Problems and Epistemological Confusion of Postmodern Relativism

Abstract

For postmodern relativism, the claim that scientific knowledge discovers reality is unfounded. This is because what constitutes knowledge can only be said under certain frameworks, such as a particular point of reference, power relation or language game. Moreover, such frameworks cannot be said to offer the essential criterion of knowledge or to be comparable to alternative frameworks. Accordingly, there are no universal set of standards. What constitutes knowledge, then is relative. This approach, widely adopted by postmoderns, is problematic in two respects: First, it presents a theory that undermines itself. Assuming the theory to be true leaves the theory itself without foundation. The second problem with such an understanding of knowledge is that it is confused about the issues of epistemology and types of knowledge. This article aims to show that the postmodern view cannot escape from the fundamental impasse of relativism and that postmodern arguments are in epistemological confusion.