origin of my existence for another: it is this alone that gives me an existence not merely *de facto* (*de trop*) but *de jure*, willed by the entire liberty of another, whose existence I will with my own liberty. If I can possess the will of another to whom I am an object, an essence, without infringing its liberty, I become my own foundation and justification. (Blackham, 2002: 121)

Within this perspective Clifford tries to subjugate Connie’s consciousness and does not let her reveal herself as subject. We may argue that in their relation Clifford justifies his subjugation of Connie through the demands of moral social codes which can be evaluated within Kierkegaardian rejection of determinism. Clifford is so obsessed with maintaining the ancestral living that he is not even troubled with Connie’s having relations with other men on condition that she does not leave him. He cannot understand that Connie needs something else that is more sensual and spiritual that would awaken her soul as she is run out her reserves.

You had that lover in Germany . . . what is it now? Nothing almost. It seems to me that it isn't these little acts and little connections we make in our lives that matter so very much. They pass away, and where are they? Where . . . Where are the snows of yesteryear? . . . It's what endures through one's life that matters; my own life matters

to me, in its long continuance and development. But what do the occasional connections matter? And the occasional sexual connections specially! If people don't exaggerate them ridiculously, they pass like the mating of birds. And so they should. What does it matter? It's the life-long companionship that matters. It's the living together from day to day, not the sleeping together once or twice. You and I are married, no matter what happens to us. We have the habit of each other. And habit, to my thinking, is more vital than any occasional excitement. The long, slow, enduring thing...that's what we live by...not the occasional spasm of any sort. Little by little, living together, two people fall into a sort of unison, they vibrate so intricately to one another. That's the real secret of marriage, not sex; at least not the simple function of sex. You and I are interwoven in a marriage. (Lawrence, 1968: 44-45)

As Clifford is detached from his organic self he is unable to comprehend what it means to share something deeply emotional and sensual. For this reason he perceives sensuality nothing more than a temporal spasm or momentarily relief that comes out of an animalistic need. That's why he does not mind whether Connie has temporary love affairs or not, since "life-long companion ship" is much more vital than temporal body thrills. However, this accompaniment is about to be a "lifelong" endurance for Connie for she becomes nothing more than an object of Clifford's desires. On the other hand, his approval of adultery and a child, so long as the child carries his surname, is highly offensive for Connie's being. In this sense Connie is perceived as an animal kept for breeding in order for the maintenance of the seed. We observe that the loss and the change Clifford experiences automate his feelings and desires and therefore he senses sensuality either as "occasional spasm" or for childbearing (45). In consequence he appreciates not the action of sensuality but its function. As Clifford is automatically interested in life he values something according to the function it serves. In consequence, he commodifies the people around him including his own identity.

Aristocracy is a function, a part of fate. And the masses are a functioning of another part of fate. The individual hardly matters. It is a question of which function you are brought up to and adapted to. It is not the individuals that make an aristocracy: it is the functioning of the aristocratic whole. And it is the functioning of the whole mass that makes the common man what he is. (197)

What Lawrence lays bare is that aristocracy objectifies individual identity in order to maintain its function. To achieve this, it tames "the disorderly emotions" for

“[t]he modern world has only vulgarized emotion by letting it loose” (147- 189). Otherwise the individual might not find a place for himself/herself as “the function determines the individual” (197). The stress on the decency is interesting and Wragby Hall does not accept any mistake that would disorganize its rules lasting for ages. In this regard Clifford repeats the ancestral action; therefore, there is no prospective individual act. In this regard Sartre, when he explains the notion of *pour-soi* and *en-soi*, suggests that past is dead since it becomes an object acted and thus finished for this reason it can be romanticised because the practice of past is secure and mechanic. In addition to that, the quote stresses that man cannot compose an authentic existence without consulting the past. On that point Sartre rates continual existing with future for it “is essentially a project”, virgin and ready to be discovered yet unsecured (Sartre, 1973: 35). It is not clear, it is a probability yet it is to exist. We can resemble it to the nature of life and death for life is a possibility but death is a certainty. In addition, death is the totality of actions without future, but life is the future fashioning project to be explored. The maintenance of existence is provided with this desire to explore the future. In this sense the futuristic virginity that Sartre discusses for the preservation of free existence coincides with Lawrence’s understanding protecting the organic “connexion between apple and the tree” (Lawrence, 1968: 37). Such connection is deemed indispensable to obtain an organic integrity that helps man to find out who he really is. In this sense the society has “severed” that connection between man and his nature and therefore, as man has lost his essence and cannot find an organic source from which he can feed his soul, his existence decays (37). The “self-annihilation” in the novel intensifies with Clifford’s desire to sustain the classic control (Hannay, 2003: 28). That’s why he is so much indulged in literature to flatter himself and to be reassured by the society and enchanted by the abstraction of the ideal. Without society he is nothing.

At this very point Lawrence questions the nature of truth regarding both its attainment and expression. We understand that in Wragby Hall the truth is nothing but an ancestral repetition of a dead past and thus it has not been internally discovered but externally taught. Man warrants his existence in the objectified reality of the past which eventually ends up with his ontological death. Ancestral action

inhibits questioning and challenging and thus presents its truth as fact which actually does nothing but hides man's organic reality. Clifford adopts the same understanding. This means that he is unable to comprehend what is to be a human and that an individual, unlike machine, possess body and soul. In addition he is unaware of the fact that human nature cannot be tamed like an animal. Human soul is like lion's; free and powerful in its nature. Therefore it needs to wander around the woods, it requires to follow the instinct to chase the prey, to observe and then to catch it on impulse. Otherwise, it will be a circus animal; fooled and ridiculed before the audience. It will soon become the toy of their enjoyment. Identically in Clifford's statement, he requires man and his feelings must be tamed like a circus lion by the lion tamer, namely by the social determinism. In this regard, as he chooses to be the tamed circus lion he is ready to renounce his real self, he is ready to behave someone other than he is and expects Connie to do the same in order to be approved in the society. He accepts the mutation yet he detaches from his essence.

Within this perspective, by taking into consideration what Sartre discusses on the nature of existence and essence, we might claim that if existence is the priority and thus the reality for Sartre on the way to structure the essence, as holding the precedence, Wragby Hall stands for the simulacrum of existence, by presenting itself as existence, and thus it detaches the reality. In this way, we are actually face to face with the objectified existence, the simulation of being, with which the subject vanishes. Therefore, by justifying itself under the guise of the reality, Wragby Hall both idealizes and conditions the reality. Having said all these, we can further argue that the subversion of reality is the reason for man's existential eradication and for all humanly values. Similarly, Clifford's abstraction and objectification eradicate what is left between them. At this point Lawrence criticizes the subordination of feelings and desires by the society.

The mass is forever vulgar, because it can't distinguish between its own original feelings and feelings which are diddled into existence by the exploiter. The public is always profane, because it is controlled from the outside, by the trickster, and never from the inside, by its own sincerity. The mob is always obscene, because it is always second-hand. (Lawrence, 1959: 66)

Within this perspective Connie's existence is hidden inside the "endless spinning of webs of yarns" that Clifford spins over her being (Lawrence, 1968: 16). She lacks the absence of a real relationship thus she is in search of an escape. She has an affair with Michaelis but she realizes that it is not the thing she longs for. This also reveals that mere sensuality cannot ease her suffering. It is because that physical desire is the destination to be arrived at. However Connie is not after the last station, she needs the way because the destination has nothing to give her. She realizes that her soul needs to be fed with something and this is what Clifford and Michaelis cannot give, she needs a source; a source for her living and being. She does not need "excursions" for "the point of an excursion is that you come home again" yet she needs to flee (45). Her relation with both Clifford and Michaelis reveals that the society has reified love and sex. However, love and sensuality are the very primordial desires of man. Like eating and breathing a person needs love and sex. It is like two people's making bread to full their stomach. One puts the flour, the other the salt. You mix them with tears of joy and tenderness. You drain your tears in it. And the ferment is the intimacy, sincerity and the sense of wholeness. You wait for a while for the dough to be fermented. You bake the dough with the flames of the souls; and there you have the bread. However you need to ferment it again and again to feed the body. Likewise the soul needs its own bread or it suffers from hunger of affection. Therefore you need to find the source to give the soul what it lacks. However this journey requires mutual devotion. If either of you swing the lead, the other loses his/her appetite in time. This is the situation for Connie and Clifford. She realizes that the "very material" that she and Clifford are "made of" is rotten to the core (64). Her soul and womanhood perish in the hands of Clifford. She feels that soul fades away before it blossoms. In this sense Clifford's soil, both literally and metaphorically, is not convenient for Connie to blossom.

She is much more aware of that when Mrs. Bolton shares her feelings on the death of her husband. She remembers those days wishfully and shows no sign of injury. Connie observes that she could manage her life without his absence, or at least she possesses the power to push herself into the life again. She invents another source in order to sustain her existence. She is the example of Sartre's future man

who ceaselessly explores and invents future for himself. For this reason Mrs. Bolton does not feel that something is left unfinished. Although she is unable to continue her life with her husband, she struggles to complete the journey by herself. In this way she does not objectify by the past memories of his deceased husband and she could define herself as subject independent of its object. However for Connie this is not the same, she could not even rejuvenate the one in hand therefore she needs fresh blood to continue existing. For the time being she is living by the “dead words” and “dead ideas” of Clifford (98).

Mrs. Bolton plays an important role for both Connie and Clifford and they assign different meaning to her presence. For Clifford, his relation with Mrs. Bolton is like that mother and son yet he looks down on her in order to foreshadow that he is the master and she is the servant. However, Mrs. Bolton is not troubled by his commanding behaviours rather she tries to adapt herself to the situation. Connie has never been able to endure it, yet she can never manifest it, as theirs is not master-slave relation though Clifford tries to bring up to that level. Interestingly, though Clifford hesitates to be nursed by a woman at first, he seems to be rather content as Mrs. Bolton fulfils his demands and obeys him without objection. This is mainly because they do not share an emotional bond and in addition Mrs. Bolton easily discovers how to play with the child inside him. For this reason, Mrs. Bolton appears to him quite agreeable. The relationship between Mrs. Bolton and Clifford reveals what Clifford expects of Connie; unquestioned obedience. In addition all these, Mrs. Bolton's presence has revealed another existential necessity for both Clifford and Connie in terms of identity formation. Within this regard, as we have mentioned before, Sartre suggests that consciousness cannot be comprehended if it is not detached from its object. This means that man is not actually what he is but what he is not. This is because “consciousness cannot become an object to itself” and it is impossible to internalize the object that you reflect (Blackham, 2002: 111). In this sense we may argue that as Clifford insists on his object, that is Sir Clifford, he cannot fashion an authentic identity, he commodifies his subject by imitating the ancestral reality. In order to form an identity that can unchain itself from the object through which it is reflected man must renounce all the inorganic connections and

negate his object. Lawrence hints through his relation with Mrs. Bolton that Clifford can attain some sort of ontological serenity when he negates his lordship title although he is not purely aware of it. In addition she awakens in Clifford the desire to gain success and wealth again. In this way he also realizes that his life is fading away with Connie. Connie realizes this long before Clifford but the energy to move again shows itself almost at the same time. Now Clifford is not the ghostly owner of the factory, he often visits the pit and meets with his engineers and tries to find another field in order to earn much more money and reputation. He discovers that art makes his condition worse as it can no longer feed “publicity instinct” “to become known” (Lawrence, 1968: 19).

As for Connie, Mrs. Bolton’s presence gives Connie some free personal time to build up her own world again. However, she cannot leave Clifford any time, at least she must be present at routine occasions like five o’clock tea and supper, or she must host people as Lady Chatterley. However, now she can spend much of her time in the woods and she deals with almost nothing at home for now she has Mrs. Bolton.

And Connie felt herself released, in another world, she felt she breathed differently. But still she was afraid of how many of her roots, perhaps mortal ones, were tangled with Clifford's. Yet still, she breathed freer, a new phase was going to begin in her life. (87)

Day by day the emotional gap between Clifford and Connie grows. The real nature within themselves cannot flourish together as they belong to different worlds. For this reason we may further argue that with Mrs. Bolton’s presence she realizes that she is torn between two identities, between Connie and Lady Chatterley. Mrs. Bolton’s coming is the start of Connie’s regeneration and identity formation process. As she wanders around the wood she realizes that life is going on. She sees the flowers blossoming and making their way inside the living earth. She takes some of them with her to remind herself that the life goes on, the sun shines and the wind blows. Beyond all these she gets to know that there is still hope for her regeneration. The organic admiration in Connie accelerates her identity formation.

To these rituals we must return: or we must evolve them to suit our needs. For the truth is, we are perishing for lack of fulfilment of our greater needs, we are cut off from the greatest sources of our inward nourishment and renewal, sources which flow eternally in the universe. Vitality, the human race is dying. It is like a great uprooted tree, with its roots in the air. We must plant ourselves again in the universe (Lawrence, 1973: 330)

Lawrence is highly critical of that man has been disconnected from his nature which can only cultivate his body and soul. Yet “it's man that poisons the universe” (Lawrence, 1968: 97). The artificial earth he lives in and the artificial fertilizer which feeds on his soul is not a remedy for his existence. For this reason Connie needs to find an organic soil to “plant [herself] again in the universe” as Lawrence suggests. In this sense, Connie’s revitalization process starts in the woods which Lawrence describes in the novel as “the joy of life” that “preserve[s] the tenderness” (97- 127).

On one day, upon Mrs. Bolton’s suggestion Connie goes out to see the daffodils blossoming behind Mellors cottage. She sits behind the cottage musing by the “powerful”, “alive” and “erect” daffodil (90). She does not mean to come across with him yet she sees the game keeper naked in his “solitary aloneness”, “like an animal that works alone, but also brooding, like a soul that recoils away” (92- 93).

It was the stillness, and the timeless sort of patience, in a man impatient and passionate, that touched Connie's womb. She saw it in his bent head, the quick, quiet hands, the crouching of his slender, sensitive loins; something patient and withdrawn. She felt his experience had been deeper and wider than her own; much deeper and wider, and perhaps more deadly. And this relieved her of herself; she felt almost irresponsible (93).

Having noticed his naked body Connie assumes herself “weak and utterly forlorn” who tries to survive outside the life itself (101). The liveliness in the wood, which Mellors possesses as well, arouses the half-dead passion inside Connie. The game-keeper has built up a secluded habitat where he can preserve his privacy. Now his territory is discovered by a woman, which actually irritates him because he himself as well is the wounded man because of his failed marriage. He appears to be an outsider obviously denying “any further close human contact” and therefore “he dread[s] her will, her female will, and her modern female insistency” (93). However,

though they are not aware of that yet, they share something in common that is the desire to make up a life without any social interference. The scene in which Connie asks for the key stands for her desire to release herself from her ontological dilemma. Each has been searching for their salvation in love and sex and for this reason they cannot help having each other on the next encounter. She lets herself go “with a queer obedience” as if she were in a dream (123).

She lay quite still, in a sort of sleep, in a sort of dream. Then she quivered as she felt his hand groping softly, yet with queer thwarted clumsiness among her clothing. Yet the hand knew, too, how to unclthe her where it wanted. He drew down the thin silk sheath, slowly, carefully, right down and over her feet. Then with a quiver of exquisite pleasure he touched the warm soft body, and touched her navel for a moment in a kiss. And he had to come in to her at once, to enter the peace on earth of her soft, quiescent body. It was the moment of pure peace for him, the entry into the body of the woman. (123)

However Connie is not fully conscious of what she has done for she cannot believe that it is real. “Her tormented modern-woman's brain” does not let her reveal herself as subject and perceive the other as subject because “for millions of years” she has been a “burden to herself” and she cannot relieve of it all of her own objectification suddenly (124). This is because one cannot possess the full knowledge of himself when another consciousness is involved because he cannot control “he” in the other. It is suggested that the reason for one’s inability to possess full knowledge of himself when he encounters with another consciousness is because one lets his consciousness be limited by the other one. For this reason she is semiconscious and “the orgasm [is] his” and “she could strive for no more” (123).

As for Mellors he feels that his struggle to fashion his own life without any social or ideological obligation is doubled when Connie comes into his life. In addition he hesitates to be with her for he cannot help thinking how he will cope with “the rest of things” and society if their relation becomes known. Now the man who closes all his doors on life should keep this demi-vierge untouched woman away from the social degeneration. This is the price for “the tenderness of the woman” (126).

It was not woman's fault, nor even love's fault, nor the fault of sex. The fault lay

there, out there, in those evil electric lights and diabolical rattlings of engines. There, in the world of the mechanical greedy, greedy mechanism and mechanised greed, sparkling with lights and gushing hot metal and roaring with traffic, there lay the vast evil thing, ready to destroy whatever did not conform. Soon it would destroy the wood, and the bluebells would spring no more. All vulnerable things must perish under the rolling and running of iron. (126)

In this artificial earth they try to make their own living without any intrusion. In each encounter Connie questions her being and tries to integrate with Mellors. However Mellors is not like the men she is used to, he is highly unconventional and critical of social demands. Mellors is presented as the untamed lion of the wood contrary to Clifford the tamed lion of public circus. On the other hand Mellors chooses to be the wild animal rather than being a ridiculed circus lion. This is real pride, the real human dignity. He wants to keep, Connie and himself away from that circus. He wishes to preserve the wilderness, that tender wilderness which makes him a real existing human being. Therefore he rejects everything and everybody belonging that circus. Now he is ready to integrate himself with her at the expense of fighting with the society that he hides himself for years.

He thought with infinite tenderness of the woman. Poor forlorn thing, she was nicer than she knew, and oh! So much too nice for the tough lot she was in contact with. Poor thing, she too had some of the vulnerability of the wild hyacinths, she wasn't all tough rubber-goods and platinum, like the modern girl. And they would do her in! As sure as life, they would do her in, as they do in all naturally tender life. Tender! Somewhere she was tender, tender with a tenderness of the growing hyacinths, something that has gone out of the celluloid women of today. But he would protect her with his heart for a little while. For a little while, before the insentient iron world and the Mammon of mechanised greed did them both in, her as well as him. (126)

After Connie returns from the trip she also realizes that the modern life in Europe is not different from the one they live in Wragby. She is aware that it is false humanity and no one seems to possess any individual quality despite the shiny world they live in. There she discovers the “mechanical sensuality” of “millions of meaningless legs prancing meaninglessly” without any warm touch and she realizes how she is weary of such “conservative” limiting manners (276). As for Mellors, he is sick of every modern today attitude for he believes that the modern love affairs are nothing but a simulacrum. Women run after a good reputable surname to have an

elegant and prestigious life, and men run after success and economic triumph to attract those women. Therefore Mellors rejects not only the life they lead but also their manners. For this reason we may argue that he feels that “mouth kisses” are for such artificial relations and therefore he refrains from kissing Connie on the lips. He does not want to love Connie like the way modern men love women. He draws his own way for love and sensuality and perhaps this is what attracts Connie. For him society is hypocritical and some sort of justification institute which takes and adapts every inorganic feelings and desires, and then presents it as if it is human reality. In the novel Clifford and Connie’s father exemplify such corrupt understanding with their approval of adultery as long as the decency is maintained. “What Sir Malcolm [cannot] bear, is the scandal of his daughter's having an intrigue with a gamekeeper. He [does] not mind the intrigue: he mind[s] the scandal” (305). As for Clifford, “a man of her own class he [does] not mind (136). Both Sir Malcolm and Clifford are only interested in sustaining the patriarchal order. For this reason they do not perceive adultery as free individual act, rather they care for its function; continuation of the offspring.

I want my wife, and I see no reason for letting her go. If she likes to bear a child under my roof, she is welcome, and the child is welcome: provided that the decency and order of life is preserved. (321)

Clifford cannot grasp that she has enough of him and Connie does not want to be the slave of the “cold spirit of vanity, that [has] no warm human contact” because “a woman has to live her life, or live to repent not having lived it” (75- 76). As for Sir Malcolm, he does not even notice what kind of life she longs for. He thinks that there is no point in “feeling entangled with the other man” because “emotions” can change”, yet “Wragby still stands” (297). He suggests that she should warrant her existence by childbearing. However, as Alastair Hannay suggests with reference to Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegelian philosophy that objective thought does not provoke individual mind but disciplines it and therefore man adapts himself to those what historical, national or familial codes. In this way he imitates their truth by internalizing the ways that his predecessors follow.

Objectively understood, there is result enough everywhere, but no decisive result anywhere, which is quite as it should be, just because decision lies in subjectivity, essentially in passion, and maxime¹³ in the infinitely interested, personal passion for one's eternal happiness (Kierkegaard, 2009:30).

In this sense, in Wragby Hall Connie is unable to attain self-knowledge that results from personal contemplation; she can find nothing as to Connie instead she is expected to embrace her predetermined identity, Lady Chatterley. On the other hand Clifford's and Sir Malcolm's "scientific tendency to objectify the phenomena" that is Connie's having sexual affair and a baby indicates that they exemplify Kierkegaardian "speculative philosopher" (179). However Connie needs "subjective thinker" who could help her sustain her being as "speculative seriousness, make all things of a piece and so have everything finished" (62-77). In addition to that Clifford justifies himself by hiding behind moral social codes, which contradicts with Sartrean notion that there is nothing that man can take refuge in but himself. Clifford hereby cannot assume the responsibility for any of his actions as he is determined only by his function in the society and his personal truth is nothing more than a speculation of "dead words" (Lawrence, 1968: 98). This proves that patriarchy and ideologies are not for human nature and this limitation discloses itself in the feelings such as fear, shame and vanity as in the example of Clifford and Sir Malcolm.

However when Connie achieves to be a subject to herself, after a voluptuous night with Mellors, when she can be what she really is, she is able to defeat her shame and fear which have suffocated her for years. At last, she could go into depth of her existence. Now she is more courageous than ever. This happens in the Wragby Wood, the representation of free human mind unknown and unpredictable yet ready to be explored. She discovers how "shameless", how pure and untouched her existence is (267). She gets rid of all her predetermined identities and unearths the real Connie. What Wragby Hall denies, the wood embraces. Nature is the embodiment of free human life and a powerful source to liberate their existence at the same time.

In the short summer night she learnt so much. She would have thought a woman would have died of shame. Instead of which, the shame died. Shame, which is fear: the deep organic shame, the old, old physical fear which crouches in the bodily roots

of us, and can only be chased away by the sensual fire, at last it was roused up and routed by the phallic hunt of the man, and she came to the very heart of the jungle of herself. She felt, now, she had come to the real bedrock of her nature, and was essentially shameless. She was her sensual self, naked and unashamed. She felt a triumph, almost a vainglory. So! That was how it was! That was life! That was how oneself really was! There was nothing left to disguise or be ashamed of. She shared her ultimate nakedness with a man, another being. (268)

However the revelation of identities is not only the one out of an animalistic desire, it is highly spiritual. It can be argued that it is also a spiritual ejaculation through which he and Connie are united both body and mind. The novel presents the spiritual ejaculation as more important than the physical one as the ejaculation of ideas are above all pleasures for one becomes free in mind and does not have to be the object of another subject. In a way it is a manifestation of freedom. We see that the other is important in revelation of the self however it is not a reassurance but a “mediation” which incarnates in the novel with sexual intercourse. Connie and Mellors use each other’s consciousness in order to discover their existence but in this mediation, no one becomes the object of the other, as it is not an attempt to subordinate. While Clifford objectifies Connie’s consciousness, Mellors reveals the subjective consciousness in her.

I stand for the touch of bodily awareness between human beings," he said to himself, "and the touch of tenderness. And she is my mate. And it is a battle against the money, and the machine, and the insentient ideal monkeyishness of the world. And she will stand behind me there. Thank God I've got a woman! Thank God I've got a woman who is with me, and tender and aware of me. Thank God she's not a bully, nor a fool. Thank God she's a tender, aware woman." And as his seed sprang in her, his soul sprang towards her too, in the creative act that is far more than procreative. (302)

Connie is able to construct an authentic being only when she is what she is not. It seems impossible to form an authentic individuality if one does not denounce the ancestral positioning. In this sense Lawrence individualizes Connie only after she rejects what her social gender role requires. Having renounced her social identity she is able to integrate with her being. That is to say that her authentic existence comes into being when she negates Lady Chatterley and embraces Connie. In addition, she can only relieve her mind when she assumes the full responsibility of her patriarchal

rebellion. For this reason Lawrence suspends all the social and moral rules for Connie in order for her to reacquire her being. In this regard Lawrence supports what society calls adultery, but what he might call finding soul and body mate in order to portray a real modern woman who unchains her soul and as well as her body.

In juxtaposing Wragby Hall and the wood, Lawrence portrays the wood as the source for being and as a means to attain self-knowledge. For this reason both Connie and Mellors take refuge in the wood for it is the only place where they can escape from the restrictions. In the wood they mediate with nature and with each other so as to liberate their existences and to find out who they really are. In addition nature is represented as the only place where they can unite their body and soul. There in the wood they have primitive life as if to negate anything with regard to modern life. They have just one peer of things they may need, otherwise they do not possess anything but each other. Thus, there is literally nothing that should comply with any criteria other than their subjects. The emphasis on primitivism can be associated with Sartre's urge for abandoning any kind of social moral and religious establishments as to define one's being. This is because nothing can be more epideictic than man himself if his existence is in question.

Having said all these one of the most important points that we might further argue lastly in this chapter is on the revelation of identities within Sartrean existential philosophy. As Sartre points out, when one consciousness meet another consciousness, which Sartre calls "double project" it is threatened by "being exposed to the liberty of the other" (Blackham, 2002: 124). In this way if one tries to control the other's liberty on himself he inevitably perceives himself as the object of his own consciousness and therefore the two cannot reveal themselves as subjects at the same time. In addition either part can only grasp his own object and cannot manifest his subject. For this reason the other consciousness pose a danger for man's own objectification. For this reason, Sartre believes that it is not possible to be "revealed at the same time as subject and object" (123). What we argue is that Lawrence opposes Sartre's rejection of this simultaneous revelation. When Connie and Mellors have a spontaneous sex in the woods they come off at the same time which hints that

if man and woman do not intend to subjugate the other and follow the instinct, in some sort of mediation s/he can reach the other as exposing herself/himself as subject and object at the same time.

For Lawrence such mediation can be obtained by sensuality that grows out of an organic desire because only in this way one might perceive the other as subject when he/she becomes one, when the phallus meets labia. Connie realizes at the end that this is what she needs for his ontological awakening.

She knew now. At the bottom of her soul, fundamentally, she had needed this phallic hunting out, she had secretly wanted it, and she had believed that she would never get it. Now suddenly there it was, and a man was sharing her last and final nakedness, she was shameless. (Lawrence, 1968: 268)

Lawrence observes phallus as medium that has the capacity to connect consciousnesses of each other at the same time. In addition we observe that sexual awakening accompanies ontological awareness that saves her from any kind of suppressed feelings. Up to that time Connie is unable to unite her desire and act, therefore she has been in search for a medium that might possibly emancipate her body and mind. At this point Lawrence argues that “to keep a connection” man “should act according to [his] thoughts, and think according to [his] act” (1959: 84). It is understood that such mutual relation between “thought and action” should also be maintained between body and mind (84). In this sense we might argue that Laurentian urge on the unification of “thought and action” coincides with Sartrean urge that is to assume the responsibility of our actions (84). This is because taking the responsibility at the same time means that one needs to think before acting. In order to acquire awareness with regards to thinking and acting, in other words to reconcile her desire and act, as the above quotation suggests, Connie “needs” phallus which provides her with the opportunity to find peace in the primitive desire and the “shameless” expression of it (Lawrence, 1968: 187). Therefore she can eventually manifest her identity, which is now “shameless” and unrestrained, when she assumes the responsibility of her own action and turns her face to Sartre’s “virgin future (1973: 35) and by severing all the ties with the dead past “she was born: a woman” (Lawrence, 1968: 187).

CHAPTER THREE
HEADING FOR ONTOLOGICAL EMANCIPATION THROUGH
WOMEN IN LOVE

“Still,” he said, “I should like to go with you—nowhere. It would be rather wandering just to nowhere. That’s the place to get to—nowhere. One wants to wander away from the world’s somewheres, into our own nowhere (Lawrence, 1995: 315).

The main objective of this chapter will be within the light of the above quotation and therefore heading for an ontological journey through which we will try to find out the difference between reaching somewhere and nowhere in the novel with reference to Sartrean notion of consciousness. In this sense, we will also reveal how the importance of reaching the state of nothingness echoes in the novel on the way to be able to reach somewhere. Therefore, we will mediate between characters’ consciousnesses while they are in collision with each other.

We may argue that, through such ontological journey, Lawrence emphasizes the importance of self-revelation, which is revealing oneself as subject without objectification. For this reason he juxtaposes antagonistic characters in order to disclose the clash between integrated and assured beings, life and death, internally invented self-knowledge and externally acquired knowledge. Those opposing pairs are embodied in the couples Gudrun- Gerald and Ursula- Birkin. As the novel progresses we will witness their ontological processes with reference to abovementioned dichotomies.

From the very beginning of the novel the two sisters, Ursula and Gudrun are presented in an existential disturbance “confronted by a void, a terrifying chasm” while they are deliberating over marriage. (10). Gudrun has just returned home from art school in London and tries to accommodate herself to her new living. As for Ursula, she feels that she is limited by the “sordid, too-familiar place”, her home, as she perceives home as the reflection of her “obsolete” life. She lacks sense of belonging and at home she cannot integrate with her being (11). Gudrun urges “the *experience* of marriage” yet Ursula perceives marriage as “the end of experience” because she is aware of the fact that modern world has degraded the word and now it

has turned out to be nothing more than hypocritical unison (5, original italics). Marriage is presented as a social success, divorce as a social failure because society welcomes only the ones who complies with its own set of codes. For this reason, an individual perceives the other as the object of his/her social reassurance.

On their way to Crich's wedding Gudrun observes the colliers and she questions her own life, for now she is unable to name her existential condition. She feels that her life is nothing but an abstraction which complicates sensing her identity. As she is unable to establish an organic bond in life the world appears to her as "uncreated" and "hostile" that can pose danger. The presence of colliers and people below her class has always frightened her (12). Ursula is aware that her sister is disturbed by their life in Beldover yet she cannot tolerate Gudrun's "tightness" and desires "to be alone" for she needs an individual sphere where she can find an ontological serenity (13). It is not intrinsic to "the enclosure of Gudrun's presence"; it is the enclosure of the society, standards. It is not a coincidence that all Lawrence portrays the scene on the way to the wedding. The wedding scene has some much to reveal about the clash between individual and ideological existence.

Punctually at eleven o'clock, the carriages began to arrive. There was a stir in the crowd at the gate, a concentration as a carriage drove up, wedding guests were mounting up the steps and passing along the red carpet to the church. They were all gay and excited because the sun was shining. Gudrun watched them closely, with objective curiosity. She saw each one as a complete figure, like a character in a book, or a subject in a picture, or a marionette in a theatre, a finished creation. She loved to recognize their various characteristics, to place them in their true light, give them their own surroundings, and settle them for ever as they passed before her along the path to the church. She knew them, they were finished, sealed and stamped and finished with, for her. There was none that had anything unknown, unresolved, until the Criches themselves began to appear. Then her interest was piqued. Here was something not quite so preconcluded (14).

In the modern world the individual is expected to fulfil definite criteria in order to justify themselves before the society to be a part of it. In this sense the term punctuality gains great importance. To live in a modern life requires being punctual at certain occasions. It is again a collective activity that forces you to adjust yourself to the social time. In this sense the wedding ceremony has been described as a military ceremony which stresses the mechanic and unmoving relationship among individuals. Gudrun observes them as "finished" immobile characters, as Connie feels "herself "like "a figure somebody [has] read about, in whom there is nothing

beyond their social identity (Lawrence, 1995: 14; 1968: 16). Within this regard, we may argue that the society has objectified its subjects by predetermining their living. In this way the individual becomes nothing but an abstraction. Nevertheless she is described as “passive, soft-limbed and diffident” (Lawrence, 1995: 8). Therefore she can easily be guided. For the time being she is under the effect of social conventions and tries to shape her life accordingly.

The wedding part plays an important role on the development of Laurentian organic living in that it puts all the characters together thus giving us the chance to detect various points of views regarding the problem of existence. In this sense when we compare Ursula and Gudrun we find out that each exhibits different attitudes in terms of their descriptions and expectations of men. For instance, when Gudrun first mentions about Gerald in the novel she just focuses on his physical appearance and social etiquette, namely his object. What attracts her is “his clear northern flesh and his fair hair” and his “maleness” (14). She has been enchanted by Gerald’s male object.

"His totem is the wolf," she repeated to herself. "His mother is an old, unbroken wolf." And then she experienced a keen paroxysm, a transport, as if she had made some incredible discovery, known to nobody else on earth. A strange transport took possession of her, all her veins were in a paroxysm of violent sensation. "Good God ! " she exclaimed to herself, "what is this? " And then, a moment after, she was saying assuredly, "I shall know more of that man." She was tortured with desire to see him again, a nostalgia, a necessity to see him again, to make sure it was not all a mistake, that she was not deluding herself, that she really felt this strange and overwhelming sensation on his account, this knowledge of him in her essence, this powerful apprehension of him. "Am I really singled out for him in some way, is there really some pale gold, arctic light that envelopes only us two?" she asked herself. And she could not believe it, she remained in a muse, scarcely conscious of what was going on around (14-15).

In their relation they have always been attracted to the physicality of sex. For Gerald and Gudrun sexuality is a destination to be arrived at and thus after they reach the orgasm, everything finishes. However, as will be explored later, this will be the starting point for their existential journey. Lawrence depicts their sexual intercourse as something wild, submissive and vanishing in a moment. During the intercourse each maintains their own “volition”, thus they can never let themselves be and surrender themselves to animalistic release (42). For this reason their sensuality is not uniting but separative.

He had come for vindication. She let him hold her in his arms, clasp her close against him. He found in her an infinite relief. Into her he poured all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he was whole again. It was wonderful, marvellous, it was a miracle. This was the ever recurrent miracle of his life, at the knowledge of which he was lost in an ecstasy of relief and wonder. And she, subject, received him as a vessel filled with his bitter potion of death. She had no power at this crisis to resist. The terrible frictional violence of death filled her, and she received it in an ecstasy of subjection, in throes of acute, violent sensation (344).

As for Hermione, she only desires to touch Birkin's body, to feel the warmth of his maleness. She does not care much about his subject, which actually Birkin cannot reveal her on account of her objectifying disclosure, but his body for her desires need to be reassured by the touch of his flesh. She is after what is mortal and at the same time certain about him and therefore there remains nothing to explore as to his possibility. On the other hand Ursula's first impression about Birkin is his mysterious personality and his unconditioned behaviours. Upon seeing him, Ursula desires to discover his existence for she is aware of the fact that there is something beyond him, beyond his reflection.

She wanted to know him more. She had spoken with him once or twice, but only in his official capacity as inspector. She thought he seemed to acknowledge some kinship between her and him, a natural, tacit understanding, a using of the same language. But there had been no time for the understanding to develop. And something kept her from him, as well as attracted her to him. There was certain hostility, a hidden ultimate reserve in him, cold and inaccessible. Yet she wanted to know him (20).

Having said all these, when we observe those three women's reaction upon encountering a male consciousness, it is possible to claim that Gudrun and Hermione have an interest in the dead consciousness of their men because what they adore is the idealized one and functional one. They feel that they have discovered everything about men's being or they think that the function of their bodies will satisfy their souls. They yearn for possessing their men both body and soul however this desire eventually transmutes all into object, by suppressing their subject.

However, Ursula is aware that Birkin has something mysterious. She sees the unseen and the mysterious existence inherent and shrouded in his apparent masculinity. In addition she sees the inhuman, the genderless essence that whispers her soul. What awakens her excitement is that his existence appears to her as

“indiscoverable”. That to uncover him, the possibility to see what lies behind the apparent he is the deepest temptation she has ever felt. He is her “future to be fashioned, a virgin future that awaits” her (Sartre, 1973: 35).

Strange, he was. Even as he went into the lighted, public place he remained dark and magic, the living silence seemed the body of reality in him, subtle, potent, indiscoverable (319).

Birkin feels that his existence is trapped when he is with Hermione. While his physical absence tortures her, on Birkin’s side her presence is torture for him. Birkin has some criteria to perceive or to be willing to perceive the other’s existence. He thinks that “to exist” is something beyond a physical occupation in the world. His division among people is not between races but essences. For this reason he considers that the majority of the people “don’t exist” for their existence does not possess individual significance. (Lawrence, 1995: 25) Within this regard, Birkin detests Hermione for she does not only limit his consciousness but also presents herself as someone having impulsive behaviours. Her mind is “imprisoned within a limited, false set of concepts” (41).

'Spontaneous!' he cried. 'You and spontaneity! You, the most deliberate thing that ever walked or crawled! You'd be verily deliberately spontaneous—that's you. Because you want to have everything in your own volition, your deliberate voluntary consciousness. You want it all in that loathsome little skull of yours that ought to be cracked like a nut. For you'll be the same till it is cracked, like an insect in its skin. If one cracked your skull perhaps one might get a spontaneous, passionate woman out of you, with real sensuality. As it is, what you want is pornography—looking at yourself in mirrors, watching your naked animal actions in mirrors, so that you can have it all in your consciousness, make it all mental.'(43)

The relationship with the other has two dimensions. The first one is to try to subdue the other’s liberty by turning the other into an object. This is because when one becomes aware of other consciousness he feels that he needs to control the other-him/he in the other consciousness. On the other hand love and the sensual desire cannot be boiled down to an animalistic desire, a temporal relief or lust. The reason is that it is not the flesh that is united but the souls. Body cannot feel anything in the absence of the soul. It is our soul giving the meaning, and it is our essence giving the meaning to existence. Losing his essence, man becomes nothing but a living dead.

Within this regard, Hermione's sensuality is quite controlled and manipulative and it contradicts with Lawrence's urge on organic sensuality. On the other hand, Hermione's excessive "deliberate" will limits Birkin's consciousness and thus he cannot reveal himself as subject (43).

The *pour-soi*, being related to the other in this way either as subject or as object, tries to escape becoming an object to the other, strives to assimilate the other or to make the other the object, engages in love or hate. In love, it is the liberty of the other that I want to assimilate or to possess as liberty; for it is the liberty of the other that separates the other from me and constitutes me an object revealing my outside to the other. In loving, I demand that the one I love shall exist solely to choose me as an object, and thus be the origin of my existence for another: it is this alone that gives me an existence not merely *de facto* (*de trop*) but *de jure*, willed by the entire liberty of another, whose existence I will with my own liberty. If I can possess the will of another to whom I am an object, an essence, without infringing its liberty, I become my own foundation and justification. (Blackham, 2002: 121)

In order to expand on the relation between characters it might be necessary to analyse them in terms of their social and individual identity. Birkin is represented as a young intelligent man who revolts against every possible social habit on behalf of fashioning himself an unrestrained organic life. He feels that he does not belong to social order where the servants are forced to serve while other high class members get the utmost enjoyment out of "toasting" (30). He estranges himself from the rest and discovers the void, the vain effort that drags them into nothingness. He dislikes the mankind, the massive mankind as they are homogenized. It is the end, it the starting point where the humankind ceases to exist. Cities suffocate Birkin as they do not give any individual sphere where one can behave as he wishes. For example in a city you cannot lose yourself in the infinite greenery, you cannot go where the road takes you. You need to follow the route. Everywhere is a destination; you need to arrive at somewhere. You need to arrive at work, school or home. Your destination is not spontaneous. It is pre-determined; which way to go, where to go. Life flows independently from the individual. It has its own rules so it ignores the individual. Either you become a part of it or you are dismissed. Everything acts massively like a horde. Therefore the individuals in cities are charmed by the resplendent magic easily. The lights, the modern civilization absorb the individual. No one is significant singly, masses are of high importance. In this sense they are damned as they are

deracinated. It is not living but acting. In this atmosphere Birkin is “muted, unreal, his presence left out. “ (62)

'Standard—no. I hate standards. But they're necessary for the common ruck. Anybody who is anything can just be himself and do as he likes.' 'But what do you mean by being himself?' said Gerald. 'Is that an aphorism or a cliché?' 'I mean just doing what you want to do. I think it was perfect good form in Laura to bolt from Lupton to the church door. It was almost a masterpiece in good form. It's the hardest thing in the world to act spontaneously on one's impulses—and it's the only really gentlemanly thing to do—provided you're fit to do it.' (32)

He thinks that standards of any kind are established in order to homogenize the society, or to establish an order in the society. The poor individual is bound to live a limited life drawn by boundaries if he needs to justify himself before the society. He is dehumanized by the absoluteness of the standards and his identity vanishes. Birkin represents Kierkegaardian subjectivism in that he thinks that knowledge must be the result of personal contemplation. In this sense, it can be said that it is impossible for an individual to come to his own conclusions if knowledge or consciousness is something to be taught. The ideology avoids individual consciousness as it may arouse questions; it may find the gaps within the system. Therefore it needs to construct its own “simulacra of people” (127). In order not to be objectified and abstracted by the society Birkin finds it essential to be able “to act spontaneously” on an “impulse” for it is the only thing, the free individual choice, that can save man from being an object (32). However such knowledge can be acquired with action and questioning, otherwise the significance of human consciousness loses its importance. In this way, through Birkin, Lawrence rejects man’s mechanization in body and soul by urging to act upon self-generated drives. If man achieves this, he might be able to discover his real nature and integrate with his being. In this sense this is what Birkin desires.

He believed in sex marriage. But beyond this, he wanted a further conjunction, where man had being and woman had being, two pure beings, each constituting the freedom of the other, balancing each other like two poles of one force, like two angels, or two demons (199).

He wants to be lost in the nothingness and denies everything and everywhere belonging to this world. Most of the people accepts the world that is given to them,

and think that there could be no other worlds. However Birkin believes that if you exert effort you can create your own free world. As the concept of love is vulgarized, Birkin does not want to name what he feels with traditional descriptions, as it is beyond those old descriptions. He needs to prescribe by himself. In order to achieve this he would like to penetrate into deeper level of his essence as he believes that “there is a beyond” in him “which is further than love, beyond the scope, as stars are beyond the scope of vision, some of them” (146).

'There's the whole difference in the world,' he said, 'between the actual sensual being, and the vicious mental-deliberate profligacy our lot goes in for. In our night-time, there's always the electricity switched on, we watch ourselves, we get it all in the head, really. You've got to lapse out before you can know what sensual reality is, lapse into unknowingness, and give up your volition. You've got to do it. You've got to learn not-to-be, before you can come into being (44)

We may further argue that Birkin believes that, as Sartre does, he needs to negate himself first and reach to the realm of nothingness by unchaining his being from all external identities in order to find reach some sort of knowledge about himself. In this sense Lawrence holds opinion with Sartre regarding free existence. In addition to all these Birkin expands Sartre's notion that for man there is not any sort of justification for man is “[c]ondemned, because he did not create himself, yet nevertheless at liberty and from the moment that h is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does” (Sartre: 1973: 34). Though man is not accountable to his creation he is left alone with his own judgment to decide on his actions and its consequences. In this process it is understood that God needs man for he “cannot do without man” yet man does not need God for maintaining his existence (Lawrence, 1995: 478). Within this regard Birkin is looking for another spontaneous consciousness that will share his own “unknowingness”. Birkin is left without excused and is in anguish thus he needs an intermediary between his anguish and consciousness. He finds it in Ursula.

'There is,' he said, in a voice of pure abstraction; 'a final me which is stark and impersonal and beyond responsibility. So there is a final you. And it is there I would want to meet you—not in the emotional, loving plane—but there beyond, where there is no speech and no terms of agreement. There we are two stark, unknown

beings, two utterly strange creatures, I would want to approach you, and you me. And there could be no obligation, because there is no standard for action there, because no understanding has been reaped from that plane. It is quite inhuman,—so there can be no calling to book, in any form whatsoever—because one is outside the pale of all that is accepted, and nothing known applies. One can only follow the impulse, taking that which lies in front, and responsible for nothing, asked for nothing, giving nothing, only each taking according to the primal desire.’(155)

Birkin would like to find out the invisible she that is beyond any worldly sight. For, it comes into sight in the darkness where the world fades from the scene, when the world sinks into a deep sleep. In addition, it is when that mysterious arrangement comes into sight and lightens the unknown. That mystical vision in the invisibility is worth the whole world, even death. The unknown comes into being when everything dies.

She had her desire of him, she touched, she received the maximums of unspeakable communication in touch, dark, subtle, positively silent, a magnificent gift and give again, a perfect acceptance and yielding, a mystery, the reality of that which can never be known, vital, sensual reality that can never be transmuted into mind content, but remains outside, living body of darkness and silence and subtlety, the mystic body of reality. She had her desire fulfilled, he had his desire fulfilled. For she was to him what he was to her, the immemorial magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness (320).

By “unspeakable communication” Lawrence mediates between two consciousnesses. We observe the communication between the souls when words are alien to every language or every word uttered on earth. A unique language, an unsurpassed discourse are renewed in each submerge and that can only be revealed in darkness. A secret communication that goes beyond the flesh, beyond any simple animalistic desire and that deep feeling dehumanizes them in the darkness of their existence. It is a journey through the darkest road ever taken, a road that can only be enlightened with light of the souls. It is the deepest fraction under the guise of unification, the ability to separate your soul and your existence from your flesh. It is to be able to discover the pure existence through the unification of souls, and in this journey you are neither man nor woman, you are sexless, loveless in order to reach the nothingness first and then to find something about your real self. Thus, you get rid of every possible burden or etiquette that the society, religion or morality hold

you responsible for. You become nothing. It is beyond any sense, even beyond love and sex. For, no earthly word or definition is enough to fill the meaning in this infinite concept. It is for this very reason that Birkin is unable to accept the traditional love, marriage and sex. Love pales beside that unknown, illimitable world of emotions. To reach nothingness before coming to the knowledge of yourself and therefore it is like a death for Birkin, leaving this world. He wants his soul and hers to be resurrected in the unknown. It is highly inhuman and unearthly. He revolts against earthly existence if this is what is offered. And these are the results of a questioning mind, a mind that works differently from the common, finished people. He is longing for something that does not have an ending, immortal and unfinalizable in its essence and that can overreach him. As for Ursula, she is no longer the vulnerable creature easily depressed with her life, for now she has Birkin with whom she can metamorphose into nothingness.

Does the body correspond so immediately with the spirit?' she asked herself. And she knew, with the clarity of ultimate knowledge, that the body is only one of the manifestations of the spirit, the transmutation of the integral spirit is the transmutation of the physical body as well. Unless I set my will, unless I absolve myself from the rhythm of life, fix myself and remain static, cut off from living, absolved within my own will. But better die than live mechanically a life that is a repetition of repetitions. To die is to move on with the invisible. To die is also a joy, a joy of submitting to that which is greater than the known, namely, the pure unknown. That is a joy. But to live mechanized and cut off within the motion of the will, to live as an entity absolved from the unknown, that is shameful and ignominious. There is no ignominy in death. There is complete ignominy in an unreplenished, mechanized life. Life indeed may be ignominious, shameful to the soul. But death is never a shame. Death itself, like the illimitable space, is beyond our sullyng. (192)

Ursula feels that it is a kind of transcendental submerging into their souls. One needs another being in this mystical journey. It may be because two intimate souls might enlighten each other and might be each other's compass in the journey. Birkin needs someone whom he knows that shares the same enthusiasm with him. The presence of such a person gives him confidence on the way to the unknown. In order to dare this journey he needs to cast off all his identities and former beings in order to develop an existence that solely belongs to him. It is not only a revolt against social identities but also a revolt against God and his so-called holy creation.

Therefore, at last he declares himself as God of his unknown primitive world.

Primitiveness can be interpreted as reaching the core of his real self. In a primitive life he gets rid of all his titles and identities and therefore what matters is not his social rank, not the handsome clothes he wears, not the perfect speeches he makes before the crowds but his naked self, naked in both body and soul. Birkin finds peace in the embracing arms of the nature “through the mediation of” Ursula (Sartre, 2001: 45). He does not need to hide his real essence or pretend. He just mediates with his other and this is “but a being torn to pieces between two negations” and reaching his and her “somewheres” (Blackham, 2002, 119; Lawrence, 1995: 315).

CONCLUSION

The present dissertation has attempted to focus on the ontological dichotomies inherent in D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover and Women in Love. To that end we have tried to evaluate existentialism which hereby proposed as a theoretical remedy for the characters' self-questioning and ontological agony.

Within this regard in the first chapter we have discussed the relevant notions in existential philosophy that coincides with Laurentian understanding of an individual life. Therefore, first of all, we have laid bare the conflict between subjectivity and objectivity, subjective thinker and speculative philosopher with reference to Kierkegaardian existentialism and then we have discussed Sartrean notion of *pour-soi* and *en-soi*, consciousness, anguish, abandonment, free choice (Kierkegaard, 2009: 179- 62; Sartre, 2001: 13; 1973: 34-39). We have also discussed that there is not any individual significance without personal commitment as man is fully responsible for what he does and in this sense he is utterly alone because there is nobody or nothing that could justify his actions. For this very reason we have emphasized that an individual should detach himself from all the objects that define his existence because those definitions are "the simulacrum of [his] reality" (Lawrence, 1968: 16). We have also added that in order to "overcome the prejudice that the human being is primarily a theoretical knower" man must reject the objective treatment that tries to subjugate his consciousness (Michelman, 2008:205).

In the second chapter we have analysed the problem of existence and search for individual identity in Lady Chatterley's Lover with reference to existentialist philosophy. In this sense, Lawrence has presented us a tale of adultery which reveals social, moral and cultural truths regarding existence, life-death, marriage, love and sex in post-war England. However, Lawrence emphasizes that sexual desires, for men and women, are quite natural, yet the expression of such organic desire by a woman is perceived to be highly unconventional. For this very reason he portrays a modern woman whose womanhood is destined to remain untouched unless she revolts against subjugation of her sexuality. In order for his heroine to unearth her

sexuality, Lawrence portrays both physically and spiritually impotent anti-hero. For her existential and sexual salvation he suspends moral codes, as well. At the end, we have revealed that only by assuming the full responsibility of her actions and renewing herself with the tenderness of touch and phallic awareness she could exist (Lawrence, 1973: 364). In this sense we have presented two anarchist lovers who do not hesitate exploring each other's body. Therefore we have stressed the importance of physical and spiritual ejaculation in the process of identity formation.

We have maintained the same point of view in the third chapter to reveal the importance of organic, sensual and transcendental love which, Lawrence suggests, can be acquired "through mediation of other" (Sartre, 2001: 45). For this reason the novel has problematized the inorganic, mechanic and unmoving relationships among the society which eventually automates feelings and responses. In this sense, we exemplified two couples, Gudrun-Gerald and Birkin-Ursula, in order to disclose how the inorganic tendency towards one's existence turns him/her in to an object and the power of metaphysical power of sensuality in subjectifying the individual. In parallel with this purpose we have emphasized the importance of other serving as a mediator between consciousnesses and unearthed how an individual can work out for one's ontological salvation through transcendental sensuality.

Finally, in the light of existentialism we have identified the inorganic moral, social and cultural ideas on existence, marriage, love and sex in the modern society. In this sense the two novels have disclosed "the taboos inherent in our culture" (Lawrence, 1959: 84). Lawrence criticizes society for it "give[s] to a word only those mental and imaginative reactions which belong to the mind, and saves us from violent and indiscriminate physical reactions which may wreck social decency (84). For this reason in the novels we have observed that characters are in between their desire and social duty. However we have also pointed out that men and women should unite "word and deed" by which he means that they "should act according to [their] thoughts" (Lawrence, 1959: 84). Lawrence observes that people act without thinking or think without acting. The disunion between "thought" and "act" should be renounced in order to be conscious of what we think and act (84). Thus, to obtain

some sort of awareness with regards to “word and deed” he “want[s] men and women to be able to think sex, fully, completely, honestly, and cleanly” (85). Such awareness inevitably brings responsibility for what is acted, which coincides with Sartrean urge that is to assume the full responsibility of our deeds. Within this regard Lawrence has presented characters that could not ease their existential agony in a conventional society. Having revealed those inclinations, we have advanced our claim on the restoration of those subjugated terms in accordance with existentialism and Laurentian understanding of sensual organic life.

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