Deep Disagreements, Rational Attitudes, and Epistemic Respect

Abstract

Disagreements are an inevitable consequence of human nature. Thoughts, beliefs, and preferences vary from person to person. However, some disagreements are deep-seated, and it is common for people involved in such disagreements to resist reconciliation. But can we say that the parties in such disagreements are rational? This question has been one of the important debates in epistemology in recent years. This study argues that it is not rational for the parties to continue their disagreement in cases of deep disagreement. To substantiate this claim, we first critically examine the views that argue that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Those who argue that deep disagreements are unresolvable explain this by the factors that make them deep. However, the study argues that the depth of the disagreement does not prevent the parties from adopting rational attitudes. This is because the depth of the disagreement also legitimizes a strong doubt the nature of the disagreement. Respecting opposing views is possible only by understanding the epistemic role of this doubt.